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Religious Advisement: Impact of Religion on
Military Operations and Strategic Implications

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Through the centuries, religion, religious beliefs, and ideologies held a prominent place in history and impacted billions of people. The core tenets of the faith of a people significantly influenced whether a country would experience peace, war, or other types of conflicts. Today religion and religious ideologies still affect our nation's military operations and foreign affairs, with religious advisement a related Department of Defense (DoD) requirement. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 1304.19 requires military chaplains to "serve as the principal advisors to Commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations."¹

This paper examines the impact of religion on military operations, with special attention to the role of religious advisement and the related issues of adversary empowerment and effective national strategy. This paper argues for the criticality of Chaplain religious advisement against the backdrop of the human domain and religiously motivated violent extremism. It provides research on religious advisement to Commanders by senior Chaplains to evaluate their effectiveness at influencing both the operational environment and national strategy, with special attention to implementing the new Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission. It reviews available assets to improve religious advisement, to include the U.S. Army Center for World Religions (CWR). Finally, this paper offer recommendations for how religious advisement can contribute to winning the current battle of ideas against religiously motivated violent extremism and building effective U.S. national strategy.

Policy and Doctrine

DoD policy directs that Chaplains from the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces advise and assist Commanders in the discharge of their command responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion.² Chaplains assist Commanders in managing religious affairs and “serve as the principal advisors to commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations.”³

Countries where U.S. Armed Forces operate usually comprise a religiously diverse population. In preparing for operations, military Commanders assess the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).⁴ The Army uses six categories to further develop an understanding of civil considerations: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events (ASCOPE).⁵ Religion and religious ideology are usually key parts of understanding the civil considerations, especially relating to the dynamics of belief systems, sociology, and the culture of the people.

The U.S. Marines illustrate the importance of understanding culture by conducting a cultural analysis of respective operational environments. Cultural analysis implies having appropriate knowledge and understanding of the complex cultural factors of territory, religion, identity, politics, language, and economics (T.R.I.P.L.E.).⁶ The knowledge of culture and how culture shapes a response to conflict, especially during times of war, and the ability to analyze and act on the information in a timely manner contribute greatly to the success of a military operation.⁷

The operational environment is complex and consists of many interrelated variables and sub-variables. The interaction of multiple entities and conditions makes

clarity difficult in the operational environment. The complex interactions ensure that no two operational environments will ever be the same.⁸ It is essential that Commanders continue to assess and reassess their operational environments⁹ to include religious beliefs and ideologies that affect their mission.

Effective Commanders usually seek to learn the dynamics of belief systems, cultural and civil considerations impacting both the operational and strategic objectives. Religion and religious ideology are integral elements of understanding the human domain of cultural and civil considerations.

Regarding recent wars, insurgencies, and world events, an understanding of religion, particularly Islamist religious fundamentalism, helps explain why violent extremism is increasing.¹⁰ The 9/11 Commission Report recommends avoiding generic terms to describe the enemy because vagueness blurs strategy.¹¹ The Commission Report itself states that a catastrophic threat is posed by Islamist terrorism, especially the al-Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.¹² Current jihadist ideology is a hybrid of Islamic religious fundamentalism mixed with totalitarianism, which leads to an oppressive, violent, and volatile environment.

The 9/11 Commission Report expresses that Islam is not the enemy.¹³ The majority of Muslims are gracious and peaceful people. Most Muslims oppose violence and do not want to force Islam onto other countries. A majority of Muslims do not practice violent jihad but seek alternate means to achieve Islamic universalization. However, radical Muslims are willing to use violence as they embrace totalitarian ideology, which includes the objective to eventually place the world under Islam.¹⁴

Why Do We Need Religious Advise ment?

Religion, politics, and security are increasingly intertwined in many of the conflicts raging around the world, especially in what confronts the United States in Afghanistan or other related Islamic countries.¹⁵ The Middle East and Africa are awash with waves of violent extremism fueled by a totalitarian version of Islamist religious ideology. Christians and other religious citizens, as well as fellow Muslims, are being executed in Pakistan and similar Islam-centric countries.¹⁶ Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Kenya, and several other countries in the region are experiencing religiously motivated violence through terrorism or insurgency.¹⁷

Egypt–U.S. relations are in turmoil because the Egyptian military removed President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power.¹⁸ Hamas is engaging in both political and terrorist activity from Palestinian and Syrian territories.¹⁹ Recently, the Iranian leadership displayed positive signs that they might take the U.S. and the international community’s concerns seriously; however, Iran may still be secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and they often display a hostile attitude toward the United States.²⁰ Furthermore, Syria stands divided by a bloody civil war and is infiltrated by terrorists.²¹

Indeed, the threats in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) remain high and significantly impact United States military operations overseas. With the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing, the murders at Fort Hood on November 5, 2009, and other terrorist attempts and attacks in recent years, the U.S. can ill afford to let its guard down in homeland defense.²²

Religious extremism and violence is on the rise and getting worse.²³ James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, states, “Looking back over my more than half a century in intelligence, I have not experienced a time when we have been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.”²⁴ A new study by the Pew Research Center reveals that the number of countries with a high or very high level of social hostilities involving religion reached a six-year peak in 2012.²⁵

Sadly, the future forecast on these issues is not much brighter. Knox Thames, the Director of Policy and Research, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), predicts that the world can anticipate increasing pressure and violence against Christians in the Middle East and continued attacks on religious minorities globally. Elections may spur violence against the religious “other” while religiously-inspired violence and terrorism will probably increase. Repressive laws restricting religious practice will most likely continue to proliferate as well. On a positive note, Thames believes global interest in religious freedom should grow in the midst of the turmoil.²⁶ With the demonstrated role religion plays in the world regarding culture, politics, conflicts, and wars, the need for professional religious advisement is clear.²⁷

Impact of Religion on Military Operations and Human Domain

In their 2013 “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills” white paper, General Raymond T. Odierno, General James F. Amos, and Admiral William H. McRaven argue for the importance of winning wars in both the operational and strategic level environments, but, even more, they argue the importance of winning the contest of wills, on which ultimate success rests. The white paper contends that the United States

should not enter into war or conflict if the effort amounts to little more than destroying or capturing the enemy's troops, equipment, or resources.²⁸

In the white paper, these top tier leaders assert that weapon systems alone are not enough to win wars. They challenge contemporary strategic modeling to consider why U.S. Armed Forces are so successful tactically and operationally but not always able to achieve strategic success.²⁹ General Odierno stated, "We went to war without understanding human domain or dimension" in Iraq and Afghanistan and "I don't want to make that mistake again."³⁰ Ultimate success in war is attained by winning the contest of wills, and the battle between those wills takes place in the human domain.

The U.S. Army is recognizing the need to understand the human domain in war and is taking a strong look at adding a new war-fighting function in 2014 based on the human domain. General Robert Cone, the Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), stated, "We are pushing hard to add a seventh war-fighting function."³¹ Learning the religious dimensions of the people within a country of national interest is a key part of understanding the human domain function and assists our military and government officials with strategic objectives.

Strategic Implications on National Security and International Affairs

Understanding the human domain requires understanding religion and religious ideology, especially in countries where religion is an integral part of society. John Lenczowski, the Founder and President of The Institute of World Politics, stated the U.S. foreign policy culture the past few decades has tended to either deal with religion superficially or pretend that religious diplomacy did not exist.³²

Other professionals indicate that part of the reason for the lack of religious diplomacy is due to a history in the United States of promoting religious liberty and not interfering in the religious affairs of its citizens or judging individuals on the basis of their faith.³³ However, this commendable impulse to keep the government out of personal religious affairs has led the U.S. government toward a dangerous outcome of failing to engage in the battle of ideas with violent extremists internationally; which increases the staying power of the adversary on the battlefield.³⁴

Leading terrorism experts explain that terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) are losing most of the battles operationally but succeeding strategically. The strategic ideological battle is more important to terrorist groups than individual physical battles because it is easier to defeat Islamic terrorists than to defeat their religious ideology, which empowers the continued fight.³⁵

The U.S. must understand that the ideological battlespace is more important than the physical battlespace. As long as the jihadists can recruit new militants with ideology, they can compensate for the losses they suffer on the physical battlefield. When jihadists ultimately lose that ability on the strategic battlefield, their struggle will die on the vine³⁶ because the center of gravity (COG) for terrorists is their ideology.³⁷ A definition of COG is “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”³⁸

The United States’ military achieves significant operational success due to the efforts and sacrifices of brave men and women serving our country, but the United States is still struggling to find long-term strategic victory in both Iraq and Afghanistan.³⁹

This ongoing struggle is the result, at least in part, of failing to address the human domain and religious ideology of the enemy.

For long-term operational and strategic success, it is essential for senior level Commanders and political leaders to understand and address the potential impact of religion on military operations, national security, and international affairs. The author respectfully recommends that Commanders at all levels recognize the strategic and operational importance of understanding religion, religious ideology, and culture as they affect the human domain in the operational environment and, more importantly, the strategic battlefield. There is a variety of resources and assets available to help provide Commanders with vital information to find success in this endeavor.

Religious Advisement Resource for Commanders

An integral resource to the Commander and staff is the unit's Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant. The Army calls this team a Unit Ministry Team (UMT), while joint doctrine calls it a Religious Support Team (RST). The UMT/RST may provide relevant and timely internal and external religious advisement to the Commander in both garrison and operational environments.

Throughout U.S. history, chaplains have supported commanders by advising them on the relationship between religious-support operations and civil-military operations (CMO).⁴⁰ I envision a tremendous partnership between the Commander, the Commander's Staff and the UMT/RST in the operational environment. A Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant who integrate themselves into the staff and fully participate in the planning processes are able to provide RA and produce valuable products that enable the Commander to make the best possible decisions.

It is essential for the UMT/RST to build rapport, trust and credibility with the Commander and staff. Leaders often look for sources of advisement they can trust. In terms of RA this means military leaders want their UMT/RST to provide objective and accurate religious advisement on a consistent basis to help the command understand the problems they face and to find the best possible solutions.⁴¹ Timely and credible religious advisement is a vital resource for the Commander and can significantly impact the mission. Effective RA at the operational level may also have strategic implications.

A premier example of RA that had both an operational and strategic impact was the coordination of the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress (IIRC), held June 12-13, 2007 in Baghdad. Army Chaplain (COL) Michael Hoyt, was the Command Chaplain for Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) and served under General David Petraeus in 2007. The RA provided to General Petraeus by CH Hoyt was instrumental in helping facilitate the creation and conduct of the IIRC.⁴²

The IIRC brought together more than 55 representatives of the most influential clerics and religious dignitaries from Iraq. The IIRC had the largest representation of faith groups in Iraq at a religious conference in 37 years. Delegates to the IIRC were selected by the country's various faith groups to include people with national-level influence. It was encouraged by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as a way to potentially slow the spread of bloodshed in the country and ultimately became an Iraqi-led event.⁴³

Representatives of Shiite clerics Ali al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr attended the IIRC, as did delegates from the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars. Other notables included the Iraqi minister of human rights, an advisor to Maliki, and 11 members of the

Iraqi Council of Representatives. Together they forged a resolution that could be characterized as “the first broad-based religious accord to support and recognize the legitimacy of the government of Iraq.”⁴⁴

The delegates rejected terrorism, sectarian violence and their agreement was the first to publicly renounce al Qaeda by name. The council publicly declared that the spread of arms and unauthorized weapons was viewed as a criminal act in Iraq. It was Iraq’s first religious accord that provided a way ahead for a committed public action by religious leaders to denounce violence, deny terrorism, demonstrate support for democratic principles and the constitution, and to display national unity.⁴⁵ The IIRC had the potential to be a pivotal watershed event to promote peace and stability. This and many other excellent examples by UMTs/RSTs over the years illustrate the importance and potential impact of RA to military Commanders.

The religious advisement capability UMTs offer also provides essential benefits as the Army forges ahead with the new RAF mission.⁴⁶ In order for the UMT to be successful in a RAF religious advising responsibility, chaplaincy personnel need to prepare and effectively interact with State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, Non-government Organizations (NGOs), religious and faith-based groups, as well as indigenous religious leaders in the RAF area of operations (AO).⁴⁷

Several Senior U.S. Chaplains’ Thoughts and Recommendations

Several senior military Chaplains responded to a survey asking several questions regarding religious advisement, which included whether there are, or should be, any

applications for religious advisement specific to the implementation of Regionally Aligned Forces missions.⁴⁸

U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) Staff Chaplain

The ARNG Staff Chaplain believes that many active duty and reserve component chaplains have excellent experience in these areas. For example, the U.S. National Guard has sixty-five State Partnerships with foreign countries. The National Guard Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) Command Chaplains regularly interact with religious leaders and other military Chaplains from these countries and advise their U.S. Commanders about the roles these leaders exercise in their respective countries.⁴⁹

The ARNG Staff Chaplain suggests that JFHQ and senior Chaplains performing religious advisement in a RAF mission need to be well-read in their assigned area and have access to a comprehensive database of world religious leaders, both in the continental United States and overseas. He said there is a need for more religion subject matter experts (SMEs) to lean on for guidance in working with foreign religious leaders and understanding the role of religion in a variety of operational environments.⁵⁰

U.S. Joint Staff Chaplain

The U.S. Joint Staff Chaplain acknowledges the RAF mission relevance and sees a potential career track where Chaplains, especially those selected by the Chief of Chaplains Office for training in world religions, continue to gain a broader appreciation for the major faiths of the world and focus on a particular region of the world and its religious expressions. These Chaplains can align with and potentially receive assignments to matching RAF units, giving them real-world experience in that region

and allowing them to hone in their expertise and provide products to deal with the religious issues of that respective RAF's operating environment.⁵¹

The Joint Staff Chaplain has direct access to the Chairman of the Joint Staff for Title 10 pastoral care and advisement. The Joint RST primarily provides advisement indirectly to the Joint Staff leadership through the various directorates of the Joint Staff, whose work intersects with religious affairs issues.⁵² This work requires Joint Staff Chaplains Office personnel to consider the second and third order effects of strategic actions and policy decisions at President of the United States (POTUS), Congressional, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) levels to try to determine what impact—relevant to religious affairs—those actions and decisions may have on the Armed Forces.⁵³

The Joint Staff Chaplain also advises Combatant Command (COCOM) Chaplains and, as appropriate, members of the Service Chiefs of Chaplains and the Executive Director of the Armed Forces Chaplain Board about joint religious affairs issues. Of the fourteen responsibilities for the Joint Chaplains office listed in Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, only one deals with providing pastoral care to the Joint Staff; the rest are primarily advisement responsibilities.⁵⁴

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Chaplain

The CENTCOM Chaplain, a Navy Captain, sees RAF as implying joint religious advisement applications. The Chaplain asserts that this is currently an Army issue and hopes that the implementation of the RAF mission does not occur in a vacuum because it should be done in conjunction with the other U.S. military services to achieve the best possible results.⁵⁵

The CENTCOM RST members perform religious advisement by participating in planning teams, boards, cells, and other planning venues. Team members prepare appropriate annexes to plans and orders and, in specific cases, personally advise senior leadership about concerns or issues that have specific applications.⁵⁶ The breadth and scope of the planning at a COCOM is significant. CENTCOM deals with twenty countries, many of which are in a state of crisis, conflict, or agitation.⁵⁷

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Chaplain

The USEUCOM Chaplain, an Army Colonel, strongly recommends that military Chaplains provide religious advisement as part of the new RAF mission. He suggests the need for intentionality regarding what the issues are in each theater of operation and the establishment of systems to capture theater-level issues and information in a central learning database that is easily accessible by all appropriate assets at every level.⁵⁸

The USEUCOM Chaplain recommends that the Joint Staff Chaplain provide a training package for incoming COCOM Chaplains from all the U.S. Armed Forces. He further suggests that the Joint Staff Chaplain have regular VTCs with all COCOM Chaplains to discuss various issues that may be faced in each theater of operation, to strengthen Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Chaplain staff integration with COCOM Chaplains.⁵⁹

The senior Chaplain at USEUCOM recommends that the CWR develop a direct support relationship with all of the COCOM Chaplains. His recommendation includes making the CWR a Joint Center. He asserts that it is a natural mission for the center and is an invaluable asset to provide religious advisement across all components.⁶⁰

U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (USACAPOC) Command Chaplain

The USACAPOC Command Chaplain provides an excellent example of partnering with the CWR to train Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants. Working together, the CWR and the Simulation Center at U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) developed a training course in external religious advisement, which is mandatory for all USACAPOC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants to attend. In a December 2013 training iteration, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) UMTs attended the training as well. In the future, the USACAPOC UMT hopes to open the training for other units and command UMTs/RSTs.⁶¹

An important part of their USACAPOC UMT training is a multi-day, scenario-driven exercise. Their latest UMT training workshop at Fort Bragg exposed the attendees to information and dialogue on almost every one of the religious traditions they might encounter in the Army or on operations. Their unit is entering a period of experimentation by sending UMT members to support relatively small (20-30 PAX) G9 cells at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) exercises.⁶² This type of cooperation among the service components is essential and helps set the religious advisement mission up for success.

First Army Deputy Command Chaplain

The First Army Deputy Command Chaplain provides religious advisement by consistently reaching out to clergy and other religious leaders in the Rock Island, Illinois, area to foster goodwill and community relations. The UMT provides religious

advisement at First Army through direct contact with the Commander and a variety of work-related processes.⁶³

The Deputy Command Chaplain's most recent operational experience was serving as the First Corps Strategic Religious Advisor. At First Corps, he provided religious advisement to the command and Command Chaplain through weekly fusion boards, participating in Commander's update briefs, serving as a strategic planner in the operations section (J3-5/9 Long Range Planning), and providing weekly briefs to United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) headquarters (HQ).⁶⁴

Summary of Senior U.S. Chaplains' Thoughts and Recommendations

The Chaplains discussed above provided insightful feedback; military leaders should consider their respective thoughts and recommendations. The examples of these Chaplains reinforce why UMT/RST members need to embrace the religious advisement mission. Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants must properly prepare in order to provide this capability, especially while serving in high-level military organizations or in a joint environment. As mentioned, the CWR is an excellent resource and provides assistance and training to UMT members on active duty and in the reserve components.

The U.S. Army Center for World Religions (CWR)

The CWR was originally founded in 2008 under the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The center offers resources for learning cultural behaviors and norms based on regional religious practices and beliefs. The CWR helps UMTs provide essential religious advisement to their respective Commanders and staffs in support of military operations. UMT members learn to provide information analysis and

understanding at a basic level in order to help U.S. forces avoid potentially disastrous misunderstandings between American Soldiers and religious adherents worldwide.⁶⁵

The CWR, co-located with the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, is a significant resource for information regarding world religions and is a valuable asset for key knowledge and reach-back capability for religious advisement to Commanders and UMTs in the growing RAF responsibility. The CWR team of three has the capability to educate, equip, and encourage Unit Ministry Teams to effectively advise their Commanders on how religion impacts military operations.⁶⁶

The CWR's mission is to provide U.S. Army Commanders with sound advice on the impact of religion on military operations. The CWR helps operationalize the strategic requirement to nest religious support and advisement at the unit level through UMTs. Religious advisement focuses internally on the religious and spiritual needs of the unit's own Soldiers and Family members, but it must also focus externally. The CWR is a key resource in expanding Army Chaplain skills to better comprehend, analyze, and evaluate how the religious factors of indigenous people in the operational environment affect military operations.⁶⁷

The CWR has potential to be a key resource in the RAF mission as well. The CWR Director proactively reaches out to ASCC Chaplains by hosting monthly teleconferences to share information and discuss key issues, including religious advisement. The CWR staff members firmly believe that sound religious advisement is essential for Commanders and provides significant operational and strategic benefits.⁶⁸

Suggestions for Unit Ministry Team Members and Commanders

For the way ahead, it is clear from all available analysis that U.S. Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants have an undeniable mandate to properly prepare, train, and engage in this critical religious advisement (RA) mission. The author respectfully recommends the following: UMT members must invest due diligence to learn religious advisement because it takes years of progressive assignments, personal experience, and individual, collective, and professional training in order to provide effective religious support and advisement at senior levels and/or on a joint staff. UMT members should embrace the religious advisement capability and realize that it is the primary responsibility and expectation at the more senior levels of military service.⁶⁹

Second, there is a variety of resources and training materials that can help further prepare UMTs, Commanders, and others interested in learning more about religious advisement. For example, the CWR is a tremendous resource and is available to the Army for consultation, advice, training opportunities, and reach-back capability for understanding world religions. There are also excellent military publications and resources available to assist.⁷⁰

Third, Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants should seek to serve in operational positions in Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Units and/or Joint Task Forces that have a robust religious advisement mission. RSTs in the other services may desire to model the same concept. Chaplaincy personnel should enroll in as many Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) courses as possible in order to understand the joint world and joint operations. To learn the nuances of how other services operate and what is unique about their

methodologies and techniques for religious advisement, Chaplaincy personnel should seek as much exposure as possible from sister service Chaplains and enlisted personnel working in advisement missions.⁷¹

Summary Analysis

Overall, the research indicates that RSTs/UMTs provide professional religious advisement that is well received by military Commanders and their staff. Many senior level Commanders evidence a deep understanding of the impact of religion on military operations. Great success and gains occurred in the past decade with the effective use of religious advisement and Soldier leader engagements at the operational level in the military.

Through the professional work of our U.S. ambassadors and diplomats, in combination with military and other governmental agencies, tremendous efforts and meaningful attempts were made to foster peace and goodwill in the Middle East, Africa, and in other parts of the world. In spite of these courageous and noble efforts, these actions have not ultimately translated into a fully effective national-level policy and strategy.

Strategic Level Gaps

General Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army, asked the U.S. Army War College Fellows to use their studies and research to help identify significant gaps at the strategic level. As part of an overall possible solution for the way ahead, two key issues were identified regarding religion and religious advisement: first, the U.S. does not appear to be successfully engaging in the battle of ideas or religious diplomacy with the

Muslim world. Second, our government is not implementing an effective national strategy that adequately addresses jihadist ideology to help prevent and counter religious violent extremism.

The U.S. faces a world of unprecedented complexity; that theme is a common narrative in American foreign policy and national security establishments. The “forces of globalization, rising non-state actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before.”⁷²

The Battle of Ideas and National Strategy

1. Religious advisement and the battle of ideas

Sebastian L. Gorka, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism expert at the National Defense University, expresses that Osama Bin Laden may be dead, but his core radical religious ideology of global revolution is very much alive and continues to grow in popularity.⁷³ He illustrates that the U.S. military proved the ability in the last twelve years to kinetically engage the enemy at the operational and tactical levels with unsurpassed effectiveness. However, the United States has barely begun to take the war to al-Qaeda at the strategic level of counter-ideology.⁷⁴ Gorka emphasizes that to be effective, our government leaders must overcome the well-intentioned but misguided belief that the religious character of the enemy’s ideology should not be discussed or addressed.⁷⁵ He believes the United States needs to “bankrupt transnational jihadist terrorism at its most powerful point: its ideology and narrative of global religious war.”⁷⁶

Other reputable professionals also recommend that civilized governments place emphasis on the ideological and transnational nature of jihadist organizations like

AQAM.⁷⁷ The U.S. government needs to successfully engage in the battle of religious ideology and counter the destructive jihadi narrative because, in the Muslim world, where violent, terroristic-leaning Islamism is on the rise, attacks and persecution are intensifying and spreading.⁷⁸ Regrettably, the crisis of violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims is largely ignored by the mainstream media.⁷⁹ In fact, “the assault on religious freedom is one of the most important trends in the world today, yet it remains under-reported and even ignored by most secular media outlets.”⁸⁰ The USCIRF depicts the correlation between totalitarian religious ideology, persecution, and the loss of religious liberty.⁸¹

Islamic extremists use their religion for inspiration, motivation, fundraising, and recruitment. They are effective at using propaganda to gain support for their religious ideology and strategic objectives. Jihadists have either found support or avoided the condemnation of many Muslims around the world. Pew Research analysis reveals that a significant number of Muslims either support terrorism, refuse to condemn it, or believe it is acceptable to use violence to remove non-Muslim influences from their country.⁸² Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton testified before Congress and stated, “We are losing the war of ideas because we are not in the arena the way we were in the Cold War.”⁸³ Christopher Harmon, Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, said, “The greatest American deficit in contemporary counterterrorism work is our failed performance in the war of ideas.”⁸⁴

For the U.S. to eventually win the battle of wills against Islamic terrorists, the author respectfully recommends the following: That U.S. leadership seek unbiased professional religious advisement and strategically engage in the battle of religious

ideology. In order to counter the Islamists' effective use of propaganda and recruitment, the United States should continue to seek to understand the enemy's religious, ideological, and strategic objectives, and then develop a robust Information Operations (IO) campaign to expose jihadist violence and help paint the ideological narrative.⁸⁵

The media should provide objective facts on these issues to help counter harmful violent extremist propaganda because there is no actual freedom of the press in a totalitarian country, fundamentalist theocracy or hybrid theocracy.⁸⁶ The American government should use its elements of national power in measured ways to address humanitarian issues, violent extremism, and oppression of religious liberties. Internationally, to protect liberties and reduce loss of life, the community of nations should recognize, document, and prosecute religiously motivated brutality and human rights violations.⁸⁷

2. Religious advisement and effective national strategy

President Barack Obama stated, "We also remember that religious liberty is not just an American right; it is a universal human right to be protected here at home and across the globe. This freedom is an essential part of human dignity, and without it our world cannot know lasting peace."⁸⁸

Knox Thames illustrates that effective national strategy must protect religious liberty and take into accurate account the religious beliefs and ideology of countries and enemy forces threatening U.S. national security.⁸⁹ Expert strategists depict the logic of implementing a national policy and strategy that realistically assesses the enemy and the threats they pose under various circumstances.⁹⁰ U.S. policy and strategy should not be shaped by political correctness or avoidance of objectively discussing religion.

Avoidance policies result in strategic futility, unnecessary extension of the length of war, and frustration of the personnel defending the nation.⁹¹

Sebastian Gorka explains that jihadists have a long-term strategy based upon their religious ideology and have been following through on their plan for decades, both inside and outside of Muslim lands.⁹² Research by Martin Rudner reveals that al-Qaeda is in the midst of executing a twenty-year strategy with five distinct phases. Phase 1 began with the attacks on September 11, 2001, and Phase 5 is scheduled for 2020 with the proposed establishment of a global caliphate.⁹³ Al-Qaeda appears to be in its Phase 3 operation, which is bringing down apostate Muslim regimes.⁹⁴

Many professionals have expertly examined the foundational beliefs and have conducted critical analysis of the religious ideology of the terrorists who fight in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of the world. But their collective knowledge, analysis, religious advisement, and recommendations did not translate into the implementation of an effective national policy or strategy by the U.S. to help prevent or reduce religious violent extremism.

Counterterrorism experts recommend that an effective strategy should identify the measurable goals that jihadists and other groups in their movement use to define victory and then deny them success.⁹⁵ The national strategy should also challenge jihadists regarding their claims to authenticity and legitimacy as they attempt to justify their actions in Islam.⁹⁶ The U.S. strategy should include effective diplomacy to discredit jihadists and bolster democratic alternatives.⁹⁷

The U.S strategy should counter the long-term strategy and goals of Islamic violent extremists. Government leadership should seek advice from professional civilian

and military Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), senior level military Commanders, and Chaplains who understand jihadist threat doctrine, ideology, religion, and its impact on military operations and strategic implications.

Military and civilian SMEs can bring a clearer understanding of radical Islamic ideology and contribute toward effective strategy development. However, according to Patrick Sookhdeo, the Director of the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, the U.S. needs to proceed with caution and avoid hiring or consulting with people who are biased toward radical Islamist ideology. He explains that some Western governments have unwittingly courted Islamists whom they thought were moderates and ended up making the situation worse regarding national policy or strategy.⁹⁸

John Lenczowski suggests a comprehensive national strategy should contain the use of both soft and hard national diplomatic statecraft, diplomacy, and resources, similar to what the United States accomplished in “Project Truth” when engaging the Soviet Union.⁹⁹ Part of Project Truth required exposing communist ideology as totalitarian and harmful. The negative light shown on the Soviet ideology contributed to ending the Cold War. Likewise, jihadi ideology and those who support violent extremism should be clearly identified and exposed as harmful to the rest of the world.

If civilized governments fail to address jihadi ideology or strategy, the result is capitulation of the strategic battlefield to religious violent extremists. It is imperative for the U.S. to seek professional religious advisement and develop a national strategy that comprehensively protects our nation from AQAM and prevails over their jihadist ideology. An effective strategy is achievable by understanding the core tenets of faith, religion, and ideology on both the operational and strategic battlefields.¹⁰⁰

Closing Comments

In the midst of an incredibly complex world, positive signs of religious advisement impacting operational success and strategic development can be found in the professional work of our senior military leaders and religious support teams serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. In addition, U.S. diplomats, ambassadors, and agencies consistently work hard to help foster peace and religious liberty. The U.S. Department of State's recent opening of the new Office of Faith-based Community Initiatives is an encouraging development as well.¹⁰¹

The United States should implement a national grand-strategy that effectively addresses radical jihadi ideology, helps prevent and counter violent extremism, and protects vital U.S. national interests. Professional and reliable religious advisement can enhance understanding to help ensure a successful, culturally relevant, and effective U.S. national grand-strategy development and implementation.

There is no silver bullet to fix religious violent extremism, but in order to elevate the opportunity for peace, the U.S. must engage in the battle of ideas and help shape a positive narrative regarding religious ideology, freedom, liberty, and democracy. As discussed, the United States and other like-minded nations need to effectively counter the global jihadist ideology at the strategic level if there is going to be an end to the seemingly endless violence, wars, and loss of national treasure.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive number 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 11, 2004), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130419p.pdf> (accessed December 16, 2013).

²U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2013), Chapter 1, para. 1-2; Chapter 2, para. 1-2.

³U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive number 1304.19, para. 4.1. See also U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Update, Volume 9, Issue 1, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 13, 2014), 1-2. The significant change in the new version of JP 1-05 is a more in-depth discussion of the chaplain's religious advisement role with the Commander and the impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in the operational area (OA). It also clarifies guidance for chaplains as they conduct religious affairs across the range of military operations, including defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and detainee operations, as well as updating the guidance regarding chaplain functions and their noncombatant status.

⁴U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADRP 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 16, 2012), para. 1-10, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf (accessed December 17th, 2013).

⁵U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 21, 2009), para. 1-8.

⁶P. J. Otis, Marine Corps University, Command and General Staff College student handout on Cultural and Interagency Operations, Part 1, Lesson: 4101-12, para. 1 b., August 16, 2011. Note: Religion gives or contributes meaning to the aspects mentioned as well as relationships, social mores, justice, life, death, and honoring the dead. Religion can influence what a society values materially and economically. It has the ability to affect politics and who is chosen as leader for a group of people of a nation. Religion contributes to communication and language through Holy Scriptures, music, art, and dress. In addition, para. 1b(b). Religion has a tendency to help codify the values in a society to include morality and ethics, marriage, family values, and cultural behaviors. Religion influences both ideology and cultural power.

⁷*Ibid.*, para. 1b.

⁸U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADRP 3-0, para. 1-5 and 1-41.

⁹*Ibid.*, para. 1-7.

¹⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2, 1-3. Religious fundamentalism is defined as a belief in the infallibility of Holy Scriptures, absolute religious authority, and strict adherence to a set of basic religious principles without any compromise with modern life. As nation-states struggle to provide for their people, some of the dissatisfied population, as a backlash against globalization, will turn to religious fundamentalism

to provide those needs that the nation-state cannot. Note: This is a primary insurgent ideology, and is further discussed in Chapter 2 of Field Manuel 3-24.2, para 1-11.

¹¹National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2014). 362.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³9/11 Commission Report, 363.

¹⁴Alexander R. Alexiev, "The Wages of Extremism: Radical Islam's Threat to the West and the Muslim World," March 2011, The Hudson Institute, 4. <https://www.hudson.org/files/publications/AAlexievWagesofExtremism032011.pdf> (accessed February 26, 2014); Patrick Sookhdeo, *A Christian's Pocket Guide to Islam* (Wiltshire, England: Isaac Publishing and Christian Focus, 2010), 24; National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, September 2006, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm> (accessed February 26, 2014).

¹⁵Knox Thames, "Attaining Sustainable Security through Civic Space for Religious Actors," *Small Wars Journal*, January 5, 2012, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/attaining-sustainable-security-through-civic-space-for-religious-actors> (accessed November 15, 2013); Also via interview with Knox Thames, Director of Policy and Research, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, November 21, 2013.

¹⁶"At Least 85 Killed in Suicide Bombing at Pakistan Church," September 23, 2013, *Associated Press*, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/23/at-least-43-killed-in-suicide-bombing-pakistan-church/> (accessed September 23, 2013); and "USCIRF Condemns Church Bombings in Pakistan," September 25, 2013, *U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)*, <http://www.uscifr.gov/news-room/press-releases/4114-press-release-uscifr-condemns-church-bombings-in-pakistan-september-25-2013.html> (accessed October 15, 2013).

¹⁷Jacqueline H. Wilson, "Nairobi Mall Attack Creates Chance to Extend Constructive Response," September 30, 2013, *United States Institute of Peace*, <http://www.usip.org/olive-branch/nairobi-mall-attack-creates-chance-extend-constructive-response> (accessed October 17, 2013); Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, "Al Qaeda and the Tale of Two Battlespaces," *Security Weekly*, October 1, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081001_al_qaeda_and_tale_two_battlespaces (accessed October 17, 2013); Nathan Hodge and Margherita Stancati, "Afghan Army Deaths Hit Record as U.S. Exits," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324665604579081193199072318> (accessed November 9, 2013); and Norman Ricklefs, "What Happened to Iraq?" October 17, 2013, *The Atlantic*, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/what-happened-to-iraq/280626/> (accessed October 17, 2013); Adam Nossiter, "Islamist Militants Blamed for Deadly College Attack in Nigeria," February 25, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/world/africa/dozens-killed-in-nigeria-school-assault-attributed-to-islamist-militant-group.html> (accessed February 26, 2014).

¹⁸Maggie Fick, "Egypt–U.S. Relations in Turmoil: Egyptian Foreign Minister," October 16, 2013, *Reuters*, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/uk-egypt-usa-dUKBRE99F07420131016> (accessed October 17, 2013). Note: Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs Nabil Fahmy addresses the 68th United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, September 28, 2013.

¹⁹"Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Hamas," *National Counterterrorism Center*, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hamas.html> (accessed October 19, 2013). Note: The National Counterterrorism Center is a United States government organization responsible for national and international counterterrorism efforts. It is based in McLean, Virginia.

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²²Josh Levs and Monte Plott, "Boy, 8, one of 3 killed in bombings at Boston Marathon; scores wounded," April 18, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/15/us/boston-marathon-explosions/> (accessed February 26, 2014); Sharon Jayson, "Jury sentences Hasan to death for '09 Fort Hood massacre," August 28, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/08/28/military-jury-sentences-fort-hood-killer-hasan/2712803/> (February 26, 2014).

²³Stephanie Condon, "Al Qaeda is 'Morphing,' Not on the Run, Intel Chiefs Say," February 11, 2014, *CBS News*, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-is-morphing-not-on-the-run-intel-chiefs-say/> (accessed February 12, 2014).

²⁴James Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, "Transcript: Senate Intelligence Hearing on National Security Threats," Congressional Record, January 29, 2014, *The Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/transcript-senate-intelligence-hearing-on-national-security-threats/2014/01/29/b5913184-8912-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html (accessed February 3, 2014).

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²⁶Knox Thames, "Religion and Foreign Affairs 2014 Outlook," blog entry posted January 7, 2014, <http://thirty-years-war.blogspot.com/2014/01/religion-and-foreign-affairs-2014.html>

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²⁷U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Update, Volume 9, Issue 1, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05, 1-2, Chapter II: If the past decade of war has taught us anything, it is that military operations can have a tremendous impact on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in an OA. Chaplains, as special staff officers, are uniquely situated to advise the Commander and other staff members on moral and ethical decision making; on morale as affected by religion; and based on their particular knowledge and experience and consistent with their noncombatant status, chaplains may advise the Commander and staff on various religious and/or humanitarian dynamics within the operational area (OA).

²⁸Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Gen. James F. Amos, and Adm. William H. McRaven, *Strategic Landpower – Winning the Clash of Wills*, White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2013), 2. U.S. Training and Doctrine Command posted the White Paper, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf> (accessed February 17, 2014).

²⁹Lance M. Bacon, "Keeping Left of the Bang," December 23, 2013, issue, *The Army Times* (Springfield, VA: Gannett Government Media Corp, 2013), 16.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²John Lenczowski, *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 177.

³³Katharine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, eds., *Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism* (McLean, VA: The Westminster Institute, Isaac Publishing, 2012), 1.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Patrick Sookhdeo, *Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism*, ed. Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2011), 228.

³⁶Burton and Stewart, "Al Qaeda and the Tale of Two Battlespaces."

³⁷Sookhdeo, *Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism*, 229.

³⁸U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through December 15, 2013). Center of gravity definition: "The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See also decisive point (JP 5-0)." http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed February 5, 2014), p. 33.

³⁹Jim Michaels and Gregg Zoroya, "Veterans Feel Sting of Ramadi and Fallujah Losses," January 6, 2014, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/06/fallujah-ramadi/4344011/> (accessed January 7, 2014); and Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg, "Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts with the Taliban," February 3, 2014, *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/world/asia/karzai-has-held-secret-contacts-with-the-taliban.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0 (accessed February 4, 2014); Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "Trust Eroded, Obama Looks Beyond Karzai," February 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/world/asia/obama-keeps-options-open-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0 (accessed February 26, 2014).

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Religious Factors Analysis, GTA 41-01-005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 2008), p. 24.

⁴¹Chaplain (LTC) Timothy K. Bedsole, First Army Deputy Command Chaplain, First Army, survey provided to author November 4, 2013. Note: Link to First Army Chaplain's Office web page, <http://www.first.army.mil/content.aspx?ContentID=366> (accessed January 9, 2014).

⁴²Tim Kilbride, "Conference Marks First Step Toward Inter-Faith Reconciliation in Iraq," June 24, 2007, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46528> (accessed March 25, 2014).

⁴³Ibid

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid. Also see case study: "Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress," Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Case Study Series, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

⁴⁶David Vergun, "Regionally Aligned Forces Continue to Organize Despite Budget Uncertainties," October 23, 2013, *www.Army.Mil*, <http://www.army.mil/article/113660> (accessed December 18, 2013); and Antonietta Rico, "New Training to Focus on Regionally Aligned Forces Concept," October 23, 2013, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131023/SHOWSCOUT/310230019/New-Training-Focus-Regionally-Aligned-Forces-Concept> (accessed December 18, 2013).

⁴⁷Chaplain (COL) John J. Morris, Staff Chaplain, U.S Army National Guard Bureau, interview by author, October 9, 2013. Survey provided to author, October 9, 2013. Note: Link to Army National Guard Staff Chaplain web page, <http://www.chapnet.army.mil/organization/ARNG.htm>.

⁴⁸The survey was designed by Chaplain (COL) Alan Pomaville, with assistance from Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, Joint Staff Chaplain, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, and Chaplain (COL) Jonathan Shaw, Professor of Ethics, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. The survey questions are as follows: 1. How is the requirement to provide religious advice to the Commander operationalized/performed within your command? 2. Does religious advisement play a significant part of your current responsibilities? 3. What assistance would aid Chaplains in providing religious advisement? 4. What training/experience did you receive in the advisement role before you

became a COCOM and/or Senior Level Chaplain? What training/experience do you recommend for Chaplains' religious advising at this level? 5. Do you have sufficient opportunity to provide advisement to your Commander (specifically referring to the latter part of the DODI which reads: "to serve as the principal advisors to Commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations")? Do you follow a standard Joint Staff Format? 6. What are some of your lessons learned/insights about Chaplains advising at your current level of command and how does the requirement differ at subordinate levels of command? 7. Recommendations on how to better manage or improve the process for the religious advisement mission in the Army or Joint Staff in general from a Chaplain's point of view? 8. Are there, or should there be, any specific applications for religious advisement specific to the implementation of Regionally Aligned Forces/RAF?

⁴⁹Morris, *ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹Chaplain (COL) Daniel T. Ames, Joint Staff Chaplain, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, interview by author, September 17, 2013. Survey provided to author, October 4, 2013. Note: Chaplain Ames also recommends that if chaplains are selected to be world religion RAF specialists, that they should not be single tracked in consecutive world religions positions, but assigned to other operational units in between their world religion assignments.

⁵²*Ibid.* The directorates on the Joint Staff include the J1 (personnel), J4 (logistics) including medical support, J5, and the Chairman's Action Group. Either CH Ames or one of his deputy chaplains serve on action officer working groups chaired by these directorates. Their respective religious advisement is then rolled up as religious affairs input along with the appropriate Joint Directorate's overall input. The religious advisement the Joint Staff RST provides consists of input from participation in meetings and working groups, drafting or editing formal narrative responses to Congressional inquiries or other requests for information (RFIs); and line-in/line-out input to strategies, policies, publications, or decisional bodies that have religious affairs equities.

⁵³*Ibid.* Often, requests for their input comes via the Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system, which resides on the classified communications side and which formally tasks, tracks, and coordinates staff input for final decision by the Chairman or his designated decision maker.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵CAPT. William Kennedy CHC, USN, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Chaplain, U.S. Central Command, survey provided to author, October 3, 2013.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷*Ibid.* CAPT. William Kennedy added that there can be significant service culture issues serving in a joint staff, which can complicate planning. The U.S. CENTCOM Chaplain reflected that people serving in a joint environment must be reminded to be willing to look for opportunities to provide lateral support to other units and services. The RST members consistently have feelers out to see if new planning or crisis action teams were stood up and to ensure that their staff has the appropriate clearances to participate and is adequately prepared to make good decisions.

⁵⁸Chaplain (COL) David R. Beauchamp, U.S. Army USEUCOM Chaplain, U.S. European Command, survey provided to author, October 16, 2013. Note: Link to USEUCOM Chaplain web page, <http://www.eucom.mil/organization/command-structure/chaplain>

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Chaplain (COL) Barry R. Baron, U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (USACAPOC) Command Chaplain, U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, survey provided to author October 2, 2013. Note: And Barry R. Baron and Ira C. Houck, "Religious Advising for Strategic Effect: US Army Chaplains as Change Agents," *Small Wars Journal*, May 20, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/religious-advising-for-strategic-effect-us-army-chaplains-as-change-agents> (accessed January 14, 2014).

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Chaplain (LTC) Timothy K. Bedsole, First Army Deputy Command Chaplain, First Army, survey provided to author November 4, 2013. Note: Link to First Army Chaplain's Office web page, <http://www.first.army.mil/content.aspx?ContentID=366> (accessed January 9, 2014).

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Julia Simpkins, "Taking Religion to the Battlefield," September 1, 2011, *www.Army.Mil*, http://www.army.mil/article/64721/Taking_religion_to_the_battlefield/ (accessed January 7, 2014).

⁶⁶Ibid. Note: The U.S. Army Center for World Religion (CWR) has a vested interest in helping UMTs learn how to do this type of religious advisement. In fact, the capability was deemed so important by the Army Chief of Chaplains Office that the CWR was asked to train the entire Army Chaplaincy in the subject of "Religious Advisement in Full Spectrum Operations" as one of the two mandatory training sessions during the 2011 Chaplain Annual Sustainment Training.

⁶⁷Ibid. Also refer to U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05, Chapter 1, para. 2. b. and Chapter 2, para 2. a. Note: "Religious affairs are the Commanders responsibility and consist of a combination religious support and religious advisement. Religious support addresses the Joint Commander's responsibility to support the free exercise of religion by members of the joint force...Religious advisement addresses the Commander's requirement to receive germane subject matter advice on the impact of religion on operations." *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf (accessed January 8, 2014). Also see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Update, Volume 9, Issue 1, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, JP 1-05, 1-2, Chapter II: Note: "Religious advisement is the practice of informing the commander on the impact of religion on joint operations, to include: worship, rituals, protected places, customs, and practices of US military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population; as well as the potential impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in the operational area (OA)." Religious Support (RS) consists of the

provision and facilitation of religious worship, pastoral counseling, and DOD support to accommodate the free exercise of religion for all authorized personnel; advising the commander on ethical and moral issues; and morale as affected by religion. In performing their primary duties of religious accommodation and pastoral care, chaplains may offer advice to the commander based on their unique perspective and role as religious military professionals. Chaplains and their enlisted RS personnel work together as the religious support team (RST) in designing, implementing, and executing the command's religious program.”

⁶⁸Chaplain (COL) Michael T. Lembke, Director of U.S. Army Center for World Religions, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, interview by author, November 6, 2013.

⁶⁹These recommendations are based on the survey and discussions with Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, the U.S. Joint Staff Chaplain, and from discussions with other senior level U.S. military Chaplains.

⁷⁰The following publications and references contain a wealth of information: 1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2013); 2. U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Support and External Advisement*, Army Techniques Publication 1-05.03 (Washington, DC, U.S. Department of the Army, May 2013). Or equivalent service instructions, directives, and guidance on religious advisement from the other respective U.S. Armed Forces Departments; 3. U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Factors Analysis*, Graphic Training Aid 41-01-005 (Washington, DC, January 2008); 4. U.S. Department of the Army, Quick-Series Guide, *The Religious Advisor for Unified Land Operations* (Fort Jackson, SC, 2012) published by the U.S. Army Center for World Religions, 5. U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 21, 2009).

⁷¹Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, , information via survey.

⁷²Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua A. Geltzer, and Sebastian L. v. Gorka, “The Complexity Trap,” *Parameters, The US Army's Senior Professional Journal*, Spring 2012, Vol. 42, No. 1, July 19, 2012, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2012spring/gallagher_geltzer_gorka.pdf (accessed January 27, 2014).

⁷³Sebastian L. Gorka, *Fighting the Ideological War*, 185. And U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2, para 2-51. Note: In the Al Qaeda narrative, Osama bin Laden shows himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma [Muslim community], reestablish the Caliphate, and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims.

⁷⁴Sebastian L. Gorka, “The Importance of Ideology in Special Warfare,” *INFLUENCE*, The Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC), Vol. 1, No. 3, January 2014. Official quarterly command internal newsletter of the Military Information Support Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

⁷⁶Ibid. And U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2, para 2-50. Narrative: The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is a narrative. A narrative is when a story is used to display the benefits of a certain ideology. Narratives are often central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions. Insurgent organizations use narratives and religious-based concepts very effectively in developing, spreading, and mobilizing followers.

⁷⁷Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, *Democracy and Counterterrorism, Lessons From the Past*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 582.

⁷⁸Michael Patrick Leahy, "Persecuted: The Global Assault on Christians," March 21, 2013, *Breitbart.com*, <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/03/19/Uninvited-Panel-Shed-Light-on-Human-Rights-Crisis-Ignored-by-Obama-the-Global-Persecution-of-Christians> (accessed January 11, 2014).

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Rachael Kohn, "Stories of Religious Persecution and the Silence of the Secular Media," October 10, 2013, *ABC Religion and Ethics*, <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/10/10/3866334.htm> (accessed January 11, 2014).

⁸¹United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2013 Annual Report, April 2013, <http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-and-briefs/annual-report/3988-2013-annual-report.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

⁸²Jonathan E. Shaw, *The Role of Religion in National Security Policy Since September 11, 2001* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 22-27, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1044.pdf> (accessed October 7, 2013).

⁸³Robert R. Reilly, *Fighting the Ideological War*, 149.

⁸⁴Christopher C. Harmon, *A Citizen's Guide to Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 91.

⁸⁵Angela Gendron, "Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy, Volume 2007-2," modified August 28, 2013, *Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC)*, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/tc_prsnts/2007-2-eng.asp (accessed February 13, 2014).

⁸⁶Hannah C. Murphy, "Turkey Jailing the Most Journalists," December 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/world/europe/turkey-jailing-the-most-journalists.html?ref=freedomofthepress&_r=0 (accessed February 13, 2014). And *World Press Freedom Index 2014*, <http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php> (accessed February 13, 2014).

⁸⁷"Effective mass atrocity prevention and response options (MAPRO) should happen early. The longer it takes to act, the greater the risk that mass atrocities will occur and more

people will die.” *Peace & Stability Operation Journal Online* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, December 2013), 15, http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/pubs/documents/Special_edition_journal.html (accessed January 16, 2014).

⁸⁸“International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 Executive Summary,” May 20, 2013, *IIP Digital*, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/05/20130520147638.html#axzz2qyvSVndB> (accessed January 20, 2014).

⁸⁹Thames, “Religion, Foreign Policy, and National Security.”

⁹⁰Carnes Lord, *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 197.

⁹¹AWR Hawkins, “Justice Dept. Won’t Let Federal Agents Profile Terror Suspects by Religion, Gender,” January 16, 2014, <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/16/Obama-s-DOJ-To-Bar-Federal-Agents-From-Using-Religion-To-Profile-Terror-Suspects> (accessed January 21, 2014). And “U.S. Government Purges of Law Enforcement Training Material Deemed ‘Offensive’ to Muslims,” December 17, 2013, *Judicial Watch*, <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/us-government-purges-of-law-enforcement-training-material-deemed-offensive-to-muslims> (accessed January 28, 2014). Concepts reinforced via discussions with multiple military service members and a senior level federal law enforcement officer.

⁹²Sebastian L. Gorka, professor, al-Qaeda Threat Doctrine Class, the Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC, class notes from November 13, 2013. Note: Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian author, educator, Islamic theorist, and the leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 60s. Qutb lived from 1903-1966 and wrote a famous book called *Milestones*, which encouraged Muslims to develop plans to restore a global caliphate, to include the use of offensive Jihad. Qutb’s writings and life example inspired Osama Bin Laden and still inspires many violent extremists today. Sayyid Qutb was eventually captured and executed by the Egyptian government for plotting the assassination of the Egyptian president. And Steven G. Zenishek, “Sayyid Qutb’s ‘Milestones’ and Its Impact on the Arab Spring,” *Small Wars Journal*, May 9, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sayyid-qutb%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cmilestones%E2%80%9D-and-its-impact-on-the-arab-spring> (accessed February 11, 2014). And 9/11 Commission Report, 51.

⁹³Martin Rudner, “*Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror*,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 36:12 (December 2013): 953-80, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.842136> (London, UK: Mortimer House, 2013), 959.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “*The Culture of Global Jihad: Character, Future Challenges and Recommendations*,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) (London: King’s College, October 2008), 6-7.

⁹⁶Stephen Ulph, *Fighting the Ideological War*, 48-49.

⁹⁷Harmon, *A Citizen’s Guide to Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 145.

⁹⁸Patrick Sookhdeo, *Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism*, 241; and “State Dept. Recruits Muslim Foreign Service Officers at Jihadist Conf.,” January 30, 2013, *Judicial Watch*, <http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2013/01/state-dept-recruits-muslim-foreign-service-officers-at-jihadist-conf/> (accessed November 9, 2013).

⁹⁹John Lenczowski, *Fighting the Ideological War*, 117-18.

¹⁰⁰9/11 Commission Report, 363.

¹⁰¹“Office of Faith-based Community Initiatives,” *U.S. Department of State*, <http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/> (accessed October 19, 2013).