Comments on Edward Geary Lansdale

On June 5^th, 2024, IWP hosted a one-day colloquium titled “Liaison & Legacy: Edward Geary Lansdale,” focusing on the late U.S. military intelligence officer, advisor, and expert on irregular warfare who practiced his craft in the Philippines and Vietnam. This paper was created as a part of the colloquium.

by V.L. Elliott

I did not know then MG Lansdale and, as best I can remember, I was in only one meeting that he attended (late 1967?). My role in the meeting was as a bag carrier, so there is nothing that I can add to what more knowledgeable discussants have provided.

We knew about MG Lansdale and some of his ideas and his successes in the Philippines. There was discussion of them that sometimes got into “who was first” with particular ideas and methods.  From my perspective, I don’t think that really mattered. It was not the origin of an idea or method so much as the “package.” What had the most effect on me and the people I worked with was the set of questions that appear to have come from—or through—Lansdale. In my own words at least, he was concerned with the “why” questions more than most. My impression is that he specifically was looking at “why” questions about the Vietnamese, which is a fascinating and monumentally frustrating line of reasoning. The Vietnamese are interesting and as great a challenge to understand as individuals and as they join, disperse, and re-join ad infinitum.

The reference to the “package” has to do with what some had learned elsewhere and applied or rejected for Viet-Nam.  Lansdale is properly recognized for his contributions to psychological operations and a descendant of that reasoning which I assume came from him was the large Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and some part of the training CORDS personnel received.  More immediately relevant to me was Lansdale’s recognition of the relevance of economic forces and factors which were noted long before but which he brought to the discussion of our security policies.

We were brought into WWII because of international economic factors, particularly the raw material needs of Imperial Japan in Southeast Asia and Manchuria.  Mainland China was lost due, in part, to rampant inflation, and Korea also faced that problem.  A primary function of the U.S. foreign economic assistance programs in Laos and Viet-Nam was to contain what was threatening to be a related challenge.

Stabilization in those days referred to overall economic stabilization, usually measured by changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) but anticipated by budget deficits, central bank creation of money, and U.S. spending, including troop spending on the economy.

In mid-1967, when CORDS was established on the recommendation of Robert Komer’s team, he had two NSC economists with him, and one, Charles A. Cooper, eventually took a position that combined the roles of the Embassy’s Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs with the USAID Associate Director of Program and Budget.  It was in many ways a policy counterpart to then Ambassador Komer’s role in CORDS.  I think it was, in some ways, a result of MG Lansdale’s questions and influence, but that is just my impression.

There was an unspoken link to pay ops. A part of the ideological contest with any collectivist system such as that of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoists, is to organize the economy based on market system lines. To have a market, the requirements are simply that people can enter or leave the market as they choose, and that information flows freely—which requires that it not be distorted.

A key part of my job wandering about Viet-Nam, especially in the I and II Corps regions, was to ground-proof what was being reported about market information.  Sometimes that was a bit of a trick since there really were not many reliable data sources in the country.  So, I guess MG Lansdale had an impact on my work in Viet-Nam, and the lessons I learned there have stayed with me.