Articles

An IWP professor testified as an expert witness on terrorist support networks inside the United States, before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.

The last of three IWP conferences on Intelligence Requirements for the 21st Century, dedicated to the memory of former CIA Director William J. Casey, discussed "Understanding the Enemy: Will Defense Intelligence Be Strategically Relevant?" 

If the proposition is true that society depends on peace and security, then it follows that learning, analysis, advocacy and debate on matters of this vital field ought to be priorities of all citizens, corporations, and foundations concerned about the future of our country.

The next time the United States needs the “new Europe,” we may find it has grown old. This is the likely result of a plan by the Office of Management and Budget to abolish broadcasting by Radio Free Europe and Voice of America in the languages of Central and Eastern Europe.

U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Andrew Natsios told an IWP audience about how bilateral foreign aid is now a pillar of American national security strategy.

A review of IWP faculty members’ latest books, articles, lectures, and other work.

One would not have anticipated that Solzhenitsyn’s monumental expose of the system of Soviet prisons and concentration camps, published over two decades ago, could ever be outdone.Yet Anne Applebaum’s Gulag: A History, astonishingly enough, succeeds.

Consider the Chilean revolution of that other September 11 — Sept. 11, 1973. It was less bloody than any other major 20th century revolution and, in economic and political terms it produced the best outcome. And yet, it is the most reviled of any in all the annals of Latin America.

There can be no Revolution in Military Affairs without a Revolution in Defense Intelligence. There can be no Revolution in Defense Intelligence without a Revolution in Defense Counterintelligence.

Some governments involved with proliferation might see the North Korean talks as an end in themselves. So long as we are negotiating, they hope, Washington can hardly risk killing the talks by taking any adverse actions (e.g., terminating the reactors, interdicting weapons-related shipments, identifying Pyongyang at the U.N. as an NPT violator and possibly sanctioning it there,…