Henry D. Sokolski

It is vital that would-be bombmakers be disabused of any notion that they could evade tough international sanctions. We need a country-neutral, reasonably predictable, more-or-less automatic sanction regime that puts all countries on notice, even friends of the powerful. Just as we’ve had to discard business-as-usual thinking to deal with the current worldwide health emergency;…

The State Department should use the upcoming conference as an opportunity to concentrate on its most immediate concern: closing the gap in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty system which makes possible the overly lax provision for a withdrawal and eliminating the uncertainties about the continuation of IAEA inspections. Read more at The National Interest

Over the years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has taken heavy fire both from enemies and friends, but recently there has been nothing so sharp as the criticism that Turkish President Recep Erdogan delivered September 24 in a UN General Assembly speech. It deserves much more attention than it got because it reflects a continued loss…

Space self-defense and partnership strategies are hardly getting the attention they deserve. Should dominance be our immediate space security priority? The short answer is no. Why? Doing so jeopardizes achieving the more urgent task of protecting our critical satellites. Dominance may be desirable but, for now, the United States must tackle the weightier task of…

This article appeared in Foreign Policy and was co-authored by IWP Professor Henry Sokolski, William Burr, Avner Cohen, Lars-Erik De Geer, Victor Gilinsky, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Leonard Weiss, and Christopher Wright. Forty years ago, a U.S. satellite detected the telltale signs of a nuclear explosion. An analysis of the evidence today points to a clandestine nuclear…

Washington must identify countries or regions that ought to not receive significant nuclear goods or technology, starting with the Middle East.

Congress needs to look hard at the rationale for a fast reactor program.

If the Saudi government’s prevarications about Jamal Khashoggi’s murder teach us anything, it should be that there are limits to how far the U.S. can trust Riyadh.

You would think we would have learned from a half-century of experience with civil-nuclear relations that nothing is more important than the character of the country we are dealing with.

The White House knows that any denuclearization agreement with Pyongyang must assure North Korea ends its enrichment and reprocessing activities.