American Exceptionalism: Implications for Strategic Communication

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All nations seem exceptional to themselves, some perhaps more than others, but the United States of America, having achieved the status of sole superpower, wins the gold. Yet America’s Exceptionalism does not refer to its unique success; this imprecise and wildly misunderstood term has come to imply a spectrum of alleged and imagined motivating factors, ranging from unparalleled acquisitiveness fueling messianic militarism to a kind of ideological colonialism on steroids, euphemistically camouflaged as spreading democracy. What most irks those who accuse America of Exceptionalism is what they take to be an air of blatant self-righteousness as it assumes the role of self-appointed global savior, when in fact, they charge, the US is merely pursuing its own grubby self-interest just like everybody else—only more so. If there is anything really “Exceptional” about Americans, charge its critics, it is the sanctification of greed by any other name.

Boston University Professor Andrew J. Bacevich, for example, writes in his latest book, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism: “From the outset, Americans evinced a compulsion to acquire territory and expand their commercial reach abroad... As the methods employed varied, so too did the rationales offered to justify action. We touted our states as God’s new Chosen People, erecting a ‘city upon a hill’ destined to illuminate the world.” Bacevich finds support from one of the most astute observers of American character, Charles-Henri Clerel (better known as Alexis) de Tocqueville, who, after visiting the colonies for the first time in 1831–1832 with his friend Gustave de Beaumont, gave the world a remarkably accurate and sympathetic picture of the New World in what became the wildly popular Democracy in America. Bacevich points out that Tocqueville had “noted the ‘feverish ardor’ of its citizens to accumulate” (p.17). Yet what had actually impressed the Frenchman far more, and quite favorably indeed, was the new nation’s participatory civil society, widespread self-government, and optimism. Tocqueville understood that the citizens of the New World were not merely feverishly passionate about accumulation; they were also arduously energetic and egalitarian, though admittedly with a propensity for conformism
that did not bode well for high culture. His assessment of American Exceptionalism was nuanced though definitely positive.

Nuance is necessary to grapple with so complex and frankly paradoxical a creed. The late Seymour Martin Lipset’s *American Exceptionalism*, which argued that American values are complex to the point of paradox, was aptly subtitled *A Double-Edged Sword*. “The American Creed,” wrote Lipset, “fosters a high sense of personal responsibility, independent initiative, and voluntarism as it also encourages self-serving behavior, atomism, and a disregard for communal good.” This highly diverse society finds room for both patriotism and opposition to war, greed and philanthropy, cynicism and idealism. What makes the US unique is a deeply rooted conviction that both individuals and nations can pull themselves up by their bootstraps, and a deep-seated optimism, as if the nation’s fate were guided by some Invisible Hand, which anyone with a modicum of reason can fathom.

The author of that concept, Scottish economist Adam Smith, had acknowledged in his celebrated book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations* (and the far less famous *Theory of Moral Sentiments*), that every man pursues his own interests. He nevertheless defended everyone’s right to do just that, arguing the superiority of free markets over mercantilism from both a prudential and a moral perspective. It is impossible to understand America’s self-conception without appreciating this liberal intellectual basis at the essence of its founding. The settlers had indeed been “chosen”—but they had chosen themselves, and were about to pursue their interests in a new way, as their Declaration of Independence would so eloquently capture.

The birth of the Declaration in the same year as *The Wealth of Nations*, *annus mirabilis* 1776, was symbolic. Most inhabitants of the New World—certainly the Founding Fathers—put their trust in the Invisible Hand whose mysterious wisdom they believed would bring prosperity to all mankind, and in particular to their own newly settled lands. President George Washington captured that national faith in his first inaugural address, delivered on April 30, 1789: “No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the US....[May] the preeminence of free government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens and command the respect of the world [since] there is no truth more thoroughly established than that there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness.” Although “American Exceptionalism” had yet to be coined by academicians, the first president had thus defined its meaning.

It had seemed self-evident to the impatiently self-assured Americans that free markets guaranteed not only prosperity and happiness but also world peace and
liberty—the ideal society where men could pursue their individual interests for the common good. Why couldn’t other nations realize the plainly visible benefits of letting the Invisible Hand play Its cards? And why didn’t they also recognize the universal advantages of trading with America? John Adams, who would soon succeed Washington, was especially upset by the slowness of the European courts to establish commercial relations with the US. He was convinced that it was the system of free exchange of goods between nations that constituted America’s most critical, certainly most profitable, message to the world.

So, too, did most of his colleagues, notably the ever-frugal world-renowned inventor Benjamin Franklin and his friend Silas Deane: “Tyranny is so generally established in the rest of the world, that the prospect of an asylum in America for those who love liberty, gives general joy, and our cause is esteemed the cause of all mankind.... We are fighting for the dignity and happiness of human nature. Glorious is it for the Americans to be called by Providence to this post of honor.” The messianic passion of the newly self-chosen people for liberty, joy, and dignity was inseparable from their devotion to free trade. America’s abundance of raw materials along with the colonists’ industrious energy should easily explain the self-righteous aggressiveness and quasi-religious commercial zeal of its new citizens, eager to buy and sell far and wide.4

Almost a century earlier, before Adam Smith, John Locke had easily succeeded in convincing educated Americans that life, liberty, and property comprised an indissoluble trinity he identified by one word: “estate.” Locke had declared the right to equal freedom to be God-given, unquestionable, prior to the establishment of worldly civil society both temporally and theoretically.5 Not in his wildest dreams could Locke have imagined that his ingenious thought-experiment, the theoretical construct he called “state of nature,” would become reified so soon, on a new continent almost as pristine as his ingenious premises.

John Locke’s American disciples followed in his footsteps. Thomas Jefferson did not substitute “the pursuit of happiness” for “property” in John Locke’s tripartite notion of “estate” to modify the idea but to underscore, even explicate, the synonymy. Property, after all, is what makes possible the pursuit of whatever we each call “happiness.” Patently necessary as life and liberty undoubtedly are to that pursuit, they are hardly sufficient. Once the conditions for its realization were philosophically justified and the territory settled, “the American Dream” was ready to be dreamt. All it needed was to carve out a political homeland.

The colonists were convinced that Providence had ordained them to found an ideal polity in accordance with the principles of reason. Men like Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson fervently, and not a little immodestly,
believed they were on a sacred mission on behalf of all humanity—even if humanity happened not to know that. By establishing an institutional governing structure based on the consent of the governed, replacing tyrannical rule by corrupt princes with republican representatives, the structure of the US was going to embody the principles of the Law of Nature, which is to say the Law of Reason.

Among the newborn nation’s most ardent admirers was the English parliamentarian Thomas Pownall, a former governor of Massachusetts, whose opinion carried considerable weight, as he spoke from intimate acquaintance with America. In a tract published anonymously in July, 1780, entitled “A Memorial Most Humbly Addressed to the Sovereign of Europe on the Present State of Affairs, Between the Old and New World,” Pownall observed that “the acquirement of information in things and business,” which circumstances force Americans to seek and develop, “thus sharpened and thus exercised, [causes] a turn of inquiry and investigation which forms a character peculiar to these people [italics in original], which is not to be met with, nor ever did exist in any other to the same degree, unless in some of the ancient republics.” Speaking not only for himself but for everyone else who has known Americans “and has viewed them in this light will consider them as animated in this New World... with the spirit of a new philosophy,” comparing them to “eaglets” who “commence the first efforts of their pinions from a towering advantage.”

National dreams are invariably embellished by a collective mythology and America is no exception. But the famous “city on a hill” metaphor is widely misunderstood as the American version of garden-variety ethnocentrism. In fact, its author, Reverend John Winthrop, far from being starry-eyed, knew the price of conspicuously located real estate. Ostentatiously shining, propped on a hill to boot, a city was bound to lose its anonymity and, with it, all peace and quiet. Winthrop warned the inhabitants: “the eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken” the result is nothing but trouble. “We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of God... we shall shame the faces of many of God’s worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are agoing.” The sentiment was echoed by Reverend Peter Bulkeley, a minister at Concord, Massachusetts, who declared that the people of New England should “in a special manner labor to shine forth in holiness above other people ... [for] we are as a city set upon a hill,” and shame will befall us if we “walk contrary to our covenant.” Rather than an unmitigated blessing, a hilltop view was seen as a peculiar burden, an added responsibility, contributing to its moral stature, but also saddling its citizens with a sense of global mission.
The true nature of American Exceptionalism was understood by few outside observers. Notable among those who did was, surprisingly enough, the parliamentarian and writer Edmund Burke, known best as the merciless critic of another, far more murderous revolution, across from the English Channel. No simple-minded reactionary, Burke realized that Americans were not guillotine-happy, hotheaded rebels. The transplanted Englishmen had become, over the course of more than a century in the wilderness, the feisty architects of a remarkably efficient, self-regulating, altogether novel society. In an impassioned speech on March 22, 1775, Burke urged his colleagues in the House of Commons to allow these strong-headed, industrious and able men across the ocean to continue to govern themselves without dictates from a distance.

Burke saw the colonists’ independence, built steadfast on Protestant religion, as “the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion”—a spirit that elevates freedom to “a kind of rank and privilege,” especially among the more southern states. Yet ever the realist, Burke hastened to dispel the impression that he meant “to commend the superior morality of this sentiment, which has at least as much pride as virtue in it,” but merely to assess the “fierce” nature of the colonists’ spirit of liberty, which Parliament would seek in vain to squelch.

The conservative opponent of utopian revolution recognized in these colonists a whole new breed of man that deserved to be let alone. Without romanticizing it, Burke appreciated its power. His warning, however, was prescient: the conviction that America was an example to every man because any man could hope to pursue his dreams there, at least in principle, led imperceptibly to an inability to comprehend how anyone would fail to acknowledge the universal validity of this system of government. Specifically, it meant that democracy’s appeal was assumed as “self-evident”—no less so than the truths evoked in the nation’s Declaration of Independence. It meant that, in the US, strategic diplomacy and global communication have generally been an afterthought. Unlike Crusaders from other times and cultures, Americans assumed that their democratic system and their motives required no special rhetorical defense. That pride which, as Burke astutely perceived, fately accompanied the otherwise commendable American religion of freedom, would eventually prove to be a handicap: The result has been a sorry chronicle of dismally ineffective public diplomacy.

Perhaps the best example of America’s failure in global communication is its inability to adequately defend its message and policies in the United Nations General Assembly. Over the course of a few short decades after its founding on Turtle Bay in New York City, the General Assembly became a megaphone for Soviet-manipulated propaganda through the so-called Non-Aligned group of countries ranging from the mildly to the ferociously illiberal. Yet American ambassadors
consistently failed to call other governments to task, during bilateral discussions, for their anti-American harangues inside the halls of the General Assembly and votes on behalf of one-sided, vicious resolutions. They were oblivious to Soviet tactics behind the scenes, pressuring weaker countries to vote and even introduce resolutions on Moscow’s behalf. America watched with a seeming \textit{noblese oblige} haughtiness that resembled the benevolent tolerance of a parent toward a naughty child, but that was, in fact, short-sighted and unwittingly condescending.

It was this political culture that Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick and her team had tried to change in the 1980s. But it was too little, too late. The US Mission to the UN in the 1980s may have gathered a pretty formidable team, led by a remarkable orator, but it wasn’t enough. Congress didn’t start to care until the 1980s, when the Kirkpatrick team and the Heritage Foundation’s exposure of voting patterns resulted in legislative requirement to take UN voting behavior into consideration as a factor in determining who gets foreign assistance and how much. The US contribution, which at 25 percent already amounted to a larger percentage of the UN budget than any other country by far, came in hard, convertible currency (meanwhile, the Soviet bloc’s was in nonconvertible “silly money”). In other words, that insult was self-inflicted in addition to the increasingly routine injury.

And things have changed depressingly little even since the demise of the Soviet Union—the UN’s assembly-line resolution mill being hard to turn around. After a brief honeymoon in the early 1990s when the US gained some support on non-consensus votes, since 1997 it has found itself increasingly isolated. Last year, support fell to 17 percent of non-consensus resolutions.\textsuperscript{12} From 2000 to 2007, recipients of US foreign aid, in particular, have voted against the US 95 percent of the time. So, the US is bankrolling the daily spectacle of flagellation, apparently having convinced itself that it all comes with the territory, in a somewhat perverse version of \textit{richeuse oblige}. This is either exceptional naïveté or just plain cluelessness; both are inexcusable.

The historic inability of the US to recognize the need for effective strategic communication is worthy of closer scrutiny.\textsuperscript{15} Most countries have traditionally made extensive use of bureaus designed specifically to influence decision makers inside and outside targeted foreign governments. Particularly after the introduction of rapid and effective technological advances in media, their scope was broadened to include public diplomacy. Most major nations appreciated from the outset the importance of radio, and most took direct control of the structure and content of radio broadcasting as it expanded\textsuperscript{14} throughout the 1920s. The US was the exception. This is not necessarily to imply that the US should have followed suit, but it does underscore a failure to appreciate radio’s potential, given its enormous reach. While other governments saw the power of broadcasting to
affect public opinion, not only at home but also abroad, the radio market in the US was almost exclusively domestic. Commercial broadcasters, after all, had no reason to advertise beyond the national audience, to people who couldn’t buy what their advertisers had to sell.

As may be expected, one of the earliest advocates of using radio for political ends was the first dictator of the Soviet Union, V.I. Lenin, at first for domestic purposes, followed within a short time by foreign-language broadcasts reaching neighboring countries and eventually the entire globe. Next in line was Nazi Germany, which installed shortwave transmitters capable of reaching even into Asia and the Western Hemisphere. The British and French governments, meanwhile, were primarily targeting their colonies in Africa and Asia. The US was the last to use international broadcasting in its foreign outreach. When, in 1939, the Federal Communications Commission sought to limit foreign transmissions by US broadcasters to programs that “reflect the culture of this country and which will promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation,” it had to back down in response to fierce opposition by CBS, NBC, and the American Civil Liberties Union on First Amendment grounds. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the US had fewer than a dozen shortwave transmitters capable of overseas broadcasting.

It was Edward R. Murrow, head of the US Information Agency during the Kennedy administration, who most clearly appreciated the significance of strategic information outreach. Murrow realized that younger people had been a primary target for Soviet propaganda for decades. During that time, the USSR had been conducting all-expenses-paid “World Youth Festivals” where future communist leaders were being groomed. So Murrow turned his attention to university student leaders. “Youth officers” assigned to various USIA posts usually spoke the local languages and established good rapport with the young people there.

But it was also possible to reach foreign audiences within the borders of the US. Yet foreign correspondents stationed in the US were virtually ignored by the White House, the State Department and the other agencies. While other countries paid a great deal of attention to members of the press, especially from large news organizations, it was not until the 1960s that foreign press centers were opened first in New York, and later in Washington.

The same has been true of overseas educational and cultural programs. The US, again, was the last of the major powers to officially promote its cultural wares abroad. The French subsidized the immodestly named mission civilisatrice; the Germans peddled their forthrightly dubbed Kulturpolitik; the Soviet Union engaged in heavy-handed but certainly not unsuccessful propaganda; and even the more subdued Brits created a special organization in 1934, the British Council, devoted
to the management of an extensive program of academic and artistic exchanges. It was not until 1947 that the US started the Fulbright scholarship program, funded by the sale of surplus war equipment abroad. Finally, in 1948, with the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, cultural exchanges rose to the rank of diplomatic tools in the US, a role long recognized by other nations.  

It was not until 1953 that the US established one agency specifically designed to deal with global communication. From the outset, the US Information Agency was underfunded, underappreciated and sometimes outright incompetent, but it did serve an important function: People who would otherwise never have contact with the US could at least catch a glimpse of it in some book at a USIA library. USIA did not, of course, engage in political warfare; it simply disseminated “information” and stayed away from “propaganda,” with practically self-defeating zeal. Among its outspoken critics was the late Senator Jesse Helms (R–NC), whose unlikely friendship with then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright led to the de facto dissolution of USIA through absorption into the State Department in 1999. For different reasons—ideological in the case of Sen. Helms, administrative for Secretary Albright—the agency that never quite found its niche was finally abrogated in both name and function. Its fate illustrated the expectations of American Exceptionalism after the end of the Cold War: “The end of history” had finally arrived, with Francis Fukuyama capturing the general consensus in his famous and infamous 1989 essay of that title; the Law of Reason had triumphed.

The celebrated Fukuyama article was centered on the philosophy of a Russian-born, German-educated Hegelian by the name of Alexander Kojeve, whose influence on French philosophy in the three decades following the end of World War II was unmatched in the US, where he was virtually unknown. But, as Professor James W. Ceasar points out in his fascinating book, Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought, Kojeve’s central idea about the end of history “has virtually become an intellectual cliché.” The post-dialectical vision, moreover, specifically involved America. Writes Ceasar: “For Kojeve the symbol of this end state is America, and living at the end of history is equated with the American way of life.”

While partly a literary device for Kojeve, the idea of America as the end of history morphs into the older tradition of American Exceptionalism—the idea that the Law of Reason is embodied in the system of liberalism as enshrined in American democracy. This latter Exceptionalism differs from traditional religious messianic movements, for it requires no conversion or special ritual—merely the recognition that human beings seek self-determination. In that respect it is quite different from nationalist ethnocentrism. Strangely wedded to the neo-Marxist vision of post-conflict universal humanism, the classical liberal conception of moral
egalitarianism came into its own in America after the demise of the USSR. More than ever it seemed that the US had no further need of public diplomacy.

We were all globalists now, whether we knew it or not. And sooner or later we would all come to know it—especially after the revolution in global communication through the World Wide Web. The Law of Reason would operate even in the absence of conscious recognition, but with the enormous advances in technology and the demise of the Soviet threat, it seemed that international harmony of goals and interests was almost within reach. And America would show the way—although more by example than by force.

It was this mindset that led to the appalling failure to appreciate the huge disconnect between the American reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and that of the rest of the world. Referring to this myopia as “The September 12 Paradigm,” Robert Kagan observes that Americans read too much in the outpouring of sympathy that followed the morning after: “Most Americans, regardless of political party, believed that the world shared not only their pain and sorrow but also their fears and anxiety about the terrorist threat and that the world would join with the US in a common response.”

Writing in the September/October 2008 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs, Kagan adds that some American observers cling to this illusion even today, and fail to appreciate the extent to which opinion leaders throughout the world, including Europe, believed that US policies and actions around the world had been “a major cause” of the terrorist attacks, and that subsequently, the US was undertaking the fight against terrorism for its own interests.21

Yet Americans, writes Kagan, “did not perceive themselves as self-interested. A full 70 percent of the American opinion leaders surveyed said they believed that the US was also acting in the interests of its allies. This gap in perception revealed a central problem with the ‘war on terror’ paradigm.”22 That gap did not involve merely Bush and the neocons, but all those in the US who supported the toppling of Saddam Hussein: “Those liberals and progressives who favored war against Iraq did so for much the same reason they had favored war in the Balkans—as necessary to help preserve the liberal international order.” This broad consensus, cutting across ideological divides in the US, “however, was not replicated in the rest of the world.” Few believed that the US was acting on behalf of world order; when they accused America of Exceptionalism, its critics believed it was deluding itself into imagining that it was anything other than just another country pursuing its own interests. Of course, it did not help that George W. Bush had come into office with just that message: opposing nation-building and curtailing America’s
foreign involvements more in line with its longstanding preference for taking care of business. It was time to enjoy the end of history.

September 11 brought an end to all that, but America was incapable of suddenly learning to communicate its goals and interests adequately. It did what came most naturally: It assumed that everyone else understood what we were all about. Strategic communication had never been our forte; it was certainly not about to become one overnight. And Bush, who was no Ronald Reagan in front of the camera or behind it, could not be expected to change it even if he understood how, which he did not. During his administration, strategic communication became more of an oxymoron than perhaps ever before in American history. Its absence was felt more keenly and even desperately, for it highlighted the depth of incompetence to which America's self-absorbed inability to communicate had sunk. On November 27, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates minced no words when he declared: "We are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qa'ida is better at communicating its message on the internet than America." So much for American Exceptionalism.

At last the message has started to sink in. In July 2008, the State Department finally acquired a new undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs: Jim Glassman, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, who understands the need to engage in a vigorous dialogue with the rest of the world, not merely to “win hearts and minds” but to elucidate what America is truly about. And in mid-September 2008, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) is introducing legislation to create a National Center for Strategic Communication.

Meanwhile, the Defense Department has been filling in at least some of the vacuum. Having set up a Defense Media Activity unit in January 2008, it is now, according to an advertisement on the agency’s website, looking for an executive to oversee its $225 million budget. The DMA combines formerly separate Pentagon media organizations, such as the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, the Stars and Stripes newspaper, and the Pentagon Channel on television. It also includes the DefenseLink website and the military services’ websites, the Bloggers Roundtable, and the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine magazines.

Does this mean that America must abandon its original Exceptionalism and admit to being no different from every other nation pursuing its naked self-interest? Well, yes—and no. A more sober assessment of foreign policy decisions in light of genuine national interest rather than a sometimes self-defeating puissance oblige, along with an even more sober global communication strategy, are long overdue. But the original idea that political freedom and open markets should be universally
applicable and are in America’s as well as other peoples’ self-interest, need not be abandoned—only the illusion that these truths are self-evident. As the nation’s founders well knew, they are, indeed, exceptional.

Notes

11 In his book, *The UN Gang: A Memoir of Incompetence, Corruption, Espionage, Anti-Semitism, and Islamic Extremism at the UN Secretariat* (New York, 2005), Pedro A. Sanjuan points out that the diplomatic beating to which the US ritualistically exposes itself in the General Assembly is only the more obvious, more tangible expression of a far greater danger represented by this Trojan piece of enormously profitable real estate in the heart of Manhattan, which happens to lie absolutely outside the jurisdiction of the FBI. During the Cold War years, the crimes being committed on this non-American territory were mainly espionage, especially conducted by the Soviet bloc intelligence services, particularly the KGB, and drug trafficking on a massive scale. The PLO’s “observer” mission to the UN (giving it a status on a par with the Vatican) was certainly a security concern, as were the activities of Muslim extremists inside the Secretariat.
13 See my *Why America is Such a Hard Sell: Beyond Pride and Prejudice* (Latham, MD, 2008).
18 See Nicholas Cull’s *The Cold War and the US Information Agency* (Cambridge, 2008).
19 James W. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought* (New

20 Ibid., p. 216.


22 Ibid.
