The third president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko (2005–10) made the instrumentalization of history a cornerstone of his legacy. The president established institutions of memory management and myth production assigning other government agencies propaganda duties. One of these was the former KGB archive (now known as the SBU archive). For a couple of years its director, the young historian Volodymyr V’iatrovych (born 1977) became a key figure of Yushchenko’s Geschichtspolitik. As such, he was directly involved in memory production, but also had a direct influence on who got access to the collections.1 Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians presented a narrative of suffering, resistance, and redemption, in which a

heroic representation of the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN[b]) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were key components.\textsuperscript{2} V’iatrovych externalizes Soviet rule as a genocidal occupation against which the Ukrainian people conducted a heroic resistance. He argues that a state-sponsored cult of personality is needed, since, he maintains, without these “national heroes” there would not be a Ukraine.

The Ukrainian struggle for independence is one of the cornerstones of our national self-identification. Because without UPA, without Bandera, without Shukhevych there would not be a contemporary Ukrainian state, there would not be a contemporary Ukrainian nation… The very example of the insurgents’ uncompromising struggle also inspired future generations of fighters for human rights and national unity – from the participants of the dissident movement to the activists of the Orange Revolution.\textsuperscript{3}

V’iatrovych presents history as a teleological, whiggish narrative; the march of the Ukrainian nation toward statehood. With its heavy emphasis on patrimonial national heroes and martyrs this curiously anachronistic narrative is a spitting image of Soviet history writing. V’iatrovych describes OUN founder Evhen Konovalets’ as a “hero of Ukraine,” “of which the entire Ukrainian nation needs to be proud… Konovalets’ and Stepan Bandera are figures of all-Ukrainian stature and the place of such heroes should be a National Pantheon, which ought to be constructed in Kyiv.”\textsuperscript{4} As the official heroic narrative diverges from a less-than-heroic reality, it is accompanied by heavy airbrushing. After being dismissed following the downfall of Yushchenko, V’iatrovych has continued his instrumentalization of history as director of an OUN(b) “front organization,” the Lviv-based Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (Tsentr doslidzhen’ vyzvol’noho rukhu, TsDVR).\textsuperscript{5}


A well-connected propaganda organization, the TsDVR is linked to a number of reputable and not-so-reputable organizations\(^6\) and serves as a bridge – between ultranationalist mythmakers in the diaspora and Ukraine proper, but also between generations, linking the first and second Ukrainian turns to the right.\(^7\)

V’iatrovych’s strategy is relatively simple. Historical events that do not reflect well upon “the Ukrainian national liberation movement” are typically dismissed as obsolete Soviet myths, propaganda, and stereotypes. Keenly aware that repetition is the mother of mythological thinking, over the past five years V’iatrovych has appeared in Ukrainian media on a near-weekly basis. He has denied OUN involvement in the 1941 pogroms,\(^8\) defended the killing of civilians by OUN activists in the service of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Belarus,\(^9\) and has characterized the collaboration of the Waffen-SS Galizien with Nazi Germany as “Soviet propaganda.”\(^10\)

In 2006 V’iatrovych’s TsDVR published an entire book in order to deny the OUN’s anti-Semitism.\(^11\) This non–peer-reviewed book was based partly upon known OUN(b) forgeries, including the mythical autobiography of a fictitious Jewish nurse, who supposedly survived the Holocaust within the ranks of the OUN-UPA.\(^12\) It has been sharply criticized as very one-

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\(^6\) According to the TsDVR Web site, its partners include not only the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ivan Franko National University but also the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), the OUN(b)-led Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), and the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Center and Museum of Genocide, the TsDVR’s Lithuanian equivalent. [http://www.cdvr.org.ua/content/партнери](http://www.cdvr.org.ua/content/партнери) (Last accessed: October 13, 2011).

\(^7\) For instance, OUN(b) veteran Volodymyr Kosyk (born 1924) who in the 1950s was the OUN(b) liaison to Chiang Kai-Shek’s Taiwan and Francisco Franco’s Spain, is now honorary director of TsDVR. “News and Views” // ABN Correspondence. 1961. Vol. XII. No. 1. P. 28; Per Anders Rudling. The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths // The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & Eurasian Studies 2107. Pittsburgh, 2011. P. 56. Fn. 196.

\(^8\) Rudling. OUN, the UPA, Holocaust. P. 37.


\(^12\) Rudling. OUN, UPA, Holocaust. P. 25.
Another TsDVR title, coproduced by V’iatrovych and titled *UPA – the Army of the Undefeated*, was created for the explicit purpose of making young Ukrainians identify with and model themselves after the OUN and UPA.14

V’iatrovych’s 2011 *Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina 1942–1947* is an attempt to address the perhaps most difficult and sensitive issue in the history of the OUN–UPA, its 1943–44 mass murder of the Polish population in Volhynia and Galicia, which the Polish Sejm in a careful formulation describes as “mass murders, characterized by ethnic cleansing with marks of genocide.”15

The abstract specifies that “[t]he book is intended for scientists, lecturers, students, and everyone interested in the history of Ukraine and Poland” (P. 2). *Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina* does not appear to have been peer reviewed, despite being published in cooperation between the TsDVR and the publishing house of Ukraine’s leading university, Kyiv Mohyla Akademiia (Pp. 1, 2). The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) funded V’iatrovych’s work in the Mykola Lebed collections and thus made the book possible. Subsequently, in his promotion of the book, V’iatrovych presented himself as “Senior visiting scholar, Harvard University,”16 or “Volodymyr V’iatrovych at Harvard University.”17 The book launch, organized by Kyiv Mohyla’s rector Serhii Kvit, a veteran of Ukrainian far-right political activism, was attended by representatives of other TsDVR partners.18 It was

18 Between 1995 and 1998, Kvit was a member of the Presidium of the Head Leadership of the KUN (Holovnyi provid KUN) and a commander, “sotnyk,” of the Stepan Bandera Tryzub, a paramilitary wing of the KUN that split from the party in 2000. He defended

**Framing the UPA’s anti-Polish murders**

The cover of the book depicts two uniformed men against a backdrop of political symbolism. The title says *Polish–Ukrainian War*, but only one of the two flags on the cover is a state flag: the red–white flag of Poland. Ukrainians, however, are represented by the black-and-red “revolutionary” flag of the OUN(b)-led UPA, which V’iatrovych consistently refers to as the “Ukrainian liberation movement” (P. 25, Ff.).

In the book, V’iatrovych presents the UPA’s massacres of Poles as part of a larger conflict, which he refers to by a neologism, “the Second Polish–Ukrainian War,” that is, a continuation of the “First Polish–Ukrainian War” of 1918–19 between Poland and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), a conflict that took place before most UPA soldiers were even born, and of which few had no living memories (P. 27). Embedded within the scope of a twenty-nine-year conflict, the UPA’s 1943–44 murder of the Poles becomes but an aspect, a detail, of a larger conflict, while massacres of civilians are interpreted as military operations.\footnote{This strategy is also used by other European ultranationalists. Jean-Marie Le Pen famously stated that the Holocaust was but a “detail” in the history of World War II. Deborah Lipstadt. Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. New York, 1994. P. 10.}
This reviewer does not find this conceptualization helpful. It is true that the Second Polish Republic had a poor track record in regard to minority policy, and the Ukrainian population had legitimate grievances, particularly after the death of Piłsudski. The increasingly authoritarian dictatorship polarized and antagonized Poles and Ukrainians, as well as Jews. The OUN welcomed and benefited from this development. By extending the scope to 1947, V’iatrovych also includes *Akcja Wisła*, the deportation of 140,000 Ukrainians to the “reclaimed,” formerly German territories as part of the conflict.\(^{21}\) Yet, the “first” and the “second” “Polish–Ukrainian Wars” were separate conflicts, and their assessments require different approaches.

V’iatrovych’s neologism implies a war between two polities. But this was not a war between two states, not primarily a war fought between two armies. Overwhelmingly, it was a campaign of mass murder and ethnic cleansing, aimed against an ethnic minority. The victims were predominately civilians: many women, children, and elderly. The smiling Polish soldier, heavily armed with a Soviet machine gun, a pistol, and a hand grenade that graces the cover is misleading at best. The situation on the ground in the spring, summer, and fall of 1943 was one of intimate murder, mutilation of bodies, and burning of entire villages along with their residents. There were no Polish state, no soldiers with machine guns to protect the Polish civilians in Volhynia.

V’iatrovych presents the OUN–UPA as the legitimate carrier of the ZUNR tradition of Ukrainian statehood, as a regular army that fulfilled the requirements of international law: “Armia Krajowa and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army had all the military insignias (*oznaky*) required by the Hague Convention in order to legally be regarded as participants in a military conflict” (Pp. 26–27).

**Domino and symmetry**

The OUN–UPA murders have been successfully contextualized by Timothy Snyder.\(^{22}\) Grzegorz Motyka presents the Polish–Ukrainian conflict as a conflict in two phases, of which the main event of the period from February 1943 to fall 1945 was the removal of Poles from the majority Ukrainian lands. The second phase, he argues, lasted from fall 1944, beginning with

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the first forced resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians, and ending with Akcja Wisła and the crushing of the UPA underground in Poland in 1947.²³

At the same time, both Ihor Iliushyn and Grzegorz Motyka make a distinction between the relatively small-scale and local anti-Ukrainian terror in Chelm/Kholmshchyna in 1942–43, and the large anti-Polish campaigns of mass murder in Volhynia in 1943 and Galicia in 1943 and 1944. These latter campaigns were centrally organized and the victims counted in the tens of thousands. Furthermore, these historians argue that there were no immediate causal connections between the two waves of violence.²⁴

V’iatrovych, by contrast, offers a domino theory to explain the violence:

Generally speaking, for the development of this war, there was a certain “domino effect” at work…it all started in Kholmshchyna in the summer of 1942. The war was still on a limited scale: from the Ukrainian side close to 500 casualties. Here the Poles liquidated Ukrainians…In 1943 the conflict expanded into the territory of Volhynia, where the suffering side was, first and foremost Poles, but the catalyst was the information about the events in Kholmshchyna. The “domino effect” was still at work in Galicia in 1944, and in 1945 in the territories west of the Curzon line.²⁵

In the book under review, the mass murders of the eastern Poles are framed as part of a war that V’iatrovych insists was reciprocal and symmetrical:

In the Polish historiography the terms “extermination,” “ethnic cleansing,” even “genocide” are used. Thus, the Polish side in the conflict presents itself only as victims, and only the Polish side as suffering. The actions of the Polish underground to exterminate Ukrainians are presented only as necessary actions in response to Ukrainian aggression. Yet, the documents (Ukrainian, Polish, Soviet, German) testify that, at the minimum, the Poles took no fewer initiatives (P. 28).

What the Polish Sejm described in terms of genocide V’iatrovych presents as a normal part of warfare, and something of which both sides were equally guilty. This is nothing new; we recognize the legitimization of war crimes from V’iatrovych’s apologetics for Ukrainian auxiliary police in Belarus in 1942, where he justified the Ukrainian auxiliaries’ targeting of civilians: “With an automatic rifle, he’s a soldier, but with a hoe he’s civilian population. When they kill him in combat, is he a civilian or a combatant?”

Rather than employing the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, V’iatrovych uses his own definition: “Genocide requires the total defenselessness, the inability of the other side to defend itself.” To V’iatrovych, the decisive factor is whether the victims are defenseless or not. “There is a total absence of such symmetry in acts of genocide” (P. 29), he claims, and goes on to argue that the UPA massacres of Poles therefore did not constitute genocide. Yet even V’iatrovych admits that “In the Ukrainian testimonies from Volhynia there is, until mid-1943, practically no information about any anti-Ukrainian activities from the side of the Polish underground. At that time they were apparently incapable of such action” (P. 114). Neutral observers agree that by 1943 the Volhynian Poles did not constitute a threat to the Ukrainian majority. They had been reduced to 8 percent of the Volhynian population, in the words of Timothy Snyder, “scattered about the countryside, deprived of their elites by deportations, with no state authority except the Germans to protect them, and no local partisan army of their own.” At the book launch, V’iatrovych’s claim to “symmetry” was criticized by Ihor Iliushyn as lacking support by current research.

In accordance with nationalist ideology V’iatrovych reduces the OUN and UPA’s anti-Polish campaign to a “third front” (P. 15): “The OUN leadership did not regard the Polish front as the main one. . . . They did not regard the Poles as the main enemy, against which they would aim all their efforts, as one often can read in the contemporary Polish literature” (P. 89). Rather, V’iatrovych insists that “to the Ukrainian underground, along with the Germans, the main enemy was the Red Partisans, who prepared the ground for the return of the Soviets” (P. 77). His claim that the UPA campaign against the Polish minority would have been a lesser priority than its resistance to Nazi Germany is not corroborated by facts. Rather, this mythological claim

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26 Himka. Debates. P. 364.
29 Kabachiy. Ukraine-Poland.
is typical of the post-Stalingrad OUN(b) propaganda intended to minimize its collaboration with Nazi Germany, and which, under Yushchenko, was elevated to official ideology. V’iatrovych does not provide any figures for Germans and Soviets killed by the UPA. Neither does he mention that the supreme commander of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych served in German uniform until 1943 nor that he strongly objected to any UPA attacks on German troops.\textsuperscript{30} If the numbers give any indication, 6 percent of the UPA–OUN commanders were killed by German forces – in battle, arrest attempts, crossfire or in detention, but over 50 percent of the UPA’s officers had a background in German service.\textsuperscript{31} As local police in German service, many had served in units deeply involved in the Holocaust. Many were elbow-deep in blood during the Holocaust. Their experiences in mass murder were later employed against the Poles.\textsuperscript{32}

**Source base**

In addition to materials from various Ukrainian archives, V’iatrovych relies heavily on the Mykola Lebed papers at Harvard University, which to a substantial degree consist of microfiche copies made by Lebed himself in the 1980s. In 2007, parts of the collection were transferred to the TsDVR archive.\textsuperscript{33} V’iatrovych makes no attempt to problematize this source, compiled by this “leading member of the Ukrainian liberation movement” (Pp. 25–26). The failure to do so is a serious concern. The leading OUN activist Mykola Lebed was convicted as one of the people involved in the 1934 murder of the Polish minister of the interior, Bronislaw Pieracki. Released from jail by the Germans, he was trained by the Gestapo in 1940–41. He led the dreaded OUN(b) security service, the Sluzhba Bezpeki, (SB OUN), in 1943–44. After the war, he was taken under the wing of the CIA, which, in its internal correspondence referred to him as “a well-known sadist and collaborator of the Germans,” but his strategic importance in the Cold War was such that they shielded him from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)

\textsuperscript{30} Rudling. OUN, UPA, Holocaust. P. 14.
\textsuperscript{32} Snyder. Reconstruction of Nations. P. 162.
\textsuperscript{33} V’iatrovych. Druha pol’ska-ukrains’ka viina. P. 26; Rudling. OUN, UPA, and Holocaust. P. 65, Fn. 272.
of the Justice Department, which wanted him prosecuted for war crimes.\textsuperscript{34} Despite its at times violent infighting, the various wings of the émigré OUN were all involved in the manufacturing of an appropriate past. Ukrainian diaspora circles passed over the OUN–UPA murder of the eastern Poles in silence. The topic is virtually missing from the UPA veterans’ own version of the past, the multivolume Litopys UPA (Chronicle of the UPA).\textsuperscript{35} This publication was partly financed by CIA covert funding as part of Cold War ideological warfare, and Lebed himself served on the Litopys UPA publishing committee.\textsuperscript{36} In this multivolume work, produced by the UPA veterans themselves, the topic of the OUN–UPA murders is passed over in silence. Other Ukrainian nationalists chose different strategies. The idea to present the UPA’s mass murder of Poles as casualties in a symmetrical war is not new. In 1979 Volodymyr Kubijovyč sent fellow scholar and Waffen-SS volunteer Vasyl Weryha guidelines for the writing of the proposed history of the Ukrainian Central Committee. “If we are writing about Polish–Ukrainian relations,” Kubijovyč wrote, they are to be presented in terms of “mainly a mutual destruction.”\textsuperscript{37}

Reviewers of Stavlennia OUN do evreiv have pointed out that “V’iatrovych is very ‘critical’ of incriminating sources, whereas, when dealing with sources ideologically close to his own position, he treats them very uncritically.”\textsuperscript{38} The same problem persists in Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, where he again relies on redacted and edited OUN(b) collections of documents, ignoring the reviewers who have pointed out the unreliability of these collections (P. 59).\textsuperscript{39} V’iatrovych’s book contains no discussion


\textsuperscript{38} Kurylo and Himka. Iak OUN. P. 259.

\textsuperscript{39} As Kurylo and Himka pointed out in their review, OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot’by 1929–1955 rr. (Munich: Zakordonny
of why reliance on collections compiled by perpetrators and ultranationalist émigré organizations is problematic. It does not reflect upon why a convicted murderer like Lebed, who, as the leader of the SB OUN was directly involved in the murders, may have an interest in presenting a less than full and candid account of the Volhynian massacres. Historians unaffiliated with the OUN, among them John-Paul Himka and Marco Carynnyk, who have also worked with the materials in the Lebed collection have pointed out its many serious shortcomings: Lebed’s group released documents selectively and edited. In addition, it edited, retyped, or otherwise manipulated released documents in order to produce an edifying narrative in accordance with nationalist ideology.

In Stavlennia OUN do evreiv, V’iatrovych calls into question documents that show how the OUN leadership endorsed the mass murder of Jews. Without providing evidence, V’iatrovych “raises doubts” about the authenticity of the 1941 autobiography of Iaroslav Stets’ko, in which the OUN(b) “prime minister” expressed his commitment to “the destruction of the Jews and the expediency of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine.”

In Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina, V’iatrovych calls into question the authenticity of documents confirming the OUN(b) leadership’s commitment to the mass murder of the Polish minority. One such document is the interrogation protocols of the local UPA commander Iurii Stelmashchuk, which confirms that the OUN leadership ordered the mass murder of the Polish population. Grzegorz Motyka, the leading authority on the UPA murders, cites Stelmashchuk to the effect that “[i]n June of 1943 the representative of the central Provid of the OUN, ‘Klym Savur’ passed on to me a secret directive from the Central Provid of the OUN about the total physical liquidation of the entire Polish population that lives on the territory of the western districts of Ukraine.”


40 Rudling. OUN, UPA, and Holocaust. P. 20
V’iatrovych presents this episode in such a way that the reader gets the impression the entire Stelmashchuk testimony is fictitious: “Those words are today the main evidence of an order issued by the Provid of the OUN about a general extermination of the Poles… Aren’t we dealing with one of the NKVD’s many attempts to compromise the Ukrainian liberation movement?” V’iatrovych asks rhetorically (P. 93). Interviewed by Ukrain’s’ka Pravda, he presents a different theory and attributes the forgery to the KGB. “[T]he citation is made from a nonexistent protocol, which I think appeared in the 1960s, when the KGB was creating a mass of material about the UPA. And the lack of important documents that would compromise the UPA was simply filled through the creation of pseudo-directives. Unfortunately, this document is quite often used by Polish historians, who have not read the Stelmashchuk case.”

When the KGB, in 1959–60, decided to blame the Lviv pogrom on the OUN(b) battalion Nachtigall, it left a huge paper trail. If V’iatrovych’s insinuations that the KGB indeed falsified the Stets’ko and Stelmashchuk cases are valid, why would the former director of the SBU archives not back up his claim with sources? Much as in the case of the Stets’ko zhyttiepys, the key points of the Stelmashchuk testimony are corroborated by other sources. As much as the Stets’ko autobiography confirms the OUN(b) leadership’s approval of anti-Jewish murder, the Stelmashchuk testimony confirms there was a OUN–UPA order concerning the mass murder of Poles. Caution, however, is always advisable. The exact rendering of this order cannot be taken for granted. The NKVD interrogators often did not record testimonies verbatim, but paraphrased them. The Stelmashchuk testimony does not constitute evidence of an OUN–UPA genocide against Poles. It does, however, confirm the UPA’s use of indiscriminate political violence and murder of civilians. The Stelmashchuk testimony refers to similar OUN–UPA orders to eliminate all Soviet POWs in Western Ukraine, all Russians in the UPA, as well as all families of Soviet sympathizers. As in the case of the murders of Poles, these orders are corroborated by various types of evidence about executions of Russians and Soviet POWs, pro-Soviet Ukrainians and their families by the UPA.

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45 Protokol doprosa arestovannogo Stelmashchuk Iuriia Aleksandrovicha, 28 fevralia 1945 goda // HDA SBU. F. 13. Spr. 373. T. 89. Ark. 30-33, 39. As a note of caution regarding using Litopys UPA as a source, it should perhaps be added that the information on Stelmashchuk’s background as the first head of the auxiliary police in the Zhytomyr region in July 1941, evident from HDA SBU. F. 5. Spr. 67434. Ll. 24-40, is omitted from the published version in: Litopys UPA. Vol. 9. P. 430. Thanks to Ivan Kachanovski for this reference.
Another problem is the selective use of sources. One example: V’iatrovych attributes the burning of the village of Malyn on July 14, 1943, in which several hundred civilians perished, to the “state police with the help of Uzbeks and Poles.”

V’iatrovych utilizes one document casually to explain what happened in Malyn when there are, in fact, ten to fifteen different and competing versions based on equally legitimate sources. There is no apparent reason why V’iatrovych chooses the particular source that he does, other than, this reviewer suspects, that this source mentions Poles in the role of perpetrators, and thus shores up his claims to “symmetry.” V’iatrovych’s methodology in regard to primary sources is to seek, and uncritically rely on those that present the “heroes” and “national liberators” in the best possible light, in sharp contrast to the Poles.

Critique of scholarship

Similar problems persists in V’iatrovych’s treatment of secondary sources. He makes no attempt to problematize Litopys UPA produced by the OUN and UPA veterans themselves. Equally problematic is his uncritical reliance on the OUN(b) activist Petro Mírchuk, who first circulated the above-mentioned forgery of a fictive Jewess in the UPA in an attempt to “disprove” the OUN–UPA’s anti-Semitism; UPA veteran Lew Shankowsky, who argues that the OUN(b) government ordered its militia to stop the 1941 Lviv pogrom and thus saved Jews; or Wolodymyr Kosyk, whose re-publication of OUN documents was redacted to fit the émigré OUN(b)’s political preferences.

47 As demonstrated by Jared McBride’s detailed study of the Malyn massacre, which was presented at a Kyiv conference where V’iatrovych was present. Jared McBride. Through an Ethnic Lens, Darkly: The Massacre at Malyn, July 1943 / Paper presented at the international conference “World War II and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine.” Kyiv, Ukraine, September 23–26, 2009.
The uncritical acceptance of émigré OUN sources stands in sharp contrast to how V’iatrovych regards critical scholars who do not belong to the Ukrainian nationalist tradition. He finds Timothy Snyder’s “attempt to equate the anti-Polish action with the actions of exterminating Jews strange,” and takes the Yale historian to task for “not even being able to base his assertion” that the UPA had a political program for the implementation for their “anti-Polish ‘ethnic cleansing’” in sources (P. 29. Fn. 27; Pp. 90–91). V’iatrovych is highly critical of the work of Władysław and Ewa Siemaszko, accusing them of making “many very serious mistakes, with the purpose of demonstrating the extraordinary suffering only of the Poles and to diminish the number of victims from the Ukrainian side.” Their work, according to V’iatrovych, contains “very many distortions, exaggerations, and open falsifications.”

V’iatrovych adds, “should maintain a more dispassionate attitude to the topic, research it solidly, and, first and foremost, search for documents.”

More serious is V’iatrovych’s insinuation that Polish and Western scholars deliberately inflate the number of Polish villages burned and destroyed by the UPA on July 11, 1943. “Polish researchers, relying, among others, on the Siemaszkos, originally talked about 80–90 villages destroyed during that day. Today – they speak of more than 160. That is used as an argument of systematic anti-Polish action, with serious coordination over a large area… I have not seen any serious methodology for the collection of the number of losses, either from the Polish or the Ukrainian side.”

Speaking of the UPA’s July 11–12, 1943 attack against the Polish villages of Volhynia, “The scale of the operation … constantly grows – from a few dozen to over one hundred settlements” (P. 120). “In the Komorowski testimony there is talk of about 60 settlements, Grzegorz Motyka says 96. In the preface of the collection of documents issued by the Polish Institute of National Memory and the SBU in 2005, this has grown to 99, [in the book by] Timothy Snyder, to 167!” (P. 120, Fn. 205). But not only do the numbers grow mysteriously in the hands of these historians. “It is clear that an operation in which 60 settlements are simultaneously targeted requires serious coordination, something that would have left documentary evidence in the UPA materials. On the contrary, such information, at least until now, has not been found” (P.

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
Thus, “To establish upon the basis of those limited data a massive action or any form of details of its conduct is, unfortunately, impossible… The thesis of a great operation on the night between July 11 and 12 is still not confirmed by the sources” (Pp. 123–124). Therefore, “the question of whether the leadership of the Ukrainian underground initiated a massive anti-Polish action remains debatable” (P. 129).

V’iatrovych presents the numbers as sketchy, the sources as lacking. As survivors’ testimonies are unreliable and supposedly uncorroborated, “unfortunately,” responsible and measured historians can say very little about these events. By inference, those who do write about the UPA murder are irresponsible: in an interview with the online journal *Istorychna pravda* (Historical Truth), a subsection of *Ukrains’ka pravda* (Ukrainian Truth), both key venues that eagerly republish V’iatrovych’s narrative, he states:

> I am frightened by the constantly increasing numbers, the “hunt for corpses” in the Volhynian tragedy, the historian underlines. In the 1990s, the number used was still close to 50,000 Poles killed, then we heard the number 75,000, then 90,000 and 100,000. More right-wing historians already speak of 250,000, even 500,000. Since we do not have a methodology, there is a juggling of figures.  

V’iatrovych is correct that the data regarding the exact number of OUN–UPA victims is still somewhat uncertain. He is also right that the politicization and instrumentalization of this tragedy have resulted in unfortunate distortions.

Nonetheless, V’iatrovych’s representation of the Polish and Western historiography is selective and disingenuous: in academic discussions, the leading authorities of Polish victims of Ukrainian nationalists state between 60,000 and 100,000 Polish and 10,000–20,000 Ukrainian victims in the...
conflict. Recent research indicates that the number of Ukrainians killed by Poles may have to be revised downward, whereas there seems to be a growing consensus around the number of Polish victims.

**Ukrainian victims**

There is relatively little research done on the Ukrainian victims of Polish terror during World War II. Motyka has previously given estimates of up to 20,000 Ukrainian victims. In a 2011 study, Motyka lowers his estimate for Ukrainian losses at the hands of Polish underground forces to between 10,000–11,000 and 15,000: about 2,000–3,000 Ukrainians in Volhynia, 1,000–2,000 in Eastern Galicia, and 8,000–10,000 on the territory of contemporary Poland, 3,000–4,000 of whom were killed before 1944 and 5,000–6,000 in 1944 to 1947.

If the Michael Chomiak Papers at the Provincial Archives of Alberta are any indication, the Ukrainian victims of the Polish terror in the ethnically mixed territories that are part of contemporary Poland, in 1942 and 1943, may have to be lowered even further. A January 22, 1944, report from the Ukrainian Aid Committee, sent to Chomiak, the editor of *Krakivs’ki visti*, from the Lublin office of Kubijovych’s Ukrainian Central Committee lists 500 Ukrainian foremen (*Ukrains’ki peredovyki*), victims of attacks from Polish forces in 1942 and 1943 in the Chelm/Kholm district and Podlasie/Pidliashshia. By district, the Ukrainian casualties had the following geo-

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57 Grzegorz Motyka sums up the situation: “Altogether, during the years 1943–47, 80,000–100,000 Poles and 10,000–20,000 Ukrainians. In Volhynia the relation is simply stunning – on the Polish side were maybe even 50,000–60,000 victims, on the Ukrainian – no more than 2,000–3,000. As for families, more than a million Poles were displaced and about 630,000 Ukrainians and Lemkos.” Motyka. Zapomnijcie o Giedroyciu.

graphic distribution: 269 in Hrubeshiv/Hrubieszow, 58 in Chelm/Kholm, 20 in Biela Podlaska/Bila Pilias’ka, 60 in Zamość/Zamistia, 54 in Bilgoraj/Bilhorai-Tarnohorod, 10 in Krasnystaw/Krasnostav, 5 in Radyn, and 24 in Lublin.\textsuperscript{59} The document not only lists the number of Ukrainians killed but also contains information on their professions, which sheds further light on the dynamics. Unsurprisingly, a clear majority of the victims were peasants, reflecting the socioeconomic composition of the population. What is striking, however, is the heavy overrepresentation of various collaborators: \textit{Schutzmänner}, local administrators, policemen. Of the exactly 500 Ukrainian victims listed, 177, or 35.4 percent had served in various forms of authority under the Nazis, as members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, policemen, SS \textit{Wachmänner}, bailiffs, or village elders. Thirty-four persons had been killed in 1942, 4 in 1941, while the overwhelming majority – 462 – in 1943, with October (92 killed) and May (91 killed) being the bloodiest months.\textsuperscript{60} This, it should be noted, is at a time during which the UPA’s slaughter of the Volhynian Poles has been going on for months.

Thus, first, there may be reason to further reduce the number of Ukrainian victims of Polish violence, at least in the lands of contemporary Poland, where Poles constituted the majority population and the Polish underground was stronger. Second, the high proportion of various collaborators among the Ukrainian casualties shows that the Polish terror against Ukrainians was of a different nature than the OUN(b) anti-Polish murders in Volhynia, which, like the OUN(b)’s murders of Jews, were ideologically motivated and systematically targeted ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{61} Third, the violence did not


\textsuperscript{61} On the OUN(b) action program for the case of war, see “The Military Doctrine of the Ukrainian Nationalists,” written by Mykhailo Kolodzins’kyi in 1938, which stipulated that “hostile” national minorities, that is, Poles, Jews, and Russians, should be cleansed from the Western Ukrainian lands. “Expel literally to the last person the Polish element from the Western Ukrainian lands and thereby end Polish pretensions about the Polish character of these lands.” Zaitsev. Viina iak prodovzhennia polityky. P. 239, citing Arkhiv OUN u Kyevi. F. 1. Op. 2. Spr. 466. Ark. 103. On the OUN(b)’s action plan to kill Jews, Poles, and other minorities in the wake of Barbarossa, see May 1941’s “Borot’ba i diialnist’ OUN(b) pid chas viiny: Instruktsii Revolutsiinoho Provodu OUN(B) dlia orhanizatsiioho aktyvu v Ukraini na period viiny: Viiskovi instruktsii,” and “Vkazivky na pershi dni orhanizatsiii derzhavnoho zhyttia” in TsDAVO Ukrainy. F. 3833. Op. 2. Spr. 1. Ark. 25-33 and 33-57.
predate the UPA campaign in Volhynia, but escalated after the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia was already under way.

**Polish victims**

Historians Grzegorz Hryciuk and Grzegorz Motyka in Poland have greatly advanced our understanding of the OUN–UPA mass murder, as have Ihor Iliushyn in Ukraine and Timothy Snyder in the United States. Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko are not trained as historians. As an Armia Krajowa participant in the events, Władysław Siemaszko is not a neutral observer. His daughter Ewa is an engineer, not a historian by training. Both operate within a narrative which has been described as nationalistic. Yet they have both spent decades collecting and documenting the information of survivors, and their findings are not easily dismissed.

There is an emerging consensus on the figures. Timothy Snyder gives the number of Polish civilian victims killed by the UPA in Volhynia in 1943 alone as 40,00–60,000 people. Grzegorz Hryciuk has analyzed the demographic flows in Volhynia and arrives at the conclusion that the fate of 60,700 Poles in Volhynia remains “to be explained.” Grzegorz Motyka arrives at a number between 70,000 and 100,000. Ewa Siemaszko’s estimates are similar, about 60,000 in Volhynia in 1943–44, and 32,000 in Eastern Galicia in 1944. Her research on the tally of victims, the most detailed to date, makes a distinction between “confirmed deaths” and “victims known by name.” In 2010 she rounded off the number of confirmed deaths to 88,700, of which 42,496 are known by name. An updated study, published in 2011 lists 91,200 confirmed deaths, 43,987 of which are known by name.

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67 Ewa Siemaszko. Stan badań nad ludobójstwem dokonanym na ludności polskiej przez Organizację Nacjonalistów Ukraińskich i Ukraińską Powstańczą Armię // Bogusław
However, V’iatrovych claims that he “has not read a respectable work” on the murders.\textsuperscript{68} The work of the Siemaszkos “contains a whole series of inaccuracies and exaggerations,” V’iatrovych claims, adding that “unfortunately, memories cannot constitute a reliable enough source of information for a researcher” (P. 18). V’iatrovych warns that a “historian must work carefully,” implying that is what he does, and the above-cited scholars do not (P. 19). To this he adds that the production of documents is also part of the war, one that often attempts to “justify one’s own action and accuse the adversaries” (P. 23). V’iatrovych questions the numbers offered in the most detailed studies, but does not offer an alternative number himself. The number must be much lower, we understand, and those who specialize in the field all err in their research and are involved in a frightening “hunt for corpses.” This reviewer would have been interested in finding out which numbers V’iatrovych regards as correct. Unfortunately, the closest V’iatrovych comes to a corrective is a fuzzy “some tens of thousands killed from both sides” (P. 32). This raises the question: if V’iatrovych does not want, or does not feel himself competent, to provide even a rough estimate of the number of victims, what is the basis for his claim to “symmetry”?\textit{Instrumentalization of history}

V’iatrovych writes that “To use the term ‘genocide’ for these events has only a political, not a scientific-cognitive purpose and is insufficient to describe the peculiarities of this conflict” (P. 30). This reviewer agrees: the term “genocide” itself does not add to our understanding of the UPA massacres any more than it helps us to understand, say, the 1932–33 Ukrainian famine. At first one may think that V’iatrovych has responded to the growing concern in the scholarly community over the instrumentalization of history in some postcommunist East European states.\textsuperscript{69} Yet V’iatrovych’s critical
attitude to the instrumentalization of genocide claims, his “fear” of a “hunt for corpses,” his unwillingness to provide something even resembling an estimate of the number of victims to support his claim of “symmetry” is not indicative of the author’s general cautiousness in regard to sources, or of a terminological conservatism. In fact, V’iatrovych is particularly poorly positioned to level criticism at the instrumentalization of the term “genocide.”

During his tenure as director of the SBU archive, V’iatrovych promoted the 1932–33 famine as deliberate genocide against the Ukrainian nation. Serious scholars in the field estimate the number of famine deaths in Ukraine in 1932–33 as between 2.5 and 3.9 million. During his tenure as director at its archive, the SBU even presented a detailed number, 10,063,000 victims in the republic during the Holodomor, or “famine genocide” in 1932–33. They arrived at this number by taking the highest of the estimates provided, 3,941,000 famine deaths, to which they added 6,122,000 “unborn” people.

In November 2011, V’iatrovych was loudly campaigning for genocide awareness. Dressed in black, and with a bullhorn in his hand, V’iatrovych marched in front of the Holodomor remembrance parade in Kyiv, shouting “today, we honor millions of children who were killed in ’32 and ’33. Those, who could have become the future of Ukraine. Those, who became a lost generation. Our memory can continue their lives.”

V’iatrovych’s utter skepticism regarding witness testimonies, terminology, and sources does not reflect academic method, research philosophy, or principle, but appears to be conditioned by the topic. Thus, whereas the recollections of Polish survivors of the OUN–UPA massacres cannot be accepted as a sufficient basis for historians, the testimonies of Ukrainian famine survivors are not only regarded as a valid source, but the memory of the famine is deemed as critically important. Genocide is a nonscientific and political category when invoked by Polish authorities to describe the OUN–UPA massacres of the eastern Poles, but a valid concept that should be taken at face value when invoked by Ukrainian authorities and V’iatrovych himself to describe the 1932–33 famine. V’iatrovych denies to the victims of OUN–UPA the genocide status he seeks for Ukrainian victims of Stalin.

V’iatrovych dismisses Motyka, Siemaszko, and Snyder’s methodology for establishing the number of OUN–UPA victims. One wishes that V’iatrovych had applied these standards to his own agency when the latter calculated the exact number of never-existent Ukrainian genocide victims and arrived at an “exact” number that, in and of itself, exceeded that of the Holocaust.

This sort of instrumentalization and capitalization of human suffering, of which V’iatrovych and his institute are flagrant examples, makes it difficult to come to terms with the traumatizing history of the twentieth century.

Antony Polonsky refers to this phenomenon as “the suffering Olympics.” Others have referred to this as a cult of competitive suffering and Holocaust envy. It is a demeaning and debasing pursuit, and becomes particularly troubling when pursued by the successors of the organizations that ordered and perpetrated mass murder at the first place.

**Equate the Ukrainian people with the OUN(b)**

By representing Ukrainians with the black–red banner of *Blut und Boden*, V’iatrovych implies the equating of “Ukrainians” with the OUN–UPA. This is both inappropriate and historically inaccurate. The responsibility for the murders rests with the perpetrators, their commanders, and ideologues. The OUN–UPA was overwhelmingly based in the territories annexed to Soviet Ukraine in 1939 and 1940, and, moreover, their influence there was limited. Kliachkivs’kyi’s UPA in Volhynia and Polissia in April 1944 had 6,920 men, a number that, by September 1944, as the Soviets returned, had fallen to 2,600. Soviet intelligence estimated that 40 percent of the UPA men were volunteers, and the rest forcibly mobilized. In Volhynia the draft was particularly brutal, in the Rivne oblast the men were mobilized under the threat of physical extermination. It is reasonable to assume the numbers were roughly the same in the spring and summer of 1943, the period when the UPA’s anti-Polish violence peaked. Thus, a rather marginal group of 6,000–7,000 armed ultranationalists, led by officers, 50 percent of whom had a background as collaborators with Nazi

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Germany, murdered about ten times as many Poles over a period of a few months.\(^{76}\) Whereas the UPA mobilized the civilian Ukrainian population for the murder, the Ukrainian people cannot be held responsible for the acts of a small, sectarian group of ultranationalist extremists. While this movement murdered in the name of Ukraine, they spoke for a marginal fraction of their imagined community. Therefore, Yushchenko did Ukraine a great disfavor when, on the initiative of V’iatrovych and other legitimizing historians, he designated the OUN and UPA as “Heroes of Ukraine.” As he identified the Ukrainian state with the OUN and UPA, posthumously rehabilitated Shukhevych, Bandera, and Stets’ko, and tasked government agencies with the obfuscation of the murders, the state took upon itself a moral responsibility for their atrocities.

As Paul Hockenos has observed, this form of revisionism is particularly strong in illiberal political cultures. Ukrainian is not unique in this regard – ultranationalist historians have been instrumental in facilitating the rise of the far right in many eastern and central European countries: “[C]ountries in which these discourses are strongest usually have high levels of anti-Semitism and other illiberal values. Those ideologies can be reflected not just in party programs but also in textbooks, museums, and the mass media… Some of the nastiest far-right movements, like the neo-fascist Jobbik party, in Hungary, grew out of right-wing, revisionist history departments.”\(^{77}\)

It may be tempting to interpret Yushchenko’s devastating defeat as a confirmation of the bankruptcy of his Geschichtspolitik. Yet this may still be premature. On the contrary, it has emboldened and encouraged diaspora ultranationalists to seek rehabilitation of OUN and UPA veterans in Canada.\(^{78}\) In Ukraine proper, it has legitimized many of the claims of the extreme right, such as the All-Ukrainian Association Svoboda (Vseukrains’ke ob’iednannie Svoboda, VO Svoboda), and its neo-fascist associates.

To many people within the Ukrainian far right, the denial is more an issue of identity than historical inquiry. Svoboda has taken a hands-on approach to denial. In August 2011, its activists invaded and ransacked a camp of

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\(^{76}\) Ivan Kachanovski. Terrorists or National Heroes. (Forthcoming).


archaeologists who were trying to count the bones of OUN–UPA victims in the formerly Polish village of Ostrówkíi.79

It is hard to see how this instrumentalization of history would not have an adverse effect on Polish–Ukrainian relations. Surveys show that an increasing number of Poles associate ordinary Ukrainians with the UPA murder and ethnic cleansing.80 Yet, despite the post-Orange Revolution tendency to equate Ukrainians with Banderites, most Polish researchers have maintained an important distinction between Ukrainians and the organizations that perpetrated the murders. As Yushchenko, upon V’iatrovych’s recommendations, made Shukhevych an official Hero of Ukraine, the Polish Institute of National Memory published an entire volume dedicated to “righteous” Ukrainians who sheltered Polish civilians from the OUN–UPA murderers.81

**Conclusion**

Franziska Bruder points out the dangers of bestowing academic credibility upon ultranationalist ideologues who do not accept basic standards of scientific method:

> Public and historical debates are not conducted in a vacuum. Of course, there will be diverging positions, varying foci, different emphases on sources – but historical researchers follow recognized standards in dealing with sources, which no historian can ignore without tarnishing his or her reputation. In addition, when evaluating sources and historical situations, historians must adhere to certain values, as they are, for instance, held by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.82

**Druha pol’ska-ukrains’ka viina** falls short of minimal academic standards. Despite its use of a note apparatus and rector Serhii Kvit’s ambitious
attempts to legitimize it, in the view of this reviewer, it cannot be accepted as a scholarly work, and it is with some hesitation this reviewer agreed to review it. Rather, this is a work of propaganda published by the successors of the organizations responsible for the atrocities. Ethnic cleansing and mass murder of civilians is not “warfare,” but war criminality. In 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ruled that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre was an act of genocide.\footnote{Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Judgment IT- 98-33 [2001] ICTY 8. 2.08.2001. http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICTY/2001/8.html (Last accessed: March 9, 2012).} Today the OUN–UPA’s 1943 campaign against the civilian Polish population would qualify under the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as “the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group.” To this reviewer, the question of whether this was genocide or not is of secondary importance. However, attempts to relativize atrocities on the scale of a dozen Srebrenicas through a selective use of sources, and repackaging human rights abuses on a massive scale as “war” is inadmissible. In his defense of the indefensible, V’iatrovych places state consolidation above human rights. The book at hand is ultranationalist political activism under the disguise of academic inquiry. As it does not follow accepted scholarly practice, it should not be accepted by the scholarly community.

V’iatrovych’s truth claims notwithstanding, Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina does little in terms of deconstructing myths. It brings little, if any understanding of the events of Volhynia in 1943. Even less so does this sort of mythmaking hold out any prospect of reconciliation, either between Ukraine and Poland or within Ukraine itself.

As an account on the OUN–UPA murder of the eastern Poles, this reviewer would not recommend Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina either to scientists, lecturers, or students. However, with a critical introduction Druha pol’s’ko-ukrains’ka viina could perhaps be used as an object of inquiry in a higher seminar on comparative far-right revisionism and obfuscation. Like Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv, it illustrates a culture of historical denial that, in combination with self-victimization, fuels the rise of the extreme right. Against the backdrop of current developments in Ukraine, it is disturbing reading.

This reviewer strongly recommends this book to the TsDVR’s North American partners, particularly to the administrators at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, which funded V’iatrovych’s research in the Lebed ar-
chives and helped make this book possible. They have good reason to ponder the implication of associating Harvard University with this sort of activism. Ukrainian studies have long struggled to draw the line between scholarship and ultranationalist activism. This book raises serious questions, not only of academic integrity but also of fundamental human rights.

SUMMARY

In a detailed review of *The Second Polish–Ukrainian War, 1942–1947*, Per Rudling challenges both the conclusions and conceptual premises of the work under review. Rudling argues that V’iatrovych’s claim of equivalency between the extermination of the Volhynian Polish population by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the one hand, and the murder of Ukrainians by Polish nationalist insurgents during World War II is historically unsustainable and ethically unsavory. Moreover, according to Rudling, V’iatrovych’s representation of the Volhynian massacre contradicts existing historiography, in particular, works by Ihor Iliushyn and Grzegorz Motyka. These historians have demonstrated that the events in question were acts of deliberate ethnic cleansing on the part of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which ideologically dominated the UPA and wanted to transform Volhynia into a homogeneous ethnically Ukrainian territory. In conclusion, Rudling denies the monograph any scholarly value and categorizes it as an example of a politically motivated denial of mass murder.

Резюме

В подробной рецензии на книгу Владимира Вятровича “Вторая польско-украинская война, 1942–1947” Пер Рудлинг подвергает острой критике выводы и концептуальные основания рецензируемой работы. Рудлинг утверждает, что попытка Вятровича представить как симметричные события уничтожение Украинской повстанческой армией (УПА) польского населения Волыни и убийства украинцев польскими националистами в годы Второй мировой войны исторически неубедительна и морально сомнительна. То, как в книге представлена “волынская резня”, противоречит установленным в историографии фактам, особенно работам И. Илюшина и Гр. Мотыки. Эти историки показали, что речь идет о сознательной этнической чистке, подготовленной Организацией украинских националистов (ОУН), идеологически домини-
ровавшей в УПА, с целью превратить Волынь в этнически гомогенную украинскую территорию. В заключение Рудлинг отказывает рецензируемой книге в научном значении и квалифицирует ее как политически мотивированный уход от признания совершенного преступления.