Dr. John J. Tierney speaking at the Lansdale ColloquiumOn June 5th, 2024, IWP hosted a one-day colloquium titled “Liaison & Legacy: Edward Geary Lansdale,” focusing on the late U.S. military intelligence officer, advisor, and expert on irregular warfare who practiced his craft in the Philippines and Vietnam. This paper was created as a part of the colloquium.
By Dr. John J. Tierney, Jr.
In 2006, my volume Chasing Ghosts, a history of the U.S. experience with guerrilla war, was published.1 Going through the entire history of such quasi-military encounters, beginning with the pre-Revolution Colonial years, I recalled how different the war engaged by Air Force Colonel Lansdale (later Major General) was in the Philippines compared to the decades-long U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Not unlike President Reagan’s end of the Cold War, the war against the Communist guerrillas in the Philippines (“Hukbalahaps”) was won “without a shot being fired” by a single American soldier. Victory was secured in about four years (1950-1954).
The war against the “Huks” in the Philippines had little of the horrific battles and casualties of regular warfare. It was rather ignored by the American media, cost no American casualties, produced no protest movement at home, no University closings (unlike now) and was directed by a handful of individuals, Ed Lansdale chief among the American advisors.
If we compare Lansdale’s experience in the Philippines with Vietnam and all the others put together, the experience must rank as “first and foremost” as to how to fight a guerrilla war successfully while no one at home knows that you’re even there.
In other words, a true “miracle” in history!
Given Lansdale’s close and personal affiliation with Philippine Defense Secretary (later President) Ramon Magsaysay, I even speculated whether American armed forces might be a deterrent to a lasting and successful foreign anti-guerrilla campaign. I quoted a Colonel in the Philippine Army who agreed:
“Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government. Local populations will shelter their own people against operations of foreign troops, even though those they shelter may be outlaws. For this reason, native troops would be more effective than foreign forces in operations against native communist conspirators.” 2
Lansdale’s (and Magsaysay’s) campaign, therefore, urged diplomatic, psychological, and political solutions to the Communist military operations against the Philippine government. In my own book, I quote Lansdale toward that precise end: “The most urgent need,” he once wrote, “was to construct a political base for supporting the fight. Without it, the Philippine armed forces would be model examples of applied military doctrine, but would go on losing.”3 With a viable political base behind it, the government could “mount a bold, imaginative and popular campaign against the Huk guerrillas.”
In his 1972 memoir In the Midst of Wars, Lansdale revealed the heart of his and Magsaysay’s political-psychological strategy to undermine the support that the Huks had enlisted in their effort to overthrow the government in Manila. And it had little to do with battle tactics:
“… the back of the Huks’ armed struggle was broken in November 1951, and they became weaker and weaker thereafter. The reason was fundamental. The people and the armed forces were truly joined together that November. Once the civilians and the military united, the Huks were left outside the national family. In effect, this event added a noteworthy footnote to Mao’s dictum that the people are the water in which the guerrilla fish swim. The Huks became fish out of water.”4
In his later study of the Huk rebellion, U.S. Army Major Andrew E. Lembke narrated the critical importance of the relationship between Lansdale and Magsaysay which defined the character of the conflict and the reason why they joined together to win it:
“Magsaysay and Lansdale’s close contact with and understanding of the people’s needs, their unique backgrounds, and common character combined to make them an extremely powerful and effective team, despite their relatively junior positions at the beginning of the Huk campaign. This thesis will argue the collaboration between Ramon Magsaysay and Edward Lansdale emerged as a critical factor in the Philippine government’s successful campaign against the Huk movement, from 1946-54, because of their shared empathy for the Filipino people, deep sociocultural understanding, and complementary capabilities and resources.”5
Throughout his manuscript, Major Lembke further demonstrated some of the techniques used by both men to arrest the Huk insurgency. In one paragraph, he showed how Lansdale’s emphasis on psychological operations turned the tide against the Huks:
“Just as the scout ranger teams had a psychological effect on their fellow soldiers, Lansdale and Magsaysay wanted the AFP [Armed Forces Philippines] to have a psychological effect on the Huks. Complimentary to AFP offensive operations was the inclusion of psychological operations, or psywar as Lansdale referred to it, into some aspect of almost every AFP operation. Lansdale was a strong advocate of psychological operations and helped establish a psychological warfare training center for the AFP. While AFP offensive operations focused on attacking the Huks’ military strength, with casualties often the result, it appears the psychological operations focused more on Huk morale in an attempt to get them to surrender. As noted previously, both men frequently cited the larger number of Huks who surrendered than were killed or captured, but as Magsaysay’s thoughts on reconciliation demonstrated, he empathized with the Huk rank-and-file and preferred they rejoin society peacefully.”6
Lembke also demonstrated the low caliber of the Philippine government and military when Lansdale arrived in 1950 (he was stationed there earlier after WWII but returned home in 1948):
“Unfortunately, professional atrophy appeared to be the preferred course for the armed forces. Officers often engaged in large-scale corruption, and were often implicated in Manila-based scandals Offensive operations usually only occurred as a result of some Huk operation that ‘made political waves in Manila.’” 7
The arrival of Lansdale in September 1950 turned the situation around swiftly:
“Throughout Lansdale’s autobiography and biography, it is clear that personality played an important part in his actions in the Philippines. He possessed deep convictions about the importance of his work in fighting communism, but more importantly in promoting democracy and democratic ideals. Lansdale’s journal, from his early days in the Philippines, demonstrates that he genuinely cared about the plight of the lower classes, particularly those in the provinces, applying blame equally to the Huks and the [Police Constabulary] for the peasant’s suffering. Lansdale’s genuine nature was also noted by those who came to know him personally.” 8
In his conclusion, Major Lembke summarized how the team Lansdale-Magsaysay may have joined together to make the defeat of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines one of the best, if not the very best, counterinsurgency teams in American history:
“Lansdale’s empathy was critical to the eventual success of the campaign because people perceived him as genuine and trustworthy. These characteristics allowed him to develop the wide network of contacts throughout Philippine society that informed his actions during the campaign. …Empathy also provided a solid foundation for his relationship with Magsaysay, which was characterized by mutual trust and respect. Without this foundation it is unlikely that their association would have lasted long.”9
Understanding this, they were able to select the programs, initiatives, and covert operations that would have the most effect on the population and the Huks. Even the smallest military operations against the Huks usually incorporated psychological operations grounded in sociocultural understanding. Rather than focusing just on improving the combat capabilities of the AFP, they also spent considerable time developing the AFP’s popular image. Lansdale and Magsaysay understood that the existing image when they took over the campaign reinforced the popular perception that the whole government was against the people.
When distilled to its essence, the counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines represented an extremely effective ends-ways-means analysis on the part of both men. Lansdale and Magsaysay determined the proper ends, i.e. the objectives of their programs and initiatives, because of their empathy for the people. They determined the proper ways to accomplish those objectives through deep sociocultural understanding. Finally, their complementary capabilities and resources served as the means for accomplishing their objectives.
Compare Lansdale’s experience in the Philippines with another counterinsurgency that took place in the 1920s and used the Marine Corps as the official agent for peace and stability (an episode at the center of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Pennsylvania, 1969).
History may have relevance after all, especially when the United States is just now coming back from a series of military interventions called (by the same media) “endless wars” and in the larger shadow of Vietnam, where this country lost 58,000 men in over a decade of guerrilla war.
But why Nicaragua, and why 1927?
Unbeknownst to most Americans, Nicaragua was the location of America’s largest military action between the two world wars (1918 – 1941). It also happens to be the location of a classic example of how/why a great power (that had just won history’s greatest war in 6 months) was both frustrated and unable to win a simple guerrilla contest against a tiny (about 500) band of irregulars in a jungle and mountain area with less than a half-million people.
Ridiculous…. but true.
At the time, the U.S. was in the middle of an “isolationist” reaction to the tragedy of World War I (called “normalcy”) and was disinterested in most world politics away from hemispheric affairs. Inside this indifference was an exaggerated interest in the “crown jewel” Panama Canal and anything or anybody that might threaten its stability. Mexico and Central America were critical in this regard, with the U.S. highly sensitive to Mexico as a destabilizing factor. Regarding Mexico, President Coolidge told Congress on January 10, 1927:
“I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been shipped to the revolutionaries in Nicaragua… The United States cannot fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests.”10
The “revolutionaries” in Nicaragua were led by nationalist guerrilla Augusto C. Sandino and his band who were holed up in the northern mountains and refused to surrender. The possibility of a takeover against the central government prompted Coolidge to send prominent Republican and former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to arrange an intervention. With almost 5,000 Marines stationed throughout Nicaragua, Stimson went home confident that order would soon be established and a native force, “Guardia Nacional,” would relieve the Marines.
Nothing of the sort happened.
The first “disaster” came almost immediately when a group of about 80 Marines was surrounded by guerrillas in a fortress called Ocotal in mid-July. On the verge of surrender, the Marines were rescued by their air wing which torpedoed the enemy on the perimeter of the fort, an instance now recorded as the first “dive-bombing” in military history. But the attack left hundreds of “Sandinistas” (as they came to be called) lying dead outside Ocotal, an event that created both domestic and global sympathy when it became news.
Things only got worse. Not only did Sandino become an international celebrity for the Marxist Left, but he also organized his home base against the “outsiders” and slipped across into Honduras when the Marines came close. “It will be very difficult,” the U.S. Ambassador wrote home, “to improve conditions so long as these bandits are permitted to cross the frontier at will.” A Marine communiqué noted how the Sandinistas were able to organize “the population of the northern part of Nicaragua into a complex system of intelligence and supply.”
Within the American ideology, the Sandinistas were denied any and all “nationalistic” origins, as memos both classified and public continued to refer to them as mere “bandits,” interested only in theft and loot. Nothing could be further from the truth.
As things in Nicaragua went “from banditry to a state of insurrection” (The New York Times), U.S. officials grew more pessimistic. The Admiral in charge of the full operation, David Sellers, noted once that, “the bandits are apparently better organized and equipped than the Brigade Commander had reason to believe.” Marine General Logan Feland eventually admitted that success in Nicaragua would “be a matter of months or even years,” while admitting that the promised Guardia “will continue at least a decade as an uncontrolled but dependent offspring of any Naval force which may remain in Nicaragua.”
In the meantime, the success of the Sandinistas in defying American power continued into the 1930s and aroused worldwide and domestic frustration against U.S. policies. By 1929, Assistant Secretary of State Francis White privately wrote that “the sentiment in this country and especially in Congress is very strong against keeping the Marines there indefinitely… we cannot indefinitely maintain a large force of Marines in Nicaragua.”
Later on, the same Henry L. Stimson who had begun the whole episode as a Coolidge emissary had now become Secretary of State under President Herbert Hoover. Events subsequently forced a full turnaround in Stimson’s mind. Privately, he wrote that “the Marines haven’t done their job… it simply hasn’t been a good job well done.” Publicly, when he was asked at a Press Conference if he would do it again, Stimson simply replied, “Not on your life.”
The last Marine left Nicaragua on January 3, 1933. Officially, the Marine Corps was bitter, with Commandant General Ben H. Fuller proclaiming at the end that he “would welcome the opportunity to settle the situation with a sufficient force of Marines.”
Augusto Sandino was assassinated in 1934 by the Guardia Nacional.
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas claiming the heritage of Sandino, led by Daniel Ortega, have totally dominated the Nicaraguan nation for most of the years since their own victory in 1979. Ortega is the Sandinista chief and the country’s “President” today in 2024; and since 2007.
Any “lessons” here? If so, they haven’t been applied since Landale-Magsaysay defeated the Huks in 1954.
Footnotes
- John J. Tierney Jr., Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006).
- Ibid, p. 225.
- Ibid. p. 224.
- Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, (NY: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 85.
- Andrew E. Lembke, Lansdale, Magsaysay, America and The Philippines, (Leavenworth KA: Command and General Staff College, 2013), p. 2.
- Ibid, p. 71.
- Ibid, p. 37.
- Ibid, p. 40.
- Ibid, p. 102.
- All references in this section: Chasing Ghosts, op. cit., Chapters 11, 12.