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ACTIVE
MEASURES





ACTIVE MEASURES

Spring 2012· Volume I, Number 1

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From the Editors

The founding of The Institute of World Politics at the end of the Cold War initially appeared as a most inauspicious beginning. The world in 1991, it was widely believed, would have little need for a school teaching the arts of statecraft, including one-of-a-kind courses in intelligence and counterintelligence. Yet the “end of history” did not live up to its utopian expectations, and the curriculum at the Institute was soon revealed as being more relevant than ever before. Twenty years on, IWP students are making valuable contributions to the practice of American foreign policy in nearly every arm of government, yet much work remains.

At the Institute students are taught to emulate the scholar-practitioner. According to one professor, one cannot be a solid analyst without possessing an extensive library. This unique form of education provides for learning in the classroom which takes many people decades of on-the-job training to achieve. The Institute is uniquely dedicated to the unity of study and practice as a means of preparing pupils for their chosen careers. Faculty, staff, and students all recognize the importance of developing the analytical faculties necessary to advance their professions.

It is hoped that through the establishment of *Active Measures* students will be able to narrow the gap between scholars and practitioners by encouraging debate, and bringing their original research out of the classroom and into the public square. Only in this way, we believe, can we discover new ways of looking at age old challenges and generate new possibilities for the conduct of prudent foreign policy.

For Cold Warriors the term “active measures” may be off putting because of its nefarious connotations. The former Soviet Union, as IWP students are well aware, used active measures as an umbrella term to describe its subversive political warfare operations waged against the capitalist system. These operations were conducted with the aim of accelerating the denouement of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Of course, Moscow failed to achieve this goal.

The student editors of this journal have chosen *Active Measures* in order to emphasize the importance of waging full-spectrum statesmanship in the promotion of Western values. From these spring respect for human dignity, rule of law, and liberal democratic government, which are mainsprings of cultural progress. Western active measures, then, calls not only for the promotion of these core values in a manner consistent with the cultural nuances of peoples across the globe, but also in a manner that avoids mirror-imaging. Ultimately, we hope that through this journal we can both further our intellectual development and leave a positive mark upon the course of history. ■

Daniel Acheson is originally from Port Angeles, Washington and will graduate in 2012 with an M.A. in Statecraft and National Security focusing on defense policy. He hopes to start a career in the intelligence community as a political analyst, preferably with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His email address is acheson.daniel@gmail.com. **Samantha Borzi** graduated from James Madison University in 2010 with a BA in international affairs. She is currently enrolled in IWP's national security M.A. program and expects to graduate in May 2013. She currently works for the Department of Defense. Her email address is borzism@gmail.com. **Sarah Coulter** is currently pursuing her M.A. in Strategic Intelligence Studies with a specialization in counterintelligence/counterterrorism. She is a graduate of the University of Mary Washington with a B.A. in history, where she worked on the newspaper and yearbook. Prior to attending IWP, she worked as an editor for the government, editing products for the President, Vice President, Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition to her part time studies, she now works in counterintelligence operations for the United States government. Her email address is sarahlcoulter@gmail.com. **Benjamin Fricke** is a second-semester Master's degree candidate in Statecraft and International Affairs. Ben hails from Radis, Germany and came to the U.S. in 2009 as an undergraduate student at Wittenberg University. He anticipates graduating after spring semester 2013 and wants to continue with his Ph.D. in international relations. Ultimately, Ben pursues a career in government and higher education. His email address is bfricke.iwp@gmail.com. **Michael Webber** will graduate in 2012 from The Institute of World Politics with a Master of Arts in Statecraft and National Security Affairs. He aspires to a career in the foreign service and has focused his research at IWP on counterintelligence and the consequences of failing states. Michael is originally from Saginaw, Michigan. His email address is webberm2@gmail.com.

From the President

John Lenczowski

I am delighted to introduce the maiden issue of The Institute of World Politics' new student journal—*Active Measures*—and I would like to express very deep appreciation to the students whose initiative this is. This journal is named after an expression from the lexicon of the former Soviet KGB, which refers to disinformation, forgeries, and covert political influence operations. This expression is symbolic of an entire field of statecraft which is but one of those neglected fields which we at IWP have been dedicated to addressing.

Active measures are conducted by hostile foreign intelligence agencies, and have historically constituted a significant threat to the national security of the United States. It is noteworthy that the conduct of, and strategic conceptions underlying, American statecraft have rarely acknowledged the existence of such activities, and have even more rarely done anything to counter them. Since active measures are intelligence operations, they logically are the object of U.S. counterintelligence policy and practice. Yet all too often, counterintelligence has been equated in the United States with counter-espionage, and has ignored active measures—an activity that dates back at least to the time of Sun Tzu.

John Lenczowski is the founder and president of The Institute of World Politics and the author of Full-Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy and Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, among other works. From 1981 to 1983, Dr. Lenczowski served in the State Department in the Bureau of European Affairs and as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. From 1983 to 1987, he was Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council. In that capacity, he served as principal Soviet affairs adviser to President Reagan. Dr. Lenczowski attended the Thacher School, earned his B.A. at the University of California, Berkeley, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

The Institute of World Politics was founded for several important purposes, one of which is to study all the arts of statecraft, and how they should be prudently, ethically, and effectively conducted. This means the study, not only of those arts which are proper to the culture of the United States, but also those which are undertaken by foreign powers, and which exceed the bounds of what is diplomatically acceptable.

This means that we at IWP seek to look at the world the way it really is, rather than the way we wish it to be, and we prepare our students to address whatever challenges may be thrown at us as we attempt the defense of American liberty and, when it comes to our foreign students, the defense of decent civilization everywhere.

Much of IWP's mission involves the study of neglected subjects, which are ignored partly for intellectual reasons, and partly due to moral failures, like willful blindness and wishful thinking. This mission also requires the cultivation of moral leadership qualities, such as having the courage to see the truth when all about you are willfully blind, and then to tell the truth to power. *Active Measures* is a symbol. It represents that larger collection of subjects addressed by IWP whose neglect has yielded great damage to our national security.

IWP's focus on the arts of statecraft necessarily involves attention to American culture: in other words, solicitude to those values and principles which are part of the genetic code of that nation which America's founding fathers established it to be. Regarding "actives measures," those founders specifically warned us about the unique vulnerability of the republican form of government—in contrast, say, to monarchy—to what they called the "insidious wiles of foreign influence." That the architects of the American constitutional system would alert us to such an Achilles heel is just one of those many object lessons about the relationship between American founding principles and the ongoing conduct of American statecraft.

In studying neglected subjects such as active measures, not to mention public diplomacy, strategic influence, cultural diplomacy, political warfare, many elements of economic strategy, and other subfields too numerous to mention here, IWP's students have been making signal, original contributions to knowledge in the many fields of statecraft. Then, they are taking the lessons of their study here to their many places of work in our foreign policy and national security communities.

I only regret that so much of their intellectual production thus far has not been sufficiently publicized, but I am enormously gratified that, with this first issue of *Active Measures*, America and the world will get a glimpse of our students' original thinking that is grounded in American founding principles and eternal philosophical truths. ■

Empire Under Reconstruction: The Grand Strategy of Post- Soviet Russia Under Putin

Paweł Piotr Styrna

The territories of the former Soviet bloc are a much different place in 2012 than in 1991, the year of the USSR's dissolution. In general, the Communist Party's official monopoly on power was revoked and many political parties (quite often claiming direct descent from pre-communist political organizations) entered the arena. Central planning was scrapped in favor of market economics, though not necessarily *laissez faire* capitalism. The former subjects of totalitarian regimes were now guaranteed Western-style civic rights, at least in theory. Admittedly, these general tendencies affected some post-Soviet states to a far greater degree than others. Even so, the changes which occurred during the past twenty years in this part of the world have prompted some to even question the validity of the concept of "former Soviet Union."¹ Nevertheless, Russia's post-communist transformation continues to be plagued by intransigent continuities and resurgent pathologies inherited from the ancien regime. Some, such as the "mother of 'Solidarity'"—the late Anna Walentynowicz—argued that "communism hasn't collapsed; it has camouflaged itself." Two interrelated policies in Putinist Russia—the rehabilitation of many elements of the Soviet past, and

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attempts to reassemble the empire—demonstrate that such assessments are by no means groundless.

Russia: From disintegration under Yeltsin to reintegration under Putin

The Russian Federation—the largest and most populous post-Soviet republic and the core of the old Soviet Union—eventually saw a partial re-Sovietization, to a significant degree the result of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991–1999). In the minds of many, if not most, Russians, the Yeltsin years became synonymous with the country’s disintegration and anarchization. As industrial production and the population’s already low living standard plummeted, a few well-connected (both to the Kremlin and the ex-KGB network) oligarchs plundered Russia’s wealth and indulged in brazen public displays of immense riches acquired overnight. Crime and corruption proliferated. Alcoholism, drug abuse, and venereal diseases—pathologies severely exacerbated as a result of communist rule—cannibalized the national substance.

Moreover, many Russians viewed the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union as one of national humiliation. As a result, they resented the newly-independent republics and satellites as allegedly ungrateful for the supposed “blessings” of Soviet rule. Ethnic Russian diasporas—particularly in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Baltic states—proved an additional source of irredentism and aggravation. Furthermore, ethnic groups within the Russian Federation—which, in spite of the implosion of the USSR, the world’s largest state and the greatest surviving contiguous colonial empire—took advantage of the weakening of central power to advance claims for greater autonomy. This prompted many Russians to fear the dissolution of the state as a result of centrifugal forces. The first war over the Muslim-majority Caucasian republic of Chechnya (1994–1996), culminating in a Russian defeat at the hands of the Chechen autonomist forces, seemed to confirm this doomsday scenario. Moreover, the sinking of the submarine *Kursk* in August 2000 served to demonstrate the level of decay affecting the Russian military during the 1990s.

Although Yeltsin, himself a former *apparatchik*, put the Communist Party on trial, Russia witnessed no significant de-communization. In fact, the CP’s leader, Gennady Ziuganov, threatened to wrest the presidency from Yeltsin in the 1996 election. Only the assistance of the oligarch-controlled media empire enabled Yeltsin to win a second term. In spite of this victory, the aging president’s popularity again plummeted, particularly as a result of the August 1998 economic crisis.

During the Yeltsin years many Russians began to associate such terms as freedom, democracy, and capitalism with anarchy, license, and cronyism. Much of the population longed for a strong hand, if not an outright reimposition of at

least some features of the Soviet system. Such sentiments certainly found fertile ground in Russia's autocratic political culture. Thus, the stage was set for the rapid rise of Vladimir Putin.

The former KGB colonel, Soviet *rezident* in East Germany during the late 1980s, and head of the FSB (the KGB's main successor) in 1998–1999, was appointed Prime Minister by Yeltsin in August 1999. Soon, upon Yeltsin's sudden resignation, the departing head of state also anointed Putin as his successor. The ex-KGB officer triumphed in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, and was succeeded by his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev. Putin himself assumed the office of Prime Minister, yet quite a few believed that he continued to wield the real power in Russia.

As president of the Russian Federation, Putin immediately embarked on a course to deal with that which he, and undoubtedly many Russians, viewed as the pathologies of the Yeltsin era. The new leader crushed the rebellious Chechens, thereby halting centrifugal forces. The power of the centralized state was greatly bolstered, at the expense of local self-government and civic liberties. For instance, elective provincial governors were now once again appointed by Moscow. The despised oligarchs were dealt a decisive blow. Economic reforms, including a 13 percent flat tax, coupled with increased oil and natural gas revenues, reversed the country's economic decline and fueled growth. Putin's aggressive foreign policy—which large segments of the Russian population perceived as prestige regained on the international stage—also contributed to his high popularity.

Yet, as the expectations of ordinary Russians continue to grow, the popularity of the pro-Kremlin “United Russia” Party has recently dropped. Medvedev's September 24, 2011 announcement—made at a United Russia Party congress in Moscow—enabling Putin to run for a third, six-year term in 2012 serves to confirm this view. The situation seems to have emboldened Mikhail Gorbachev to criticize the Putinist leadership in light of the approaching March elections. The last Soviet leader called for an “update” of Russia's “senior leadership” and castigated the “United Russia” Party as a “worse version of the Soviet Communist party.”²

Whitewashing the Soviet Union under Putin

The Putin years witnessed attempts to rehabilitate the Soviet past and to reconstruct the empire. While allowing the return of the body of the famous anti-Bolshevik Civil War commander, Gen. Anton Denikin, to Russia in 2005, Putin's regime also restored the red banner as the official flag of the Russian armed forces and reinstated a slightly modified version of the Stalinist Soviet anthem. Russian

historical policy during the Putin-era effectively whitewashed the genocidal dictator, Joseph Stalin, by ignoring his crimes and portraying Stalin as a strong leader of a mighty state. Stalin's foreign policy decisions, such as the signing of the Nazi-Soviet (Ribbentrop-Molotov) Pact of August 1939, which partitioned Poland and enabled Hitler to spark the Second World War, was defended as a necessary move to secure the USSR's national interests. The Soviet occupation of East-Central Europe following the collapse of the Third Reich continues to be depicted as a "liberation." The Soviet genocide of over 22,000 Polish officers at Katyn in 1940 is relativized. In essence, the Soviet-era was superficially purged of its communist character and reintegrated into Russian history as a legitimate element of national memory.³

The Chekist's⁴ nostalgia for the Soviet Empire is not surprising given Putin's blunt 2005 claim that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." His grand strategy involved reasserting Moscow's power on the world stage, in general, and her dominance in the former Soviet bloc, in particular. This neo-imperial doctrine led logically to a new Cold War with the West, with special emphasis on the United States and its allies among former Soviet republics and satellites. Yet, Putin's strategy entailed a gradual transition from apparent accommodation to ill-disguised hostility toward the Atlanticist system.⁵

Putin's grand strategy: rebuilding the empire

Putin's tactics were succinctly described by STRATFOR analyst Lauren Goodrich. According to Goodrich, Putin recognizes a tension between the alleged indispensability of autocratic rule in Russia and the necessity of obtaining Western technology to modernize the country. He skillfully resolved this tension by, initially, accommodating the West in a period necessary to shore up his strength. Hence, such overtures towards the West as the post-9/11 offer to cooperate on the anti-terrorist front. Following a period of internal political, economic, and military consolidation, however, Putinist Russia gradually adopted a more aggressive and hostile stance from 2005 onward.⁶

Admittedly, the pro-Western color revolutions in post-Soviet successor states like Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) constituted a setback from the Kremlin's point of view, but only a temporary one. Soon, however, Moscow recovered lost ground. In August of 2008, utilizing ethnic separatism, Russian forces invaded Georgia and *de facto* annexed two Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2010, the pro-Western Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko lost an election to a pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich. Soon

thereafter, in April 2010, the ousting of a pro-American leader in the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan ushered in a pro-Russian Roza Otunbayeva. Meanwhile, within days, the pro-U.S. Polish President, Lech Kaczynski, perished, along with his entire entourage, in a suspicious plane crash near the Russian city of Smolensk. In the wake of the air disaster, Warsaw's foreign policy rapidly evolved in a pro-Moscow direction.⁷ Russia also continues to remain a hegemon in such post-Soviet states as Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Then, the September 17, 2011 parliamentary elections in Latvia witnessed the victory of the left-wing, pro-Russian "Harmony Center" Party. At all events, the chronology of post-Soviet Russian resurgence is well-known. Therefore, this paper shall devote more attention to its justifying ideology and driving mechanisms.

Aleksandr Dugin: The blunt ideologue of post-Soviet neo-imperialism

The theories of Aleksandr Dugin—the troubadour of Russian "Eurasianism"—closely parallel the actual practice of Putinist grand strategy. A staunch anti-American and one of the main founders of the National Bolshevik Party, and the current leader of the Russian "Eurasianist" movement, Dugin is a self-admitted fascist (albeit, he claims to reject Nazism) and styles himself as a deeply Orthodox "conservative revolutionary." His views, in fact, constitute a clear example of the totalitarian compatibility of fascism and bolshevism, a disturbing phenomenon quite common in post-Soviet Russia. The scion of a long line of Soviet intelligence officers, Dugin also gazes with nostalgia upon the old Soviet Empire and its institutions. By no means a marginal figure, he is an influential ideologue who is well-connected to the Kremlin and Russia's security-military apparatus. His hefty 1997 magnum opus, *The Foundations of Geopolitics (Osnovy Geopolitiki)*, serves as a text book at the Russian military's General Staff Academy. As of yet, it remains to be translated into English.

The main thrust of Dugin's neo-imperialism boils down to a global offensive to reduce the influence of "Euro-Atlanticist" powers, i.e. the United States, Great Britain, and their allies. A "Eurasian Empire"—centered around its Russian core—is envisioned as the engine driving this vast and diverse international anti-American coalition. To quote Dugin's main work: "In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland of Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution. . . . The new Eurasian empire will be constructed on the principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, the strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us."⁸

Dugin's great anti-Atlanticist coalition involves three major strategic alignments, including the Middle East, East-South Asia and Europe.

In the Middle East, the Moscow-run Eurasian Empire should build alliances with Muslim states, including Arab regimes and Islamist Iran (already an informal Russian ally). Interestingly, Dugin calls for the handing of a truncated Christian Georgia to Islamist Iran as war booty, which points to a rabid hatred of the small but Caucasian nation which dared to embrace a course independent of Moscow's. It also indicates that the outwardly Christian (Orthodox) exterior of Duginism is an insincere façade.⁹

In East and South Asia, Dugin advises Russia to cultivate alliances with India and Japan (torn away from the U.S. orbit, of course) to counter China, which he considers a major threat and a powerful rival.

Europe, in turn, is to be purged of American influence through an alliance between the Russo-Eurasian empire and a nascent European federation led by Germany and France. Pro-American Central European ex-satellite states are to be crushed by the pincers of an already existing Russo-German "strategic partnership." Here Dugin probably envisions a new division of spheres of influence, such as the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.

Of course, the post-Soviet ideologue's geopolitical vision assumes a reincorporation of such former Soviet republics as Ukraine and the Baltic states into the "new Eurasian empire." Yet, Dugin emphasizes the reassembled empire's Russian-dominated but nevertheless multi-ethnic and multi-religious character. He condemns Great Russian nationalism, based on Orthodoxy and nationality, as a constraining tool in the hands of American Atlanticism.¹⁰ After all, Russian nationalism *sensu stricto* may hamper imperial expansionism.

The tools to achieve the Eurasianist grand strategy are primarily political and economic, though military force is certainly not ruled out. Pipeline diplomacy, i.e. the strategic use of Russian natural gas and oil exports, is already a major weapon in the Putinist arsenal. In addition, Dugin urges the wide-scale employment of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation techniques in enemy territory. For instance, in the United States, he advises a Machiavellian strategy of *divide et impera*, including the provoking of "Afro-American racists" and introducing "geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social, and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements—extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the US. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics."¹¹ Similarly, in the case of Poland, Dugin calls for the undermining of traditional Catholic and patriotic values and endorsing libertine and leftist tendencies.¹² Clearly, conflict and demoralization in the enemy camp is the main objective.

Aleksandr Dugin's geopolitical advice bears a striking similarity to Soviet grand strategy during the Cold War. And indeed, his "new Eurasian Empire"

is merely a reinvented version of the old Soviet Empire, albeit pragmatically stripped of its Marxist-Leninist ideological garb, if only superficially. While Dugin is certainly neither the leader nor the sole *spiritus movens* behind post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy, a juxtaposition of his recommendations and Putin's policies will reveal sufficient compatibility to warrant the attention devoted here to Dugin's theories.

Foreign espionage: The U.S. is the "main target"

Throughout the entire span of its existence, the Soviet Union devoted vast resources to spying on the non-communist world. During the Cold War, the prime target of Soviet bloc espionage activities was, of course, the "main enemy"—the United States. Pete Earley's 2007 book, *Comrade J*, demonstrates that the USSR's implosion has not altered Moscow's strategy of aggressive agentural penetration of the West and that the Kremlin continues to perceive America as an enemy. In fact, Moscow did not significantly curtail its activities against the U.S., now reclassified as the "main target," even during the lean and chaotic Yeltsin years. The protagonist of Earley's work—the KGB/SVR spymaster Sergei Tretyakov—defected in October 2000, offering the FBI a goldmine of information about post-Soviet espionage in the U.S. Comrade J, according to the author's obituary, "rose quickly through the ranks to become the second-in-command of the KGB in New York City between 1995 and 2000. As such, he oversaw all Russian spy operations against the U.S. and its allies in New York City and within the United Nations."¹³ It is quite possible that information supplied by Tretyakov eventually led to the arrest of eleven Russian illegals, also known as sleeper agents, on June 28, 2010.¹⁴ The Soviet-Russian defector offered a blunt warning to Americans: "As a people, you are very naïve about Russia and its intentions. You believe because the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia is now your friend. It isn't, and I can show you how the SVR is trying to destroy the U.S. even today and even more than the KGB did during the Cold War."¹⁵

The death of Sergei Tretyakov at the age of 53 on June 13 was not made public until nearly a month later on July 9, 2010, when obituaries began appearing in the Western press. Some sources have even linked his death to the Smolensk plane crash.¹⁶

Conclusion

How is the "Euro-Atlanticist" West, and particularly the United States, to respond to this challenge? Although supporters of President Obama's "reset" policy

claim that the new approach has secured greater Russian cooperation in the War on Terror, there is more convincing evidence that it has emboldened aggressive and expansionist tendencies in post-Soviet Russia.

In December 2010, the famous Soviet dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky, granted an interview to a Polish media outlet. He was advising the Poles to be firm with the government of post-Soviet Russia following the Smolensk Plane Crash. Yet, his words are just as applicable to the Russian policies of other Western countries, primarily President Obama's "reset:"

I do not understand how one can speak of improved relations with Russia. She is run by people who do not comprehend what such a word means. You may delude yourselves that you have good relations with them, but for them it means that they can pressure you even more, and demand even more. This pressure will last as long as you are under their control. They are especially interested in seeing you divided and quarrelling amongst yourselves. ... They are the descendants of the Cheka and the KGB, and, as such, they have their own specific mentality. They do not understand what normal inter-state relations mean. For them any other country can [only] be either an enemy, or an agent. Besides these two criteria there is no room for partners or friends. These heirs of the Soviet services do not, because they cannot, have a Western mentality, which assumes that if two sides agree to something, they carry out their obligations. For Russia's current rulers such a policy is unattractive. They believe that they must act aggressively. If you give them your finger, they will take your entire arm.¹⁷

In the near future, Bukovsky's plea for realism is unlikely to find fertile ground in Washington, Paris, Rome, or Berlin, however. The current mainstream policy-making circles in the West appear irredeemably wedded to wishful thinking in relation to post-Soviet Russia. Yet, two decades following the fall of the Soviet Union, as Moscow continues to utilize Western appeasement and naivete to advance its neo-imperial, anti-Atlanticist agenda, its increasing brazenness might eventually awaken realist sentiments. These might suggest, at a minimum, greater Western cooperation when dealing with the Kremlin, and a coordinated policy, which might be termed "neo-containment." In light of Vladimir Putin's official return to the Russian presidency, a telling manifestation of post-communist continuity in the post-Soviet zone, firmness is much more likely to generate results than the Obama administration's failed "reset" policy.

In spite of the West's current policy of appeasement toward post-Soviet Russia, quite a few Westerners find themselves dismayed with the multiple pathologies and continuities carried over from Soviet times. These continue to plague post-Soviet Russia and exert a strong and negative impact on her relations with

foreign states, and particularly the Atlanticist West. Quite illustrative of this is then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' frank February 2009 admission, in a diplomatic cable since publicized by WikiLeaks, that "Russian democracy has disappeared and the government was an oligarchy run by the security services."¹⁸ Will such assessments translate into concrete revisions of policy *vis-à-vis* Moscow?



Notes

1. Brian Whitmore and Robert Coalson, "20 Years After the Big Breakup, Does the 'Former Soviet Union' Still Exist?" *RFE/RL*, August 18, 2011.

2. Charles Clover, "Gorbachev calls for change of Russian leadership," *Financial Times*, August 17, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/174a8322-c8e9-11e0-aed8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1VbV4bqYw>.

3. See Aleksander Szczygło, Leszek Pietrzak, and Bartosz Cichocki, *Russian Historical Propaganda in 2004–2009* (Warsaw: National Security Bureau, September 16, 2009), 4. Available for download in English, Polish, and Russian at http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/544/1841/Propaganda_historyczna_Rosji_w_latach_20042009.html?search=24640.

4. The Cheka, an abbreviation for the "All-Russian Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage," was created by Lenin's decree in December 1917, i.e. in the wake of the October Coup. Headed by the renegade Pole, Feliks Dzierzynski (Rus. Felix Derzhinskyi), the Cheka served as the Bolshevik regime's secret police and terror apparatus. During the Stalinist era, the Cheka underwent several name changes: beginning with the GPU, OGPU, and NKVD, and ending with the most-known abbreviation, the KGB, following the Second World War. After the Soviet implosion, the KGB was split up into several successor agencies, including the FSB (internal security) and the SVR (foreign intelligence). It is significant that Vladimir Putin and his milieu were molded by the worldview and modus operandi of the security apparatus.

5. See Janusz Bugajski, *Dismantling the West: Russia's Atlantic Agenda* (Washington, DC: Potomac Press, 2009).

6. Lauren Goodrich, "Russia's Evolving Leadership," STRATFOR, July 5, 2011.

7. See Paweł Piotr Styrna, "Case on the Smolensk Plane Crash Still Open Despite Polish Government Report," *SFPPR News & Analysis*, September 2, 2011, <http://www.sfppr.org>.

8. Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii (The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia's Geopolitical Future)* (Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997), 216. For succinct syntheses of Dugin's views in English see: John B. Dunlop, "Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics," Princeton University, Lichtenstein Institute on Self-Determination *Working Paper*, August 2003, http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/wp_russiaseries_dunlop.pdf; John B. Dunlop, "Russia's New – and Frightening – 'Ism,'" *Hoover Digest* 3 (2004): <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hooverdigest/article/8074>.

9. *Ibid.*, 351.

10. *Ibid.*, 197, 213, 251-252.

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Strategic Water Supplies

Brian Platt

Aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) systems combine man-made technology with existing geological formations and natural weather patterns to store and supply large amounts of freshwater for human consumption. Aquifer storage and recovery systems are a proven technology that efficiently provides freshwater at a fraction of the cost when compared to other types of water storage facilities. This reliable capability possesses the potential to mitigate regional instability by offsetting the effects of drought or providing a source of water in areas of diminishing access to freshwater. ASR systems retain enormous strategic potential by providing a long-term, low-cost source of freshwater to developing and agriculturally dependent nations.

R. David G. Pyne defines aquifer storage and recovery systems as “the storage of water in a suitable aquifer through a well during times when water is available, and recovery of the water from the same well during times when it is needed.”¹ Essentially, excess or abundant freshwater is pumped into an aquifer, stored, and recovered when needed using the same pump. Instead of only extracting water, ASR systems replenish or expand existing aquifers or create new aquifers.² Aquifer storage and recovery systems have twenty-two uses, but seasonal storage, long-term storage, and emergency storage of freshwater comprise the three primary applications.³

Aquifer storage and recovery systems have been in use worldwide for over 40 years. The United States contains the majority of the ASR systems employed globally. Other countries such as Australia, Israel, India, and England use ASR systems

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to provide an available source of freshwater.⁴ Pakistan is studying the feasibility of using ASR systems to mitigate current water shortages.⁵

The strategic value of freshwater

The strategic value of freshwater should not be underestimated. In a speech given at the National Geographic Society on March 22, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that access to clean freshwater is a matter of national security.⁶ Since 805 AD, over 3,600 non-navigational freshwater treaties have been signed, including 300 treaties signed since 1945.⁷ The increasing scarcity of accessible sources of uncontaminated freshwater exacerbates local and regional instability. Dr. Peter Gleik recorded over 40 cases of major violence due to constrained access to freshwater between 2000 and 2009. Examples in Kenya demonstrate the range and magnitude of violence. Between September 2009 and September 2010, an estimated 400 people died due to clashes over access to water.⁸ In another conflict, a clash between villagers and monkeys left eight monkeys dead and 10 villagers wounded.⁹

According to Nevin Kresic, 36% (18 million mi²) of available dry land depends on groundwater for irrigation. Freshwater in lakes, rivers, and groundwater comprises 0.609% of the total global supply of freshwater. The global supply of groundwater totals 0.6%.¹⁰ Almulla et. al. contend only .008% of the global supply of freshwater is available for human use.¹¹ The remaining 99% supply of freshwater is locked up in ice and the oceans.

Scarcity of freshwater

By 2025, 40 countries in the Middle East and Africa will have scarce supplies of freshwater.¹² According to the United Nations fact sheet on water and sanitation, 1.1 billion people currently lack access to uncontaminated drinking water.¹³ Pakistan is facing a water crisis. Irrigation consumes over 90% of available water, and available water has declined over 66% since the 1950s.¹⁴ Niger and Mauritania are nearly dependent on external supplies of water.¹⁵

Groundwater comprises the main source of freshwater in Africa. Groundwater supplies 95% of Libya's freshwater. Due to increasing populations and an increased demand for agriculture products, many African countries overexploit sources of freshwater through poor irrigation practices. This depletes existing aquifers and may deteriorate the quality of the remaining freshwater. Drought in Nigeria between 1985 and 1989 led to the drilling of 537 wells, many of which were left uncapped and free flowing. Large quantities of water were lost and

added to the decreasing water level of Lake Chad.¹⁶ Subsequently, the water level at Lake Chad has declined more than 80% since 1980.¹⁷

Most Gulf Cooperation Council countries in the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) have less than a four day supply of freshwater stored for use.¹⁸ The United Arab Emirates is constructing a \$435 million facility to store up to a 90 day supply of freshwater (over six billion gallons) for Abu Dhabi City in the event of an emergency.¹⁹ Water consumption in Kuwait is almost equal to the production capacity of desalination plants.²⁰ In Kuwait, irrigation of landscaping lead to declines in groundwater forcing residents to shift to freshwater produced from desalination plants.²¹

Advantages of aquifer storage and recovery systems

ASR systems have advantages when compared to other types of water storage facilities. Some of the advantages are: large storage capacities, low construction costs, require an acre or two of land per well (i.e. small footprint), low risk of contamination, safe from vandalism, and no evaporation loss.²² Additionally, ASR systems offer the flexibility to expand for increased storage capacity. A community could install a small ASR system and expand the system as the community grows.²³

Storage capacities of ASR systems range from 10 million gallons to billions of gallons of water. Many ASR systems in the Southeast United States inject water into the Floridian aquifer which covers hundreds of thousands of square miles. The Las Vegas, NV ASR system combines the advantages of a large freshwater storage capacity and a small footprint compared to a comparable reservoir. The Las Vegas ASR system comprises 42 wells with a 157 million gallon per day (MGD) capacity.²⁴ At an acre or two of land per well, the land requirement is a fraction of the amount needed for a reservoir of comparable storage capacity. An above ground 100 MGD facility would require a reservoir one KM wide by 12 KM long by 10 meters deep.²⁵

Many studies document the financial advantages of constructing and operating an ASR system versus other water storage facilities to store and provide freshwater. Myrtle Beach, SC analyzed the annual cost of producing and storing 1000 gallons of freshwater between different storage facilities as shown in Table 1.²⁶

Table 1: Annual cost to produce and store 1000 gallons of freshwater

<i>Storage facility</i>	<i>Annual cost</i>
Two-million gallon ground tank	\$ 31.00
500,000 gallon elevated tank	\$61.00
36 million gallon ASR	\$ 0.97

Construction costs of ASR systems vary widely due to the size of the system required for the intended purpose. West Palm Beach, Florida spent \$1,700,000 on an ASR system that currently injects up to eight million gallons per day for storage.²⁷ In Ft. Myers, Florida an ASR well that supplied one million gallons of freshwater per day was estimated at \$1.5 million.²⁸ Tualatin, Oregon built a \$2.4 million ASR system that will supply one million gallons of freshwater for 90 days.²⁹ San Antonio, Texas constructed a \$240 million ASR system to store up to 21.3 billion gallons of freshwater. Three years after completion, the ASR system injected 10.2 billion gallons of excess freshwater.³⁰ In comparison, the Temperance Flat dam in California is estimated to cost \$3.3 billion and may provide less than 65 billion gallons of water annually.³¹ Table two provides a sample of the different ASR systems in the United States.

Table 2: Comparisons of different ASR systems in the United States

<i>Location</i>	<i>Cost to build</i>	<i>Storage capacity</i>	<i>Water supplied</i>
West Palm Beach, Florida	\$1.7 million	Upper Floridian Aquifer	10 M/G/D
Tualatin, Oregon	\$2.4 million	100 million gallons in winter	1 M/G/D for 90 days
San Antonio, Texas	\$240 million	21.3 billion gallons	60+ M/G/D
Monterey, California	\$3.3 million	Seaside groundwater basin	16.8 M/G/D May-December ³²
Wichita, Kansas	\$200 million	Equus Beds Aquifer	100 M/G/D ³³

Farmers employ aquifer storage and recovery systems to provide freshwater to mitigate the effects of dry seasons and drought. Farmers in eastern Oregon take advantage of the wet winters and employ ASR systems to pump excess water into aquifers to offset the effects of dry summer months.³⁴ Orissa, India's monsoon season (June through September) produces 82% of the annual rainfall. Capturing excess rain water and storing it in ASR systems permitted an additional harvest during the dry winter season.³⁵ Doug Wilson concluded that a 1.5 billion gallon ASR system in southwest Georgia would have a positive effect on the agricultural economy by mitigating drought conditions for one to two years.³⁶ Brigham City, Utah uses ASR systems to offset the dry summer months with very low cost.³⁷ Portugal is seeking ASR systems to mitigate the effects of drought in southern Portugal where groundwater supplies freshwater.³⁸ ASR systems dampen the effects of drought in Australia.³⁹

Aquifer storage and recovery systems take advantage of different sources of untreated freshwater in order to fill aquifers for future irrigation use. Some of

those sources of water are municipal wastewater, stormwater runoff and irrigation return flow. Using nonpotable water for irrigation reduces demands on freshwater sources.⁴⁰ Adelaide, Australia employs 22 ASR systems to annually inject and store 528,400,000 gallons of stormwater runoff which is used primarily for irrigation.⁴¹ The San Antonio, TX ASR system benefited from heavy rains to pump water into its underground aquifer.⁴²

Downsides of aquifer storage and recovery systems

Aquifer storage and recovery systems develop problems when not constructed correctly. The wells can clog preventing the injection or recovery of water. Hazardous trace elements such as arsenic may leech into the aquifer. ASR systems require specific geological conditions to successfully store and extract water; thus poor planning or employing unqualified engineers may cause the stored water to flow out of the aquifer.⁴³

Successful construction of an aquifer storage and recovery system requires patience and time. The St. Johns River Water Management District in Florida experienced a 3½ to 5½ year process to construct a complete and operational ASR system from site selection to final construction. Actual construction of the ASR system itself may take from 12 to 18 months.⁴⁴ Constructing an ASR requires a long-term commitment to ensure the system operates properly and stored water remains uncontaminated. A correctly constructed and properly operating ASR system provides local communities a long-term source of freshwater to mitigate drought or reduce the incidents of water-borne diseases.

Reducing instability

Aquifer storage and recovery systems have the potential to reduce tensions between nations or populations that compete for freshwater from the same source. Capturing and storing excess freshwater in aquifers precludes constructing dams or reservoirs on rivers that may violate international treaties. In 2008, a group of Iranians crossed the Afghanistan border and bulldozed a diversion dam built on the Helmand River.⁴⁵ Pakistan and India are in talks over concerns of India's usage of the Indus River.⁴⁶

Providing a sustainable source of uncontaminated freshwater for human consumption or irrigation in Afghanistan utilizing ASR technology would benefit Afghans. Only 20% of Afghans have access to clean, uncontaminated water which contributes to health problems. Seventy-five percent of the 400 patients at the Parwan provincial hospital suffer from diseases due to ingesting contaminated

water. In Charikar, Afghanistan, the lack of access to clean water exacerbates the tension between Afghans and the NATO coalition. A promise of clean water remains unfulfilled as a \$1.25 million, four-well project has been delayed.⁴⁷ In the Khost province of Afghanistan, the construction of wells and dams by well-meaning military and non-governmental organizations lowered water tables and dried up traditional sources of water. Provincial reconstruction teams constructed diversion dams on the Shamal River, but the reservoirs filled up with silt after just two years.⁴⁸

In Afghanistan, 85% of the residents farm for a living.⁴⁹ Due to unreliable patterns of rainfall, 85% percent of Afghanistan's agriculture products depend on irrigation. For years, Afghan farmers relied on an ancient system to irrigate crops. These ancient systems, called *karez*, are horizontal tunnels dug into the base of mountains. In 2002, 6,741 karez systems irrigated 163,000 hectares. By 2008, over 60% of the karez systems dried up due to drought conditions. Because of drought, the amount of irrigated farmland declined by 50%. This statistic is critical as agricultural products cannot grow in irrigation-dependent areas due to unreliable rainfall. Rain-dependent agricultural areas have contracted due to successive dry years.⁵⁰ In addition, spring melt water from glaciers and snowpack arrives earlier in the year due to changes in climate. This results in less available water to irrigate crops in late summer. ASR systems could potentially store the excess freshwater available during snow melt and excess precipitation then extract the water during the dryer months to irrigate crops and provide potable water to Afghan villages and cities.

Hope exists for water issues in Afghanistan. John Shroder of the Afghanistan Studies Center at the University of Nebraska at Omaha states that there is plenty of water available, especially sources of groundwater. Accessing sources of groundwater and using it wisely is critical to the sustainability of agriculture and crucial to the stability of Afghanistan.⁵¹ ASR systems could take advantage of any existing aquifers in order to store excess water.

Currently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the only Department of Defense entity utilizing ASR technology. The United States military contains over two dozen well drilling units that are tasked to provide potable water to military units. The well-drilling manual used by the Air Force, Navy, and Army does not mention ASR systems. Well drilling units possess the drilling equipment necessary to reach adequate depths for an ASR system. If the U.S. military adopted ASR construction well drilling units would require additional training to properly construct an ASR system. Possessing this type of proven, non-lethal technology is a capability that can assist a commander's ability to proactively respond to inherent instability caused by constrained access to freshwater.

Aquifer storage and recovery systems are a proven technology that captures excess freshwater from various sources, stores the freshwater in aquifers, and then recovers the freshwater when needed. The benefits of ASR systems outweigh other freshwater storage systems. ASR systems are less expensive to construct than dams and reservoirs, provide flexibility in that ASR systems can expand to meet growing needs, have a small surface footprint, and can store large amounts of water with no loss to evaporation. Aquifer storage and recovery systems could be a potential diplomatic tool and assist with local and regional stability to arid regions of the world by providing a sustainable source of freshwater for agricultural and personal use. ■

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Iran's Real Nuclear Option: Closing the Strait

Darren Fazzino

Iran's genuine power comes from its location and geography. Their real nuclear bomb is the Strait of Hormuz and their capacity to close it, and with 35% of the world's oil supply flowing through it,¹ a powerful lever to operate. In January 2012, Iran held another military exercise, the seventh since 2000 as part of their Great Prophet military exercises. The cost of oil rose 5% at the very prospect of military action in any format in the Persian Gulf. This indicates the power of controlling this piece of property. Iran's greatest threat to world stability is not its nuclear bomb project, but rather Iran's potential to regulate traffic in and out of the Strait.

Iran borders the entire northern edge of the Persian Gulf. The strait wraps north with Oman to the south, but Iran dictates access to the strait because it controls the openings and the straight itself. Closing the strait carries penalties, yet the historical record favors Iran. Such regions are easy to close, and negate American aircraft carrier power. American carriers operate on the assumption that a certain area around them is free of all ships. In the crowded Strait of Hormuz, this is not possible. The United States should consult with Xerxes regarding Thermopylae about the problems of fighting in a closed environment before attempting it herself.

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In 2002, the U.S. Navy ran an exercise, the 2002 Millennium Challenge, which was a hypothetical case of American operations against an unspecified enemy in the Persian Gulf. This remains the largest fleet exercise on record, running 23 days and costing \$250 million.² The outcome was the red team was able to swarm the blue team and sink a good deal of it, resulting in the simulated death of 20,000 sailors and the loss of 1 carrier, 10 cruisers, and 5 of 6 amphibious landing craft. While simulations only go so far, other scenarios where the United States is ambushed in a strait yield the same results. With the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this is a possibility.

Carrier groups are optimized for fleet on fleet contact, not close-in ground support. In the Taiwan Strait as well, American carriers are not projected to do well in the event of a surprise attack. A 2009 RAND report gives China the edge in an air war, creating an umbrella for a cross-strait invasion to take place.³ Swarms of missiles would overwhelm and disable the American carrier fleet. While this is an unlikely scenario, it illuminates the problems associated with America carrier groups in close quarters. Their defensive system relies on sanitizing the air space around a carrier group. This is not an option in the Taiwan Strait because an American carrier group cannot remove the entire Chinese air force without taking very high losses.⁴ The same applies to the Strait of Hormuz. The Persian Gulf's geographical location makes it very difficult to operate carriers because it forces them close to shore.

The problem of operating outside of their natural environment is what makes the Strait of Hormuz such an operational hazard, and why it has become Iran's greatest military aid. Of the entire strait, ships can only navigate two small parts. Iran dominates the northern side, and could easily hamper passage through the Strait by mining these two passages. It has done so in the past, during the Tanker War of the 1980s. The Strait's tight geographical confines also make ships highly vulnerable to anti-ship missiles because the distances between ships is much smaller than on the high seas. There are not 50 miles of open water on any given side of a ship; at best there are only 30.

The Tanker Wars are an example of how Iranian domination of the Strait would play out. In 1988, there was a series of naval incidents between Iranian and American forces. The Iranian plan was to use small boats carrying cruise missiles. Ignoring the poor tactical execution of the Iranian attack, the damage from anti-ship missiles to American ships was catastrophic. While hit by a missile, ships need to go to a dry dock and count as mission kills. They are for the short term, as good as sunk in terms of their ability to perform mission functions. The USS *Stark* incident is evidence of the vulnerability of ships in a close quarter's situation.

The Falkland Islands campaign also illustrates the dangers posed anti-ship

missiles to even the most modern navies. The British Royal Navy lost two ships to Exocet missiles as well as one destroyer and two frigates to Argentine bombing sorties.⁵ One ship was also damaged by an Exocet missile, but survived. All of the attacks resulting in these losses were made by shore-based aircraft. The technological match-up between the two militaries was very much in favor of the British, but fighting far from home, and in the case of these ships without adequate air cover, proved fatal. The British military was one of the world's best at the time, and still sustained losses to a navy that was inferior in all classes. Designed for a one-hit kill, anti-ship missiles are very effective against smaller ships. This only serves to highlight the dangers of anti-ship missiles.

Because the topography of the Persian Gulf limits fleet mobility, carrier groups cannot have their usual area of sanitized space. They must accept closer tolerances because it is a heavily trafficked area. The downing of the Iranian airliner, Iran Air Flight 665, in 1988, speaks to this problem. The close operating environment results in high risk to American ships, and the possibility of making an error becomes very high. This possibility came to fruition in the 1988 Iranian airline shooting.

These problems are known to both sides, and will be exploited or negated accordingly. While the American military would most likely be the victors in a military contest over the Strait of Hormuz through sheer force of arms, the question of cost arises. The Iranian military is no match for the American military in an extended conflict. Iran's strength, though, is the American aversion to casualties. How much blood, treasure, and oil should the U.S. spend to reopen the Strait? It becomes problematic, quantifying American lives in terms of petrodollars.

This is why the Strait is Iran's strongest political card. The Iranian regime is a rational international actor, and knows that nuclear weapon use will not further its cause. If it truly believed it could get away with nuclear weapon use, it would have made other highly irrational decisions and ceased to exist as a state. Iran behaves as a rational actor because its guiding principle is the continuation of the regime and an expansion of its power. It is not a purely ideologically driven state. This has been shown since at least 2003, when Shia IRGC helped Sunni AQI insurgents build and detonate IEDs for the greater good of weakening American power and making the invasion more costly.⁶ Shia Iran is working to make Sunni-dominated Iraq its client state, which means there cannot be a U.S. presence. If the state were a strict ideological state, this wouldn't have happened. There is great benefit for the regime if it can make Iraq a client state. Iraq is a regional rival, and controlling it would further Iranian influence in the region. From a realist statecraft point of view, Iran is making an excellent regional power play.

Iran's trend of rational behavior extends to their nuclear bomb project.

Considering the region from Tehran's point of view, the world has become a very hostile place. American troops have occupied two bordering countries, and the neighbors are hostile to the Iranian state. With few useful friends, Iran pursues a nuclear bomb for reasons of defense, not offense. Iran cannot get away with using a nuclear weapon in any context. Atomic weapons offer a shield from international action because it alters the calculus of any conflict. Will Iran use a bomb? Probably not, but is that enough to risk an entire army?

Iran's nuclear weapon program is not the greatest threat they present, however, because there is no utility in using nuclear weapons. They are an excellent deterrent to other nations attacking one's country because they introduce doubt, but they are overall useless as an offensive weapon because of retaliation. There was a lot of concern in 1991 over Saddam's potential WMD use on coalition troops. He did not use them, but precautions were taken anyway. Iran is unwilling to risk wholesale destruction by using atomic weapons.

Outside of the theoretical outcomes of a potential military clash in the Strait between Iran and the US, there are hosts of other issues that make Iranian action in the Strait very powerful: the volume of oil that is transported daily through the Strait represents 35% of the world's oil supply.⁷ There are alternatives to shipping oil out, but they are very expensive to run and maintain. This becomes a massive force-multiplier for any action that Iran takes. The cost of any action means windfall profits for any state that exports oil, for example Iran, whose budget is based on 80% oil revenue.⁸ While closing the Strait would hurt Iran, it would hurt other nations more and benefit oil-producing nations.

This is the heart of Iran's option: the ability to touch other states' wallets. This money must come from somewhere, and it will come from the pockets of other nations. One can buy weapons, but one cannot purchase money. Selling assets can make money, but liquidation has an endpoint. Either way, countries and companies will have to learn how to do with less or open their wallets further to buy the same amount of oil. Any option is expensive and costs resources that could have utility elsewhere.

Higher prices will have worldwide consequences. Nations cannot avoid higher oil prices. Oil is an inelastic good; its demand is relatively inelastic because there is no realistic replacement for it. With no oil, goods are not produced. Its supply is therefore required for the world economy. Any interruptions in this supply have cascading effects around the world, as oil has become to food for the global economy.

Iran's geopolitical position gives it the power to leverage the world markets. This is their true nuclear option, not the successful acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are self-defeating and only make sense as a deterrent


weapon, while worldwide economic warfare is a far stronger tool. Nations cannot fully shield themselves from the cascading effects of such a massive drop in oil supplies, nor do they have recourse from the high prices. Contingency plans have endpoints and cannot fully compensate for rising oil prices. Nuclear weapon use does offer recourse. Because of this, economic warfare, not nuclear terrorism, is Iran's strongest tactic. Iran can gain a lot more politically by blockading the Strait than by using a nuclear weapon. Nations can condemn and dismiss a nuclear explosion, but they cannot dismiss the possibility of higher oil prices. That is something which will strike directly at their populations, and not as abstract as events in countries far away.

It also puts Iran in a politically better negotiating position. With any Strait crisis, Iran can ratchet up and down pressure accordingly. It is hard to negotiate with someone who holds a key economic lifeline and is willing to squeeze it. This position of power gives Iran a stronger ability to shape events to its liking.

Other nations in the region will be unable to stop Iran from doing this, and so the impetus will fall on outside powers that have the strength to deal with the Iranian military. When will the West have a showdown with Iran over freedom of navigation? When the problems posed by such an action are greater than the problems associated with opening it back up. Iran can harass tankers in the Strait up to a certain threshold and not face significant international backlash.

Iran could also use the Strait as a tool of coercion. If Iran was placed under strain, it could use the Strait as a bargaining chip to relieve international pressure. It could attack shipping and only stop when other nations backed down their pressure on Iran to act in a certain way. The multi-faceted use of the Strait by Iran is part of what gives it its strategic importance and makes it Iran's most capable political power card.

Iranian economic warfare is Iran's biggest tool because it is something that impacts all nations. It offers more flexibility than the results of a nuclear bomb project, and does not draw the world's attention as much as a bomb program. It is a threat that can slowly build because it is based on capability, while a nuclear weapon is more decisive: it either detonates or does not. This gray area makes responding to it more difficult, adding a completely new dimension to the threat.

The Strait of Hormuz is Iran's strongest card to play. The Iranian bomb project is not as large a threat because the Iranians cannot use a bomb without facing apocalyptic international backlash. The Strait allows Iran greater flexibility to apply or relieve international pressure because it permits escalation. Such a capability means that Iran can leverage the international community to behave differently by partially restricting traffic or not. Iran's fortunate geographical location gives it a lot of power. Hopefully they never utilize it. 

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Scientific Communication: Communicating with the Enemy?

Scott Cullinane

Due to the development of technology, the means of mass communication have spread over the globe and information dissemination is constantly becoming easier and more common place. Particularly in the developed world, free access to information via the internet from almost any spot is no longer an optional luxury, it is expected. This increasing ability to share and access information has only heightened the long standing tensions between the free flow of information and the need of national security to limit that flow. One specific area that has been troublesome and continues to threaten national security is scientific communication.

In the scientific community it is common practice for scientists to share their information and freely collaborate regardless of international boundaries or politics. Science is “an international body of knowledge that transcends the traditional borders of nation-states” and so communication across those boundaries is natural.¹ No location has a total monopoly on scientific talent. Over the past 70 years America has emerged as a scientific leader in the world, preeminent in many fields. The U.S. commits resources to scientific discoveries of all kinds and has facilities to do research on a wide range of topics. During that same time

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period the military and the tools of war have also grown more complex and technically sophisticated. The centers of research and science in America have at times been used for military purposes and their work increasingly has national security implications. This has made scientific research a key part of U.S. national security. Protecting the methods and discoveries of American science from other nations and furthering American science are both national security priorities.

The modern world's increasing interconnectedness when combined with the growing importance of science to national security creates a paradox. Access to science must be controlled so that other countries cannot steal valuable information; however a critical part of science is openness and scientific communication. To do the former, you must infringe on the latter. The dilemma is that scientific communication is a known weak spot in American national security and that other countries have already exploited this opening for decades. Yet, because of the fundamental differences between the scientific community and the national security agencies tasked with protecting America, this predicament has remained unresolved.

While the growth and spread of technology in recent years has exacerbated the security problems with scientific communication, the issue itself is not a new one. The academic environment of openness that American science seeks to operate in has been a target of foreign powers for years. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union took advantage of scientific communication; beginning in the 1950s America and the Soviet Union conducted cultural and scientific exchanges that the Soviets used as one means to make up for their own domestic deficiencies in science; while, in contrast, the U.S. sent people to Russia mostly as an exercise in diplomacy, aiming to improve relations through personal contact. The Soviets sent delegates to the West to learn technical information that could aid them. Michael Taksar, a mathematician who managed to emigrate from the USSR in 1977 confirmed that the Soviet Union viewed scientific exchanges as exercises in information gather for their own sole benefit.²

Dr. Sergei Gubin, a Russian scientist, is one such example. For two years in the 1970s Dr. Gubin of the Moscow Institute of Physical Engineering visited the University of Michigan studying fuel-air explosives with an American professor who consulted for the U.S. Navy. When Gubin returned to the USSR he, unsurprisingly, continued to develop fuel-air weapons for the Soviets with the benefit of what he had learned in America.³

In comparison, some American scientists were more naïve in their interactions with the USSR. American scientists used the avenue of scientific communication as a way to try and bring political change behind the iron curtain. They used their

positions to protest human rights abuses by circulating petitions and in some cases refusing to take part in scientific exchanges in dissent.⁴ It appears that the American scientific community did not appreciate the organized and serious nature of the Soviet efforts to steal their work and undermine the United States' scientific advantage.

Through these scientific exchanges the Soviet scientists were able to glean much more than just raw data; they learned "valuable information... about personalities, institutions, and methods of work in American."⁵ The American scientific community produced so much open source material that the Soviet scientists were almost overwhelmed and were not sure where exactly they should focus or where American science was focused. By actually visiting the scientific institutions in the West they were able to familiarize themselves with the specifics of each institution and with whose work they should follow. This helped the Soviets gauge where their research should be focused. The Soviets were so aggressive and successful in their pursuit to exploit this academic openness offered by the American scientific community it caused Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of CIA, to label it the "hemorrhage of the country's technology."⁶

The first major steps to combat the advantages the USSR was gaining from scientific communication were taken during the Reagan administration. The effort included publishing two major documents which still effect how America deals with the issue today: Executive Order 12356 and National Security Decision Directive 189. EO 12356 was issued in 1982 and covered the topic of creating a "uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information."⁷ It stated specifically that "basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified" but that "information shall be considered for classification if it concerns... scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security." Also, for added security, EO 12356 included the provision that "if there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified." These basic, almost commonsensical, provisions were a major step forward and were reaffirmed in 2003 when President George W. Bush issued EO 13292. NSDD-189 was published in 1985 and spoke specifically and directly to scientific research and the security threats it faced, singling out "Eastern Bloc nations" in particular.⁹ NSDD-189 recognized the threat against American science and set a broad policy of protecting it from dissemination when national security was involved.

EO 12356 and NDSS-189 were critical for two reasons. Foremost, they reflected how serious the issue of security and scientific communication was and that that fact had been recognized at the highest levels of government. It created a broad principle that if scientific research had national security implications it

should be protected. Secondly, both documents sought to strike a balance between traditional openness and security. NSDD-189 in fact states that it was the administration's policy that "to the maximum extent possible... research remain unrestricted." It also states that science is "essential" to American security and that the "free exchange of ideas is a vital component" of that.

These broad policies put in place during the Reagan years were implemented, to an extent, even if some in the American scientific community did not always agree. During the 1980s the U.S. government limited activities for certain Eastern European visitors to American universities and even "advised university administrators to exclude students from the People's Republic of China from studies and/or research in certain fields."¹⁰ Yet, in the early 1990s, with the dissolution of the USSR, these precautions with scientific communication disappeared.

After the threat of the USSR passed, other countries still sought to take advantage of the open scientific process and scientific communication in America. Today the most concerted and single greatest threat in this regard is from the People's Republic of China (PRC). While during the 1970s and 1980s the Chinese participated in scientific exchanges with the U.S., much like the Soviets, the situation changed in the 1990s with the proliferation of communication technology. Now, a phone call or email supplements visits to a foreign country in scientific communication. This has made gaining information and secrets through scientific communication even easier and numerous examples of Chinese aggression, using delegations and modern technology, have come to light. In fact, Nicholas Eftimiades wrote in his hallmark book, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, that "China's most productive method of legally acquiring foreign technology is to send scientists overseas on scholarly exchange programs."¹¹

One of the most important works in bringing this national security issue to the public's attention was the publication of *The Cox Report*. That report, from a specially convened House Committee, detailed the extent and scope of Chinese espionage in America and it included a section on scientific communication. *The Cox Report* stated that "almost every PRC citizen allowed to go to the United States as part of these [scientific] delegations likely receives some type of collection requirement."¹² These trips are also used "to identify scientists whose views might support the PRC" and to flag them for further attention.¹³ Furthermore, when U.S. scientists visit the PRC they are invited to give presentations in "an academic setting... [with] increasingly sensitive questions" being asked which are designed to illicit classified information.

The 2009 Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission also includes information about exploitations of scientific communication by the PRC.

The Commission writes that “China prefers to obtain its information a little bit at a time” and then combines it to create the full picture. Using this method the PRC is able to take small pieces of information, perhaps useless on their own, through less obvious channels such as scientific communication. When U.S. scientists visit China they are given “grueling schedules intended to wear them down mentally” and then peppered with “incessant” and “coordinated” questions to “produce indiscreet disclosures rather than conscious espionage.”¹⁴

The PRC, in order to help its intelligence organizations utilize scientific communication maintains a number of front groups. These front organizations are arms of the Communist Party but appear not to be and have less alarming names so as to not arise suspicion when they interact with academic and research institutions in the West. The *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission* writes that “like the Ministry of State Security, the Military Intelligence Department also maintains affiliated think tank institutions.”¹⁵ These “affiliated” groups take advantage of the goodwill of U.S. scientists through scientific communication and uses what Chinese scientists learn for military ends. The PRC has used the fronts of legitimate scientific institutions to reward scientists who favor the PRC with accolades and other honors that will further that scientist’s career. The PRC will also do the opposite, such as deny visas to scientists who prove less useful. As was stated by one American economist, “academics who study China... habitually please the Chinese Communist Party, sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously” in order to maintain their good standing.¹⁶

While there have been several high profile cases involving PRC espionage in the U.S., perhaps the best known is the case of Wen Ho Lee, an American nuclear scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory who is widely believed to have passed highly damaging information to the PRC. An official statement on the matter by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee makes the role scientific communication played clear. The statement reaffirms *The Cox Report*, stating “It was, in fact, standard PRC intelligence tradecraft to use scientific delegations to identify and target scientists working at restricted United States facilities.”¹⁷ Lee’s wife, Sylvia Lee, who was a co-conspirator, “volunteered to act as hostess for visiting Chinese scientific delegations... and [had] closer relationships with these delegations than anyone else at the laboratory.” The Senate Committee’s statement continues, “Moreover, Wen Ho Lee had himself aggressively sought involvement with a visiting Chinese scientific delegation, insisting upon acting as an interpreter for the group despite his inability to perform this function very effectively.” Also under the cover of scientific communication, the Lees went to China on an official trip to “deliver a paper on nuclear weapons-related science.... He visited the Chinese laboratory... that designs the PRC’s nuclear weapons.” Lee did what

the Rosenbergs were executed for, and Lee was able to do it under the cover of scientific communication. The PRC has also used modern technology, such as e-mail, to conduct scientific communication. *The Cox Report* recounts the case of U.S. scientist Peter Lee who used email to communicate with Chinese scientists and pass reports related to his secret work to the PRC.¹⁸ This shows that while sending delegations is still a crucial part of scientific communication, it is not the only method.

Yet, despite this evidence of scientific communication being misused to harm America, the American scientific community remains hesitant, if not hostile, to the idea of limiting scientific communication. An article published in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* incredibly attacks *The Cox Report* for implicitly considering “China’s thefts of U.S. secret information as a hostile act.” The article argues that the Wen Ho Lee case is irrelevant because China has fewer nuclear weapons than the U.S., so there really is no harm to the U.S. in allowing the PRC to have warhead designs.¹⁹ Not all American scientists share that view, but the fact that those views are even considered legitimate and reasonable in the academic community shows that the lessons of the Cold War and those of the more recent history with the PRC have not been learned.

Today, *The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States* reads, in part:

Foreign intelligence activities extend beyond traditional targets in the Intelligence Community and other U.S. national security structures. The private sector and academia are fertile breeding grounds for advanced scientific discovery, cutting-edge technology, and advanced research and development that make them irresistible “soft targets” for foreign intelligence collectors.²⁰

There is, and has been going back at least 25 years, a recognition in the U.S. government that scientific communication is a vulnerable point in American security. Even from what is just publically known, the use of scientific communication by the Soviets and now by the PRC should be sufficient to galvanize action to correct this problem. Yet, that has not been the case.

The scientific community, specifically scientific associations such as the National Academy of Sciences, has maintained consistently that America is best served by the research advancements that come from scientific communication, even if some information is stolen in the process.²¹ It is true that scientific communication enables scientific advancements and promoting American science, like protecting it, is also relevant to national security. Yet the government has recognized this going back to the Reagan administration.

What is so troubling about the arguments put forward by some in the American scientific community is that they seem unwilling to even acknowledge how they

have been, and are being, taken advantage of through scientific communication. For some reason, perhaps distrust of the government, perhaps due to some naïve academic outlook on the world, the scientific community is unwilling to recognize what is going on around them. In 2006 the Commerce Department tried to impose rules in regards to “deemed exports;” that is, when foreign students or scientists come to the U.S. and learn about technology that is too sensitive to be exported. When these foreigners travel home, they have essentially exported the technology they learned about, circumventing the export ban. The Commerce Department attempted to place some controls on this back door to export controls, but because of the “outpouring of anxiety in academia and among scientists” the proposed rules were not put in place.²² It appears that any policy or action the government might take to defend scientific communication from exploitation by foreign powers is doomed to conflict with the American scientific community.

Going forward, is there any policy that can fix this impasse? Almost all of the recommendations that have been put forward are not new policy ideas, but simply doing current policy better. This is not a bad place to start. Established counterintelligence tradecraft, if done well, would likely fix many of the current problems, however, this is always much easier said than done. From a policy point of view the more fascinating issue lies with the scientific community. Is there a way to get scientists to stop pretending like they work in a vacuum, somehow detached from the rest of the world by an impenetrable shield of academic integrity? After reviewing the literature produced on the subject by various scientists, the answer may very well be that it is impossible. An article published by the New York Academy of Sciences concluded that not only should scientific communication not be limited, it should be expanded because “international science can help build bridges between countries in conflict.”²³ Scientific communication may be able to do many things, but end conflict is not one of them. This statement is indicative of the scientific community putting too much faith in the non-scientific possibilities of scientific communication.

Before any policy or regulatory changes take place to address this problem with scientific communication, the issue must be clearly identified by the government. Much like what was done under the Reagan administration, a finger must be pointed squarely at those countries who exploit scientific communication. This will define the debate between the scientific community and the government and force those involved to argue their points based on specifics, not abstract, philosophical points. This clear leadership from the top of the government would, hopefully, also have the effect of spurring U.S. counterintelligence efforts against these countries, once it is made clear that moving against them has political backing and is a priority.

Currently, the scientific community is fearful of government oppression or undue limitations on scientific communication; the scientific community phrases the argument as science against the U.S. government. The case for limiting scientific communication due to national security should make clear that the issue is not the U.S. government verse science, but that scientific communication exploitation is about scientists verse scientists. It must be argued that it is not the U.S. government undermining scientific communication, but it is other scientists, working at the behest of other countries, who are the ones doing the exploiting. While the American scientific community may generally remain under the impression that all scientists work in an academic bubble of pure research, scientists who work for other nations, know this is not true and do not pretend that it is.

In the past, scientific communication took place largely through delegations of visiting scientists. This allowed the host country the possibility of some control by means of issuing entry visas or controlling travel within the country. As has been seen recently, modern communication technology has been used to circumvent those traditional means of control, such as in the Peter Lee case. Information can be exchanged faster, and through a variety of ways, increasing the difficulties for in the U.S. in controlling scientific communication. This has created a situation where only with the active participation, or at least with some support, of the scientific community, can the U.S. ever hope to secure scientific communication. Given the track record in this matter, this is not likely within the foreseeable future. ■

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Italy and Albania: Their Alliance and the Italian Invasion of 1939

Peter M. Tase

At the beginning of the twentieth century Albania existed as an agrarian nation run by local chieftains, except for intermittent short-lived central governments, until King Zog I, with the help of Yugoslavia, secured absolute power in December, 1924.¹ With wide support from the people of Albania, Ahmet Zogu was able to forge a strong economic alliance with Italy which strengthened the emerging centralized government and gave Albanians a sense of nationhood.² For fourteen years the Italian-Albanian alliance developed and functioned to the benefit of both countries, ending only with the Italian invasion of Albania on April 7th, 1939. This essay will examine the benefits of this alliance and the reasons leading to the shocking reversal on the part of the Italians on the eve of the Second World War.³

Establishment of the Italo-Albanian Alliance

King Zogu, the architect of the Italo-Albanian alliance, established a foreign policy that was an important element in his political program, as well as his eco-

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nomic program. In January 1925, Zogu sent a letter to Mussolini pledging alliance, and Mussolini responded immediately by expressing his recognition of the Republic of Albania and its Government.⁴ At the same time, Zogu's administration was overwhelmed by different European companies offering to invest in all branches of the Albanian economy. These offers consisted of things such as the construction of railways, docks, mines, and drainage schemes, as well as oil industry and banking development. Unfortunately, Albania, still without paper currency and using gold coins, was facing difficulties in building a modern fiscal and money economy, and Zogu understood his country needed a national bank. The easiest way to achieve this was to establish an economic relationship with a strong country. Surrounded by pro-Italian cabinet members and convinced that Britain was standing behind Italy in order to offset the support France was giving to Yugoslavia, King Zogu openly announced his intentions to cooperate fully with Italy and turned his back on the Yugoslav government who had brought him to power. Thus began a fourteen year period (1925–1939) of Italian companies pouring wealth and resources into Albania to reconstruct this poor agrarian country. In the spring of 1925 two important concessions were signed with Italy; the first was the right to found a national bank and the second was the approval of the establishment of an Italian company (SVEA), to develop the Albanian economy. The National Bank of Albania (*Banca Nazionale D'Albania*) was in truth an Italian bank operating under Italian law and its reserves were in Rome. This institution offered financial services to the young government that some other financial institutions did not; however, through the agreement, the Italians had the right to keep the majority of shares (51% against 49% to the Albanians). This made it possible for an unexpected development whereby the Italian banks secured the majority of title and deeds through fraud and corruption. When discovered, this caused a scandal and resulted in the resignation of the Albanian finance minister, who, it was revealed, had been awarded one million gold francs for committing this fraudulent activity on behalf of the Italian government.⁵ Unfortunately, it did not end there, the bank funds had been administered by the *Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell'Albania* (SVEA), the development company to improve the Albanian economy, which was, in fact, a subsection of the Italian Finance Ministry. While the funds administered by this institution were indeed spent on infrastructure and public works, for example development of oil resources, it just so happened that the contracts would be awarded to those firms preferred by the Italian government.⁶

Undoubtedly, Albania would never have become developed economically without the presence of foreign aid and loans. Above all the Italians were better than the Yugoslavs in being the ambassadors of westernizing Albania. Interestingly, in December 1924, when Zogu was first raised to power, he was but a Serbian

puppet. However, by June 1925, with the Italo-Albanian alliance, Albania had become an Italian province without a prefect. At every opportunity Zogu referred to Mussolini as a great leader and said that he was inspired by Mussolini from early on, though he seemed not to want to become dependent on a sole foreign partner and invited investment from other countries as well. However, the Italian government demanded that Albania recognize the declaration of Paris which established Albania as an Italian protectorate with Italy expected to provide both abundant money and arms.

The Pact of Tirana—1926

The multidimensional relations between Italy and Albania reached yet a new level with the signing of the Tirana Pact on November 27, 1926, which brought 200,000 francs in aid that was followed quickly with other means of assistance. The treaty would last five years and included these two important points:

Article 1: Italy and Albania will recognize that any disturbance threatening the political, legal and territorial *status quo* of Albania is contrary to their common political interests.

Article 2: In order to safeguard the above mentioned interests the two countries will undertake to afford each other mutual support and cordial cooperation: they also will commit not to make any political or military agreements with other powers prejudicial to the interests of either Italy or Albania.

With the signing of this agreement Mussolini promised that he would make a gift to Ahmed Zogu of several million lire, and Italy would provide significant assistance to develop the Albanian military and economy. Zogu's government now became dependent in every way on the Italian plans towards Albania. At the same time, it was a fruitful strategy to balance the strengths of the adversaries in the Balkan conflicts. However, with Albania so firmly planted on the side of Italy, Yugoslavia tried to assuage her feelings of insecurity by causing trouble at Albania's northern borders for the next two years.

In 1928, with the Yugoslav troops threatening at the northeastern border, Ahmed Zogu declared in front of the House of Commons his intentions to become the king of Albania. Italy immediately began to throw monetary support his way. To bolster the Albanian economy and transportation infrastructure, Italy signed another agreement with Albania in June 26, 1931. In it, Italy offered to subsidize the Albanian budget by extending a loan of one hundred million gold francs (L 6,600,000).⁷ These new measures were taken to make the Albanian economy more stable by balancing the country's budget and facilitating public works. By this time, Italy had established a committee with four members which

had a similar role to that of SVEA during the late 1920s. This commission monitored the financial affairs of all ministries, and ironically, Italian members of the committee had a veto power on outlay in order to ensure that Italy had enough financial control to check corruption. However, this agreement did assure a positive relationship between the two countries for years to come.

Through the years, Albania accepted a greater number of Italian advisers, some to exercise even more authority than before, and in the same vein, agreed to install a number of Italian technical experts, whose advice was not solely restricted to financial and economic matters; they also consulted on public works and oil concessions around the country. At every turn, the Italians continued to agree to extend their manpower contributions and financial assistance in all areas of Albanian economy. Italy's generous support was so impressive that they even forgave a loan of 100 million gold francs, of which only 20 million had been paid back by the Albanian government, when this agreement was signed in June 1931. Paradoxically, a new loan of nine million gold francs was made, plus another three million that Mussolini offered spontaneously in 1935. Furthermore, the Italian government granted another loan of about ten million gold francs which was for the development of agriculture, to be payable in five years; this loan had only a 1% interest, made possible by a guarantee from the Italian oil concession in Albania which was already reaping huge profits.⁸ Topping this, Italy granted another loan of three million gold francs, this time interest-free, to be used for the establishment of the tobacco monopoly in the country; this amount had to be liquidated in a period of fifteen years with a minimum of 200,000 lire paid each year. Lastly, Italy offered a loan of 40 million gold francs in annual installments of eight million gold francs, with the money to be spent on the construction of public works which would be monitored by the Italian specialists. Thus, with one loan after another, the Italians had their fingers fully into every segment of the Albanian economy.

A particularly important project to the Albanian economy was the construction and modernization of the port of Durrës as a result of an agreement made in Rome between the two governments. The structure of the harbor and the infrastructure was improved considerably after the Italians took entire control of the construction of the main section of it. In addition, another agreement was signed in 1936 allowing Italy's interference in, or regulation of, Albanian finance, customs, revenues, exports and imports through this and other ports, which channeled even more profits back to Italy. One of the most lucrative industries in the country was oil: it was managed after the First World War by British Petroleum until the Italians began to move into this sector in 1920.

Eventually, 300,000 Italian émigrés came to settle in Albania. Italian schools opened everywhere and the major cities of Albania were given Italian names. The

outcome of the Italian interference was really a *de facto* colonization of Albania which had its positive impact in regards to development of the import/export trade in the interwar period.⁹ Mussolini once declared, "Italy's policy in Albania is quite clear and absolutely straightforward. Its sole object is to preserve and to respect the independent status of this small country, which for centuries has lived in friendship with us;" it would take another three years to reveal the true intentions of Italy towards Albania.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the small country of Albania could not have been stabilized and would have sunk into anarchy had Italy not stepped up to take the helm of this newly formed nation.

Italian contributions to every aspect of Albanian economy and culture completely transformed Albania in a matter of two decades. Thanks to the Italian assistance the total exports in 1938 amounted to 10.2 million gold francs and the principal items were crude oil, cheese, eggs, and livestock. Imports exceeded 18.9 million gold francs, and consisted of textiles, cereals, petroleum, machinery, and sugar. Finally, in 1938 the Italian government implemented a generous renegotiation of the SVEA debt of 28 million francs of penal interest were written off. Italians shared their experience and expertise to bring "western" values to Albanian society. Italy introduced its own education system in accordance with the ideas of Mussolini and how the youth should be educated. There was even a delegation sent in 1937 to advise King Zog I on organizing youth committees similar to the fascist groups in Italy. By the mid 1930s, Albania's bargaining position was nil and Italy had almost subsumed the Albanian economy and culture. Yet, Italy, under the glare of disapproving international eyes, was still threatened by the possibility of Yugoslav patronage.

Italian strategic interests

Any contributions Italy makes to the Albanian economy are and have always been based on the interest in the geostrategic positions of the two countries. Indeed, from Italy's heel to Albanian gulf of Vlora, it is only 50 miles. As far back as the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, Italy had begun to pursue an aggressive role towards controlling Albania.¹¹ At that time, the Albanian territory was a war-torn nation, incapable of defending herself and on the verge of being partitioned by neighboring countries. Besides Italy, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria all had self-aggrandizing plans involving the Albanian territory. It should be emphasized that Italy has always pursued a policy of colonization and annexation of the Albanian nation. So it seemed "business as usual" to step in and take a "fatherly" role in 1925. The desires of the principle Albanian elected officials, who wanted to rely on a foreign power from which they could take loans and bring the

Albanian economy to its feet, matched perfectly with *Il Duce's* plans. Since coming to power Mussolini had pursued a strategy based on invading weak countries and profiting from their resources. Albania was an especially prized plum. First, its strategic geographic position provided a perfect bridge to expand Italian influence in the Balkan Peninsula. Secondly, the Italian Dictator wanted to control the Adriatic completely and having Albania under his protectorate would give him the right to control the Straights of Otranto and thereby secure the entire eastern coast of Italy from an imminent attack. Thirdly, control of these straights also afforded Italy control of the Yugoslav navy and international trade in and out of the Adriatic. When Italian troops invaded Greece on October 28th, 1940, it became abundantly clear that this strategy had worked. Fourthly, North Africa was on the top of the list after Albania to be controlled and without a full control of the western Balkans it would have made impossible to achieve these objectives in North Africa. At first, Mussolini was willing to collaborate, as he had done in the past, with the Yugoslav government and offered them a piece of the Albanian pie. *Il Duce* always had the idea of triumphant foreign policy that would challenge the world and he dropped negotiations with Yugoslavia. Italian policy towards Albania was never based on altruistic principles. It was not really about making a contribution to the economy, but was rather more about securing the Italian interests across the Adriatic and waiting for the perfect moment to declare full authority over Albania and its neighbors.¹² The assistance offered by Italy consisted of giving with one hand and taking double the amount with the other. The relations with the Italian government, as Zogu sorely discovered, were not at the level of genuine friendship. By 1939, the Italian ally was distrusted more than the enemy.

The Italian invasion begins; the break of the alliance (April 7th, 1939)

In a matter of months Mussolini would decide to invade Albania, resulting in a complete destruction of the entire infrastructure that Italy had so carefully built. By the end of 1938, with the alliance between the two countries starting to crack and with a new government being elected in Yugoslavia, Mussolini was inspired to achieve, with considerably less effort, his intentions against Albania. For Mussolini, the Balkans, offered tremendous mineral wealth and strategic geographical position, but more importantly, he wanted to keep pace with his German buddy who had already annexed the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. To justify the invasion, if only to themselves and Germany, Italy prepared a report analyzing the importance of the Albanian territory, and plans for its reclamation. It would take less than a year for Albania to be completely overwhelmed and gutted by its former ally, Italy. Mussolini continued in his intentions to invade all of the countries border-


ing Albania, and never wanting to be considered a second string ally of the axis.

In Rome, indignation stemming from the jealousy of the German expansion in Europe preoccupied Mussolini who wanted to maintain an equal position in the "Pact of Steel." The Italians continuously refused to revise their demands addressed to King Zog and Zog would not budge. Twice, King Zog I did not accept four requests made by the Italian foreign minister, Count Ciano. The first was the complete control of the infrastructure including ports, airfields and roads to be used in a situation when the Albanian sovereignty was in danger. Zog insisted that such an extension of the Italo-Albanian alliance was not acceptable, and that Italian troops should enter the country only with the explicit request of the Albanians themselves. The second request was to have a secretary general in every ministry of the administration. Zogu wanted Italian staff members to be present only on an ad-hoc basis. The third was the request to give full civic and political rights to Italians in Albania. Zogu repeatedly opposed the idea of having foreign citizens to be part of the Albanian parliament, but he supported the idea of civil rights. The fourth and final request was to promote the Italian legation to an embassy, which was only a change in protocol.

It should be pointed out that the King's family was celebrating the birth of the prince named Leka, on April 5th. Having to deal with these political difficulties at this time, Zogu felt betrayed and could not stop his tears of disappointment. Meanwhile, a large number of people surrounded the king's palace and requested weapons to fight the Italians.¹³ Zogu sent a telegram to Mussolini requesting to reopen the negotiations and wanted his old friend, General Pariani, to be sent to Albania to direct the negotiations. Instead, Mussolini retorted with a fierce message saying that Zogu should send a representative to meet with General Guzzoni at the shores of Durrës (the site of the invasion). Realizing the irony of this offer, on the eve of April 7th, two hours before the invasion, the royal family, under Zogu's supervision, left Albania and immigrated to Greece. This was severely difficult for the queen who had delivered Prince Leka only two days before. On the same morning, Count Ciano directed a flight operation over Albania spreading leaflets calling upon the people to demonstrate friendship to the Italian forces.

In the port of Durrës the first invasion faced some resistance, but in the other ports the Italians disembarked quietly and without a problem. At two o'clock the same day, King Zogu addressed the nation and called upon all the people to unite the fight for the freedom of their beloved nation. Unfortunately, no one organized this effort and there were only pockets of resistance here and there. For almost comical Italians, this was essential. The capture of Tirana, the capital, was of primary importance to Mussolini and he was continuously asking how long it would take to reach it. In the first stages of the invasion, confusion ruled the Italian forc-

es. They had a lack of radio communication and the troops could not report their positions before advancing. Furthermore, the specialist units were not prepared for the tasks they undertook in the invaded territory, and there were motorcyclists, truck drivers, and even generals who could not do their jobs. Often the roads were blocked by broken vehicles and the generals threw up their hands. But still they bore on to overthrow the Albanians. When they finally arrived at the capital, the streets were surprisingly empty, with no resistors in sight.¹⁴

There are several reasons why King Zogu was not willing to use force to confront the Italian troops. First, Zogu did not have the support of the neighboring countries, Yugoslavia and Greece. Both of these countries did not want to supply armament to the Albanians, as they had been scared off by the Italian military capabilities. Secondly, the Yugoslav army declared that they would not enter the Albanian territory unless there was conflict in a Fifteen mile radius of the northeastern border. However, Yugoslavia was restrained from entering into Albanian territory by a previous agreement with Italy. Thirdly the Albanians showed little interest in fighting under the leadership of King Zogu. In fact, many Albanians spent their first week under Italian occupation debating whether Zogu was worth keeping as king. Zogu's regime had failed to keep control of the local leaders because Italy had found a way to eliminate Zogu as a middleman and finance these "chieftains" directly. Whatever resistance there was to be, it would be waged by communist groups that fought tirelessly throughout the war. Mussolini was able to find a pretext in order to make his strategic invasion legitimate and as necessary as possible even from the Albanian point of view. The Italians pretended that in order to preserve peace in the Balkans it was important to overthrow the Zogu regime. It was interesting to see an Italian puppet become their number one enemy 14 years later. Zogu explained, "I knew what Italians were after and I prevented them from getting control of the country by peaceful means. . . . International politics left us no other choice to come to an understating with Italy. But the megalomania of the fascist regime made us certain that one day we should have to fight to defend ourselves."¹⁵ Interestingly, Count Ciano and his clique never really had to depose Zogu as his Albanian support had already dried up. And as for "preserving peace in the Balkans," the Italians had merely blown apart a very fragile time of Balkan quietude. As a French journalist once said, "*Pays Balkanique, Pays Vulcanique*": peace in the Balkans is like a "peaceful" volcano.¹⁶ 

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Re-colonized Zambia: China's Colonial Interests on the African Continent

Paul M. Butler IV

The landlocked South African nation of Zambia celebrated independence from European colonial rule in October 1964 with the election of Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda and the removal of British imperial power in the country.¹ The British government in the early 18th century saw Zambia and neighboring countries as resource rich regions with enough economic and labor capital to supply the growing influence and power needed by the British government to further economic growth and expand the imperial empire of the crown. Like many colonial histories in the African continent, the European power desecrated Zambia of her natural resources and subjugated her native people to imperial rule and law. It was not until the late 20th century that Zambia, after dictatorial leaderships and

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regimes that followed imperial rule, gained a multi-party democracy and began to grow as a socio-economic African power, attracting the attention of foreign investors and international economic interdependence.

Amongst the multitude of inquisitive foreign countries that noticed the economic worth of Zambia, the People's Republic of China was one of the first to establish connections with the developing nation. China's growing economic strength as well as expanding foreign investment demanded a higher necessity of natural resources and labor. From this increase came the Chinese interest in the African continent, and from this interest sprang the involvement of Chinese government and business in underdeveloped nations such as Zambia. These Sino-African relations, although having historical and diplomatic roots, have created an economic relationship based on colonial tactics between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Zambia, proving the expanding foreign influence and interest of the Chinese government and economy. At the expense of human rights, governmental integrity, and economic development, China's communist claw is now digging into African soil to fuel her production as well as shaking the cultural core of Zambian society. African nations affected by the Middle Kingdom's actions have questioned if China is the second wave of colonization. In order to fully comprehend the interests, intentions, and strategy of China's infiltration into the Zambian socio-political infrastructure, it is necessary to comprehend the contextual historical, cultural, and geographic analysis of Zambia.

Relations between the two nations began in the 1940s when Zambia was fighting to gain independence from the British crown. Opposition forces to imperial rule received the financial, political, and moral support of the Chinese government who sympathized with struggling for national determination.² In return for support and advice, Zambia (and other similar nations who also received aid from China) repaid the support with the establishment of diplomatic missions with China. This established relationship provided a foundation for a strong economic and political partnership that leads into the 21st century. Also within this decade, China stepped forward and built the Mulungushi textile factory as well as supplied technology and training to keep the cotton industry in Zambia growing and stable. This gave the Zambian economy a well-needed boost and helped employ thousands of Zambians in a sector that became the highest producing factory in all of Zambia.³ Among many other projects, the Chinese also created, funded, and gifted the Tanzania-Zambia Railway line to support interstate trade and help advance the general East-African economy.⁴

After the Cultural Revolution in the late 1980s in China, the government officially adopted foreign policy measures to strengthen and create relations with resource rich Africa, Zambia included. The Sino-Zambian relationship was

strengthened with a focus on economic partnership in the 1990s.⁵ With the arrival of the millennium, African nations began focusing on eradicating poverty and creating wealth within nations with the Millennium Development Goals.⁶ As African nations united under the newly developed African Union, China's economy was rapidly growing and gaining prominence in the international arena, consequently assuming larger responsibilities in the industrialization and development of developing countries. In 2006, China adopted a new mission in regards to the African continent and established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which held various goals to strengthen the relationships between Africa and mainland China, including; doubling aid to Africa, building schools and hospitals, training professionals, creating agricultural centers, giving more loans, and opening the Chinese markets to the least developed African nations.⁷ From these initiatives, many African nations, Zambia included, have enjoyed the economic prosperity attributed to the increased partnership with China. However, in the case of Zambia, the nation is experiencing negative cultural and governmental side effects similar to the virus of colonialism.

With the ascent of the Chinese economy and an increased rate of production, the demand for natural resources accordingly surged. Specifically, the metal industry caught the eye of the Chinese traders, and the geographic location of Zambia offers high levels of copper as well as other natural resources (fertile soil, cobalt, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium).⁸ In late 2007, Zambia enacted a privatization act in many of the previously public sectors, including mining and manufacturing. Since copper and various other mined minerals were in such demand, the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group Corporation Limited (NFMCC) purchased the Chambesi mine, the second largest copper producing mine in Africa.⁹ The augment in productivity and growth of the sector allowed for job creation for local Zambians as well as many Chinese immigrants who flooded the Zambian job market. In response to skeptics and protectionists of the Zambian economy, an immigration policy was put in place to protect the welfare of the Zambian people, yet has been criticized for rarely being enforced and lacking regulatory procedures, resulting in the influx of Chinese immigrants moving to Zambia, establishing residence, and working in the mining industry. Chinese investment in both the manufacturing and mining industry far surpasses any foreign competitors, and Zambian citizens and leaders have struggled with the political and cultural repercussions of an intimate relation with the Chinese.

Hostility towards the Chinese government and developers conglomerated in the small country of Zambia, and from this enmity propelled violence, protests, and political action to reverse and repel the Chinese influence in Zambia. Chinese corporations have been accused of treating Zambian employees like labor slaves

by subjecting them to poor working conditions, miniscule salaries, and pitiable health and safety precautions.¹⁰ Zambians have placed the culpability on Chinese corporations for the loss of jobs for natives as well as the collapse of local industries not related to mining. As claimed by many Zambians, not only have the Chinese infiltrated the economic structure of the country, but also the cultural composition of the country is at jeopardy. Guy Scott, a Patriotic Front Leader in Parliament and a former minister of agriculture discloses the Chinese influence in economic sectors of public life when stating, "If you go to the market, you find Chinese selling cabbages and bean sprouts. What is the point in letting them in to do that? There's a lot of Chinese here doing construction. Zambians can do that."¹¹ Protests raged the country of Zambia as hundreds of Zambian miners objected to harsh working conditions and the large population of Chinese immigrant workers who took Zambian jobs. In one incidence, the Chinese executives of a mine opened fire on protesting Zambians in a coal mine in the southern province of Sinazogwe.¹² The charges put against the Chinese managers were dropped in court, outraging Zambian workers.

The political and economic unrest in the country materialized in the most recent Zambian presidential elections in September 2011. Michael Sata, a former government minister, took office in late September after defeating the incumbent president of 20 years, Rupiah Banda. Sata heavily campaigned to the Zambian population on the platform of Zambian national interest in the face of the Chinese "dragon." He was awarded the nickname "The King Cobra" for his fierce speaking tactics and his venomous attacks on Chinese colonial business interests in Zambian natural resources.¹³ Sata supports and encourages multilateral economic relationships with foreign investors, but emphasizes the importance of adhering to labor laws. Sata warned the public of an overly influential China, stating, "Zambia has become a province of China. The Chinese are the most unpopular people in the country because no one trusts them. The Chinaman is coming just to invade and exploit Africa."¹⁴

The post-colonial African nation of Zambia rejoiced in the bloodless removal of imperial European powers in 1964, protecting their assets and people from foreign plunder and resource deprivation with the construction of a democracy. Due to Zambia's rich geographic location, the multitude of economic possibilities and resources brought the Chinaman to the humid rolling hills of Zambia, eager to develop and benefit from the vast resources available. The Zambian economy greatly benefited from the initial influx of foreign investors as Zambian workers flocked to mining sites and manufacturing plants to contribute to the rise in economic prosperity. As previously stated, the Chinese government used this rich and underdeveloped country to fuel its' rapidly rising production, citing previous

diplomatic and financial missions with Zambia as evidence of a strong relationship fueling the growing Sino-Zambian union. A mounting anti-Chinese sentiment amongst native Zambians has brought the attention of the international community and caused a close examination of Chinese involvement in Africa. Fear of colonialism has materialized on the African continent as an economically advanced China robs the African nation of her rich resources at the expense of human rights and sovereign integrity. With the election of Michael Sata, the Zambian population voiced their fears and resentment for Chinese involvement, expressing their trepidation of another colonial rule at the voting booth. It is the integrity of the people of Africa, the watchful eye of the international community, and the dark history of colonial rule that will prevent the scramble to Africa to evolve into the second wave of colonial rule. 🗿

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The Ideological Foundations of Islamic terrorism

Cassandra L. Bales

Ideologies offer a black and white narrative, identifying the main problem in society and providing a solution that will lead to a better world. History is littered with ideologies that promised to perfect man and society. The baby boomer generation faced the “red scare” with the threat of communist infiltration and nuclear war. The demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s repudiated communism as a legitimate political system, but the next decade saw the rise of a new ideological threat: Islamism or totalitarian Islam. The small number of violent Islamists belies the ideology’s impact, and in today’s world, radical Islam is the central ideological threat facing the United States. To understand the nature of the danger, this paper will look at the problem and solution identified by Islamists, influential ideologues, and the central concepts of the ideology.

The topic of totalitarian Islam is difficult because it is not a unified movement and many of the key concepts are unknown or confusing to non-Muslims. Farhad Khosrokhavar writes in *Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide*:

Jihadism’s [totalitarian Islam’s] ideology is perhaps the most comprehensive, anti-modern, and anti-liberal of any in the world after the demise of communism. It is solidly argued in terms of

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ideas and cogency, and its content is by far the broadest one in the post-communist era. [...] Many groups are involved in it: the close circle of devoted Jihadists who are ready to sacrifice their lives for the Sake of Allah; the much wider circle of hyper-Fundamentalists who are ready to cooperate with the Jihadists financially and sometimes logistically and politically, but not their military enterprises; the even much wider circle of Islamic fundamentalists who refuse to get involved in the Jihadist enterprise or help them directly, financially or politically, but who, indirectly are ready to facilitate some of their undertakings in those parts of the world they deem necessary to actively engage in.¹

Just as communism fades into history, as have all ideologies promising utopia, so one day will totalitarian Islam, but until it proves itself bankrupt, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the ideology's goals and concepts. The best place to begin in this endeavor is with the problem identified by totalitarian Islam: the decline of Islamic power.

All religions grapple with finding a path and purpose in modern times, but this struggle is particularly acute for Islam because of a widespread belief in the religion's superiority as God's final answer to flaws found in other monotheist faiths. In the Muslim narrative, the Quran is the "very thoughts of God sent down to mankind and are the givens on which humanity must base every action to create a moral and just society."² As Muhammad is believed to be the last prophet, no more revelations will be forthcoming and "the world must be changed to reflect the truth of Islam."³ Further, the Islamic revelations are felt to be universal, while the Torah and the Gospels are specific to a people and time.⁴ The belief that Islam is the complete guide to life and universal to all of mankind leads to the assumption that it should dominate across the globe. The decline of Islamic civilization and the strength of the Christian and Jewish West means something went terribly wrong according to totalitarian Islam.

Just as Marx and Lenin interpreted history to suit their purposes, so too do Muslim extremists: "they play fast and loose with both historical fact and traditional religious interpretation in order to understand their past as they believe it must be understood."⁵ From this position of interpreting history and religion to fit the worldview dictated by totalitarian Islam, there are three basic explanations for the weakened position of Islam relative to the West. The first dates from the early years of the religion and holds that Islam went off the proper path after the "four righteous Caliphs."⁶ Ali, the fourth and last of the righteous Caliphs, died in 661 C.E. and the Caliphate evolved into a heredity monarchy. To some extremists, this signaled the degeneration of their religion because monarchy is not a form of government recognized by the Quran or hadith and thus cannot provide the necessary structure for the practice of true Islam.

The second explanation is more modern and sees the problem stemming from the end of the Ottoman Caliphate on March 3, 1924. Despite historical evidence of the Caliphate's troubled history and its evolution into an honorific, totalitarian Islamists believe "that since the death of Muhammad there had existed only one Caliph at a time who ruled the entire community of believers."⁷ Regardless of the historical accuracy, the Caliphate is important because it is needed for the execution of *shari'a* (Islamic law) in its entirety and the end of the institution marked the death of true Islam to some radicals.

There are still others that argue the supposed loss of Muslim dignity and honor came from a "deliberate assault by" unbelievers.⁸ In this view, a battle between the forces of good and evil has raged since the formation of Islam, with all historical developments interpreted through this lens. For example, "the entire purpose of imperialism was, in this view, to destroy Islam and kill as many Muslims as possible," a continuation of the medieval Crusades.⁹ So, problems faced by the Muslim world are not the result of internal problems or weaknesses, but caused by outside forces.

In hopes of further understanding this ideology, its key concepts and goals for the future, this paper will now examine the contributions of three influential thinkers to totalitarian Islam: Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Halim Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Ibn Taymiyya lived at a time when the Mongols had conquered the core of the Islamic world. He believed that traditions had arisen that "were not sanctioned by the legitimate sources of the faith" and he advocated the need to return to the sources of the Islamic faith, the Quran and hadith "as interpreted by the first generation of Muslim scholars."¹⁰ He was one of only a few religious authorities prior to the eighteenth century that spoke out against the practices of saint veneration and shrine visits; totalitarian Islam is highly critical of these practices and regards them as heretical.¹¹

Ibn Taymiyya did not only rail against traditions he believed to be unIslamic, but condemned those that failed to practice the religion as he saw fit. The Mongol conquerors of his time claimed to have converted to Islam, but continued to use their native law systems alongside elements of *shari'a*.¹² For Ibn Taymiyya, the *shari'a* must be enforced in its entirety, and a leader that fails to do so forfeits the right to rule. But Ibn Taymiyya did not stop with the right to rule, and went further to declare a Muslim that "does not live by the faith is an unbeliever."¹³ On the subject of jihad, Ibn Taymiyya called it the "'best of all the voluntary (good actions) which man performs,' even better than the hajj."¹⁴ He broadened the understanding of jihad to include fighting against Muslims who failed to participate in jihad.¹⁵

From this approach comes the concept of *takfir*, in which one Muslim may

designate another professing to be a Muslim as a non-believer.¹⁶ *Takfir* plays an important role in totalitarian Islam because the holy texts condemn the killing of fellow Muslims, and extremists are able to circumvent this by declaring people unbelievers and able to be killed. It should be noted that the majority of Muslims reject the idea of *takfir* and believe that such judgments are the domain of God, not man. For the current generation of totalitarian Islamists, Ibn Taymiyya's legal opinions provide legitimacy to overthrow Islamic political leaders and carry out jihad against unbelievers and "false" Muslims.¹⁷

The second influential ideologue in the development of totalitarian Islam is a modern figure: Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi. An Indian and later Pakistani thinker, Mawdudi trained as a journalist and published numerous works in the 1930s that failed to have an immediate impact, but would later be crucial in the ideology as Arabic translations appeared. Similar to Ibn Taymiyya, Mawdudi felt that Islam had accumulated many traditions that were contradictory to true Islam. Going further than Ibn Taymiyya, Mawdudi argued that Islam returned to a state of *jahiliyya*, the period of ignorance prior to Islam, after the rule of the first four caliphs. The integration of "cultural ideas from Greeks, Iranians, Indians, and local pagan cults" caused this return to *jahiliyya*.¹⁸ With this impure history, the only solution was to discard it all and use only the Quran and hadith as "sources for living the Islamic life."¹⁹

Mawdudi argued that "the practice of Islam is inseparable from an Islamic state;"²⁰ a state provides the structure needed to practice true Islam according to this ideology. As it is impossible to be a good Muslim in an unIslamic state, it then becomes the duty of all Muslims to participate in creating an Islamic state. From this idea flows the totalitarian Islamist mandate that jihad is an individual duty in which all Muslims must participate as able. Differing from Sayyid Qutb, who will be discussed later, Mawdudi believed that jihad, although obligatory, could be a peaceful endeavor with a focus on preaching and teaching for the purpose of creating the conditions necessary for the creation of an Islamic state.²¹ Mawdudi established a party to spread his ideas, Jam'at-i-Islami, which he regarded as a vanguard—clearly inspired by the Marxist-Leninist literature of the time. Despite his defense of jihad as a peaceful instrument, Mawdudi did believe that open warfare would be inevitable as the battle to establish Islam progressed.²²

Mawdudi is described as the "intellectual father of modern Islamism"²³ and his ideas had a large influence on Sayyid Qutb who became known as the "intellectual father of modern Islamist terrorism."²⁴ A contemporary of Mawdudi, Qutb worked as a teacher for the Egyptian government and began to espouse radical views upon his return from the United States to obtain his master's degree in 1951.²⁵ Qutb then joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became editor of the

group's newspaper. It was a troubled time for the Brotherhood and Qutb was arrested in 1954. He was released in August 1965, but rearrested in December 1965 and executed in 1966. Qutb produced a commentary on the Quran, called *In the Shade of the Quran*, and numerous letters while in prison. His followers published sections of the commentary and letters in a volume titled *Milestones*,²⁶ which remains an important work in the ideology and "provide[s] much of the ideological and theological foundation for modern jihadism."²⁷ Qutb's death made him a martyr, increasing his legitimacy.

Similar to Mawdudi and the majority of Islamists, "the central idea in Qutb's thought was that Islam is a comprehensive guide to living in accordance with God's will and that it cannot function if it does not emanate from the state itself." It is wrong to "confine Islam to the private sphere"²⁸ and to Qutb the separation of church and state that defines secularism is a form of "hideous schizophrenia."²⁹ Islam cannot exist in a secular state because rule by men will result in a corrupt society. To Qutb, the legal system is the deciding factor on whether a state is Islamic or not, and only the use of *shari'a* in its entirety can make an Islamic state, not its population. As there was no true Islamic state in Qutb's time, he argued that true Islam did not exist in the world.³⁰

Acknowledging the influence of Mawdudi, Qutb also argued that Muslims were living in a new period of *jahiliya*. Vernon Egger wrote in *A History of the Muslim World Since 1260* that "Mawdudi broke with Islamic tradition by equating Islam with state-building and the designation of Muslim societies as being in a condition of *jahiliya*; Qutb used those concepts to build a case for advocating the violent overthrow of Muslim-led governments."³¹ In other words, Qutb took the thoughts of Mawdudi a step further and "legitimized rebellion by recasting it as jihad."³² Where Mawdudi emphasized the peaceful parts of jihad with warfare as part of some future struggle, Qutb stated that armed action casted as jihad was necessary now, making it possible for people to practice true Islam. Picking up elements from Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb "asserted that secular rulers usurp the authority of God—the greatest sin possible—and that people who follow the man-made laws of such rulers are equally guilty of being outside God's religion. Both the ruler and ruled are infidels, even if they claim to profess Islam."³³

In *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, Mary Habeck wrote: "In concrete terms jihadis believe that their mission is to implement their version of Islam, including the imperative to carry out warfare against unbelievers, and all the troubles of the Islamic world will disappear."³⁴ To achieve the goal of utopia, totalitarian Islam believes Muslims must return to the holy texts of the Quran and hadiths and throw out over "1,400 years of development in Islamic law and theology."³⁵ Just as the ideology plays fast and loose with historical fact, it does the

same with its interpretation of the Quran and the hadith:

The jihadist [totalitarian Islamist] use of the sacred books is in turn part of the larger struggle taking place within the umma [Muslim community] for the soul of Islam. On the one side are the extremists, who want eternal conflict with the unbelievers to define their community and their future. On the other side are socialists, liberals, moderates, and most traditionalists, who want peaceful accommodation with both nonmembers of their community and modernity as a whole. Both factions appeal to the sacred works, which they say support their ideas; both claim to be the true voice of Islam.³⁶

The way in which totalitarian Islamists interpret the holy texts is important because of the ideology's insistence that Muslims use only the Quran and the hadith as guides for the proper life and the willingness to kill those that stray.

Extremists "assert that the sacred texts must be taken at their most literal and applied in their entirety."³⁷ This means that every element of a person's life—political, social, cultural, and personal—must be taken from the Quran and hadith, rejecting the separation of the sacred and profane that characterizes modernity. But as with other things, the ideology reserves the right to ignore sections that contradict its vision. For example, the Muslim narrative describes the Quran as being revealed over a period of twenty years with early verses from Mecca citing "commonalities with Jews and Christians" and later verses from Medina calling for armed struggle against polytheists and "people of the book." Totalitarian Islamists "cite abrogation to claim that these later verses completely negate those that came before,"³⁸ so their claim to desire the use of the entirety of the holy texts is false. Another problem with the ideology's use of the sacred books is its proponents "never give full interpretive weight to the fact that every text was revealed in a set of specific circumstances in the past."³⁹ Traditionally, the circumstances surrounding the revelation play an important role in legal rulings, but totalitarian Islam ignores this, taking examples out of context to justify actions.

The ideas and concepts in this paper spring from a single belief taken to the extreme by totalitarian Islam. Called *tawhid* and expressed in the words "There is no god but Allah," which is the first pillar of Islam, it is the idea that Allah is unique.⁴⁰ This belief in the uniqueness and absolute unity of God leads to a number of assumptions. First, the need to accept only Allah as stated in the first tenet of Islam makes all other religions false and, taken to the extreme, that members of other religions and false Muslims are enemies to be fought and killed under the banner of *jihād*.⁴¹ Secondly, God, as laid out by the Islamic holy texts, is the only "master and ruler" and people must "see themselves as the slaves of God bound by

their very nature to obey him.”⁴² The failure to do this is the root of all evil in the totalitarian Islamic narrative.

On another level, it is believed that tawhid demands that the Islamic community be unified socially and politically.⁴³ No division of any kind is to be allowed to mar the unity of the future Islamic state, including the schism between Sunni and Shi’a. Only God’s laws have significance and only God has sovereignty. A true Muslim must acknowledge this and practice only God’s law—*shari’a*. As mentioned earlier, the failure to follow *shari’a* as dictated by totalitarian Islam is cause to label someone an unbeliever by *takfir*.⁴⁴

Continuing the reasoning of tawhid, the establishment of an Islamic state is necessary not only to provide the structure to institute *shari’a*, but also to ensure the community’s unity. To Mawdudi, the creation of a state based on God’s law will free man from the “servitude and exploitation” of laws made by man.⁴⁵ There is a thread throughout totalitarian Islam that expresses the desire to help all mankind. The ideology believes that only through the justice inherent in a state based on *shari’a* can mankind fulfill its true purpose of serving God. Similar to other totalitarian ideologies, the Islamic version contains a sense of self-righteousness that it knows what is best for people.

As only God has the right to make laws, liberalism is “fatally flawed” and democracy must be rejected as “a false religion, not just a false political idea.”⁴⁶ Totalitarian Islam uses western concepts, but the ideas are manipulated and made to fit into the ideology’s religious framework. From *tawhid*, everything takes on a religious character. So democracy becomes not just a political system to be debated, but a false religion that must be warred against for the future of Islam. The destruction of the secular world, or the Western world, is a necessary step in ensuring the Islamic community’s unity and creating utopia.⁴⁷

For totalitarian Islamists there are three common goals that overcome disagreements on ideological points. First, there is the desire to liberate “all of Palestine from Zionist control.”⁴⁸ The creation of Israel is viewed “as a permanent bridgehead in the lands of the *umma*.”⁴⁹ Jerusalem is the third holiest place in Islam, and though far removed from many of the world’s Muslims, the Palestinian conflict is a rallying cry for militants. Secondly, totalitarian Islam mandates the “establishment of an Islamic state based on *shari’a*.”⁵⁰ The Iranian revolution of 1979 provided hope for Islamists, Sunni and Shi’a alike, that this goal is possible. The third shared goal is the “removal of Western influence or foreign presence from Muslim territory,” ending *jahiliya* for some ideologues.⁵¹

While there is agreement that the above goals are important and necessary steps in creating the Islamic utopia, there is disagreement on the tactics for obtaining the ideology’s aims. Some local groups stress the need to combat the “near

enemy”—often secular governments in Muslim majority countries. There are other groups, of which al Qaeda is the prime example, with a global agenda that argues it is necessary to target the “far enemy” first. Often defined as the United States, al Qaeda argues bringing down the far enemy is a precursor to success locally.⁵² Whatever tactics espoused or used by particular groups, all claim to work towards establishing an Islamic state.

The majority of totalitarian Islam’s ideologues spend much of their time describing what is wrong with the world and why, and then encouraging or defending violent actions to mold the world into an Islamic utopia. The details, however, of this future state are vague. Just as Marx seemed to assume that the communist state would naturally come into being, totalitarian Islamists largely appear to believe that true Muslims will be divinely guided to form the perfect state. The basis of everything is the Islamic sacred texts and a common refrain of the ideology is “the Quran is our constitution.”⁵³ Any form of government not based on the Quran and hadith is rejected and a leader must be selected in ways authorized by the holy texts. Mawdudi envisioned the future state would be led by a “small group of Quranically pious clergy somewhat like the politburo of the Soviet state.”⁵⁴ The foreign policy of any Islamic state with a totalitarian bent will consist of “perpetual jihad because [...] the interpretation of the sacred texts compels it.”⁵⁵

The problem and solution offered by totalitarian Islam are clear and to the point: Islam has weakened, reverted to a state of *jahiliya*, and Muslims must use the Quran and hadith as the sole guide to life. But while the various groups that espouse totalitarian Islam across the globe commit to the goal of establishing an Islamic state and practicing “true” Islam, there are a variety of different tactics employed, emphasis placed on different religious beliefs, and disagreement on which enemy to strike first. Adding to the confusion is the reliance on concepts, like *jahiliya*, *takfir*, and jihad, which are unclear to Westerners. Despite these difficulties, the United States must work to undermine and challenge the Islamist ideology as it ultimately seeks the destruction of our government and the values we hold most dear. 🗑️

Notes

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A Geostrategic Game Changer— Hydrocarbon Reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean

Benjamin Fricke

Introduction

The Mediterranean region is one of the oldest and most traveled in the world. The discovery of massive deposits of oil and gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in 2009 further solidified the area's importance. Globally, energy prices have risen and an oligarchy of energy exporting countries has developed. Energy dependency is a geopolitical disadvantage and hinders economic development. Due to the vulnerability that comes with energy dependency, new regions were explored to gain access to alternative resources. Israel's pressure for excursions to find new energy sources was also fueled by a lack of energy and great international dependence. The Texan company Noble Energy¹ assisted Israel in its quest for new hydrocarbon reserves. In 2009, the first major discovery was made

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in the Tamar field, located in the Levant Basin and was considered the biggest global finding of hydrocarbons in 2009.² The discovery of hydrocarbon reserves has shifted geostrategic incentives and power throughout the Middle East and Europe.

The Levant Basin and Aegean Sea are also home to hydrocarbon reserves. These major reserves are off the coast of Israel near between Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.³ The game changer was the major hydrocarbon finding and discovery of a gas field 135 kilometers (84 miles) west of Haifa in 2010.⁴ Israel sought to declare this region as part of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) immediately. Named after the biblical sea monster Leviathan, the field is located in the Levant Basin, encompassing approximately 83,000 square kilometers of the Eastern Mediterranean area. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) there is an estimated mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin.⁵ “The Levant Basin Province is comparable to some of the other large provinces around the world,” noted a spokesperson from the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) Energy Resources Program. “Its gas resources are bigger than anything we have assessed in the United States.”⁶ This enormous discovery is a significant economic factor for the region and according to USGS it could meet Israel’s gas needs for the next one hundred years.

With the oil and gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean, the geopolitical gravity of the whole region has changed. Problems about the distribution and excursion privileges are very pronounced between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece on the one hand and Turkey, Lebanon, and the Palestinian provinces on the other hand.⁷ The discovery of the Leviathan hydrocarbon field triggered conflict from the Lebanese government which contests the current EEZ claimed by Israel. To this claim the Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman replied: “We won’t give an inch.”⁸ This one instance is one example of the tensions in the region between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, as why it has been a hot spot for Greek-Turkish struggle for over forty years.

The impact of the hydrocarbon fields will not come to full fruition until the question of who has supreme authority over which part of the common deposit and how international law protects a state against infringements upon its part of the deposit are solved. Under circumstances in which natural boundaries divide countries and resources, the principals of territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity would be applied. Yet, there is no clear-cut boundary between the resources and therefore those principles do not apply. Yet, this does not clarify how to resolve the issue of the hydrocarbon deposits, which are in international waters and the important question of Cyprus, which is divided

into a Turkish zone and Greek zone. Despite of the ownership disputes over the hydrocarbon discoveries, Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have voiced their will for cooperation and mutual exploitation of the resources. On the other hand, an emerging Turkey is undermining this cooperation by alliance building with Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.⁹ This conflict between Turkey and Israel is part of their larger struggle in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean region has traditionally been plagued by conflict and war. There are major problems in all of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, including: massive population growth, insufficient self-sustainability in food production, large quantities of debt, a severe lack of economic competitiveness, a lack of technological advancement and good infrastructure, as well as high unemployment and massively state controlled economies.¹⁰ Additionally, small elites run the democracy deficient countries. The discovery of hydrocarbon therefore seems to be the short cut out of misery for many of the nations in this region and some politicians are already talking about this region potential to be the new “Persian Gulf of the Mediterranean.”¹¹

New Alliances

The geopolitical consequences of the finding of such a large amount of hydrocarbons must be viewed through the shifting political alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past several decades. Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered tremendously under the Turkish AKP government. Turkey has developed a new strategy and an expansionist attitude that diverges from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Western civilization-based republic. The new doctrine is called *Strategic Depth*,¹² designed by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. He argues that Turkey has a special position in international relations due to its history and geographic location.¹³ Davutoglu further calls Turkey a “Central Power”¹⁴ which underscores its significance and supports its claim to play a leading role in Europe, the Middle East, and Western Asian affairs.¹⁵ The Strategic Depth Doctrine rejects Turkey as a geostrategic toy for other countries and calls for the development of a proactive strategy and foreign policy, which should be amplified by its Ottoman history.¹⁶

One initial major emphasis of the doctrine was the “zero problem policy with neighbors Policy.”¹⁷ The current Turkish government under Prime Minister Erdogan has put major efforts into normalizing relations with countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Armenia but failed to solve the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and further degraded Israeli-Turkish relations. Turkey seeks a role in the Middle East in which its position is not dictated by the U.S., the E.U., or Israel. Rather, Turkey wants to have more independence as a country and in defining its role in

the world. Its claim to a share of the hydrocarbon discovery will be a key tool to proving their increasingly important role in the region they seek.

The Strategic Depth Doctrine is essential to contextualize the dispute over the hydrocarbon discoveries with Greece, Cyprus and Israel because it reflects Turkish understanding and self-proclaimed entitlement to be the region's hegemonic power based on the Ottoman past and newly gained economic strength. With the decline of Israeli-Turkish relations, a new alliance between non-Muslim partners was formed. Israel, Cyprus and Greece entered into an alliance to explore and extract hydrocarbons from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Israel and Cyprus additionally signed an agreement that defines the Israeli and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁸ Moreover, Israel's Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has also announced the possibility of stationing Israeli fighter jets in Cyprus in order to keep the hydrocarbon extraction secure.¹⁹ This action would cause further tension and diplomatic strife between Israel and Turkey, whose diplomatic relationship has reached a low point since the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident. Yet, this alliance between Cyprus and Israel serves as a counterweight to Turkey's regional aspirations based on its Strategic Depth Doctrine,²⁰ and could make Turkey realize that if it really wants to be a hegemonic power it needs to maintain good relations with Israel.

Additionally, Turkey has disputed the hydrocarbon exploration in the Cypriot EEZ because it claims its share for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognized by Turkey. In the case of Cyprus and its Exclusive Economic Zone, Turkey argues that the islands have no continental shelf or the right for an EEZ, and that its actions are meant to safeguard the rights of Turkish Cypriots.²¹ In September 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan announced that "Turkey will take appropriate measures to avoid unilateral exploitation of the Eastern Mediterranean by Israel."²² Later that month, Turkey sent a warship to protect a Norwegian oil exploration boat hired by the Turkish government.²³ Cyprus' Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozakou-Marcoullis called Turkey "the neighborhood bully," adding that a Turkey "whose foreign minister once promoted a policy of 'zero problems' with its neighbors is now pursuing a policy of 'only problems.'" She added, "The tensions with Israel were just the beginning of a concerted effort by Ankara to delegitimize others in order to legitimize its actions."²⁴

The second alliance in the energy gamble is between the hydrocarbon extracting countries and the European Union. Hydrocarbon exports from Israel, Cyprus, or Greece are a welcome alternative to E.U. member countries such as Germany, France, or Poland, who often rely on Russian gas to meet their needs. About 50 percent²⁵ of the E.U.'s gas supply is imported from Russia at very high prices. Additionally, the fear of Russia cutting off the gas supply to Western and Central

Europe is imminent. The extraction of Cypriot and Greek gas would exclusively happen within the economic boundaries of the European Union and with proper protection present a safe and reliable alternative to Russian gas. Moreover, it is projected that the E.U. will not be able to compensate its energy deficit by 2020 with imports from Russia and North Africa.²⁶ For the E.U. this implies a geostrategic shift, because it can substitute Russian or North African gas imports with Mediterranean gas. It is prudent for countries such as Germany to support the Greek and Cypriot efforts of extracting the hydrocarbon reserves and secure this resource for the European economies. After the Turkish warship incident and the obvious advantage of having gas in the E.U.'s EEZ, it becomes clear that whoever can impose their will in the region will be the winner of the situation.

Geopolitical Opportunities

The Greek economy however, has experienced a severe decline and high numbers of unemployment strangle the country. The oil and gas findings represent the biggest surprise for energy security in Europe and a chance for Greece to fix its debt problems. The extraction of the Aegean Sea resources could be the short-term solution Greece has been hoping for. Revenues would allow Greece to decrease its debt and fund necessary reforms creating a long term strategy to solve its economic problems. Therefore, it is in the interest of the European countries, primarily those who are currently Greece's creditors, to stabilize Greece and invest in the Greek capacity to extract those resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In fact, Germany, as the E.U. largest creditor should mortgage the Greek gas industry and form a naval coalition of European Union countries and Israel to protect Greece's and Cyprus gas interests in the Mediterranean.

The second geopolitical advantage for the Eastern Mediterranean region and Europe is the pipeline that would run through exclusive European Union waters and avoid Middle Eastern countries and Turkey in particular. Turkey hopes to become the energy hub of the region,²⁷ which is in line with its Strategic Depth Doctrine. Bypassing Turkey would hinder Turkey's aspirations in the region and protect Central and Western Europe from possible Turkish influence. Yet, a closer economic relationship between Turkey and the European Union could be beneficial as well due to its containment of Turkish aspirations and reduction of its ambitions to form closer ties with Middle Eastern countries that are hostile to Israel and potentially dangerous to the E.U. Turkey could strengthen its friendship with E.U. countries and secure potential hydrocarbon resources for itself.

Moreover, the investment that will be required in infrastructure, maintenance, and support services, financing, and banking all suggest that job creation will be

long term. This would be a positive and stabilizing development for the whole region.²⁸

Conclusion

The hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean present a grand opportunity and great challenge for the region. Historic conflict between Israel and its immediate neighbors as well as Greece and Turkey present a problem for the peaceful extraction of the resources. A lack of cooperation and clear guidelines for the legal status of the liquid hydrocarbon reserves complicates the problem. Turkey's hegemonic aspirations and its Strategic Depth Doctrine represent a clash of interests in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, the geostrategic importance of the region is a game changer for the region at large. Israel has the chance to compensate its increasing gas needs with domestic production and cut its dependence from its surrounding Muslim neighbors. Additionally, the economic potential of the hydrocarbon reserves represents an opportunity to forge stability and peace in the region due to economic pressure and interest.

The economic importance for the European Union is also a powerful factor in context of the hydrocarbon reserves. The European Union has the opportunity to develop more energy independence from Russia and detach its energy dependence from Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey. Moreover, the tremendous wealth presents an opportunity for Greece to consolidate its finances and Cyprus to develop its economy in a more sustainable manner. The hydrocarbon reserves in the Levant Basin are a true game changer and provide opportunities for development and power politics beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. ■

Notes

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The Three Pillars of Stability: A Medium Range Forecast on the Political Stability of Saudi Arabia

Andrew D. Knapp

I. Executive Summary

I believe with reasonably high confidence that the Saudi Royal Family will remain in power over the coming 18 months. Secondly, I believe with moderate confidence that no regime threatening political opposition to the Royal family will emerge within the same timeframe. This conclusion is based on an understanding of the economic and symbolic drivers of political stability in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and draws comparisons to the failures by other Arab states to maintain their standing with the populace. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia¹ is well grounded for the moment. The family of Sa'ud simultaneously draws on religious legitimacy, populist spending, and a functional security apparatus to suppress and co-opt dissent. These three pillars of legitimacy do not appear to have eroded with the popular zeitgeist in the Arab world over the past year. No major² unrest has occurred over this time period, and it is evident that these three strategies are currently successful at maintaining the *status quo*. In addition to

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these strategies, the regime is also putting forward incremental reforms, specifically within the sphere of women's rights and regional politics, which confront the criticism that the Saudi regime is not moving forward.

The Saudi regime is not absolutely stable, however. Structural and long-run forces are greatest threat to the Saudi royal family's claim to the throne, and over time will complicate their ability to use the three above strategies to remain in power. The feudal disintegration of the royal family through a succession crisis or the event of an economic crisis caused by fluctuations in the price of petroleum will effect Saudi Arabia's ability to maintain these strategies in some eventuality. The current model is stable, and in my assessment these two structural outcomes are unlikely to fall within the coming 18 months. Nor is a disintegration of the strategies themselves that likely within the timeframe in question.

II. Background and possible impact of insurrection within KSA

Saudi Arabia is the home of Islam and the cornerstone of the global oil market. It is the only major oil producer with reserve capacity, and can manipulate its production to meet budget needs in the short term. The effects of protracted instability or revolution within Saudi Arabia would be difficult to quantify, but it is fair to assume that the emergence of an even moderately effective opposition force would contribute to a rapid increase in oil prices, resulting in economic chaos for the developed world.³ Rumors that a Saudi "Day of Rage" was in the works last March led to a record number of market bets on \$200 crude,⁴ and although this event never came to fruition, it belies the impact an actual uprising would have on the global economy.

Secondly, any revolutionary movement that successfully resists or replaces the House of Sa'ud in the Arabian Peninsula will necessarily involve Islamic rhetoric that trends towards either existing brands of islamism or creates a new synthesis between Islam and politics, which would be exported to other conflict zones and color the intellectual landscape of the Islamic world for several decades to come.

Saudi Arabia has the same basic ingredients that led to revolutions in other Arab states over the course of the past year; a preponderance of young and unemployed males, economic stagnation at home, and a gerontocratic government ruled by a small and entitled faction apart from the populace. As of February 2011, the *Economist's* "Shoe Thrower Index", which measures a variety of quantifiable demographic factors⁵ ranked Saudi Arabia in the middle of the pack at 53/100, with a score of 100 representing the "most unstable" Arab state. Both Bahrain and Tunisia, two states that have experienced significant unrest over the past year, were ranked as more stable than Saudi Arabia, at 37 and 49/100,

respectively.

Unlike Arab states that have experienced significant unrest, the Kingdom has stronger institutions to legitimate its authority and can rely on tools beyond the mere threat of force. However, these institutions are *stronger* more than they are *different*, and the collapse of these institutions still remains a very real possibility. The use of excessive repression or the emergence of serious economic stability that is beyond the power of the regime to mitigate with welfare will lead to incidents of even greater unrest, which if prolonged could contribute to the collapse of the regime.

III. The Three Pillars of Saudi Legitimacy

Saudi Arabia's political stability can be credited to the "Three Pillars of Legitimacy"—populist spending, Islamic governance, and the presence of a strong security apparatus to deal with individuals who are not bought off or co-opted by the former two. These three domestic strategies are part the Kingdom's whole system of governance, and are currently implemented exclusively by members of the Saudi royal family. It is my assessment that majorities within all major segments of the Saudi Arabian populace are currently dissuaded from actively opposing the regime for reasons stemming from the three pillars. The absence of evidence that a major dissent is brewing implies the evidence of absence, insofar as the domestic situation remains unchanged.

A. RENT SEEKING AND POPULIST SPENDING

Saudi Arabia's political stability is in part predicated on a rent-seeking economic model that redirects revenues from petroleum production to subsidize the cost of food and housing for the population at large. This "Bread and Circuses" approach is endemic to the Arab world, and was the means employed by Mubarak and Ben Ali prior to their own removals. Arab rulers have traditionally compensated for the lack of broad-based economic development with spending programs that compensate for the lack of productive or political involvement on the part of the populace. This practice is historically ingrained and endemic to the model of governance that Arab states have adopted after the colonial era. Egypt, for example, relied on the repossession of foreign assets, which were distributed to build networks of patronage, eventually leading to the stifling cronyism that has provoked uprisings both historically and in recent memory. Gulf regimes, however, possess a greater ratio of oil revenues per capita, which allows for greater potential to use oil-based welfare as a political tactic, and diminishes the level of taxation the regime is forced to impose on the population in order to support

itself and its programs. Saudi Arabia is the only major oil-producing state with excess capacity. As such, the Kingdom can change its production of petroleum to react to global prices and retains the capability to raise revenue in the short term by increasing production quotas. States that have experienced severe unrest have not had a comparable stream of revenue to fall back on, and have been compelled to negotiate or use force, which has led to greater unrest.

Recent spending increases and unemployment

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Saudi welfare program has become even more extensive and has been further tailored to the same grievances that motivated unrest in other Arab states. In August 2010, the Saudi government announced an additional \$385 billion, five-year spending plan as the Kingdom targeted at reducing a jobless rate of about 40 percent for Saudis between the ages of 20 and 24. Within weeks of the current unrest's spread to Egypt, King Abdullah boosted spending on housing subsidies by 40 billion riyals (\$10.7 billion), social security by 1 billion riyals, and added a 15% cost-of-living adjustment to existing benefits for public-sector workers.⁶ For the broader populace, housing subsidies have been put in place by KSA as a reaction to demand-side inflation in the price of housing,⁷ which deeply affects the lives of urban Saudis.

These actions in and of themselves were fairly incremental, though KSA motioned towards a 500 billion dollar infrastructure program on top of the 36 billion dollars in stimulus in 2011. The figure itself was Arab hyperbole, and while it is still possible that a large sum has been set aside for such an event such an investment would represent several decades of revenue sacrificed to buy off the populace and maintain the family of Sa'ud's position at the top. Each \$1-a-barrel increase in the price of oil adds about \$3 billion to the Saudi treasury,⁸ so it can be inferred that a 30 dollar spike in the price of crude similar to 2007 would leave the Saudi government with around 90 billion dollars in extra revenue. That amount of money can still dissolve some amount of popular dissent in the short run, but too much stimulus at once would raise questions about why the regime wasn't as generous in years prior. A speculative spike motivated by instability in Saudi Arabia would give KSA revenue to combat political rivals, but such a strategy is limited in the medium-to-long run because large changes in spending would diminish the traction that existing programs have with the population. Even if those changes in spending were successfully distributed, and staved off dissent in the short run, the problem of new and unrealistic expectations arises, and the regime would risk setting the bar higher than it can consistently jump.

B. RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY

The Kingdom's 1992 constitution cleverly weaves Islamic legitimacy with absolute monarchy. The majority of the Saudi constitution's wording provides for the Islamic nature of Saudi governance, the minority of the constitution guarantees monarchical governance by the family of "Sa'ud, and to their children's children"⁹ in which each acting king chooses and grooms an heir apparent. Even though all the explicit and legal language is reserved for the preservation of the monarchy, Islam comes first in the equation of Arabian politics and the regime goes to great lengths to preserve its Islamic image. It can be assumed that no opposition movement will be taken seriously that cannot first pass as an improvement on the Saudis without losing Islamic character.

The Kingdom contains Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in the Islamic religion, and its leadership is vested with the responsibility of caring for these sites. The Royal Family thus far has succeeded at co-opting Sunni Islam, and funds a large religious apparatus within the state to promulgate the faith among Saudi citizens and the world at large. There is no formal church-state distinction in Saudi Islam—KSA is a very tightly knit Cesaropapist regime, which is to say that religion is subordinated to the state or dictated at the whim of the Saudi royal family^{10,11}. Saudi Arabia is not a theocracy in which clerics rule, but the Saudi royal family has gone to great lengths to buttress its Islamic bona fides by establishing Islamist institutions that co-opt the moral and religious demands of the Sunni majority. This takes on the form of highly visible charity and donation through the Islamic practice of *zakat*. Wahhabists within the ruling family have built madrassahs at home and abroad through private philanthropy, and while this practice bolsters anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment abroad, it also establishes the royal family's credibility among its own subjects and telegraphs that the family of Sa'ud is serious about the message of Islam. The presence of state-sanctioned Mutaw'een, a traditional religious police who enforce Islamic codes of dress and behavior, is another salient example. While the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (who share their office's title with the Afghan Taliban's enforcement arm) is unpopular among liberals and the Saudi middle class, they are seen as a legitimate institution by many Saudi citizens whose primary understanding of society comes from the tradition of conservative Islam. Those groups disillusioned by the preponderance of religiosity are very small compared to the greater populace. This leaves little ground to gain ideological traction if one wishes to perpetrate an Islamist revolution in Saudi Arabia, since the Saudi monarchy already possesses the center stage.

There are two axes of religious extremism within Saudi Arabia that oppose the state. The first is the narrative presented by Al-Qaeda, the second by Shi'a citizens, who are not part of the ruling family's narrative of legitimacy. Al-Qaeda

has been in decline since 2006 due to the failure of their violent ideology and the Saudi state's combined efforts at increased security and deradicalization. The Shi'a as a faction within Saudi Arabia are fairly weak, though they are still much stronger than Al Qaeda as a political movement. The Shi'a compose roughly 15% of the population of Saudi Arabia¹² and are primarily concentrated in the rural Eastern Province, away from the center of power in Riyadh. Furthermore, the Shi'ite populace as a whole is not completely opposed to the current regime; King Abdullah's reforms have opened up some social and political space for the Shi'a, and have some maintain hope becoming part of a larger and more inclusive Saudi society.¹³ That said, some small protests have cropped up. The most recent and lethal event involved four deaths by gunfire in the eastern city of Qatif, two of which occurred at the funeral of an earlier victim, a telltale sign of growing civil unrest.¹⁴ Thus far these events have been small and isolated, but given the Shi'a culture of martyrdom and the mode in which information now travels via social media, a few martyrs could lead to a rapid escalation in violence, as was witnessed in Syria earlier this year. Insofar as there is continued violence with no mediating factor Shi'a unrest is the greatest threat to political stability within Saudi Arabia over the coming eighteen months.

C. THE SECURITY APPARATUS

The efficacy of the Saudi Security Service is crucial to the continued stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In and of themselves, economic and religious factors are not enough to deter or co-opt active dissidents, nor are they enough to confront foreign manipulation of domestic affairs. The General Intelligence Presidency [GIP] is the Saudi agency tasked with providing this service. The upper echelons of the service are populated by members of the royal family, with lower-level positions given almost exclusively to fellow Sunnis.¹⁵ The security service is lavishly funded and recently announced its plans to expand the service by 60,000 new security forces.¹⁶ This, again, is probably overstatement, but it does establish that the regime is serious about cleansing the streets of any space for dissent.

Deradicalization efforts

Saudi Arabia began a deradicalization program in 2004, tasked under the Ministry of the Interior. This program involved a six-week course, facilitated by imams, psychologists, and security forces. Effectively, since everything is in the family and there are no formal institutional boundaries in Saudi Arabia, this should be seen as an effort to force dissidents to acknowledge the regime's economic and moral legitimacy. The primary goal behind this program was to neutralize extremists who advocated the overthrow of the Saudi royal family, not

necessarily to neutralize Islamic radicalism in and of itself. The counseling program is successful in terms of the Saudi Kingdom's purpose if those who graduate the program no longer direct their anger towards the Saudi royal family. To quote a recent evaluation of Saudi deradicalization efforts by the Council on Foreign Relations:

Reflecting their study of results with early program participants, Saudi rehabilitation experts have begun increasing disengagement-focused elements. They still stress the importance of religious dialogue to address a detainee's understanding of Islam, a strategy critical for a government that relies on religion for legitimacy. But recent changes suggest new emphasis on educational efforts aiming to *modify a detainee's behavior, not change his religious beliefs*.¹⁷ [emphasis added].

These programs produce intangible effects and it is difficult to measure them with a solid metric, however, it does seem fair to infer that they are reasonably effective. Initial public statements on the program by default claimed 100% effectiveness—later discoveries that some graduates returned to terrorist organizations led officials to curb their grade back to 80-90% effectiveness.¹⁸ It is also clear that the Saudi security service is learning from its mistakes, and has made the process more holistic and gradual. As of 2007 those in the program are now exposed to a wider range of courses, including classes and counseling on sharia law, psychology, vocational training, sociology, history, Islamic culture, art therapy, and athletics.

Kinetic security measures

While deradicalization efforts have focused mostly on radical Sunnis, the security force proper has been utilized against the Shi'a. Between the beginning of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and March 27, 2011 Human Rights Watch reported the arrest of roughly 160 dissidents in Saudi Arabia. 145 of these individuals were reported as Shi'a demonstrators from Shi'a provinces, with most of the remainder is anecdotally reported to be comprised of bloggers and secular activists.¹⁹

Judging by the current absence of protests outside of Shi'a dominated areas, I infer that KSA currently maintains a political balance between the islamists and secularists among the Sunni majority. Economically developed Saudis who don't have familial or ideological ties to the regime rely on the the Kingdom for security from the radical islamist groups and the threat of downward economic mobility. Arabs who judge their environment according to conservative Islamic standards rely on the Kingdom for sustenance too, but also trust that the King is adequately serving his duties as keeper of the Islamic tradition on the Arabian

Peninsula. Though both groups have grievances that could easily rise to the surface, these grievances cancel out in relation to the Royal family's current political position. Though the lower classes suffer poverty, their uniting factor with the regime is Islam. Though the secularists suffer the islamists, their unifying factor with the regime is a desire for prosperity and security.

IV. Conclusions and Summary

In my judgment, the above factors will eventually contribute to a political collapse involving the removal of the royal family and its replacement with a regime in Saudi Arabia. In the short run, however, the regime is stable and the strategies that it uses to keep Saudi Arabia stable are holding steady. There is still risk that global economic instability, Shi'a sectarianism intensified by persecution, or failures to institutionalize succession will result in new factions that deny the legitimacy of the regime. Though a global economic crisis would take time to affect Saudi domestic politics, it is still possible within the timeframe, as is a sectarian security crisis involving Shi'a partisans. These threats are not a high probability within an eighteen month timeframe, but the further into the future one looks, the more certain it becomes that the regime will experience existential challenges insofar as it maintains its current body of policies.

It would take a significant spark for any group, even if it does form, to overcome the grand strategy that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have been able to maintain. ■

Notes

1. By "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" [henceforth KSA] the author means the Saudi Monarchy. "Saudi Arabia" designates the place and the populace apart from the Saudi Monarchy. "Saudi Royal Family", "SRF", and "House of Sa'ud" designate the family as members relate to each other.

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Afghanistan's Opium and U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia

Joseph Humphrey

United States policy toward Afghanistan and Central Asia in general has not always been what it is today; in fact, some might argue that it has been fairly inconsistent. For example, U.S. relations with organizations operating within Afghanistan in 2011 drastically differ from interactions with such groups in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, in such a turbulent and unstable region of the world as Central Asia, it is difficult to find many consistent factors on which to rely. One element that can be relied upon for significance, however, is Afghanistan's opium crop: Afghanistan is the largest opium producing country in the world.¹ According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in 2007, Afghanistan produced ninety-three percent of the world's opium.² With this in mind, it is evident that opium is a major domestic element of Afghanistan's society, and any U.S. policy concerning the region—particularly U.S. policies toward the Taliban and al Qaeda—must account for the significance of this drug.

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A Brief History of Afghanistan and Opium in the Region

From the outset of the Durrani Afghan Kingdom in the 18th Century, “Afghanistan was a state torn and ravaged by foreign interests.”³ Although never a colony, Afghanistan figured heavily in European power politics, and was propped up and deposed by Russia and Britain who were competing for influence in the region.⁴ Thus, Afghanistan has historically suffered from a weak central power. As a result, Afghanistan could not benefit from global developments, such as the railroad, which was “one of the major aspects of nation building” in neighboring territories.⁵ Unlike many other countries, though, Afghanistan had the ideal climate for the poppy seed.

Opium has been a part of Afghan society for centuries. Since the “beginning of commercial opium production—whether licit or illicit—Asia domination has never been challenged.”⁶ What may surprise many, however, is that opium production is much older in Southwest Asia than in Southeast Asia. The spread of opium in Southwest Asia was a by-product of early silk trade routes and predates that of Southeast Asia, the better-known source of opiates.⁷

It is important to note, though, that Afghanistan was not always the opium producing capital of the world that it is today.⁸ Afghanistan shared the production of opium primarily with Iran and Pakistan. The arid climate that these three countries, known as the “Golden Crescent,” were able to provide, allowed the poppy plant to thrive. Thus, as a part of the greater “Golden Crescent,” Afghanistan historically shared opium production with these other countries.

The opium produced in the Golden Crescent was fairly self-contained for decades and provided opiates for Southwest Asia almost exclusively. After the Shah’s 1955 ban on opium production in Iran, Afghan and Pakistani production were almost entirely for Iran’s consumption.⁹ Iran’s increasing consumption of opium caused a similar increase in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s production to meet the demand. It is interesting to note, however, that although Iran was absorbing all the opium Afghanistan and Pakistan could produce, drug abuse in Afghanistan and Pakistan was still relatively uncommon.¹⁰

Unfortunately for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 closed the primary market for their opium. Around the same time, Pakistan’s new government under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq prohibited the “production, commerce and consumption” of opium in Pakistan.¹¹ As Pakistani poppy production ceased, “so opium production increased in neighboring Afghanistan.”¹²

Furthermore, the Afghan-Soviet War also contributed to the increase in domestic opium production. As a part of counterinsurgency measures, the Soviets

targeted the rural economy and local resources. By the end of the war, the impoverished locals had no other choice than to start growing opium.¹³ After all the destruction, the durable poppy plant was all the Afghani farmers had left. By “destroying established social institutions and creating widespread economic chaos, the Soviets turned Afghanistan into a model environment for the drug trade.”¹⁴ This allowed Afghanistan, the only remaining country of the Golden Crescent, to step up and fill the void left by Pakistan and Iran. By the end of the war with the Soviet Union, Afghanistan had become the world’s leading producer of opium.¹⁵ The Iranian revolution, Pakistani prohibition, and the Afghan-Soviet war had transformed Central Asia from a self-contained opium zone, to a major supplier of opiates for the world market.¹⁶

Obviously, then, opium is relevant for U.S. policy *vis-à-vis* Afghanistan.

In reference to the Taliban and al Qaeda, it is pertinent and even imperative that U.S. policy acknowledge the impact opium has on these organizations that operate within the borders of Afghanistan.

The significance of Afghanistan’s opium crop to the Taliban and al Qaeda

When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan at the end of the war, Afghanistan was left with a power vacuum. The country had been ravaged and, as it was noted earlier, the only reliable source of income and stable aspect of the economy was the opium crop. Interestingly, prior to 1978, Afghanistan had been self-sufficient in its food production, but the Soviets “shattered this fragile capacity.”¹⁷ Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, “state sponsored terrorism declined and anti-government organizations had to look for alternative sources of financing.”¹⁸ In the period between the conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet War and the rise of the Taliban in 1994, a period that is often called the “warlord period,” the significance of opium is evident.

According to Barnett R. Rubin, in a paper entitled *Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry*, opium funded not only terrorism, but also warlordism.¹⁹ Drug trafficking added to the power of the tribal leaders who controlled the various provinces of Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew.²⁰ The tribal leaders supported the militias that kept them in power with the revenue they received from the drug trade.²¹

Similarly, according to Gretchen Peters, in her book *Seeds of Terror*, “Drug trafficking and tribes growing poppy were critical to the Taliban’s swift and astonishing rise to power.”²² The opium trade provided tax revenue, which allowed the Taliban to operate despite global pressure and economic sanctions.²³ The Taliban reasserted control over what remained of Afghanistan’s weak capacity for admin-

istration and revenue collection.²⁴ Such revenue, according to Peters, funded military campaigns like the one against the Northern Alliance, as well as supported the “global ambitions of Osama bin Laden.”²⁵ Osama bin Laden personally funded a portion of the Taliban’s rise to power that allowed them to finally take control of Kabul and so forged the connection between the Taliban and al Qaeda.²⁶ This relationship eventually led to the terrorist training camps in southern and eastern Afghanistan run by al Qaeda.²⁷ The 9/11 Commission, however, stated “while the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda.”²⁸ However, this statement has been increasingly questioned with many arguing that the 9/11 Commission overlooked the drug connection.²⁹

Although the al Qaeda connection to the drug trade may be debated, the connection between the drug trade and the Taliban, and then the Taliban and al Qaeda, is irrefutable. Not only did the Taliban use opium as a source of income, it also used it as a source of power. After the Taliban was deposed from power in 2001, to gain local support again, they promised the farmers that they would protect the opium product unlike the Americans and the new Afghani government who sought to eradicate it.³⁰ This was a reversal of their earlier position. In 2000, before the U.S. invasion, the Taliban prohibited the consumption and production of opium. Although there are several theories as to why the Taliban would do this, it is most commonly accepted that the prohibition was designed to increase their international image as well as increase the price of opium by limiting supply. Regardless, the drug trade helped the Taliban stay in power during the 1990s and was a key element in their plan to take back power in the early 2000s. According to Drug Enforcement Agency estimates, the Taliban collected more than \$40 million a year in profits from the opium trade.³¹

Stated frankly, drugs are a major factor in both the economy and power structure of Afghanistan. The balance of power in Afghanistan is controlled, in large part, by the opium production. In a report entitled *Afghanistan's Drug Industry*, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime states that the magnitude and importance of Afghanistan’s opium are virtually “unprecedented and unique in the global experience.”³² Few, if any national economies have ever been as dependent on illegal drugs as Afghanistan is today.³³ For example, in 2003, the size of the drug sector relative to the licit GDP was sixty-two percent.³⁴ However, many are quick to point out that the share of the opium sector in the Afghan economy has declined steadily over the last few years. Although true, this fact reflects the steady growth in the licit sectors of the economy rather than lower production and exports of illegal drugs, which have remained largely unchanged.³⁵

Afghanistan and Narcoterrorism

With such obvious prevalence of the opium economy in Afghanistan, many have asked if the conflicts and violence that arises from organizations such as the Taliban and al Qaeda are actually “narcoterrorism.” Such a question is pertinent to any discussion of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

The term “narcoterrorism” was first introduced by Peruvian President Belaunde Terry in 1968.³⁶ When discussing narcoterrorism in reference to the current situation in Afghanistan, it is necessary to delineate what sort of narcoterrorism one is referring to, for the term has become less descriptive over time. Historically, narcoterrorism referred to the criminal actions of organized drug cartels. Of all the real and alleged links between terrorism and other forms of crime, the one between terrorism and illicit drug trafficking is the strongest.³⁷ This, however, does not automatically mean the actions of the Taliban or al Qaeda are “narcoterrorism.” There can be no doubt that there is a “simultaneous presence of armed conflict, including the terrorist variety, and the cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotic drugs,” but there is no evidence of terrorist organizations working together with organized drug cartels.³⁸ Rather, terrorist groups develop “in-house” capabilities for conducting activities, such as drug production, usually associated with organized crime.³⁹

It is imprudent to group drug cartels with terrorist organizations. There are certainly links between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations, but there are significant motivational and operational differences. For example, terrorist groups are usually ideologically or politically motivated while organized crime groups are simply “profit oriented.”⁴⁰ Similarly, terrorist groups seek media attention while organized crime groups do not. It is evident from these examples that referring to activities of the Taliban or al Qaeda as narcoterrorism is simply inaccurate.

Organizations such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are unquestionably involved in drug trafficking, but they share neither methods nor motivation with organized drug groups. It would, therefore, be incorrect to describe terrorist activities in Afghanistan as narcoterrorism. However, with the Taliban and al Qaeda now being “household names” and with the significance of opium in these organizations becoming more obvious, the term narcoterrorism is likely to take on a new meaning, a meaning that will include the Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s use of drugs.

The Current State and the Way Forward

Some may argue that the connection between the opium economy and the Afghan Taliban is only evident in the peak times of the War in Afghanistan. This

could not be farther from the truth. According to a 2011 United Nations report, in 2009 alone, the Taliban earned roughly \$150 million from the opium trade.⁴² Furthermore, as of July 2011, heroin was the most abused opiate in the world and Afghanistan, producing 380-400 tons a year, was the center of the global heroin manufacturing economy.⁴³ Sadly enough, even though Afghanistan at one point seemed immune to drug abuse, it has experienced a steady rise in opium abuse in the last decade.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Afghani production of opium has exceeded estimated global demand for the past several years. This has resulted in the creation of large stockpiles of opium, which ensure a steady supply for years to come.⁴⁵ Opium remains one of the largest sources of export earnings for Afghanistan and a major source of income and employment in the rural regions of the country.⁴⁶

Why does this matter? Specifically, how does this apply to U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and U.S. national security? After all, the war on drugs and the war on terror are completely separate operations. Simply put, a failure to understand the significance of the opium crop in Afghanistan could undermine the entire U.S. and even the international effort in the region. The obviously “booming opium industry jeopardizes not only Afghanistan, but the U.S., Europe and the entire region of Central Asia.”⁴⁷ The Taliban and al Qaeda use drug money to finance their operations while the Afghan warlords and militias grow rich off of the drug sector. All of this creates insecurity and “blocks efforts by the national government to extend its authority.”⁴⁸

However, the opium trade, partly because of the black market, simply pays more and allows the peasantry to survive. Many Afghan farmers grow opium because it is the difference between prosperity and death. Therefore, any U.S. policy in Afghanistan must be coupled with the knowledge and understanding of both the harm opium has done and the function it has played in allowing the people to survive.⁴⁹

Obviously, though, stability in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without addressing the drug issue. Any policy must “curb” the drug industry without destroying the country’s economy.⁵⁰ Such a feat will require a comprehensive plan that involves neither the complete and immediate eradication of the opium crop, nor the condoning of illicit trade. The U.S cannot abandon the Afghani peasants who rely on the poppy crop for survival. After all, local poppy farmers have historically provided key intelligence concerning the Taliban to U.S and NATO troops. The situation, therefore, may, at times, require the U.S. to consider both the war on terror and the war on drugs, and prioritize one over the other. Both the war on drugs and the war on terror involve a resourceful and elusive enemy that has the potential to inflict significant damage to the U.S., but it is important to remember that the two are not the same. It is necessary to decrease and eventually eliminate Afghanistan’s dependence on illicit drug trade, but it must be done gradually.

In summary, the opium industry infiltrates and severely impacts Afghanistan's economy, state, society, and politics. It is a major factor in the balance of power in the region and there can be little doubt that terrorist and anti-government forces profit from the drug trade. Afghanistan is a country of "enormous complexity," but this complexity can be partly understood through a recognition of the facts concerning the opium industry.⁵¹ The opium economy enriches only a few while providing a livelihood to many of Afghanistan's poorest. It simultaneously prohibits true development and stability by providing a strong financial stream to organizations like the Taliban and al Qaeda. It presents a problem that is glaringly evident, but exceedingly difficult to solve. Nonetheless, U.S. policy, particularly policies toward the Taliban and al Qaeda, must address, or at the very least, recognize and account for the significance that opium has within the country of Afghanistan. ■

Notes

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Propaganda in the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War

James Gabele

Several reasons are given for the Iran-Iraq War: access to the Shatt al-Arab, contested territories, continuation of Persian versus Arab fighting, oil, etc. Iranian propaganda and Iran's attempt to incite revolution in Iraq are not cited often. Before and during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran conducted a campaign hoping to cause a Shiite uprising in Iraq, but most of the oppressed Iraqi Shiites supported the Iraqi regime and did not revolt. I argue Iranian propaganda failed to incite an Iraqi Shiite uprising before and during the Iran-Iraq War for three reasons: (1) Iran propaganda was designed to target Shiite populations in both Iran and Iraq, (2) Iranian propagandists' failure to understand Iraqi Shiites rendered their propaganda ineffective, and (3) Saddam's effective propaganda and internal security measures prevented a Iraqi Shiites uprising.

Iran's propaganda campaign in Iran and Iraq

Iran's propaganda campaign against Iraq was influenced by Iran's internal political and ideological needs. During the revolution, the various groups united to overthrow of the Shah. After the revolution, the new Iranian government looked for a way to keep the coalition of revolutionaries together and target dissidents.¹ The radical Shiites, under Khomeini's leadership, realized one way to unite the

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population would be to create a foreign enemy. Khomeini had ideological reasons to “take and implement Islam all over the world, to every country.”² The success of the Iranian Revolution was seen as a sign to export the revolution to other countries—especially the Muslims living under secular governments. Furthermore, the ideology had a messianic mission, destroy Israel and liberate of Jerusalem. When paired with the ideology’s tenet: “the road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala,” Iraq appeared as the starting point.³

The propaganda campaign targeted the populations of Iraq and Iran. Within Iran, the Iranian government used theocratic populism warning Iran’s population to be on the outlook for those seeking to disrupt the unity of Iran.⁴ State propaganda labeled the dividers as agents under the influence of foreign governments—in particular, U.S., Israel, and Iraq.⁵ The propaganda had three purposes. First, the state mobilized the population to target dissenters and consolidate government power. Second, the propaganda passed the blame for regime failures, such as their poor economy, on to foreign powers. Third, the message was pre-propaganda. Khomeini wanted to prepare Iran to face external enemies and to expand his base support from “the oppressed, poor nation of Iran” to “the devout nation” including all Muslims. The shift enabled Iran to export its revolution beyond its borders and defined enemies as foreign secular governments.

Iran used broadcasts, publicity stunts, and assassinations. Radio Tehran was the center. Over the airways, Radio Tehran called for Iraqi Shiites to question the Iraqi regime and form an alliance with other Muslim nations.⁶ Broadcasts demonized the Ba’ath Party and Saddam calling them criminals, corrupt, heretics, and Jewish pawns. In June 1979, the broadcast became open calls the Shiites and the Kurds to revolt. During the broadcasts, Radio Tehran hosted various groups—Islamic Revolutionary Struggle for Iraq, the Islamic Movement of Iraq, and the Islamic Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Iraq—yet these groups were fictitious.⁷ The fictitious groups gave the impression to both the Iranian and Iraqi listeners that the movement was much larger despite the movement’s small size.

Iran turned several Iraqi defensive actions into propaganda. In 1979, Saddam evicted 100,000 Iraqis of Persian origin because Saddam believed the group had links to ad-Da’wa, a rebellious Shiite group formed in the 1960s, believing that the group was agitating the Shiites and cooperating with Iran. Iranian propaganda framed the event as religious persecution of Shiites and called for the liberation of the Shiites. Iraqi propaganda framed the event as expelling Persians—a pure ethnic issue.⁸ Saddam executed Baqir al Sadr in April 1980. Al Sadr was friend of Khomeini and participated in the 1977 riots with Khomeini. Iran declared three days of mourning for the martyr and deplored his “murder.”⁹ In 1980, Iranian conducted several assassination plots, most notably the failed assassination at-

tempts on Iraqi Deputy Primer Tariq Aziz and Minister of Information Latif Nusseif al-Jaimin. Within April 1980, 22 Iraqi officials were killed.¹⁰ The assassinations created an image that the movement was serious threat to Iraq and hoped to inspire Iraqi Shiites to commit violent acts.

The propaganda produced mixed results because Khomeini targeted Shiites in Iran and Iraq with the same propaganda. In Iran, the propaganda succeeded enabling the Khomeini to consolidate power and providing an image to Iran that the Revolution expanded beyond its borders. However, Iran's propaganda failed to cause the Iraqi Shiites to revolt because Khomeini believe Iraqi Shiites would find his propaganda messages appealing and respond like Iranian Shiites. In short, Khomeini made a mirror imaging error. Combining internal and foreign propaganda failed because the targeted populations are different.

Iran's disconnect with Iraqi Shiites: History and culture

Iran failed to start a revolution in Iraq because the propagandists misunderstood Iraqi Shiites. Iran committed mirror imaging errors when crafting propaganda. The error caused Iranians to ignore ethnic, tribal, and religious differences between Iranian and Iraqi Shiites. Iranian propagandists did not factor the effects of the Iraqi economy, the strength of Shiite opposition, and Iraq's internal security. These factors rendered Iranian propaganda useless and inhibited their tactics. In contrast, Saddam knew how to use his knowledge of Iraqi culture to create successful counterpropaganda.

One major problem was the ethnic differences between Persian and Arab Shiites. Since ancient times, the Arab and Persian populations fought each other and developed differently. After Islam spread to the region, the traditional fighting between Persians and Arabs remained; the Sunni-Shiite split contributed to the conflicts. The Caliphate and Islamic kingdoms fought each other; Persia and the Ottoman Empire fought each other for centuries. In other words, the myth that Islam eliminated ethnic differences was false. Ethnic identity remained an important source of conflict. Iran attempted nullifying the ethnic differences by shifting focus from ethnicity and religious sect to piety:

I tell all sections of society that in Islam there are no privileges recognized for one group as distinct from another, Sunni or Shi'a, Arab or Persian, Turk or non-Turk. Islam recognized social distinction only for the just, for piety. Only those with piety enjoy social distinction. Those with the spirit of humanity enjoy social distinction.¹¹

Iraqi Shiites did not identify with this propaganda because it conflicted with

previous Iranian propaganda. During the revolution, Khomeini condemned Arabs for not attacking Israel and declared the Persians would need to destroy the Arabs to attain their goal.¹² According to the rhetoric, Shiite Arabs would be destroyed. Iran reused the anti-Arab propaganda again during the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly, the anti-Arab propaganda alienated Iraqi Arab Shiites.

Southern Iraqi Shiites identify themselves more with their tribal culture than their religion. The southern tribes are recently converted to Shi'a and lacked organized religious structures in their society because of their nomadic lifestyle.¹³ Later in the 20th century, the Shiite tribal populations moved into cities where more Shiite mosques, communities, and schools existed. However, the tribal population did not participate in urban communities because of their tribal culture. Their habits inhibited Iran's most successful tactics to mobilize and to indoctrinate Iranian: large religious events.

The Iranian Revolution succeeded because Iranian Shiites were well organized through large festivals, such as celebrating the death of Hasan. Khomeini used the large festivals and Friday prayers to foment revolution especially the Passion of Hasan plays. The plays reinforced his interpretation of the world, and the play is widely popular in Iranian Shiite culture with numerous troupes throughout Iran. Before the Iranian Revolution, he used the role of Caliph as the Shah and Hasan and Hasan's family to symbolize the people of Iran. In the play, Hussein murders Hasan and his family because they refuse to follow the Caliph of Damascus. According to Khomeini, the play has two themes. One is "the world is Karbala and everyday is Ashura." One meaning is the Iranian faithful must be ready for martyrdom everyday of their life.¹⁴ The second meaning is the Iranian people must avenge the death of Hasan by overthrowing the Shah. After the revolution, the Caliph became the symbol for Saddam.¹⁵ Because the play is central to the Shiite faith and widely performed in Iran, the population was continually conditioned to Khomeini's ideology and mobilized the population. Furthermore, the plays were independently produced throughout Iran causing the propaganda to have an amplified effect.

Unlike Iranian Shiites, the Iraqi Shiites were not as organized nor had the same enthusiasm for the play as Persians. Iraq did not have numerous troupes performing the Passion of Hasan and few large events and festivals on the same scale as Iran. Iraqi Shiites preferred their smaller, tribal influenced rituals. The lack of mass organization denied Iranians from using an effective method and from organizing existing dissent among Iraqi Shiites. Thus, disorganization among the Iraqi tribal Shiites helped the population resist Iranian propaganda.

However, the large Shiite riots in 1977 during Ashura in the cities of Najaf and Karbala are exceptions, but the behavior of the Shiite community can be explained. First, Khomeini and his Iranian followers were in Iraq and instigated the

riots.¹⁶ Saddam exiled Khomeini in 1978. Second, the Iraqi government suspected the participants had a connection to ad-Da'wa.¹⁷ Iraq expelled 100,000 Persian Shiites in 1979. Probably, the majority of those expelled participated in these large events. If so, the expulsion hindered Iranian efforts to incite a revolt because a large support base like ad-Da'wa no longer existed.

Unlike Iranian propagandists, Saddam knew how to use Iraqi culture and history to create the myth of Iraqi nationalism. Saddam countered Iran's propaganda by creating the myth of the "new Iraqi Man" whose nationalism superseded ethnic and religious differences.¹⁸ Saddam used Iraq's ancient history and created the image of Iraqis continually resisting Persia to maintain Iraqi identity. In another myth, he used the image of Al-Qadisiyah Saddam, an Arab leader who conquered Persia and brought Islam to Persia. In a speech on April 2, 1980, Saddam declared:

In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we tell those Persian cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts.¹⁹

The myth used the traditional Arab verses Persia rivalry and changed the religious tone of the conflict.²⁰ Building upon the myth, Saddam argued Islam is Arab. Therefore, the Persians were heretics, and Saddam and the Ba'ath Party were defenders of the Islamic faith like Al-Qadisiyah.²¹ His creation of Iraqi nationalism worked before and during the Iran-Iraq War reinforced Iraqi Shiites to identify themselves as an Iraqi nationalist first and Shiite second.

Economy statecraft and propaganda

Both Iranian foreign and domestic propaganda stressed ending poverty and appealed to the poor, religious, and oppressed people:

Apart from wanting to make your material life affluent, we want to see your moral life affluent as well. You need spiritual values. They have taken away our spiritual values... We are going to make power and water free for the poor classes. We shall make buses free for the poor classes. Do not be satisfy with just this. We shall impart greatness to moral and spiritual values... We shall develop both your world and your hereafter.²²

The rhetoric was used in Iran to appeal to Khomeini's base of poor Shiites during the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini employed the same rhetoric to Iraqi

Shiites because of their second-class status and poverty. However, poverty was declining among Iraqi Shiites before the Iran-Iraq War. Rising oil prices in the late 1970 sparked a boom in the Iraqi economy. Between 1972 and 1980, oil production doubled in Iraq from 72.1 million to 130.2 million metric tons. Revenues increased from \$575 million in 1972 to \$26.5 billion in 1980.²³ The new wealth caused wages to rise and created new jobs. The Iraqi government used the new wealth to buy off trouble groups in Iraq from giving free TVs and cash to resettle Kurds²⁴ to renovating Shiite shrines and mosques. In a sense, the Shiites were becoming more affluent, and the renovation campaigns appeased the Shiites.

The newly created wealth assisted Saddam to appease his population during the war. Saddam continued funding the renovation of Shiite shrines. More importantly, he combined economic statecraft and propaganda together. He pursued a guns-and-butter policy early in the war to isolate his population from the economic consequences of the war and gave away money, cars, and land to families who lost someone during the war.²⁵ After Iraq lost the ability to export oil during the war, Saddam used foreign currency reserves to keep imports and commodities artificially low.²⁶ His actions caused Iraqis to believe their economic wellbeing was not being harmed and prevented a decline in their standard of living.

In contrast, the Iranian economy suffered from the revolution and reorganization. Internal Iranian propaganda called for “sacrifice for the regime,” or “our faithfulness is being tested,” or “the foreign enemies are to be blamed for our poverty.” Clearly, the economic promises of increased wealth made to the Iraqi Shiites failed because Iraqi Shiites could not relate to the economic conditions in Iran.

Tarhib and Targhib

The newly created wealth assisted Saddam’s internal security policy: *Tarhib* and *Targhib*, “terrorize” and “reward.” Saddam pursued a policy to keep the Iraqi Shiites from revolting through a combination of intimidation and bribes. As mentioned earlier, Saddam used his wealth to create an image that he was helping the Shiites by renovating the shrines and mosques. The wealth also helped expanding his internal propaganda and police forces. Propaganda became omnipresent. Iraqis joked that the population of Iraq was 26 million, 13 million Iraqis and 13 million images of Saddam.²⁷ In addition, Saddam expanded his security forces to 1 in 5 Iraqis because of the February 1977 riots.²⁸ Saddam defined treason to include any minor complaints. The large security force and omnipresent propaganda in Iraq atomized Iraqi society. The atomization created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. People feared being reported to the security forces for making treasonous statements.²⁹ The fear inhibited Iraqi dissent from organizing opposition.

Saddam continued his *tarhib* and *targhib* campaign, during the Iran-Iraq War. He continued to “reward” Shiites by renovating Shiite shrines, expanding Shiite participation in the Iraqi parliament guaranteeing Shiites would have 40% representation, and extending Ba’ath Party membership to Shiites. Saddam used terror to destroy subversive elements allied to Iran. In 1983, Saddam’s security forces crackdown on the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) by arresting 90 family members of Hojjat al-Islam Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, the organization’s leader exiled in Iran. Saddam threatened to execute his family members unless al-Hakim ceased subversive activities in Iraq; 16 were executed, and the SCIRI ceased activities.³⁰ After 1983, no visible Shiite dissent existed. The SCIRI was probably the last group Iran had in Iraq to incite Shiites.

Unintended consequence: Influencing the decision for war

Although the Iran failed to influence Iraqi Shiite behavior, Iran’s propaganda influenced Saddam and the Ba’ath Party’s perception of the Iraqi Shiites. Before Iran’s propaganda campaign, Iraq worried about the Iranian Revolution spreading to the Iraqi Shiite population. Iran’s support for fundamentalist extremists throughout the Middle East increased Iraq’s fears.³¹ The Iran’s campaign exaggerated the number of the Iraqi dissents. Though isolated, small Shiite rebellions occurred, the Iraqi government assumed the worst: the isolate individuals represented all Iraqi Shiites. Iraqi officials believed war against Iran would end Iran’s campaign. As a result, Iran’s propaganda had an unintended consequence: influencing Saddam’s decision for the Iran-Iraq War.

It does not appear that Iran believed Iraq would start a war based upon the agitation propaganda. Iran made no military preparations for war. After the revolution, a third of the Iranian military deserted, and the Iranian government conducted purges of the military. Iran depended upon foreign military technicians and equipment. The revolution caused Iran to lose these sources—especially the United States. If Iran thought their actions would provoke a war, Iran would have prepared.³²

Summary of Iranian mistakes

The Iranian attempts to overthrow Saddam’s government failed. Before the Iran-Iraq War, isolated episodes of Shiites rebelling occurred, most noticeably, the assassinations. During the war, Iran could not incite the Shiites to rebel or appear as the liberators of Iraqi Shiites. However, homemade, pro-Iraq propaganda could

be seen in Iraqi Shiite occupied by Iran, and Iraqi Shiites fought alongside Iraqi Sunnis.³³ Iran's failure was a combination of misunderstanding the Iraqi Shiite and trying to reach both Iraqi and Iranian Shiites with the same message and tactics rendered Iranian propaganda ineffective; in contrast, Saddam understood the Iraqi Shiites and created effective propaganda. Mirror imaging was a common Iranian error. Iran thought the Iraqi Shiites functioned like Iranian Shiites, therefore Iran used the same or similar propaganda tactics, messages, and symbolism that were successful during the Iranian Revolution. Saddam succeeded because he knew what myths and images appealed to Iraqis.

Another error made by Iran was organization. Iran believed the large riots in 1974 and 1977 indicated that the Shiite community could a mass movement and create a revolt. However, the Iranian leadership forgot that they and their followers were present in Iraq during the riots. Khomeini organized and participated in the riots. Most of his supporters were later exiled from Iraq, thus the core element of active participants were removed. Ad-Da'wa and SCIRI were not large movements after Saddam's security crackdown after 1977. Saddam's security drove dissent underground making it difficult for Iraqis and Iranians to organize. As a result, Iran had difficulty organizing Iraqi Shiites and running propaganda within Iraq, therefore broadcasting from Iran became the chosen method.

Iran underestimated Saddam's ability to appease the Shiites. Saddam used the invested in infrastructure in Shiite communities and raised the Iraqi Shiites' standard of living. He used his understanding of Iraqi culture to counter Iranian propaganda through nationalist appeal to avoid religious differences within Iraq. As a result, he squashed opposition and mobilized Iraq for war.

Lastly, Iran's propaganda campaign had a large domestic function within Iran. Khomeini needed a foreign enemy to bring opposing sides of Iran together and remain consistent with the regimes ideology by exporting the revolution. Internal Iranian propaganda accused Saddam agents for trying to divide Iran. Radio broadcasts to Iraq were tailored to appeal to both Iranian and Iraqi audiences portraying a Shiite insurgency bigger than in reality. However, exaggerating the size of the insurgency had an unintended consequence. In 1980, the Iraqi Interior Minister concluded: "The number of misguided supporters and religious sympathizers is considerable."³⁴ The Iraqi assessments influenced the decisions to execute Baqir al-Sadr, to expel of the Persian Shiites, and to start Iran-Iraq War. Iran probably did not intend to start a war in 1980, but the eight year war enabled Iranians to unite behind their new government. ■

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actions to appeal to foreign publics and governments for support. He argued Iraq's invasion of Iran was protecting the rest of the Persian Gulf from the revolution and called upon all Arabs to support him. Saddam received several loans from foreign governments.

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