Military Glasnost' and Strategic Deception

BY

DR. JOHN LENCZOWSKI

This article first appeared in the 1990 winter issue of the International Freedom Review published by the International Freedom Foundation.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ has been one of the most astonishing political innovations of recent Soviet history. Because it has the hallmarks of free speech, and therefore the opening of a closed society, this policy has convinced the West that fundamental changes are taking place in the USSR—changes which also have dramatic foreign policy implications. The general Western impression of glasnost’, however, has been that it is principally a domestic policy designed for purposes of internal reform. But one component of the policy—military glasnost’—reveals that it has been designed as much for foreign policy as for domestic purposes.

The campaign of military glasnost’ has comprised a wide variety of initiatives, including: invitations of Western observers to hitherto secret military installations; exchanges of defense ministers and officers; and Soviet acceptance of new, intrusive arms control verification measures. Some of these initiatives have been undertaken in cooperation with the U.S. defense establishment, while others have been pursued unilaterally by Moscow. Their net effect on the East-West political and military balances, while not easily quantifiable, seems nevertheless considerable.

Portents of Military Glasnost’

While the policy of military glasnost’ began in earnest under the regime of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, intimations of it could be detected in earlier periods of U.S.-Soviet detente. One element of this policy—dialogue on politico-military issues between U.S. and Soviet defense officials—has some precedent. The

John Lenczowski is Senior Fellow at the Council for Inter-American Security, Adjunct Scholar at the International Freedom Foundation, and Adjunct Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University. He formerly served as Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council from 1983 to 1987. This article is adapted from a chapter of a book in progress detailing the Soviet use of political influence operations, including “active measures,” disinformation, cultural exchanges, and public diplomacy, to advance their agenda globally.
general history of U.S.-Soviet military contacts—from the negotiations for military cooperation in World War II to the nuclear test ban negotiations of the 1960’s—had been one of mutual suspicion. But with the apogee of the Nixon detente in 1972, inter-military relations began to mellow when the two sides signed an agreement on Incidents at Sea. By 1979, the Vienna summit included meetings between Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov and between Generals David Jones and Nikolai Ogarkov.

Another element of the new military glasnost', Soviet willingness to accept intrusive arms control verification, also has historical antecedents. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 included provisions for data exchanges. And the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 contained provisions for limited on-site inspections. Due to the inadequacy of these provisions, however, neither treaty has been ratified by the Senate.

Other glimmerings of military glasnost' could be detected during the regime of Yuri Andropov. Although Soviet military officers had traditionally participated in arms talks, they were almost never involved on the central stage of East-West politics. In 1983, however, in the wake of the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007, they made their debut. The Kremlin’s initial reaction was to deny any responsibility. But when the U.S. government began to reveal evidence of Soviet culpability, and the initial Kremlin misrepresentations had manifestly failed to convince Western publics, Moscow felt compelled to find more credible spokesmen.

One of the first salvos in this new approach was an article in Prawda by Soviet Air Defense chief Colonel-General Semyon Romanov, which purported to contain authoritative technical data bolstering the Soviet position. He charged, for example, that the airliner had turned off its air navigation and collision avoidance lights.¹ This detail, central to the Kremlin’s developing story that the plane was on a spy mission, was completely undermined the following day when the United States revealed audiotapes of the Soviet fighter pilot referring three times to his observation of the plane’s strobe and navigation lights. With Moscow’s credibility sinking as each day passed, major damage control became neces-

¹ Prawda, September 5, 1983.
sary. On September 9, Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and a couple of high-ranking colleagues appeared at a major press conference to outline the official Soviet position on this incident. The appearance of such senior military officers as the lead Soviet spokesmen in a major East-West incident had few if any precedents.

The significance of this press conference lay in the fact that the Kremlin had decided to make its case to the world with political figures of marginally greater credibility: military officers with their aura of apolitical professionalism. These were not customary spokesmen such as representatives of the Foreign Ministry or the International Information Department, whose diplomatic euphemisms and propagandistic falsehoods the Western public is accustomed to taking with a grain of salt. So, in spite of the fact that precisely such falsehood emerged as the central theme of Ogarkov’s performance—namely, that the Korean airliner was on a “deliberately, thoroughly planned, intelligence operation”—the rare appearance by Red Army officers could not but have a certain glasnostian mystique.2

The full, strategically conceived policy of military glasnost’ did not begin until Gorbachev was well ensconced as General Secretary and the new detente with the Reagan Administration had fully emerged. The Geneva summit of 1985 witnessed the signing of an educational and cultural exchange agreement and the presentation by President Reagan of the “Geneva Exchanges Initiatives” which proposed massive new “people-to-people” exchanges with the Soviets. The agreement and these initiatives, largely accepted by Moscow, set the stage for the beginnings of the full-blown military-to-military dialogue which originated during the Washington summit of 1987.

Military Dialogue and Exchanges

While much of the impetus for U.S.-Soviet military dialogue came from the American side, it was the Kremlin’s policy of unleashing its own formerly sequestered, supreme military and defense officials which enabled this dialogue to take place. Why the direct participation of these officials in East-West diplomacy was permitted is not immediately clear.

One possibility is that these supreme defense (and intelligence) authorities decided that it would be useful to do some “field work” themselves to get the measure of their adversaries. Or Moscow may have wanted a separate diplomatic channel with

**The Kremlin has tried to encourage the mirror-image perception that the Soviets “are just like us,” and therefore not guided by any messianic ideology.**

another element of the U.S. government, thus circumventing the State Department and traditional inter-agency decision-making procedures. Such a tactic would not be unusual, given that the Kremlin has done this for years (e.g., establishing “back channel” communications with the White House, negotiating with members of Congress, etc.).

However much validity these theories may have, it is the hypothesis of this study that Moscow’s principal motivations for military dialogue—as well as the entire policy of military *glasnost*—have been: 1) to deprive Western political and especially military authorities, as well as Western publics, of the “enemy image” of the USSR; and 2) to mislead the West as to Soviet strategic intentions, by focusing the West’s attention on putative changes in Soviet policy and thus distracting it from operational continuities.

Soviet authorities have been explicit about these purposes. Gorbachev, for one, declared: “Our *perestroika*, with all its international consequences, is eliminating the fear of the ‘Soviet threat,’ with [U.S.] militarism losing its political justification.”³ Similarly, one of Gorbachev’s top theoreticians, Fedor Burlatsky, declared that it is “necessary to destroy the 'enemy image'... still haunting Soviet-American relations.”⁴ The ubiquitous Georgi Arbatov, head of Moscow’s USA Institute, even clued Western reporters into the strategy: “Gentlemen, we are preparing to carry

out an attack on you: we intend to deprive you of your enemy." And Valentin Falin, one of Gorbachev's top strategists (who would soon become head of the International Department), explained in the wake of the 1988 Moscow summit that:

... the old picture of the enemy, this main psychological foundation of the ideological confrontation, is dwindling away. The political and psychological base which had permitted the U.S. Administration to increase expenditures for developing the military-industrial complex is now beginning to disintegrate.6

Destroying the enemy image of the USSR, a traditional strategy of Soviet propaganda, has taken a variety of forms over the years. As this author has described elsewhere, the principal salients of this strategy have involved attempts to convince the West that the Soviet Union is no longer communist and that it consequently no longer pursues unlimited global objectives.7 In promoting the theme that Marxist-Leninist ideology is dead in the USSR, the Kremlin has tried to encourage the mirror-image perception that the Soviets "are just like us," and therefore not guided by any messianic ideology. Once we begin to perceive that they are just like us, we become inclined to believe that there is a harmony of interests between the two countries and it becomes more difficult to envision any intractable obstacles to the realization of that harmony, except perhaps unreconstructed Cold Warriors (or, in Gorbachev's words, "Cold War recidivists"8).

The appearance of the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, at the negotiating table during the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, was arguably the first step in

the development of the new policy. In the course of the discussion about how to count nuclear weapons, Akhromeyev demonstrated a willingness to make a significant concession to the U.S. position on how to count bombers and the weapons carried by them. His conciliatory approach contrasted sharply with the visible consternation of Victor Karpov, who up until then had been the chief of the Soviet negotiating team, and who had adopted persistently inflexible positions. Due to Akhromeyev’s apparent persuasion of his colleagues, the Soviets made the concession which ultimately served as the basis for all future progress in the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) talks. On top of this, other major concessions were made on verification and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)—concessions which came so quickly and unexpectedly that the American delegation was astonished.

The contrast between the rigid, posturing Karpov and the amiable, conciliatory Akhromeyev could have been explained either by genuine political-strategic differences between them or by the possibility of a staged “good cop/bad cop” routine that is common to diplomatic negotiations. While no categorical answer can be supplied to this question, the subsequent role of Akhromeyev as a glasnostian “good cop” suggests that the latter is the more plausible explanation.

Not only did Akhromeyev begin to appear at subsequent meetings between Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, but he showed up at the December 1987 summit where he was invited by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, into the National Military Command Center (also known as the “tank”) deep within the Pentagon. So much had Marshal Akhromeyev impressed his hosts over the preceding months that he was given an honor guard and a 19-gun salute as he entered the building. The chief of the Soviet military was now to be accorded the respect of a great military professional and not that of the head of an army which at that time was intensifying its attacks on civilians and laying millions of land mines in Afghanistan in preparation for its forthcoming withdrawal.10

Another participant at the Washington summit was Colonel-General Nikolai Chervov, chief of the arms control section of the Soviet General Staff. He too had played a pivotal "good cop" role in the INF negotiations a few months before, when he dropped Soviet insistence on retaining 100 INF warheads, thus overcoming a major U.S. concern about verifying only a partial elimination of INF missiles, and clearing the way for the ultimate agreement.\textsuperscript{11} Upon arrival in Washington, Chervov immediately appeared at the first of several Soviet media blitzes.\textsuperscript{12}

The conciliatory role played by these two prominent officers was instrumental in launching the process of military-to-military dialogue which began at that 1987 summit when Marshal Akhromeyev agreed to consider unprecedented military exchanges in the interest of "improving relations" between both sides.\textsuperscript{13} Two months later, both governments announced agreement to conduct a series of meetings between defense ministers and chiefs of staff.\textsuperscript{14} In March, 1988, Secretary Carlucci and Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov met and, among other things, launched military-to-military negotiations on avoiding "dangerous military incidents"—a process which culminated in an agreement in July 1989.

The military dialogue reached unprecedented heights with subsequent exchanges: the Carlucci/Yazov visits to each other's country; a six-day visit by Akhromeyev to the United States (including stops at military installations and "good-will" visits to places such as Oklahoma City where the Soviet general donned an Indian headdress for the cameras); and a reciprocal trip by Admiral Crowe to the Soviet Union in 1989.\textsuperscript{15}

While Crowe did make a few token remarks in the context of this trip about the continued necessity of maintaining American vigilance, they were considerably overshadowed by his other

public statements. For example, he issued his now-famous response to a question as to whether the Soviets were still America's enemy: "They're not my enemy. I'm a military man and we do what we have to do, but I don't particularly look at them as an enemy."

The Admiral returned from his trip exclaiming: "Soviets are a great deal like Americans." As he explained it, "I might have understood that intellectually, but I had to visit the Soviet Union in order to understand it emotionally."

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Joseph Went, who accompanied Crowe, was similarly bowled over. "You know, General, your soldiers are just like ours," he shouted to his host, General Mikhail Moiseyev, upon climbing out of a Soviet armored personnel carrier. "I got in there and the first thing I see is a picture of a soldier's girlfriend pasted up in front. That's exactly what our men do."

Crowe and Went were also taken to another ritual stop in Soviet tourlandia: graves of World War II victims. As usual, they were given the routine about the "20 million" Soviet war dead and how this is proof that the "Soviet people" never want another war.* To add a poignant moment to Admiral Crowe's experience, he and General Moiseyev just happened to be approached by an old peasant woman, who, with tears streaming down her face, begged


* Needless to say, there was no mention of how many of those 20 million were killed by the policies of the Soviet regime itself, including the deportations to Siberia and elsewhere of millions from the Baltic
the two military chiefs to ensure that there would never be another war.\textsuperscript{20}

Notwithstanding the fact that the persistent invocation of World War II has been a time-worn theme of Soviet peace propaganda as well as an instrument used to bolster the Communist Party’s legitimacy, our itinerant military leaders were extremely impressed. Admiral Crowe’s most “overwhelming impression” was his new understanding of the “searing” impact of World War II on the Soviet psyche.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, General Went explained how his visit to the Soviet cemetery helped him understand the Soviet mindset: “I have to say I never thought about that before… a visit like this gives you some empathy with their mentality.”\textsuperscript{22} Witnessing reactions like these, Gorbachev was moved to conclude: “Admiral Crowe’s visit to this country and our military facilities demonstrates that we are moving from the notion of enemy to the notion of partner.”\textsuperscript{23}

These initial exchanges bore further fruit. Soviet generals began to appear at various forums in the United States. Major General Yuri Lebedev, for example, in an interview arranged by the pro-disarmament Center for Defense Information, told the \textit{Washington Post}: “I do have a dream”—a dream that the Soviet Union and the United States will “call off the arms race and turn their energies to giving their citizens better, freer lives.”\textsuperscript{24}

Marshall Akhromeyev then made an unprecedented appearance to testify before the House Armed Services Committee just as Congress began debating funding for the B-2 Stealth bomber. Comporting himself “with charm, good humor and a wit that often had the congressmen and audience laughing,” he made a surprise

\begin{flushleft}
states, Moldavia, Crimea and the Caucasus, the Volga Germans, the okruzhentsy (troops who had been encircled by the Germans), returned Soviet prisoners of war (who had been contaminated by foreign influences), members of General Vlasov’s national liberation army, other “fifth columnists,” spies, etc.


\end{flushleft}
announcement that Soviet tank production would be cut by 40 percent, insisted that Soviet military doctrine was now "defensive" and then invited an American military officer to speak before the Supreme Soviet. The strategic message, couched amid the charm and standard Soviet peace propaganda, was several-fold:

1) The United States should agree to open talks on limiting naval forces—a demand that the United States has repeatedly rejected, given America's vastly greater dependence on sea lines of communication compared to Moscow's. Should the United States fail to agree, Akhromeyev threatened that "the entire arms control negotiating process will break."

2) No START agreement can be reached if the United States builds a strategic defense system (SDI).

3) If France and Britain attempt to augment their nuclear arsenals, Moscow would build and deploy new medium-range bombers.

4) If the United States agrees to adhere to the ABM Treaty (which the USSR has continually violated) Moscow would refrain from deploying new types of strategic weapons.

5) If the United States does not deploy its MX missiles on railroad cars, Moscow may be willing to eliminate its rail-based strategic missiles.

6) The United States should agree to conduct negotiations "to limit or even reduce" military research and development.

In spite of the fact that threats were issued in almost all of these proposals, they were obscured by the drama of Akhromeyev's appearance and his public diplomacy skills. The effectiveness of his performance could be gauged by the reactions: a standing ovation from his Congressional audience and the decision of both houses of Congress to put the brakes on the B-2 Stealth bomber program. That the Kremlin should exploit the talents of this

general should not evoke much surprise in light of the way Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze is reported to have described him: "the
world's most peaceful general staff chief."^28

Another feature of the new military dialogue included recipro-
cal port-calls of U.S. and Soviet naval vessels. The first of these
was the visit of three of Moscow's most advanced ships to the U.S.
naval base at Norfolk, Virginia, complete with dancers from the
"Northern Fleet Dance Ensemble" and the Soviet Navy Orchestra
playing Sousa marches at dockside.^29 Admiral Igor Katasonov, the
ranking Soviet officer, exclaimed: "We stand for converting the
seas and oceans of the Earth into the zone of cooperation, of
mutual assistance and friendly contacts."^30 Even Soviet sailors
became ambassador of friendship for the day. Seaman Sergei
Zhupezyk, surrounded by Western reporters, explained: "We are
very interested in a greater understanding between our two
countries and in carrying forward the recent friendship initiatives
made by our rulers."^31 The peaceful intentions of the Soviet navy
seemed suddenly clear to some of the participants in the gala
events. "Peace has got to start somewhere... This visit is part of
making that peace" enthused one American sailor.^32

Other scheduled chapters for this dialogue include exchanges of:
European Theater Commanders-in-Chief, military medical
officials, military museum officials, War College personnel, mili-
tary historians, military bands, rifle/pistol teams, Army Chiefs of
Staff, Air Force Chiefs of Staff, soldiers, more naval visits, and an
invitation to Admiral Crowe to testify before the new Soviet
Congress of Peoples' Deputies.^33

The new benign image of the Red Army that has resulted from
the glasnost' campaign has been so effectively imparted that it has

^29. "As Hill weighs B-2, Soviets Test PR Wings," Washington Times,
    July 18, 1989.
^31. "We Have Met the 'Enemy' and He's Sort of Like We Are," Washington
^32. "Norfolk Liberty...," op. cit.
^33. John G. Roos, "Military to Get Closer Look at Soviet Counterparts,
    Armed Forces Journal International, August 1988, "Soviet Foresees
    Exchange of Soldiers," Washington Times, October 5, 1989, and
permitted American retailers to market Soviet military watches without fear of adverse public reaction. Major American department stores thus felt no compunction about publishing advertisements exclaiming:

Da! RED HOT! Soviet Watches From Russia With Love

One American audience found itself standing to the Soviet anthem with nary "an unfluttered heart in the house."

... For Dads, grads and comrades ... the newest gift of glasnost! ... Peace-time timepieces.... Black or white faces with a RED star! ... They meet all CCCP requirements."34

In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that there should be an equal lack of adverse public reaction to a nation-wide tour of the Alexandrov Red Army Song and Dance Ensemble and the Red Army Chorus, enthusiastically described by one of its sponsors, the taxpayer-subsidized John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, as:

a stunning company... the world's mightiest choir... a dazzling mixed corps of gravity-defying Cossack dancers and virtuoso ballerinas and a full orchestra including balalaikas, domros, bayans and other traditional Russian folk instruments.35

To the contrary, after hearing the chorus sing "God Bless America" and the "Star Spangled Banner," one American audience found itself standing to the Soviet anthem with nary "an unfluttered heart in the house."36 And even President Bush saw fit to

have the chorus to see him off from the White House lawn as he boarded his helicopter shortly before the Thanksgiving holiday.\(^{37}\)

If there is any remaining doubt about the general purpose of this aspect of military *glasnost*, it should be dispelled by a revealing critique in the Soviet press. In a report on the visit of West German warships to Leningrad, *Pravda* criticized the ineffective and un-*glasnostian* conduct of the Soviet host, Rear Admiral K.L. Tulin, who, in response to press inquiries which had nothing to do with military secrets, responded that he was not authorized to give interviews to the press. *Pravda* commented on this as follows:

> Indeed, building bridges of trust between servicemen is probably more complex than doing so in other spheres today. However, you cannot ignore the fact that public opinion, which is formed by the mass media, plays a role that is by no means unimportant even here. It is therefore distressing that it was not considered possible to send a sufficiently competent spokesman who was prepared to speak to the correspondents.\(^{38}\)

In other words, military dialogue is not only a question of personal meetings, relationships, and “trust.” In the Soviet view, it is a question of public opinion formation.

Although the Soviets have a long record of directing propaganda toward the general public as a way of building constituencies to apply political pressure on Western leaders, their use of military dialogue is a new variation of this technique. Now, in addition to addressing the general public, the Soviets are targeting Western armies and defense establishments. It is noteworthy however that they have specifically enlisted their own military personnel and not their normal professional propagandists to be the principal agents of this campaign. This tasking is reflected in the authoritative military-ideological journal, *Communist of the Armed Forces*:

> The Soviet state and the CPSU direct the construction of the armed forces so that, by their composition and activity, they reinforce to the maximum degree the role of

the political (non-military) means of maintaining security and the efficacy of a peace-loving foreign policy. The military circles of the big states (of the blocs) exert influence on the international climate, on world politics, on public opinion, and on the psychology of the peoples and all mankind. . . . The accomplishment of the task assigned by the political leadership concerning relations with Western armies constitutes an important assignment of the activity of the socialist army for the prevention of war.39

Such a tasking now brings the military into complete conformity with Moscow’s policy of using every other imaginable professional group—from lawyers to journalists to physicians—to influence their counterparts in the West, whether directly or through front organizations. This “person-to-person” technique has several advantages. First, it enables Soviet propaganda to reach its targets directly, without being filtered either through the intelligence community or through other sources of expertise which could help put the medium and its message in the proper context. Secondly, by showing us how their armed forces love their women and children as much as we love ours, the Soviets put a human face on the faceless enemy, thereby rendering Western defense forces less psychologically prepared to achieve their sole mission, should they ever have to be called upon to undertake it. Furthermore, this technique of military dialogue enlists the support of Western generals to achieve these very purposes. The Kremlin could scarcely find a more credible assistant for the achievement of its psychological strategy than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However much this process of eliminating the enemy image may seem reciprocal, in fact it is not. Western publics (and armies) are disproportionately vulnerable to perceptions management through the mass media in comparison to those in the Soviet Union, where the media, even in the age of glasnost, are still monopolized by the Party, which continues to diabolize American “imperialism” and “militarism” through numerous disinformation

campaigns. Finally, while it is eminently plausible to conceive of the Kremlin exploiting such military exchanges for psychological strategic purposes, given the longstanding Soviet traditions of strategic deception and *maskirovka* (camouflage), it strains credibility to believe that strategic deception underlies the purposes of travelling American generals. Unless, of course, one is willing to believe that American officers who are the products of a system with an institutionalized disregard of psychological warfare have suddenly and secretly changed their entire *weltanschauung* and *modus operandi*.

**Displaying Secret Military Facilities**

One of the most dramatic features of military *glasnost’* has been the Kremlin’s campaign to reveal selectively a number of its hitherto restricted military facilities. The campaign began in earnest in the summer of 1986 in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which found the new “open” Soviet Union reverting to its habitual instinct to conceal from its own people and the world the extent of damage and danger from such a catastrophe. This tight-lipped handling of the event had thus created a major credibility problem for the Kremlin’s overall *glasnost’* campaign. Opening up secret facilities to unofficial U.S. groups, the press, and even official U.S. observers would prove to be a most effective way to dispel this credibility gap.

The first step was Moscow’s agreement with, and invitation to, a group of unofficial American observers from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an anti-nuclear pressure group, to witness a Soviet nuclear test. On top of any effort to regain credibility, the Kremlin’s purpose was to show an American group which shared its view on nuclear tests that a test ban treaty could be “adequately verified.” Then such a group could be a more effective lobby in Washington for a test ban. Subsequent displays of secret facilities not only served to convince Western skeptics of the verifiability of arms accords, but also to distract attention from Soviet noncompliance with most existing agreements.  

The invitation of a partisan group of Congressmen and their staffs as well as representatives of the NRDC to the Krasnoyarsk

---

ABM radar in September 1987 was perhaps the most spectacular of these gambits. The individuals invited by the Kremlin were those who were identifiably inclined to reject Reagan Administration charges that the radar was a clear violation of the ABM Treaty.

The Kremlin's purpose was to show an American group which shared its view on nuclear tests that a test ban treaty could be adequately verified.

And their general response was indeed no surprise. In their trip report, Democratic Reps. Thomas Downey, Bob Carr, and Jim Moody stooped to the use of an apologia which even Moscow could not muster the temerity to put forth: "Whether the installation is early warning or spacetrack, it is clearly not deployed. Thus we judge it not to be a violation of the ABM Treaty at this time." (emphasis in original) On top of this, they discounted the potential threat of the radar, given its apparently shoddy construction and its ostensibly limited capabilities.

The Congressional-NRDC trip was originally designed to discuss a wide variety of arms control issues with the Kremlin. The Krasnoyarsk visit was not added until the very last minute, to the surprise of all the visitors. In spite of this apparently impromptu Soviet decision, it was clear that the Soviets had made a variety of preparations, including the evacuation of over 1,000 workers from the area, the high likelihood of a special cleanup at the site, the installation of Western-style toilets for the visitors (so that they would not have to use "Siberian toilets" (holes in the ground), and the preparation of a banquet, complete with a roast suckling pig. Given the long history of Soviet maskirovka and the restrictions imposed on the visitors at the radar, it would not be surprising that other preparations had also been made to present the facility in a misleading light.

The partial display of the Krasnyorsk radar served a number of Soviet purposes: 1) to defend its legality; 2) to demonstrate the new Soviet "openness" (which the Congressmen described as "spectacular," possibly "more important than the access to specific facilities and information," and "evidence that this world is changing"); 3) to strengthen the hand of arms control partisans by enabling them to claim, as did the Congressmen, that Americans can monitor Soviet compliance with arms treaties, and that the Soviets are offering "unprecedented cooperation" in facilitating this monitoring; 4) by revealing the radar in its state of incomplete construction, to foster the impression that it neither represents a threat nor possesses formidable capabilities; 5) to encourage unilateral U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty by timing the visit days before a Senate vote on the legality of the Krasnyorsk radar and Senate debate on whether to abide by the narrow or the broad, "legally correct" interpretation of the treaty (as it turned out, the Senate supported the Soviet position and voted against the latter); and 6) thereby to undermine American public support for SDI.

For all the hoopla generated about the significance of this visit for arms control verification, Pentagon officials described the visit as worthless for such purposes but useful for fostering the impression of openness.

The following month, Western officials were given limited access to the obsolete chemical weapons site at Shikhany as part of an effort to build support for a chemical weapons ban—a proposal which would be utterly unverifiable. Although it produced little new information—the U.S. representative called it akin to a "tour of a museum"—the Soviets hoped to demonstrate their new openness. "We have nothing to hide," said one of the high-ranking Soviet hosts. An auxiliary purpose of the visit to Shikhany was also revealed by Soviet spokesmen who declared their opposition to U.S. plans to start chemical weapons production two months later after an 18-year hiatus. The visit came six months

43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
after Moscow first admitted that it even possessed chemical weapons.47

Then, in December, a team of U.S. officials was permitted to inspect three Soviet radars which the Reagan Administration had identified as other violations of the ABM Treaty. (This charge was made on the grounds that they had been illegally moved after having been tested at an agreed ABM test range.) Col. Gen. Chervov announced that the U.S. inspectors would "see for themselves that whatever concerns [they have] are just one soap bubble."48 The U.S. officials who made the inspection were reportedly divided over how much effort was made to deceive them. It was clear, however, that their hosts had carefully prepared the radar sites by laying fresh coats of paint everywhere—possibly to conceal the material composition of various items—and obscuring some features of the installation, including scratched-out serial numbers on pieces of equipment. According to one delegation member:

Everyone agrees that the Soviets doctored the evidence at the site in order to try to minimize the basis on which our earlier claims were made and increase the credibility of their alternate explanation.49

Over the next two years came a cascade of new invitations, inspections and revelations. Prominent among these were:

— The visits of first a Congressional delegation and later a group of twenty U.S. government scientists to tour the Kremlin's main nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk and conduct verification experiments with seismological sensors.50

— The tour of various Soviet military installations by Secretary of Defense Carlucci, including: a Blackjack bomber base at

Kubinka (the first time this bomber had been revealed to Western observers); the Black Sea fleet headquarters; and war games performed by the Taman Motorized Rifle Division (a “show unit” which has historically been used alternatively to display the latest Soviet weaponry and to downplay Soviet capabilities). This visit coincided with the initiation of the dismantling of Soviet INF missiles under the terms of the INF Treaty and under the observation of both official U.S. inspectors and Western anti-nuclear activists who were also invited to be witnesses.\textsuperscript{51}

The tour of a Soviet naval vessel by a U.S. delegation of Congressmen, scientists, and activists from the Soviet-favored Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The purpose here was to inspect an SS-N-12 anti-ship cruise missile in the first of a series of special experiments involving politically compatible Western scientists to examine various tools for arms control verification. Specifically designed to show how the presence of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles could be verified, Executive Branch participation in this “experiment” was rejected by the White House, which held that it was not in the U.S. interest (not only because this was a Soviet propaganda exercise but because successive Administrations have denied the possibility of verification of the presence of cruise missiles).

Indeed, the entire event was well orchestrated by the Soviets, who conducted several dry runs of the tests before the Americans showed up, stripped the ship of competing radiation sources, restricted the locations of monitoring devices and ensured that the devices could not penetrate either through the ship’s deck or any lead shielding that might be placed in a launch tube. The delegation was also given a display of the latest Soviet propaganda routine: the “clash” between exponents of “old” and “new” thinking: in this case, a tight-lipped security official who protested the continuation of monitoring beyond the prescribed time period versus Soviet scientists who ignored his protests.\textsuperscript{52}

The invitation of the same group to a laser center at the Soviet testing ground at Sary Shagan. The group was shown, by


authority of the Politburo, two low-powered lasers used for tracking aircraft and testing the tracking of satellites. The Soviet hosts conceded that the lasers would be useful for designing anti-satellite weapons. But despite this admission, the guided tour

---

**The problem with all this “analysis” was that none of the American visitors were experts on lasers.**

---

produced at least some of its desired results. Congressman Jim Olin (D-Va.) declared that the laser “doesn’t represent any threat as a weapon.” An NRDC official called the laser “a Potemkin village built by the Pentagon.” And in an article in the *New York Times*, two of the participating scientists, Frank von Hippel and Thomas Cochran, attacked the Defense Department for “spreading a myth” that Moscow was developing a laser weapon for anti-satellite and possibly anti-ballistic missile purposes and concluded that there are no laser weapons in the USSR. Then on the basis of this guided tour and the reactions of the “experts,” the *New York Times* commented that “this vaunted Soviet laser” was “better suited for guiding shoppers to Count Potemkin’s used car lot than for destroying U.S. satellites.” The editorial concluded that Congress should reject the Bush Administration’s request for funds to begin testing a new anti-satellite laser as a counter to Soviet anti-satellite weapons.

The problem with all this “analysis,” however, was that none of the American visitors were experts on lasers and the tour of the laser center was added to their itinerary at the last minute, leaving them no time to consult with real specialists in preparation for the trip. Furthermore, what the visiting “experts” were shown was the oldest laser facility at Sary Shagan. They were steered clear of the more modern installations, particularly the one which contains

---

laser weapons.56 (Not only do the Soviets have ground-based laser weapons, but recently a high-level Soviet scientist-defector reported the secret deployment in 1983 of a space-based laser system with anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, which would be another major violation of the ABM treaty.57)

— The invitation of the same delegation to the secret Soviet nuclear weapons production reactor site at Kyshtym, a city in the Ural mountains not listed on any Soviet map. While on this unprecedented tour, the Soviets announced that they would close down all five reactors producing plutonium for nuclear weapons at this site. The goal of this visit, as stated by the Soviet hosts, was to emphasize Soviet willingness to accept on-site inspections if the U.S. accepts Moscow's offer to reach an accord on the "controlled cessation of all weapons-grade fissionable materials." For all the ostensible value such a treaty might have in achieving the elimination of nuclear arms, closing plutonium factories would have no effect on either side's ability to produce new nuclear weapons, given that existing supplies of plutonium may easily be recycled.58

— The tour by a delegation of House Armed Services Committee members of various Soviet military installations, including: a naval base a Sevastopol, an SS-11 command post, a gas laser laboratory, and a motorized rifle division. Although some military details were revealed on this trip, the visitors were denied requests to see the Nikolayev shipyard, SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBM sites, T-80 tanks, and the laser facility at Dushanbe.59

— The visit by members of the Western press to Kunashir island in the southern Kuriles (i.e. the Northern Territories of Japan), where a Soviet military garrison is stationed.60

Acceptance of Intrusive Arms Control Verification

Alongside the various Soviet guided tours organized to strengthen Western pro-disarmament constituencies, Moscow has agreed to a whole series of increasingly intrusive verification arrangements to be applied to a variety of arms treaties. The Kremlin's willingness to accept these procedures seems to have come partly in response to firm U.S. negotiating positions and partly on its own initiative for the purpose of promoting agreements—such as a ban on nuclear testing—which it supports but the United States does not. The following are the highlights of Soviet moves in this area:

1) As part of its persistent attempt to compel U.S. acceptance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, Moscow undertook a series of actions to demonstrate its willingness to accept on-site inspections. It first agreed to such inspections in the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and later in 1979 during negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban. In 1983, three days after news broke that the United States would propose revising the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) so as to permit on-site inspections, the Kremlin proposed its own inspection plan at the UN-affiliated Committee on Disarmament.61

In August 1985, in an effort to force Washington's hand, Moscow tried one of its old ploys: a unilateral test moratorium (previously attempted during the Kennedy administration). This time, however, to boost the public pressure on the United States, Gorbachev offered to open Soviet test sites for inspections if the United States would join the moratorium.62 Having experienced Soviet duplicity during the 1960s' moratorium, Washington rejected participation in the Kremlin's latest version. With the failure of this attempt, and the Chernobyl setback, Moscow launched into its full-fledged glasnost' campaign with the agreement on test monitoring with the NRDC (described above). It continued with a Soviet proposal to the United States to conduct nuclear tests at each others' test sites, which Washington ac-


cepted in principle. Then at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament, Moscow indicated that it would accept quick on-site "challenge" inspections of nuclear tests.

Finally, in November 1987, as part of the TTBT revision negotiations, Moscow agreed to mutual inspections of nuclear tests. After visits to each others' test sites over the course of the following year, the Soviets agreed to American use of a highly intrusive monitoring system, known as Corrtex, as part of the inspection arrangements. They also agreed to the establishment of networks of seismic listening posts for the same purpose.

2) Nine days after the departure of U.S. officials from their 1987 guided tour of the chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, Moscow announced its willingness to reveal the size of its chemical weapons stocks before the signing of an international convention banning these weapons. The Soviets had hitherto insisted that they would not reveal this until a month after such a convention took effect. Western officials had maintained that no agreement would be possible without prior knowledge of the size of chemical arsenals. As usual, however, Moscow demonstrated the limits of glasnost' when, the following year, it forbade a British delegation visiting Shikhany to inspect two chemical weapons complexes nearby.

3) The Soviets agreed to data exchanges and unprecedented intrusive on-site inspections in the INF Treaty of December 1987. These include short-notice inspections and resident on-site inspectors at a key missile assembly plant. Soviet agreement to these provisions had a considerable effect in building Senate support for the Treaty, in spite of the fact that the overall

verification procedures for the treaty are seriously inadequate. For example, they do not provide for inspections of suspect weapons sites or SS-25 sites (the SS-20 missile banned by the agreement can be deployed in the canister of an SS-25 mobile ICBM). The

**Soviet willingness to demonstrate greater openness on an ostensibly purely civilian issue was designed nevertheless to have politico-military effects.**

Soviets control all transport and communications of U.S. inspectors, thus depriving them the secure communications necessary to cope with camouflage, concealment, and deception. And there are various other means by which the Soviets can frustrate proper inspections.\(^68\)

4) In 1988, the Kremlin agreed to the exchange of information about civilian nuclear power. While explicitly designed to address safety concerns of civilian uses of nuclear energy, the agreement also covered data exchanges on the design and construction of reactors.\(^69\) Soviet willingness to demonstrate greater openness on an ostensibly purely civilian issue was designed nevertheless to have politico-military effects. This was made clear already as early as February 1985 when Moscow signed a nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency providing for international on-site inspection of some of its civilian nuclear plants. As a Soviet Foreign Ministry official explained: "This shows our country is ready for international verification in disarmament. On the eve of the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, we feel it is necessary to create a favorable atmosphere."\(^70\)

5) In 1989, the Warsaw Pact made an unexpected offer in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe to permit sweeping.

---

continuous inspections at dozens of military bases, naval port, and railroad junctions in exchange for similar rights in Western Europe. This proposal even surpassed in some areas the verification requirements which NATO had been proposing. The motivation for this significant Soviet move, however, was to draw France and Britain more deeply into arms control arrangements, when both these countries have attempted to maintain their own independent deterrent forces.\textsuperscript{71}

6) Finally, Moscow agreed in principle with the United States to conduct trial inspections of each other's nuclear arsenal as a prelude to signing a START accord. Here both the Soviets and the Bush Administration shared a similar political objective: to convince arms control skeptics in the Senate that verification of a strategic arms accord is possible.\textsuperscript{72}

**Mutual Confidence-Building Measures**

Another component of the Kremlin's military *glasnost* campaign has consisted of its efforts to promote its concepts of "confidence-building measures" (CBM's) in the context of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe—a project of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In September 1986, Moscow signed the Stockholm Accord establishing procedures for various CBM's, including: the requirement to give advance notice of major conventional force exercises within Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals; observation by all signatories of all exercises of more than 17,000 personnel; and a limited number of on-site challenge inspections.

Stockholm gave Moscow another opportunity to demonstrate its new "openness." However, as usual, in addition to serving the consistent purpose of promoting arms control and destroying the enemy image of the USSR, the promotion of CBM's would also serve another of Moscow's propaganda objectives: the effort to convince Western publics of the legitimacy of the entire premise of the Stockholm negotiations. This is the idea that war is most likely to arise by accident and not from purposeful aggression—specifi-

cally, that NATO might overreact to Warsaw Pact military maneuvers.

As part of these negotiations, the major Soviet effort was to push for mandatory consultations in the event of an East-West crisis. Thus, before the West could mobilize in response to suspected aggressive preparations, it would have to consult with Moscow, thereby risking a critical delay in preparing its own defense mobilization. When the United States rejected this proposal, the Kremlin's strategy was to promote the accidental war premise. The more this premise is accepted by the West, the greater the likelihood that inspections of military exercises can serve to lull the inspectors into a false sense of security rather than alerting them to potential aggression.

The first of the Stockholm confidence-building measures were implemented in August 1987 as U.S. inspectors joined the other signatories to witness Red Army maneuvers near Minsk.73 The West reciprocated by including East Bloc observers at a British exercise in November. And Warsaw Pact states issued their annual military calendars of notifiable military activities, and performed more specific notification requirements, with the exception of providing geographic coordinates for each exercise phase.74

Among the various purposes of these show-and-tell displays, the Soviets have tried to promote one of their consistent propaganda themes: namely, that the USSR fears the NATO "military threat" and the possibility that aggressive actions against the East might be masked by military exercises. During one of his U.S. trips, Marshal Akhromeyev and his delegation complained that Moscow needed advance notification of the U.S. Strategic Air Command's annual "Global Shield" exercise which simulates a response to a Soviet attack. As one member of his delegation told his American hosts: "We have to work hard to tell that from real war."75 Such a claim, which strains credulity, exploits Western tendencies to engage in "mirror image" perceptions of the Soviet

Union, and encourages us to believe that U.S. defenses are equally responsible for creating East-West tensions.

Other purposes behind the Kremlin's "openness" concerning its military exercises have been: to promote its new propaganda line that Warsaw Pact military doctrine had indeed become "defensive" in orientation;\(^{76}\) to present Western observers with impressive shows of force, so as to bolster the credibility of Soviet threats; and simultaneously, to downplay Soviet capabilities so as to help anesthetize the Western sense of threat from Soviet power. While these last two appear to work at cross purposes, in reality they are designed to complement each other by addressing the psychological predispositions of different Western audiences.

**Glasnost' in the Military Budget**

A not insignificant part of the overall glasnost' campaign has been Moscow's attempt to appear more forthcoming about the scope of its military spending. Since the officially-published Soviet military budget is almost universally regarded by Western analysts as grossly understated, any upward change in these figures could help add credibility to Kremlin claims in this arena. A spate of articles in the Soviet press in September 1987 began the process of gaining such credibility.

In an article in Pravda, Gorbachev himself promised to do "more work" to provide comparable military spending figures as a way of building trust between East and West. About the same time, the flagship journal of glasnost', Moscow News (with its mostly foreign circulation), announced that the Kremlin is prepared to publish figures not only of the Ministry of Defense, but also those of Soviet military research and development. The Party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, admitted the lack of necessary information about military affairs and charged that this hampered the work of Soviet journalists. And the literary journal Novy Mir published a complaint that even Soviet diplomats and international affairs commentators must rely on Western documentation on these matters.\(^{77}\)

---

Following these glasnostian salvos—sufficiently numerous and concentrated in time to catch the attention of the Western press—Moscow did not reveal its genuine military budget. Instead, it proceeded to milk this issue for all the propaganda value it contained by tantalizing the West over the next two years with a stream of intimations that this budget would actually be revealed. For example, a member of Marshal Akhromeyev’s visiting delegation told his hosts in 1988 that “in a year or two” the Soviet military budget would be seen “clearly like in a mirror.”78 In June 1989, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov provided the first official revelation of the breakdown of this budget. Declaring that it totaled 77.3 billion rubles (in contrast to earlier claims that it was merely 20.2 billion), he also revealed the respective subtotals for weapons procurement, research and development, personnel salaries and pensions. He then declared the Kremlin’s intention to cut this budget by one-third to one-half over the following six years in order to balance the overall Soviet budget.79 When the 77.3 billion figure was subsequently ridiculed by Western analysts as still a gross underestimate, Marshal Akhromeyev gave the House Armed Services Committee the equally ridiculous explanation that the figure appeared low because of the artificially low price of Soviet raw materials and the low pay of Soviet officers.80 He also issued yet another promise that the full budget would be publicized in detail.81

Glasnost' in Space

The selective opening of military installations to Western observers has been accentuated by a campaign to lift the veil of total secrecy surrounding Soviet space capabilities. This process began in 1986 when the Soviets invited a group of Western scientists to the Space Research Institute in Kaliningrad to witness a Soviet spacecraft approach Halley's comet. This was soon followed by the broadcast on Soviet television of the liftoff of a manned space flight—apparently the first time that such a spectacle was shown to a country-wide audience. The next month, foreign reporters were invited to the control room of the Soviet space flight center in Kaliningrad to watch a televised interview with two cosmonauts in orbit aboard the Soviet space station "Mir" ("Peace"). Contradicting Western intelligence reports, the cosmonauts denied that the Soviet space program had any military purposes.82 All three of these events were apparently unprecedented.

In 1987, a new element of space glasnost' emerged as Moscow began intensive efforts to court Western customers for Soviet space launches. Here, genuine economic competition for launching commercial satellites could serve the ancillary purpose of demonstrating that there were no military secrets being hidden in the Soviet space program.83 It could also enable the Soviets to gain access to advanced Western satellite technology. On top of commercial negotiations for this business, Moscow invited both its potential customers and other observers to its secret "cosmodrome" space launch complex at Baikonur.84 These were the first Westerners allowed in this facility since 1975.

The next year, U.S. Air Force officers, NASA officials and reporters were all admitted to this inner sanctum of Soviet space programs to witness the launch of a Soviet rocket destined for Phobos, one of the moons of Mars. They were greeted with Pepsi-cola, french fries and press conferences, as well as an atmosphere of casual nonchalance, in contrast to the anticipated bureaucratic

security consciousness. By 1989, this campaign reached a crescendo as Prime Minister Ryzhkov finally admitted that the USSR indeed did have a military space program. And not long after this, the visiting House Armed Services Committee delegation was given yet another "peek" at the Baikonur facility. In the spirit of glasnost' it was revealed to them that the number of planned space shuttle missions might be cut in half over the next several years. Shortly thereafter, Western reporters joined the parade to Baikonur to witness another launch, this one adorned with an advertisement for an Italian insurance company (in order to "help pay expenses," according to Soviet officials). In yet another reprise of "We're just like you," the head of cosmonaut training impressed the reporters with how much the Soviet space program and that of NASA are alike: both face "limited resources" at a time when the governments of both countries are trying to cut their budget deficits.

Finally, the Soviets won more headlines celebrating their new "openness" when they revealed yet another space launch facility to foreign reporters—this one at Plesetsk. This time, the gimmick was to disclose one of the worst rocket disasters of the space age, an explosion that killed 50 people in 1980. The base commander explained: "This is a time of openness and we have to make everything known that was hidden before."

The New "Honesty" about Arms Treaty Violations

In the six years since the United States spotted the Krasnoyarsk ABM radar and charged the Soviets with an ABM Treaty violation, Moscow issued forth a stream of falsehoods about its legality and a myriad of offers: to halt its construction if the United States dismantled its legal radars at Thule in Greenland and Fylingdales in England; to transform the facility into a "center

86. "Soviets Admit Massive Deficit . . .," op. cit.
for international space cooperation"; and to dismantle it if the
United States accepted the narrow interpretation of the ABM
Treaty. Having encountered resistance and derision at every turn,
Gorbachev promised President Bush in September 1989 that the
USSR would finally dismantle the facility. In a gratuitous gesture
implying legal equivalence, the Administration responded: "We
recognize the Soviets have concerns about these radars [Thule and
Fylingdales] and we are considering ways in which we can address
those concerns."

Then, the next month, to make the most of what had proved to
be a losing issue, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze publicly admit-
ted that the radar "had been built on the wrong site" and that it was
therefore "a violation of the ABM Treaty." (This, incidentally was
not the first time the Soviets had admitted this violation. Soviet
General Boris Surikov admitted it in April 1987.) While this
admission had the effect of leaving egg on the faces of those
Congressmen, State Department officials, NATO allies (every one
of them, in fact), and other arms control "experts" who had
defended the Soviet position either directly or indirectly by refus-
ing to go on the record with the violation charge, the Kremlin
doubtlessly concluded that this was a small price to pay for the
dividends it hoped to collect by telling the truth about the obvious.

Moscow's main dividend, of course, would be the hope of
gaining credibility for its assertions about other, less clear-cut
issues. Another would be the possibility that, by putting the
Krasnoyarsk issue to rest, it would distract Western attention from
the matter of truly strategic significance: namely, the ongoing
construction of a country-wide ABM system with all necessary
battle management radars. A related benefit would be the
possibility that the United States would finally agree to extend the
ABM Treaty and therefore accept limits on the development of a
strategic defense. And finally, Moscow might also move closer to
its objective of eliminating ever greater increments of America's

90. "U.S. Praises Admissions by Shevardnadze," Washington Post, Octo-

October 25, 1989.

92. Quoted in remarks of Rep. Curt Weldon, Congressional Record,
nuclear deterrent by removing the last officially-declared obstacle to a START agreement.

The possibility of this last dividend is as much a result of official U.S. diplomatic malpractice as of Soviet calculation. In

A related benefit would be the possibility that the United States would finally agree to extend the ABM Treaty and therefore accept limits on the development of a strategic defense.

March 1987, in his report to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms agreements, President Reagan unequivocally declared:

Compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements... Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.93 (emphasis added)

Of course, by signing the INF Treaty without requiring compliance with any existing agreements, the Administration accepted a great deal less. But then, in the last year of the Administration, the previous prerequisite for future agreements was explicitly narrowed from “compliance with all past agreements” to mere compliance with the ABM Treaty. As the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks stated:

Continued Soviet unwillingness to dismantle the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk, which is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty remains a matter of deep concern. We have made it clear to the Soviets that we will not accept less than full compliance with the Treaty, and that we will not be able to conclude any further strategic arms control agree-

ments until that violation is corrected.\textsuperscript{94} (emphasis added)

One can only imagine the scorn in Moscow over the repeated protestation of "not accepting anything less." There is scarcely a more blatant example of a unilateral surrender of one of the United States' most significant arms control bargaining levers.

**The New "Honesty" over the Afghanistan War**

One of the main features of the general *glasnost'* policy has been the spate of revelations to the Soviet public about the war in Afghanistan. These have included accounts of the sufferings of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, casualty figures and the neglect of returning war veterans as well as documentary films making analogies between Afghanistan and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{95} Even the dirty side of the war found exposure in such periodicals as *Moscow News*.\textsuperscript{96}

While doubtlessly many of these exposés have been designed for domestic reasons, one can reasonably speculate about some possible foreign policy purposes as well. The analogies with Vietnam, for example, encourage more Western mirror-image thinking about the USSR, particularly that a Vietnam-syndrome will inevitably grip the Soviets and therefore disincline them either toward victory in Afghanistan or toward more foreign aggression. Similarly, the various stories implying the futility of the war encourage us to believe that Moscow has in fact abandoned its strategic purposes in Afghanistan, and stimulate an excessive optimism concerning the prospects for defeating those purposes.

For example, in the summer of 1988 Major General Kim Tsagolov told an interviewer in *Ogorek* (and thereby the readers of *The New York Times* and *Washington Post*) that the Kabul communist regime could collapse when Moscow completed its troop pullout.\textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{97} "Soviet General Declares Kabul Could Collapse," *New York Times,*
Such a "revelation" of an authoritative Soviet attitude could very well have been designed to encourage Western decisionmakers to believe that indeed Kabul would topple with no extra effort from the Mujahiddin or, for that matter, from Washington. The massive, sustained, $300 million per month Soviet military airlift to Afghanistan in the wake of the troop withdrawal is some indication that the Soviets may have planned such a psychological salvo to weaken resistance to the "Afghanization" of the war.

A related purpose may have been served by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's "confession" about the Afghan war. Noting that "the main thing is not to conceal, but to acknowledge mistakes and correct them," he declared that the Soviet invasion was "the most serious violation of our own legislation, of Party and civic norms, and ethical standards of the time."98 There could scarcely be a more dramatic admission of guilt and "mistake-making." And yet, given that Moscow is still heavily involved in the Afghan war, it may be possible that this admission of a mistake was designed principally for Western ears. If Western decisionmakers become convinced that the Kremlin really believes that it made a mistake, then they may be much more inclined to believe that its real intention is to stop supporting the Kabul communists. Again, such a belief may prove to be a psychological obstacle to decisive Western support for enough aid to ensure Mujaheddin victory.

The Prettification of the KGB

If any doubt should remain that large portions of glasnost' are designed for strategic deception, the extraordinary campaign to give the KGB's public image a facelift should dispel it.

The spectacular debut of this effort occurred in January 1987 when Pravda reported that then-KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov had fired one of his Ukrainian department heads (who was also a senior Party official) for fabricating evidence to arrest a local journalist. Pledging to "take additional measures to ensure the strict observance of law," Chebrikov's announcement amounted to an admis-
sion that the KGB has indeed violated the law in its repressions of Soviet citizens.99

It is quite possible that this particular revelation was designed for domestic purposes. The journalist who had been arrested had apparently criticized local official corruption in a series of published exposés which had finally exhausted the patience of the local authorities. But the spirit of his articles happened to coincide perfectly with the anti-corruption, ideological purification and discipline campaigns which Gorbachev and the central Party leadership were conducting within the Party at the time. These campaigns, which resulted in the purge of at least 200,000 members of the nomenklatura in the first three years of Gorbachev’s regime, were targeted principally at the regional party apparatuses, and the Ukrainian one was not immune. Nevertheless, the KGB could not have been unaware of the foreign policy repercussions of such a revelation. In light of this, and the pattern of subsequent KGB glasnost’, the publicizing of this KGB mea culpa must have been done with an eye to its foreign impact.

In December 1987, Vladimir Kryuchkov, then head of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence and active measures), accompanied Gorbachev as part of the Soviet delegation to the Washington summit and met with National Security Adviser Colin Powell at the White House.100 The fact that such a senior KGB official would venture from his protected vault to conduct traditional diplomacy seemed to signal a new modus operandi.

By 1988, the KGB facelift reached full stride with the launching of a regular column in the largest circulation Soviet periodical, Argumenty i Fakty, entitled “The USSR KGB Reports and Comments.” One article, for example, highlights how KGB staff acted in a “selfless” manner in foiling an airplane hijack attempt in which children were taken hostages: “From the beginning, the KGB was assigned the task of doing everything to save the children’s lives.” It goes on to describe its actions to conduct disaster relief after the Armenian earthquake. Particular praise was given to the border

guards whose usual role is to prevent people from fleeing the country.\textsuperscript{101}

Later, Kryuchkov, after assuming the leadership of the organization, started his own personal campaign to portray the KGB as

\begin{center}
\textbf{To round out this campaign the KGB . . . went so far as to release a documentary film which portrays its kinder, gentler image to the soundtrack of disco music.}
\end{center}

"an earnest government servant of legality and democratic reform." "Legality, truth and glasnost' are the modern watchwords of the KGB," he told the Soviet weekly, \textit{New Times}. "I think the 'secret war' can be ruled out today, even at the level of the intelligence services." When asked if the KGB kept files on Soviet citizens, he responded: "You might find such things in other countries, but not here." And in an interview with the Italian communist paper, \textit{L'Unita}, he added: "Violence, inhumanity and violation of human rights have always been alien to the work of our secret services." To give his claims a greater gloss of credibility, he has couched them in a display of his own humanity: his fondness for Bellini's opera, \textit{Norma}, his appreciation of the pianism of Van Cliburn, and his description of his tough workday at the Lubyanka: "The KGB chairman's life is no bed of roses."\textsuperscript{102}

To round out this campaign the KGB testified in front of the new Supreme Soviet, established its own new press office, and even went so far as to release a documentary film which portrays its kinder, gentler image to the soundtrack of disco music. The film, titled "The New KGB," tries to dispel its image as an instrument of political repression and focuses instead on its role as an anti-crime and foreign intelligence service eager to cooperate with the West against terrorism and drug trafficking. The film even shows the agency's new public relations director tasting the swill

\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{Argumenty i Fakty}, December 24-30, 1988.
served to inmates at Lefortovo prison and exclaiming: "My wife can't make kasha like this. I have a taste for it, back from my army days. Can I have some more, please?" At the press conference releasing the film, KGB officials also screened an interview with Kryuchkov, who revealed that the KGB intended to publish its budget and details of its organization. ¹⁰³

The KGB even succeeded in getting air time on U.S. television when "Al" Gudonov, one of Moscow's English-speaking correspondent-propagandists, appeared on Cable News Network at the end of 1989 with a special report from inside the Moscow headquarters. After ascribing all of the KGB's repressive abuses to the Stalinist past, he showed a modern KGB officer in action—rehearsing a poem for the Chekists' New Year's Eve party. Next Kryuchkov appeared, proclaiming that "the image of my organization is changing." Finally, Gudonov signed off with the "KGB band" exuberantly playing the tunes of Glenn Miller. ¹⁰⁴

Of course, no modern public relations campaign can be complete without a television call-in show. And so, before a countrywide TV audience, three KGB Major Generals and two Colonels answered the phone and endeavored to portray themselves as "just plain folks." ¹⁰⁵

To assist in the outreach effort to the West, Soviet officials, including a couple of retired senior KGB officers, participated in a conference on anti-terrorism at the Rand Corporation along with such luminaries as former CIA Director William Colby. The very presence of senior KGB figures made its calculated impression on the astounded American participants. And in their efforts to portray themselves as victims rather than supporters of terrorism, the Chekists encouraged their hosts that KGB-CIA cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism and anti-hijacking would be a good thing. Given the efforts Moscow has made over the years to mask its massive role in the support of terrorism—through training, financing and arming terrorist groups as well as providing them

forged documents, communications assistance and safe haven—
their success in convincing many of their American interlocutors
of the wisdom of U.S.-Soviet intelligence cooperation in this field
is ample testimony to the effectiveness of their glasnostian
facelift.\textsuperscript{106}

**Conclusion**

To gain a complete understanding of the character of military
*glasnost*, it is necessary to examine the nature of *glasnost* as an
overall policy. One of the main hindrances to comprehending this
term is the fact that our media and government have unquestion-
ingly accepted the official Soviet mistranslation of the word—
"openness"—supplied to us by the *Novosti* propaganda agency.
This definition diverts attention from the two real definitions: the
proper definition, which is "publicity," and the official ideological
definition which Soviet lexicons explain by referring inquiries to
the entries on "revolutionary vigilance." In practice, *glasnost* is
not freedom of speech, nor is it the truth. It principally involves
revelation of information about which everyone already knows.
While it involves publicizing more truth about Soviet history,
politics, and society than was revealed before, it still involves the
classic recipe of the propagandist: a mixture of the truth and
falsehood blended in such a way as to yield a manipulated result.
Manipulated truth is not truth; it still remains a lie.

The purposes of domestic *glasnost* have been manifold:

— the revival of the domestic propaganda apparatus, to which
no one had been paying attention, given its utter lack of credibil-
ity;

— an effort to regain the political support of a demoralized
workforce (through exposés of official corruption, for example);

— a similar effort to regain the allegiance of an intelligentsia so
alienated from Soviet socialism that it had become a de facto ally
of anti-Soviet critics in the West, and by regaining that allegiance,
ensluting the intelligentsia's support in the revival of the economy;

\textsuperscript{106} See "U.S.-USSR Counterterrorism Efforts Noted" *TASS*, October 10,
1989, *FBIS-SOV*, October 11, 1989 p. 11; "CIA, KGB Retirees Discuss
Antiterrorism Fight," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, October 11, 1989, *FBIS-
SOV*, October 13, 1989, p. 13; and "KGB Deputy on Hijacking,
— to attack rotten elements of the Party apparatus who had lost their spirit of partiinost' (party-mindedness) and were weakening the revolutionary character, cohesion and centralized direction of the Party;

— to attack opponents of the ruling clique in the Kremlin; and

— to coopt radical reformists in Eastern Europe so as to prevent the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

While these various purposes have met with uneven results, the foreign policy successes of glasnost' have been nothing short of spectacular. Just one of the components of this policy, the campaign of military glasnost', has played no small part in this success. As the data presented here demonstrate, this campaign has comprised a steady and intensive drumbeat of publicity-seeking initiatives over the course of four years. Virtually all of these initiatives have captured headlines in the American prestige press—as the footnotes in this study amply indicate. Military glasnost' has largely achieved its principal purpose: to erode the "enemy image" of the USSR and to mislead the West about the continuing global strategic intentions of the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Moscow has continued to be heavily engaged in seeking to achieve its strategic goal in Afghanistan—the consolidation of communist power in Kabul. It has doubled its aid to its clients in Cambodia. It is achieving its strategic objectives in Angola by supporting its clients there at a rate 20 times greater than U.S. support for anti-communist resistance forces. It is achieving its goal of the establishment of a one-party state in Namibia, run by its Marxist clients, the South West African People's Organization. It is sending its communist clients in Nicaragua military aid at the rate of over $500 million per year. Over the course of eight years, Soviet aid to the Sandinistas exceeded U.S. aid to the Resistance by a ratio of 24 to 1. And this military infusion, in turn, arms a communist insurgency in El Salvador which now, thanks to glasnost', is no longer connected to Moscow in the American public mind.107

Soviet active measures (i.e., disinformation, forgeries and covert political influence operations, targeted against the United States) continue unabated, but now without official public protest or meaningful countermeasures from the United States.  

The Bush Administration has actually proposed the sixth straight year of defense cuts, while failing to tell the American people the truth about Soviet military realities. 

Meanwhile, Moscow's military buildup continues to outpace the defense preparations of the United States by wide margins and should continue to do so even if the Kremlin makes significant military budget cuts. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has not accepted from the Congress, but has actually proposed, the sixth straight year of defense cuts, while failing to tell the American people the truth about Soviet military realities. In any case, whatever evidence may exist to show that Soviet military spending may be marginally decreasing, it is still premature to conclude that this does not reflect what Soviet authorities have indicated is their strategy—i.e., to cut back their emphasis on high quantities of arms in favor of acquisitions of higher quality weapons systems. The long-time Soviet emphasis on high quantities of arms has now been judged not only to be too expensive, but more importantly, to have an adverse propaganda impact. As Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov explained:

Restructuring is also deepening defense building. . . . The effectiveness of this building . . . should be ensured primarily by means of qualitative parameters. . . . The orientation first and foremost toward qualitative parameters . . . is dictated . . . by the fact that the emphasis on quantitative indicators is becoming not only increas-


ingly costly, but less and less effective in both military-political and purely military terms.\textsuperscript{109} (emphasis added)

As the American sense of threat from the USSR has been thoroughly anesthetized by \textit{glasnost}' and military \textit{glasnost}, with the cooperation of summitteering Presidents and dialoging Generals, the pro-defense consensus has completely broken down with little prospect of its resuscitation. We have become so convinced that the Soviets are no longer Leninists that we are ready to believe Gorbachev every time he tells us what we want to hear, but disbelieve him when he says:

The CPSU firmly stands on principled positions. It remains devoted to socialist ideals. . . . Our people made a choice in October 1917, and despite the deformations of socialism and its Leninist concept which have taken place in the past, we will firmly go along this path. We say \textit{perestroika} is the renewal of socialism, but not its dismantling. We say \textit{perestroika} is revolutionary transformation, the elimination of the deformations of socialism, not the restoration of capitalism. We say \textit{perestroika} is the revival of creative Marxism, a new awareness of Leninist ideas. . . \textsuperscript{110}

One wonders what kind of crisis and how much human destruction will be necessary to overcome the intellectual and psychological disarmament to which our national political and military leaders have been accomplice.
