Creative Forgetting

Polish and Ukrainian Historiographies
on the Campaign against the Poles in Volhynia
during World War II

Introduction

Polish and Ukrainian historiographies on the campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Poles in Volhynia during World War II differ enough to have been created by the mind of a schizophrenic. When discussing the issue, historians seem to lose control of their emotions, resulting in what often resembles the delusions and hallucinations of a troubled soul. Polish historians accuse the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Powstanska Armia), the military arm of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv), the Bandera faction (OUN-UPA) in particular, of massacring tens of thousands of Polish civilians in the territory of interwar southeastern Poland, now Western Ukraine (mainly parts of Polesie, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, and the eastern part of the Lublin region) and place the center and beginning of the tragedy in Volhynia. In short, they point out that in February/March 1943, the OUN-UPA began a policy of ethnic cleansing against the Polish Volhynians that intensified in the summer of that year and soon encompassed all of south-eastern Poland/Western Ukraine.

In turn, some Ukrainian authors claim that it was the Poles who started the slaughter of the Ukrainian population in the Chełm area (the Lublin region in eastern Poland) in 1942, or even as early as 1941, and would rather view the Volhynian events as retaliatory massacres. This stubborn discrepancy of accounts includes not only the historical record, but also the responsibility for the ethnic cleansing. Further, the scarcity of academic research, until recently, aimed at establishing the number and the identities of victims sustains this incongruity in the different accounts of the same events.

It is legitimate and obligatory to analyze the murders of both Poles and Ukrainians in all areas of conflict between 1939–1947, especially in Volhynia, Galicia and the Lublin region. I believe, however, that, as many Polish authors argue, Volhynia suffered the greatest loss of lives out of all the areas of conflict between the Poles and the Ukrainians, and that the principal victims were Polish peasants. Moreover, the archival sources do not support the claim that the Poles were the first to wipe out entire villages. In contrast, increasing evidence points to the OUN-UPA initiation of the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. The nature of the events in Western Ukraine...
was best characterized by an OUN-B[anera] member based in the Przemyślany region (Eastern Galicia), who wrote in his report:

Some people from the masses are very critical of the fact that we were not able to destroy [znyszchyty] all the Poles, or at least those who were the most to blame, but (destroyed) all the rabble [motlokh] and not the active element. And since all the aces escaped untouched, they can do a lot of harm to our state building in the future. They say that when the Poles were killing some Ukrainians in Lwów or anywhere else, they pulled up in their cars, killed and left, and this gives these killings a more political and respectable character because the Poles kill the most active element. But our people limit their actions to villages and set against the simple Polish rabble and not the active people. The masses want the OUN’s fame to shine all over the world, and not remain stained ... Some from the masses fear that one day this action against the Poles will be brought before the international court of law.

A report from Volhynia, written in September 1943, expresses a similar sentiment:

...the population starts to doubt if we are capable of delivering anything greater if the fighting units are not capable of completely wiping out [znyszchyty doreshty] the Polish element that harms the Ukrainian population at every turn.

While the OUN-UPA commanders were not satisfied with the efficiency of their destruction campaign, Heinrich Schöne, the Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podolia, saw the OUN-UPA strikes as extremely injurious to the civilian population. At the end of May 1943, in the early stages of the OUN-UPA campaign against the Poles, he informed Ukrainian Orthodox bishop Polikarp regarding the fate of Volhynian Poles: „According to our count, more than 15,000 Poles were killed up to this point!” Schöne had also no doubt that the victims were „defenseless Poles.” The majority of these 15,000 deaths has already been documented by historians.

For the OUN, the Poles were a separate category earmarked for destruction, and singled out exclusively because of their nationality. A case in point is the September 10th, 1943 order by Mykola Kozak, nom de guerre „Smok,” the Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky–SB) Department Head of the Military Group „Bohun” (Referent Sluzhby Bezpeky, Viiskova Okruha) in Volhynia, sent to the SB heads in the military nadraions:

I remind you once again, all members of the SBVN [SB in the nadraions], that the Police and Executive Unit of the SB in raions and subraions have the right to pass death sentences only on the enemies of the Ukrainian nation. We consider as the enemies of the Ukrainian nation all Communists regardless of their nationality; Polacks; all collaborators of the German police, no matter what their nationality;
those Ukrainians who worked with our enemies, [those] who act against the UPA orders and attempt to destroy the unity among the Ukrainian nation, those who entered the UPA with perfidious intentions, those who, as enemy informants, work not for the UPA, but as traitors for the benefit of the enemies of the Ukrainian nation.10

According to the OUN and UPA documents from Volhynia, the destruction of the Polish communities was to be complete. In Volhynia, the landed property belonging to the murdered or fleeing Poles was given to the Ukrainian peasants by a special directive of the UPA Supreme Commander, Dmytro Kliachkivskyi, nom de guerre ”Klym Savur.”11 In the UPA-controlled areas, according to Kliachivskyi’s order, the harvest of 1943 was conducted under the slogan: “not even one piece of bread into the hands of the enemies: the Germans, Moscovites and the Poles.”12 Very frequently Polish villagers who found shelter in larger towns but dared to return, without protection, to harvest their fields were killed on the spot when discovered. There is ample documentation that supports this claim: personal testimonies, reports of the Home Army and the office of the Home Delegate [Delegatura], and the UPA reports accusing the surviving Volhynian Poles of “stealing” what was not theirs any more.

The scale of destruction of Polish property confirms that the UPA aimed at erasing any traces of the Polish presence in these territories. The Organization and Mobilization Department of the aforementioned Military Group „Bohum” in Volhynia reported the following in October 1943: „… At the same time, the action of blowing up bridges, mining and digging roads, taking down telephone lines, destroying Polish monuments in the whole Military Group is in full swing … On October 9, 1943, in the „Taras” territory, all telephone lines were destroyed … Simultaneously, on the same day, all [Roman Catholic] churches were destroyed, [as well as] monuments – everything that would point to the existence of Poles on our lands.”13 In the early part of 1944, in the Horochów (Horokhiv) raion, the Soviets seized an order issued by the „commander of the UPA ‘North’” and dated February 11, 1944, which said:

Freedom for the Peoples! Freedom for the Individual! ... Liquidate Polish traces:

a) Destroy all walls of churches and other Polish buildings of worship.

b) Destroy trees growing near homes so that not even a trace remains that anyone had lived there (do not destroy fruit trees by roads).

c) Before November 25, 1944, destroy all houses that were formerly inhabited by Poles (if Ukrainians are living in these houses, it is imperative that the houses should be taken apart anyway and converted into dugouts); if this is not done, the homes will be burned and the people who live in them will have nowhere to spend the winter. We alert your attention once more to the fact that if anything whatsoever remains that is Polish, the Poles will have claims to our lands.”14
These were not “empty threats”. Iaroslav Moriak, a member of the OUN Home Leadership and the OUN Lev Oblast Leader, concluded in one of his reports (of May 1944) prepared for the SB: „The Polish question was put to a mechanical and technical, but not politically planned, solution – [it was] systematically brought to an end (in practice).“15

The people who made the crude remarks or wrote the reports and orders cited above were much more conscious of the nature of the tragedy that was played out in the settlements, fields and forests of south-eastern Poland/Western Ukraine than some of today’s historians are. Hence, do historians know what really happened in south-eastern Poland/Western Ukraine during the war? In this essay, I will show what meaning and context the different authors, both Polish and Ukrainian, ascribe to the Volhynian chapter of this rather terrifying history: how do they frame the discussion in terms of the territory and the character of the conflict? How do they see its origins? Did the Poles or the Ukrainians begin the killing of innocent villagers?

In order to answer these key questions, I will review the secondary sources dealing with the Polish-Ukrainian massacres during World War II, singling out the most controversial events of that time as far as the Poles and the Ukrainians are concerned. I will also present the prevailing interpretations and explanations. I will first discuss the general state of the historiography relating to ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, and then review in detail the main theses. Finally, I will offer some other perspectives on the topic. As my paper will show, many Polish and Ukrainian historians are reluctant, to say the least, to address the Volhynian massacres in a professional and comprehensive way. Moreover, this paper will demonstrate that the two accounts, Polish and Ukrainian, diverge on the crucial issues of chronology and geography, as well as the number and identities of the victims.

**General State of the Historiography**

Some of the dissension over the answers to the questions posed exists because the destruction of the Polish communities in Volhynia during World War II has not yet been given its rightful place in the work of academic historians. Moreover, the attempts of historians to shed some light on the plight of the Polish population are very recent.16 Even if we broaden the topic in terms of territory (to include all of what is now western Ukraine and eastern Poland), chronology (1939–1947), and the nationality of the victims (both Poles and Ukrainians), virtually no monographs by academic historians have focused on the mass murder of civilians.17 This shortcoming is surprising, since the literature concerning the two main actors in the tragedy, the Home Army (Armia Krajowa–AK) on the Polish side and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the Ukrainian side, is quite extensive. In contrast, research on the dynamics of the destruction of civilian communities is still in the early stages.

The poor state of historiography on the subject has numerous causes. To begin with, if we exclude scholars of Polish and Ukrainian origin, hardly anyone in the West is
aware of the Volhynian massacres. In Poland and Ukraine, they could not be researched until the late 1980’s. In Poland, Ukrainian Nationalism was studied, but the geographical scope of the works was limited mainly to areas within the post-war Polish State. In the name of friendship with the Soviet Union, it was considered inappropriate to study the history of Western Ukraine. Any such discussion would point to the presence of a Polish population living there before 1945. In Soviet Ukraine, the Volhynian events were not described in much detail, let alone analyzed. The historical research pointed to the anti-Soviet and anti-Ukrainian activities of the OUN-UPA, emphasized its collaboration with the Nazis, and showed its brutality towards the local population which was only vaguely defined in terms of nationality.

Paradoxically, despite their uninhibited freedom of expression, Polish and Ukrainian émigré scholars have not produced a more impressive output, but here for different reasons. For these scholars, the topic was relatively fresh and of great emotional charge. The indescribably barbarous and cruel manner in which the civilian population was killed acted as a strong incentive to block any rational approach to the problem and to sustain animosities and resentments. A deeply engraved conviction that “between them and us there is spilled blood” proved to be enduring, especially since a large portion of the post-war wave of both Polish and Ukrainian emigration originated from the eastern stretches of the pre-war Polish state. Generally, however, the Ukrainian émigré publicists and some historians managed to present their own version of the events in Volhynia, while the Poles remained silent until quite recently. Ukrainian émigré scholars concentrated on documenting the activities of the OUN-UPA without due regard for the question of the ethnic cleansing of the Poles. One notable exception is the controversial yet well-documented books and publications of Wiktor Poliszczuk. Unfortunately, his work was met with either hostility or total silence in Ukrainian circles.

Ironically, both in independent Poland and Ukraine, the study of the Volhynian massacres is seldom free from its political context. Polish historians, who could potentially deal with the problem, tend to avoid the topic for many reasons. First, they see it as being rather uncomfortable and complicated. Second, many historians do not want to be the ones to open barely healed wounds and believe that a joint Polish-Ukrainian commission of historians should approach the problem. This attitude is challenged by a small minority of writers, who despite many obstacles, mostly financial constraints, document the stories of the survivors.

Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to lean towards unreserved glorification, if not whitewash, of the OUN-UPA’s deeds during the war. Alternative approaches are rare. Overall, the Polish and Ukrainian views on the issue generate criticism and opposition on both sides.

The Ukrainian Story

The Ukrainian side of the story is closely related to the authors’ political affiliations and sympathies. The OUN-UPA interpretation can be traced back to propaganda...
publications of the Ukrainian underground from the time of the Volhynian events. How these publications present the conflict with the Poles is important, as more and more Ukrainian historians employ similar, if not identical, arguments.

Let's start, however, with the few OUN propaganda statements that did not find their proper place in the discourse of the Ukrainian historians. The earliest interpretative statement of this nature comes from the summer 1943 edition of the journal *Ideia i Chyn* [Idea and Deed] issued by the OUN-B’s leadership. A short note declares: “The Ukrainian population of north-western Ukraine has begun to respond to the terror and provocations by Polish colonists, seksotiv [snitches] and Communist cells with self-defense actions, exterminating all hidden enemies of the Ukrainian nation.” 26 A month later, *Do zbroii*, a publication of the Political Department of the UPA included the following comment: “The Ukrainian nation entered the pathway of the decisive military reckoning with foreigners and will not stray until the last foreigner is expelled to his [native] land or into his grave.”27 The above pronouncements were written in May and August 1943, the period when mass attacks on Polish villages were in their full swing. They not only reveal the OUN-UPA style of argumentation, but also expose the nationalist mindset of the authors.28

In October 1943, an official communiqué of the OUN-B’s leadership concerning “the events that have been taking place during recent months on the Ukrainian lands” was issued. The document declares: “Neither the Ukrainian nation nor the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has anything to do with the mass murders.” Four general reasons were given to explain the tragic killings:

(a) The strained relations between both nations during the war resulted from the exterminatory policy of the inter-war Polish administration towards the Ukrainians; this tension was aggravated even more by the Polish desire to regain the territory of Western Ukraine;

(b) It was the Poles who initiated the wiping out of the civilian populations in the Chełm and Hrubieszów area of the Lublin region when the Germans started to colonize the area;

(c) Part of the Polish population in Volhynia entered into the service of the German occupants or the Bolshevik intelligence groups and participated in anti-Ukrainian activity;

(d) The Polish police in Volhynia, formed after the Ukrainian police went into hiding in the forests, began to „conduct a systematic pogrom of the Ukrainian population.”

Perceiving those four factors as the background of the tragedy, the authors of the communiqué indicate that the *riznia* [butchery] was caused directly by people on both sides who allowed themselves to be pushed into fulfilling foreign interests, namely those of the Germans and the Soviets.29 The leadership of the OUN-UPA put the blame squarely on the Poles, and the Ukrainian underground press widely used the above reasoning.30

This line of argument, with its four points, is echoed in many historical works and memoirs written after World War II. Therefore, I will first discuss those post-war publications that do not stray from the course presented in the above-mentioned propaganda material and were very often written by prominent members of the UPA. One of these
works that is increasingly often quoted by professional Ukrainian historians is Mykola Lebed’s *Ukrainska Povstanka Armiia* [The Ukrainian Insurgent Army]. Its author admits, without providing an exact time reference, that „the UPA gave the Polish population an order to leave the Ukrainian territories of Volhynia and Polissia [Polesie].”31 This statement could not, however, become the flagship of the Ukrainian argument on the origins of the massacres and was deleted in later editions of Lebed’s account. Other passages proved more convenient in the discussion. One of them runs as follows: „At the turn of 1943–1944 and in the spring of 1944, a lesser third front of defense—a front against the Poles—was created in the western part of Galicia.”32 Also useful were Lebed’s remarks on the resolutions of the Second OUN-B Conference held in April of 1942. The resolutions declare that Polish-Ukrainian dialogue is possible if the Polish side respects the right of the Ukrainian nation to the Western Ukrainian lands. However, at the same time, the OUN-B will conduct

a struggle against the chauvinistic attitude of the Poles and their appetite for the Western Ukrainian lands, against their intrigues and attempts to control the important spheres of economic and administrative apparatus at the expense of the Ukrainians.33

To summarize, Mykola Lebed’s original assessment, „the lesser third front against the Poles” was established at the turn of 1943–1944 in Eastern Galicia, whereas the Volhynian events were initiated by foreign agents and hostile Poles, and, therefore, the leadership of the OUN-UPA had no choice but to combat them.

How the OUN-UPA fought „foreign agents” is explained in Petro Mirchuk’s *Ukrainska Povstanka Armiia 1942–1952* [The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1942–1952] another classic of the OUN-B interpretation of events. Discussing the UPA battles with the Germans and the Soviets, the author declares that „at the same time the UPA neutralized the threat of Polish outposts (*placówki***).”34 According to Mirchuk, Polish „colonists” in Volhynia waged a war against the Ukrainian population by collaborating with the Germans: these Poles worked in the Gestapo, participated in the German administration and Schutzmannschaften and collaborated with the Soviets, providing them with intelligence information. Mirchuk holds that Polish *placówki* (outposts) were established under the pretext of fighting the Germans, but in reality, they were set against the UPA and organized „bandit attacks on the Ukrainian hamlets.”35

The following statement made by Lev Shankovskyi provides a good summary of the pro-Bandera explanation of the Volhynian massacres:

The Poles were the first to start their armed actions against the Ukrainians. As early as 1941 in the Chelm and Podlasie areas, Polish terrorist bands appeared and began to kill Ukrainians and destroy Ukrainian villages. The mass murders of Ukrainian leaders in the Chelm area were already initiated by the Poles
in April 1942 ... The following numbers show the dimensions of the Polish terror: from August 1942 until August 1943, the Poles killed 543 Ukrainian leaders, by the end of 1943 this number had increased to 594 ... As far as the events in Volhynia are concerned, the first big Ukrainian action against the Poles (Janowa Dolina) took place on 21/22 of April 1943 ...

Ultimately, Shankovskyi repeats the accusation that the Poles who served in the German-sponsored police and the Bolshevik partisan units started a systematic pogrom of the Ukrainian population in Volhynia. It is worth noting at this point that such claims are hardly ever supported with any documentation. Shankovskyi estimates that around 425,000 Poles „left“ Western Ukraine (Volhynia and Eastern Galicia) in 1943 and 1944, failing to note that those Poles had fled the area, while many others perished.

Let us now focus on publications written much later, which, in line with the wartime communiqué of 1943, blame the Poles for commencing the civil violence and even include lists of victims who died at Polish hands. Vasyl Veryha claims, referring to the Archive of the Ukrainian Central Committee, that the Poles killed 500 Ukrainians in the Chełm area throughout 1942 and 1943. Specifically, this assertion is based on a document called „The list of Ukrainian leaders murdered by Poles in the Chełm and Podlasie areas.” This register contains information about the identity of 500 victims, such as the place and date of death and the deceased’s position in the local community. It was compiled at the beginning of 1944 by the Ukrainian Central Committee in Lublin and sent to that organization’s headquarters in Kraków. This document has very often been quoted, but never analyzed. It shows that 33 civilians on that list were killed before January 1, 1943. On careful scrutiny, one finds that the document does not report cases of large-scale murders of Ukrainian civilians until May 1943, whereas the mass slaughter of the Polish population in Volhynia started, at the latest, in February 1943, and individual Poles, whole families and groups of victims perished from 1939 on. Incomplete versions of this register can be found in many publications. In one case, 378 casualties are claimed over the same period. The same can be said about Evhen Pasternak’s list. No attacks on Ukrainian villages are noted in 1942, and there are five in 1943: the first four took place on May 26 and the last one on October 27. This fact does not prevent Pasternak from claiming, like so many other Ukrainian authors before him, that the 1943 attacks on the Polish civilians in Volhynia were acts of retaliation for Polish atrocities in the Chełm area. It is important to note here that some historians in independent Ukraine have advanced these same OUN-invented claims.

In contrast, Ukrainian accounts that differ from those presented above are provided by authors who were members of the famous partisan group „Polissian Sich”, a formation politically linked with the Ukrainian National Republic’s (UNR) government-in-exile in Warsaw. Maksym Borovets (nom de guerre „Taras Bulba”), the commander and
the organizer of this group, points out in his memoirs that in March 1943, the entire Polish population of Western Ukraine was placed under a collective death sentence, and the OUN Bandera movement ordered the burning of Polish villages. He clearly states that in April 1943, Mykola Lebed urged him to join in the operation of clearing the territory affected by the uprising of its Polish population, which he condemns. For Borovets, only barbarians, and not the army, apply collective responsibility. Many other Bulba or Melnyk sympathizers in the UPA fully share his view. One of them, Osyp Shuliak, comments succinctly on the plight of the Polish peasants: "but all that happened cannot be explained in any way."

Overall, the Ukrainian account does not go beyond the narratives of the major actors in the tragedy. Furthermore, trained historians ignore this story. All editions of The Encyclopedia of Ukraine, including the newest, avoid the issue altogether. Through a very laconic paragraph, we learn that the Germans in Volhynia conducted the mass shooting of innocent people and the burning of entire villages in the second half of 1942. The Germans replaced Ukrainian administrators with Russians, Poles and Volksdeutsche and thus deliberately set national groups against one another. The terse comments of another author of The Encyclopedia of Ukraine, about a war of all against all and the efforts of the Ukrainian Central Committee, the Ukrainian bishops, and the most influential circles of Ukrainian community to restore peace, do not even begin to tell the story of what actually happened in Volhynia as they are half-truths at best. If the massacres are reported at all, they are in conformity with the OUN-UPA war-time announcements presented as mutual ones, which were started by the Poles and claimed the lives of innocent Ukrainians. Peter Potichnyj, an authority on the history of the Ukrainian Underground, states that in Hrubieszów county alone more than 2,000 Ukrainians were killed by the Polish underground in 1942–1944. The tendency to imply that the Poles initiated the massacre of the civilian population is apparent. A popular synthesis of Ukrainian history mentions the Polish view of the massacres but qualifies this with the following statement:

Ukrainians claim that massacres of their people began earlier, in 1942, when the Poles wiped out thousands of Ukrainian villagers in the predominantly Polish areas of Chełm, and that they continued in 1944–45 among the defenseless Ukrainian minority west of the San River.

At times, the degree of certainty about the Poles’ initiative is overwhelming. The narrative of The Third Reich and Ukraine by Volodymyr Kosyk is a good example. According to that author, the Poles started attacking Ukrainian villages first, while the Ukrainian self-defense and UPA units merely defended the Ukrainian population.
with easy access to many sources. His 285-page history of the OUN-UPA, which analyzes
the events of 1942 and 1943, is a wealth of information on the period but includes only
a 14-page chapter on "The OUN-UPA and the Poles." Here the argument, although dis-
passionate, follows that of Mykola Lebed, Lev Shanovskyi and other pro-OUN publicists
and historians. Just as in the works of many years ago, the description of the "Polish-
Ukrainian struggle" is dominated by claims of Polish terror in the Lublin region, Polish
collaboration with the Germans and the Soviets, and the alleged willingness of the OUN
to come to terms with the Poles.53

On occasion, one finds interpretations that go against the prevailing approach of
Ukrainian historiography. One such interpretation is that of Iaroslav Pelenski. Pelenski a
leading figure in Polish-Ukrainian dialogue and reconciliation presented his perspectives
in the journal Vidnova. Here he employs the term "Polish-Ukrainian war of 1942–1947"
for the bloody conflict between the two nations and divides it into two phases: the events
of 1942–44 and those of 1944–47. He characterizes the undeclared "Polish-Ukrainian
war" as extremely brutal and full of barbaric excesses and appeals for critical investiga-
tion. The Ukrainian scholar admits that the inquiry must acknowledge the attempt of the
Ukrainian Nationalist Underground to "depolonize" the Western Ukrainian territories. He
contends that this attempt took the form of the expulsion and selective exterminatory
actions against the Polish population living in the area.54 When commenting on the Polish
estimates of the number of victims, which oscillate between 60,000–80,000 and 100,000,
he remarks that these numbers are inflated by the sheer fact of being presented by one
side only.55 The path for Pelenski’s approach was undoubtedly prepared by the brief but
important comments of Roman Szporluk, who stresses that the Ukrainian Underground,
fearful of a Polish return, began to attack the local Polish population in Volhynia.56

From the Polish perspective, two themes dominate the occasional remarks of
Ukrainian scholars on the massacres in Volhynia. The first is their lack of conviction in
providing a clear and objective account of Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II.
Their skepticism is based mainly on the fact that both the German administration and the
Soviet partisan groups did their best to inflame an already difficult situation.57 The second
leitmotiv popular among Ukrainian scholars points to the plans and preparations of the
Polish Underground to assert Poland’s claim to its pre-war frontier with the Soviet Union,
and to bitter memories of conflict during the First World War and the inter-war period as
the causes of the conflict.58

As we can see, the OUN-UPA onslaught on the Polish Volhynians does not find its
rightful place in Ukrainian historiography. The majority of publications, which merely
scratch the surface of the problem, can be classified as memoirs and personal accounts
written by people directly involved in the events of World War II.59 Trained Ukrainian
historians, while devoting many volumes to the activities of the OUN-UPA during World
War II, tend to ignore the Volhynian massacres altogether.60 For the most part, they collect
and publish documents that glorify the OUN-UPA. Regrettably, the editorial comments
accompanying these documents simply repeat the claim about the Polish initiative in starting the mass killings of the civilian population in the Chełm region. This claim is never supported by reliable evidence and is often contradicted by numerous and graphic descriptions of the OUN-UPA’s hunt for Poles in Volhynia found in later documents.⁶¹

There are exceptions however. Drawing on documents produced by the OUN-UPA, the German army administration, the police security service, and military intelligence, and on documents sent to the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement by Soviet partisans, the NKVD and army leaders, a Kiev historian, M. V. Koval, concludes that the UPA indeed ruled with terror. Although he fails to discuss the UPA’s attitude towards the Polish population in Volhynia, a number of documents he chose for publication leave no doubt as to who was the driving force behind the mass slaughter of Polish Volhynians.⁶²

The Polish Story

The Polish version of the story was first provided in the underground press and the reports and radio messages sent to the Polish Government in Exile in London by the representatives of the Delegation for the Homeland (Delegatura na Kraj). Although initially very patchy, these messages played an important role in shaping Polish views about the events in Volhynia. First of all, these statements provide a first-hand account of the situation as perceived by people who were right in the middle of the conflict. More significantly, the terms „massacre” or „slaughter” (rzeź) for the attacks on the civilian population, used to this day in Polish historical works, were first introduced in these underground documents.⁶³ One of the first messages received in London read:

In March of this year [1943], Volhynia was seized by anarchy initiated in the county of Sarny by the nationalist and anti-Soviet activity of a bandit, Bulba Borowiec; it then spread to the county of Kostopol, reaching the number of 4,000 victims...⁶⁴

Another report of August 19, 1943 stated: „The organization of the slaughter rests in the hands of the local apparatus of the OUN, which is controlled by Soviet agents.”⁶⁵ This general confusion as to the role of the OUN’s leadership in the action and its intentions remained unresolved for some time. Within a few months, however, the reports began to present a more precise and unified picture. On December 27, 1943, the following message was sent:

In his proclamation of November 16, the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army urges all Poles to leave the Ukrainian Lands and move beyond the Bug River. He threatens [the Poles] with extermination, giving as an example [the fate of] Huta Stepańska, one of the places where the Poles found refuge from Ukrainian attacks.⁶⁶
Polish historiography never questions the conviction that the OUN-B planned and directed the mass onslaught on the Polish population in south-eastern Poland/Western Ukraine. It is generally pointed out that the Ukrainian Nationalists’ attacks on the Poles began in Volhynia at the end of 1942, gradually moving from east to west and escalating from attacks on individuals to attacks on families and, eventually, entire villages. In February of 1943, the counties of Sarny, Kostopol, Równe, Zdolbunów and Krzemieniec were most threatened. By June 1943, the attacks had spread to the counties of Dubno and Luck, and, in July, to Horodhów, Wlodzimierz Wołyński and Kowel. By the end of 1943, all of Volhynia became the theatre of massacres.67 Polish authors emphasize strongly that the Poles were not the first to wipe out villages. However, these authors readily admit that the AK was considering the possibility of confronting the Ukrainian Underground when faced with the task of seizing control of the south-eastern Polish Provinces as soon as the German retreat from the area became evident. This confrontation, however, was to be a military fight and not a mass slaughter of the civilian population. Moreover, in the spring of 1943, the AK in Volhynia was still in the process of organizing itself and consequently was very weak.68 Ryszard Torzecki, a long-time investigator of Polish-Ukrainian relations, argues that in these unfavorable conditions, the Poles, who were a small minority in Volhynia, would have had to be suicidal to have initiated the cleansing of Ukrainian villages. Once the struggle began, the Poles were simply defending themselves, following the ruthless rules set by their opponent.69 Feeling defenseless, some Poles joined the German police force, despite the appeal of the Commander of the AK in Volhynia not to do so, in order to protect themselves from and take revenge for Ukrainian attacks.70 Contrary to the opinions expressed by Ukrainian authors, Polish historians claim that little collaboration with the German-organized police was taking place against the local population until after the first massacres of Polish villagers, which are believed to have occurred in February 1943. As a rule, the Germans were unable to recruit local Poles into the police until the attacks on the Polish villages started.71 Therefore, the Poles’ occasional collaboration with the Germans cannot be the direct cause of the mass slaughter of the Poles, as the Ukrainian side sometimes suggests.

Polish historiography unanimously refutes the Ukrainian accusation that it was the Poles who started the annihilation of Ukrainian villages in the Chełm area (in the Lublin region). Many well-researched Polish scholarly works and published diaries have focused on the situation in the Lublin region during the war,72 because part of this area’s population had been subjected to brutal expulsion from their native villages in order to make space for German settlers, an operation orchestrated by the notorious SS General Odilo Globocnik. This was nothing other than an ethnic cleansing of the Polish population. From November 1942 to August 1943, 110,000 Poles from that region were forced to leave their homesteads. Some of them found shelter in the nearby forests, while others were sent to concentration camps or to the Reich for forced labor.73
As Polish authors report, Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Lublin region had deteriorated considerably by the end of 1942 and at the beginning of 1943 because of two main factors. Firstly, some Ukrainians from those areas were also forced to leave their homes but were allowed to stay within the Lublin region and occupy vacated Polish homesteads. The more lenient German attitude towards Ukrainians was dictated by the desire to take advantage of their presence. Ukrainians were resettled in such a way as to provide a shield for German colonists from the escalating attacks of partisans, as, indeed, many uprooted people joined the guerrilla units which gained significantly in strength. Secondly, the Ukrainian police and the Ukrainian administration headed by the Ukrainian Central Committee were employed in the expulsion of the Poles and thus became accessories to the Nazi ethnic cleansing. This contributed to the Polish resentment towards the Ukrainians in general. According to some authors, this led to Polish partisan attacks on Ukrainians in the Lublin region. They claim that, starting in May 1943, one can find cases of collective responsibility being applied to Ukrainian settlers who took possession of the homesteads vacated by expelled Poles. However, the actions of the Polish underground against the Ukrainians of the Lublin region could not have provoked the Volhynian massacres, as it was the news from Volhynia that intensified the Poles’ resentment and animosity toward the Ukrainians. This conclusion is based simply on a comparison of the chronology and the number of victims in Volhynia and in the Lublin region. The available estimates of Polish and Ukrainian losses in the territories of present-day Poland (mostly in the Lublin region) support this argument. According to Grzegorz Motyka, from 1943–44, the death toll attributable to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in that area was at most 4–5 thousand for each side, with most of the deaths occurring after the fall of 1943, which was several months after the Volhynian massacres of the Poles got underway. Polish historiography thus does not leave any room for doubt that the chronology of the massacres in all areas of mixed Polish-Ukrainian settlement and the sequence of unfolding events undermine the contention that the ethnic cleansing of the Poles in Volhynia was a reprisal action.

Furthermore, the still incomplete Polish documentation of Polish losses indicates points in time as well as other territories where innocent blood was spilled. The collapse of the Polish State in 1939 and the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 are considered to be such critical moments. Thus, according to the reports of the Polish underground and the documentation collected by the Rada Główna Opiekuńcza [the Main Help Council], 750 people were murdered by the Ukrainians in the province of Tarnopol alone (in Eastern Galicia) from mid-September 1939. (Although incited as well by Soviet propaganda, the killings stopped once the Soviets fully established themselves in the area in October 1939.) A special category targeted by the OUN were Polish fugitives from central Poland. It is estimated that only in five counties of Tarnopol and Stanisławów provinces (mainly in the area of Przemyśl – Buczacz – Rohatyn) around 2,000 Polish fugitives were murdered. The second round of violence came in June and July 1941, at
the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union. For four counties in Eastern Galicia, 450 Polish victims were reported.\(^{79}\) A recent study indicates that in Volhynia, Ukrainians murdered well over a thousand Poles in 1939, and 41 in 1941.\(^{80}\)

Until recently, the most extensive work dealing with the number of the Poles murdered in Volhynia during the war was Józef Turowski and Władysław Siemaszko’s *Zbrodnie narjonalistów ukraińskich dokonane na ludności polskiej na Wołyńiu, 1939–1945* [Crimes Perpetrated Against the Polish Population of Volhynia by the Ukrainian Nationalists, 1939–1945].\(^{81}\) This chronological register of the OUN-UPA’s attacks on the local Polish population provides dates, places, short descriptions of the circumstances of the crimes and estimates of the number of victims, giving their names whenever possible. The entries are based on materials gathered for an oral history project initiated in 1985 by the veterans of the Twenty-Seventh Division of the AK. In all, about a thousand Volhynian localities are listed where, according to this work, 30,000 people were killed. The authors point out, however, that these statistics do not reflect the true number of victims.\(^{82}\) This work is complemented by the more recent, and, in terms of the provenance of the sources, much more extensively documented, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez narjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołyńia 1939–1945* [Genocide Committed by Ukrainian Nationalists on the Polish Population of Volhynia During World War II, 1939–1945], a ten-year long project undertaken by Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko.\(^{83}\) The latter provides the documentation for 36,543–36,750 murdered Poles in Volhynia between 1939 and 1945, with the majority of victims (33,347–33,454) being killed in 1943. The authors were able to identify 19,379–19,401 victims by name and the authors maintain that these figures may be revised upward as the true losses could have exceeded 50 to 60 thousand, since the fate of the Poles is known in only half of the administrative units in Volhynia with Polish inhabitants. Significantly, both registers, the older and the newer, include killings from the whole period of the occupation of Volhynia. The distribution of the number of documented deaths in Volhynia is quite striking — it has a very high peak corresponding to 1943 and long tails (see Appendix I).\(^{84}\) Examining the distribution of the number of documented deaths throughout 1943 is, therefore, worthwhile. The data collected so far points to the culmination of violence in the spring and summer of 1943 (see Appendix I).\(^{85}\) As both registers indicate, after the first attacks on Polish civilians in September 1939, killings continued throughout the war, taking the form of random murders of small groups and families in November 1942, and escalating to attacks on entire villages around February/March 1943. Undoubtedly, the work of Józef Turowski, Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko is fundamental and requires careful analysis and further verification.\(^{86}\)

A new book by Czesław Piotrowski, published in 2002, investigates the material destruction of the Polish (mostly village) settlements (*osiedla*) in Volhynia. Piotrowski’s focus is on 1,150 settlements which were almost exclusively Polish or where the Poles were in the majority. According to his research, the OUN-UPA onslaught on Polish communi-
ties consumed 1,048 thus defined Polish settlements. In this destruction, 26,167 Polish farm households (zagrody) disappeared. In comparison, German pacification actions, as Piotrowski states, took 37 Polish settlements, whereas 66 settlements survived the war but were later destroyed by the Soviets after the war with the expulsion of the remaining Poles from Volhynia. The research of Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko makes it clear that the abovementioned 37 German pacifications were carried out with the participation of the Ukrainian police, a fact that should not be ignored given the accusations in Ukrainian historiography of Polish collaboration with the Germans.

Altogether the works of Polish historians allow us to make quite precise estimates regarding Polish population losses in Volhynia. According to the 1942 German census, after the deportations effected by the Soviets in 1939–1941, there were 305,740 Poles left in Volhynia. It is estimated that 50,000 to 60,000 Poles were murdered by the OUN-UPA mostly in 1943. These killings would then account for 16 to 20 percent of Polish population in Volhynia at the time. That there were not more fatalities was largely because Polish peasants flocked to the larger towns and cities under German control where they were relatively safe from the OUN-UPA attacks. According to Polish estimates, based on archival documentation, another 50,000 Poles fled Volhynia to central Poland and approximately 25,000 of those looking for shelter in urban areas as a result of the OUN-UPA terror were deported to the Reich for slave labor. Thus, in Volhynia alone, the OUN-UPA policy of wholesale slaughter resulted in around 135,000 Polish victims – either murdered or permanently displaced before the Soviet takeover in spring and summer 1944. It is estimated that around 10,000 Poles from Volhynia were forcibly drafted into the Soviet Army (from 1944 on) and another 5,000 joined the Home Army leaving Volhynia forever. In the final blow to the Polish community in Volhynia, approximately 132,000 Poles were deported to the redrawn Poland by the Soviets between 1944 and 1946 in the face of continuing OUN-UPA terror. In the end, only around 10,000 Poles, mostly of mixed origin, remained, which leaves approximately 13,000 Poles unaccounted for. In the space of a few years, the long-standing Polish village communities in Volhynia simply ceased to exist.

Those acquainted with the Polish version of the story may ask: „What about the Poles? Did they not slaughter Ukrainians?” Polish authors who asked themselves these questions admit that members of the village self-defense and the AK are known to have killed inhabitants of Ukrainian hamlets. They also killed many UPA fighters. However, these authors point to the self-defense and reprisal nature of such killings and emphasize that the AK command condemned wanton acts of vengeance, including murder and plunder. Having said that, it is worth noting that the Polish side, though providing an explanation for its crimes against Ukrainians, is not attempting to minimize its actions. The Polish view of these events is based on the conviction that the responsibility of the OUN Bandera leadership for initiating the ethnic cleansing against the Poles in Volhynia cannot be disputed. Also, it is important to note that Polish historians will not be able to fully establish the scope of Polish reprisal actions without the help of Ukrainian
researchers. The latter have not yet produced comprehensive data on Polish assaults. Two independent Polish estimates, likely on the low side, put the number of Ukrainian victims of Poles at around 2,000.92 There is no evidence, however, to support claims that tens of thousands of Ukrainians perished in Volhynia at the hands of Poles, as some Ukrainian historians maintain. Moreover, thousands of Ukrainians were also killed by the OUN-UPA, sometimes for protecting Poles, but more often because of their real or perceived opposition to OUN-UPA policies or because of in-fighting among OUN factions.

Conclusions and Some Other Perspectives

Despite the evidence contained in many archival sources, the historiography on the butchery in Volhynia is still characterized by incongruous interpretations, if not denial of basic historical facts. Polish historians (as do German and Soviet sources) all point to the Ukrainian Nationalists as the initiators of the „war against the civilians.” In contrast, Ukrainian historians are either silent about the OUN-UPA’s culpability or else either dismiss it with brief remarks about „mutual massacres” or even outright denial. Rather, they accuse the Poles of widespread collaboration with the Germans and Soviets or of having initiated the conflict in the Chełm area. One should not be surprised by these kinds of arguments as they always exist in the denial literature on any violent ethnic conflict. As in other cases, the claims are not supported with thorough research and an examination of all available sources. As a result, the historical truth about the mass slaughter of the Poles is still lost in the two incongruent accounts of Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II. Even eight joint Polish-Ukrainian conferences (1997–2000) devoted to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1939–1947, held twice a year alternatively in Warsaw and Lutsk, were not able to generate any real consensus. Polish and Ukrainian historians agreed mostly on important but auxiliary research issues that do not directly address the main issue, namely the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia.

One might have expected that the joint Polish-Ukrainian conferences would have succeeded in reaching a consensus on the most basic issues and in acknowledging the facts.93 One might have hoped that the conferences would have resulted in at least a long-term plan to lay out foundations for future research. One might have expected that the Polish call for a joint program of categorizing and recording deaths on both sides during and after the war would have been accepted. The Polish side prepared a computer database and appealed to the historians of both nations to share their findings. The Ukrainian response to this offer was not open refusal but was also not enthusiastic agreement. In the end, the offer was never accepted.94

The main arguments of both sides during the conferences did not differ from those already prevalent in the literature. The spirit of the presentations is best expressed by the official communiqué of the second conference held in Warsaw in 1997:
The Polish participants of the conference are of the opinion that the Ukrainian liberation movement under the direction of the OUN Bandera walked down the road of nationalism, attracting a considerable part of the Ukrainian population of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. The lack of tolerance and brutal methods of struggle were part of the tradition of this organization. This lack found its expression in individual terror in the inter-war period and a mass terror that attained the character of genocide in Volhynia in particular and in all south-eastern Polish provinces in general during the Second World War. The Ukrainian side maintains that the causes of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict should be sought in the Polish policies towards the Ukrainian population before World War II, and that the nationality policy of the OUN does not reveal a lack of tolerance towards other nations.95

This polarity was just as evident at the eighth conference in 2000.

The present cannot be reflected upon in isolation from the historical past, and the Volhynian events are no exception. The history of relations between Poles and Ukrainians inevitably influenced their behavior during World War II. The characters of the perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing were molded in the heat of struggle against Polish rule, though other factors such as ideology undoubtedly played a decisive role as well. Thus, Ukrainian historians tend to see the war-time tragedy as the result of the pre-war Polish discriminatory policies towards the Ukrainians. The hard facts of history show that Polish policies in the 1920s and 1930s were often chauvinistic and discriminatory, but so were the minority policies of almost all the states in this part of Europe.

While not dismissing the benefits of such background explorations, I believe that in the end, they ignore the crux of the issue and though providing a historical background to the tragedy, they do not explain the most important direct and immediate causes of the ethnic cleansing. In short, all these factors may have been necessary pre-conditions for the oncoming tragedy, but they were not sufficient ones. Despite undeniable tensions between both nations, the wiping out of entire villages constitutes a break with the past that is too large to be explained by these tensions alone.

Violent confrontations between Poles and Ukrainians clearly occurred throughout the war in all territories inhabited jointly by the two nations (except for the Lemko region), starting from the moment of the collapse of the Polish State in September 1939. Mutual denunciations and a general will to weaken the rival, even if in a dishonorable fashion, prevailed until the very end of the war and some years after. Despite this mutual animosity, the evidence so far presented suggests that no Ukrainian villages were wiped out by the Polish Underground in the Lublin region at least until May 1943, and that the number of Ukrainians who died in 1943 is disproportionately smaller than the number of Poles who died in Volhynia, as the compilation in Appendix II illustrates.96 In fact, ample evidence indicates that as early as February and March 1943, the Polish civilian population of Volhynia was subjected to a campaign of ethnic cleansing, and, as a result, tens of thousands of them, regardless of age and gender, were killed.97
Ukrainian historiography repeatedly alleges widespread Polish collaboration with the Soviets and the Germans as one of the major causes of the Ukrainian „reprisal action” in Volhynia. It also attributes a significant role to the Soviets and Germans in instigating the outbreak of violence but furnishes scant evidence to warrant such a conclusion. The participation of both Poles and Ukrainians in both German and Soviet formations active in the area cannot be denied but should be carefully and honestly investigated. Research should analyze the circumstances of the creation of these groups, assign them a chronology, determine the scope of the phenomenon and explain what role they played in the dynamics of the bloody events. Polish claims of only minimal numbers of Poles in the Schutzmannschaften or Ukrainian assertions of the massive desertion of Ukrainian police into the forest in the spring of 1943 may turn out to be half-truths. However, we possess enough knowledge now to dismiss as propaganda the argument that Polish collaboration with the Germans or Soviets caused the outbreak of the violence. Many bloody pacifications of Polish and Ukrainian villages in Volhynia (e.g., the largely Ukrainian village of Kortelisy) were conducted by the Ukrainian, not Polish, police and the Germans before the OUN-UPA onslaught on the Poles. Many Poles found themselves in German and Soviet formations precisely to escape the consequences of the ethnic cleansing. As far as charges of collaboration with the Soviets are concerned, we have to remember that although underrepresented, Ukrainians did constitute approximately 46% of the five major Soviet partisan units in Ukraine, though precise figures for Western Ukraine are not known. We do know that one third of Kovpak’s men were Ukrainians. However, even if we eliminate Ukrainian collaboration from our analysis, the dimension of Polish collaboration and the scope of the slaughter of Poles are incompatible. Also, we should not forget that it was the elites of both nations who were waging a struggle for their homeland. The vast majority of Ukraine’s population was politically uncommitted and concerned primarily with survival, as were the Poles. Finally, even if we were to accept those accusations of Polish collaboration, annihilating a whole village for the „willing” or „forced collaboration” of some individuals brings to mind the collective punishment characteristic of Nazi and Soviet patterns of behavior.

Even if some Ukrainian authors admit that the OUN-UPA killed many Polish peasants, those authors still treat these deaths as a natural outcome of the political struggle for the area between the OUN-UPA and the AK. They see the Volhynian events as provoked by Polish territorial claims and the AK activity within Operation „Tempest” in the area. Although the link between Polish plans to reinstate the Riga frontier (i.e., Poland’s legal inter-war boundary with the Soviet Union) and the Ukrainian reaction cannot be ignored, the OUN-UPA decision to clear the area casts more light on the dark side of the Ukrainian Nationalist’s psyche than on Polish plans. Otherwise, we would come to the faulty conclusion that any military confrontation, and this is what the Poles were preparing for, involves cleansing the area of the rival population by mass killings. In fact, the tragedy of the Polish population in Volhynia started almost a year before the Home Army
initiated Operation „Tempest” in 1944. Moreover, the internal OUN-B documentation from as early as 1941 reveals that the Polish population’s prospects did not look bright in Western Ukraine/south-eastern Poland long before the OUN-UPA began its systematic onslaught against the Polish communities. The Ukrainian Nationalist agenda was premised on a fait accompli: a territory cleared of Poles which would serve to undermine Polish territorial claims. The problem of the OUN policy towards the Polish population of Western Ukraine/south-eastern Poland, both in its theoretical foundations and its practical outcome, has still to be faced honestly. The facts, which have been ignored for too long, point to a premeditated plan to take advantage of the war in order to reduce or even obliterate the presence of Poles in Western Ukraine/south-eastern Poland by radical means. Classifying the „Moscovites,” Poles, and Jews as enemies, a May 1941 document prepared by the upper echelons of the OUN-B instructed its members as follows:

We destroy in the struggle mainly those who defend the regime: [the rest] we resettle into their [native] lands; we destroy mainly the intelligentsia and do not let them into any places of authority, and, in fact, we make it impossible for them to produce intelligentsia or access schools, etc. For example, so-called Polish peasants are to be assimilated and made conscious right away, in that ardent and fanatic time, of the fact that they are Ukrainians, only of Latin rite, heavily assimilated. The leaders are to be destroyed.100

Neither Polish nor Ukrainian historiography, with the exception of Wiktor Poliszczuk, have investigated the history of the OUN’s pre-war and war-time ideological and political concepts and plans concerning the fate of national minorities in the future Ukrainian state. These historiographies ultimately fail to analyze empirically the OUN’s intentions toward the national minorities. Such analysis should have led them to the conclusion that the OUN leadership embraced ethnic cleansing as a solution to the national minorities problem even before 1939.

It is extremely discomforting that more and more historians from Ukraine adhere to the theories that were first worked out by the OUN-UPA propaganda specialists and later found refuge in the West among émigré historians. Ivan Lysiak Rudnytskyi’s enlightened evaluation of the true nature of the ideology and practices of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, formulated years ago in the West, turned out to be isolated and did not reach Ukraine. His instinctive insights, based on secondary sources, led him to chilling conclusions. He was apprehensive about the OUN’s totally undemocratic character during the war,101 its tight and virtual monopoly over the UPA,102 and the enchantment of its leaders with the fascist models propagated by Dmytro Dontsov.103 Rudnytsyi’s tentative conclusions were: first, that the OUN was responsible for waging a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Polish population;104 and, second, that the OUN did not treat the Jews as compatriots.105 The mainstream of contemporary Ukrainian academic histo-
rians ignores Rudnytskyi’s hypothesis. Rudnytskyi’s insights share the same fate as the documentation of the Polish side or that of the OUN itself found in Ukrainian archives, both of which are supportive of his views: „We destroyed 55 state farms [filvakiv] during the operation. ... Around 85 Polish colonies perished during our operation.”106 „17 state farms [maietkiv] were destroyed. ... 24 colonies were destroyed, two of them partly.”107 „During the operation of the UPA, 28 state farms [filvakiv] were destroyed in the territory of the okruh. ... There were altogether 49 [43?] colonies destroyed in the territory of the okruh; this does not include the Lutsk [Luck] and Ostrozhet [Ostrożec] raion where all the colonies were destroyed. ...”108 How is this fragmentary evidence to be interpreted? It can be understood only as proof of Rudnytskyi’s conclusions and it runs contrary to the prevailing spirit of present-day Ukrainian historiography. These accounts in OUN reports omit the number of Poles killed, mention perfunctorily the number of “state farms” and “colonies” destroyed, emphasize the minimal losses incurred by the Ukrainians, and itemize in great detail the amount of loot stolen from the ravaged Polish communities.109

The OUN-UPA policy towards the Polish population during the war has yet to be examined in the context of the ideology of Ukrainian Integral Nationalism. One has to remember that the Ukrainian Nationalists defined their movement in terms of two intertwined components, ideological and organizational. They classified it as totalitarian and regarded it a way of life. Furthermore, one has to consider two important aspects of that ideology: its worldview (sviatohliad) and its ethics (etyka). The first of those concepts provided a philosophical explanation of the world as dominated by nations that are constantly at war with one another and are seeking domination and expansion. The latter concept, as interpreted by the OUN, exalted hatred and encouraged evil as a tool in the struggle.110 Also, like almost all extreme right-wing organizations, the OUN was obsessed with the activity of foreign agents and any „enemy influences.” The moral convictions of the OUN’s members were influenced by Dontsovian nihilism and propaganda literature that fostered hatred. One can prove, despite claims to the contrary, that the OUN was a highly ideological, extreme right-wing organization that put a lot of effort into the intensive indoctrination of its members.111 A thorough examination of these matters should be accompanied by an explanation of what the Nationalists actually meant by the terms „new man” (nova liudyna) and „National Revolution” (Natsionalna Revoliutsiia). In other words, the explanation of the Nationalists’ attitude towards the Poles will never be complete without an attempt to understand who the Nationalists were, what they wanted to achieve in 1943, and how they wanted to achieve it. One OUN-B document states:

Our propaganda has to lead (the people) into frenzy and fanaticism. ... The enemy is to be demoralized, disoriented, and destroyed using any means possible. Do not be humane, as that is the sign of weakness, which is the demise of the revolution. The revolution wins and secures new rule, and for that, it must show the greatest force and assertiveness (scare the foreigners, consistency), win
the trust of our people. ... The revolution must be stern, hard, unsparing [bezposhchadna] and decisive and just. The revolution has its own unsparing punishing law.112

Those words of instruction cannot be dismissed as mere empty phrases, as they were enacted within several months of being written. The full meaning of the Ukrainian Nationalists’ incantation of the 40th point of the „Pravyla Zhyttia” [The Laws of Life], „Respect motherhood as the source of continuation of life. Make your family the pivot of purity of your race and nation,”113 cannot be glossed over, given that so many survivors have testified to the practice of urging the Ukrainian peasants to murder their Polish spouses and their Polish-Ukrainian offspring. Ukrainian scholars who see the OUN as patriots fighting for an independent Ukraine overlook its many negative aspects. Unfortunately, non-Ukrainian historians have been equally negligent in failing to investigate the OUN ideology systematically.

The great challenge for Polish and Ukrainian historiography is to go beyond a general and all too often sketchy reconstruction of the Volhynian events. This goal will not be achieved until academic scholars from both countries start studying the victims on both sides. It is important to determine exactly how many lives were lost on both sides and the circumstances in which the killings were carried out. In other words, first we have to reconstruct the full history of the mass killings and establish what actually happened. Unmistakably, an honest investigation of these mass killings will point to deeds that cannot be justified in any way. As with any violent ethnic conflict, such an investigation will point to discrimination and deprivation and to patterns of local violence on both sides that fed one another and changed reasonable individuals into murderers. At the same time, and this much can already be said, an honest investigation will point to the existence of a tightly organized group of men who thrived on hate and were ready to commit the crime of genocide against another nation in the name of ill-conceived love for their own kind.
APPENDIX I

Documented deaths of Polish civilians in Volhynia, 1939-1945

Source: Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky, 2000), vol. 2, pp. 1038, 1045. The authors themselves emphasize repeatedly that their data is part of an ongoing research project and as such is far from comprehensive.

The number of Poles killed by the OUN-UPA and the Ukrainian police in the period 1939-1945:

1939............... 1,036–1,1336+?
1940............... 3
1941............... 41+?
1942............... 301
1943............... 33,347–33,454+?
1944............... 1,783
1945............... 31+?

The number of Poles killed by the OUN-UPA and the Ukrainian policemen in 1943:

January................................................................................93-93
February...............................................................................305
March...............................................................................1,759 1,765+?
April...............................................................................2,688+?
May...............................................................................2,025 + 2,042+?
June...............................................................................2,251+?
July...............................................................................0,473 + 10,527+?
August...............................................................................8,280 + 8,298+?
September...............................................................................1,162 1,167+?
October...............................................................................183+?
November...............................................................................173+?
December...............................................................................756 762+?
Month unknown...............................................................................3,199+?
APPENDIX II

Reported deaths of Ukrainians in the Lublin region, November 1941-January 1944

This compilation is based on "The list of Ukrainian leaders murdered by the Poles in the Chelm and Podlasie areas," Provincial Archives of Alberta, Michael Chomiak Papers, Accession number 85.191/59, unnumbered pages. The list, dated January 22, 1944, was prepared by the Lublin Office of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Each box below gives the total reported number of victims in a given month. The figure in parentheses refers to the number of policemen killed:

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</table>

Notes
1. Specifically, Polish historians argue that these deeds were the work of the OUN-UPA, its Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky – SB), and the so-called Kushch Self-Defense Units (Samooborony Kushchovy Viddily – SKV) subservient to the OUN-UPA.
2. This is not an exhaustive list of the territories involved in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.
3. The number of victims in any violent ethnic conflict is always a matter of hot dispute. In the early 1990s, Polish authors provided the following estimates of the number of Polish victims who died at the hands of the Ukrainian Nationalists between 1939-1947: around 40,000 in Volhynia, between 30,000 and 40,000 in Eastern Galicia, and between 10,000 and 20,000 in the Lublin region. See Andrzej Chojnowski, Ukraina [Ukraine] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 1997), p. 161. See also Ryszard Torzecki, Polecy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczpospolitnej [Poles and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Question during World War II in the Territory of the Second Polish Republic] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993), p. 267. Ukrainian authors give no overall estimate of their losses.
4. Kraievyi Provid Orhanizatsii Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv na Zakhidnykh Ukraїns'kyh Zemliakh [The Home Leadership of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists in the Western Ukrainian Lands], further referred to as „Kraievyi Provid OUN na ZUZ," a report by „Chumak,” „Zvit z propagandyvnoi pratsi za misiat traven 1944” [Report On the Propaganda Work for the Month of May, 1944] (June 9, 1944), Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi archiv vyshchyi ukraїns'kyh orhaniv Ukrainy [The Central State Archive of Higher Institutions
of Ukraine] [TsDAVO], 3833/1/118, p. 63.
5. „Susplihno-politychnyi ohliad lutskoi okruhy za misiats serpen 1943” [Social and Political Report from the Lutsk Okruh for the Month of August 1943], TsDAVO, 3833/1/125, p. 9.
7. The „Bohum” UPA Military Group No. „02” covered the southern half of the Rivne (Równe) oblast and the Kremianets (Krzemieniec) area. It was divided into the following nadraions: Korets (Korzec), Rivne (Równe), Zdolbuniv (Zdolbunów), Dubno (Dubno) and Kremianets (Krzemieniec). The territory of the Polish Województwo Wo³yƒskie was roughly covered by three UPA military groups. Each military group was divided into nadraions, and nadraions were subdivided into raions. Sometimes one can also encounter intermediate units in documents. Thus, a nadraion could be divided into subnadraions. Also, a raion could be divided into subraions.
8. All emphasis in italics in the article and included sources is mine. I preserved in bold the emphasis that appears in the original sources.
9. In the sources I selected, I translate the derogatory terms „liakh,” „liakhy” as „Polack” or „Polacks.” Whenever authors of the Ukrainian sources use the proper term „poliaik,” „poliaky” I translate it as „Pole” or „Poles.” The same applies to the derogatory term „moskal” or „moskaly” for Russians, which I translate as „Moscovite.”
10. „Nakaz ch. 2” [Order No. 2] (September 10, 1943), an order by „Smok,” TsDAVO, 3833/1/94, p. 11.
11. „Rozporiadzhennia v zemelnii spravi Holovnoi Komandy Ukrainskoi Povstanchoi Armii” [The Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Directive Concerning the Land Question] (August 15, 1943), ordered by the UPA Supreme Commander „Klym Savur” (Dmytro Kliachkivskyi), TsDAVO, 3833/1/48, p. 1.
12. „Nakaz ch. 5” [Order No. 5] (August 15, 1943), an order by the UPA Supreme Commander „Klym Savur” (Dmytro Kliachkivskyi), TsDAVO, 3833/1/48, p. 2.
14. „Prykaz kustovym providnykam i referentam” [Order for the Kushch Leaders and Department Heads] (February 9, 1944), ordered by „Mandrivnyk,” Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskyh obiedan Ukrainy [Central State Archive of Public Organisations of Ukraine] (TsDAHO), 1/23/931, pp. 36-40. This document was published in Ukraine.
15. „Do suchasnoho nasohoho orhanizatsiioho polozhenia (Dumky chlena)” [On Our Present Internal and Organizational Situation (Thoughts of a Member)], (May 21, 1944), reported by „Jarooslav Moriak,” TsDAVO, 3833/1/233, p. 13.
16. Wladys³aw Filar (ed.), a military historian, made an attempt to break the silence in his *Przed Akcjà „Wis³a” by³ Woly³* [Before Operation „Wis³a” There Was Volhynia] (Warszawa: Światowy Zwi¹zek Zolnierzy Armiї Krajowej, Okrºg Woly³, 1997), and his collection of documents, *Eksterminacja ludnoÊci polskiej na Woly³n* [The Extermination of the Polish Population of Volhynia] (Wis³a: The Extermination of the Polish Population of Volhynia) (Warszawa: n.p., 1999). Both works are excellent and well documented, but too brief to be exhaustive. Most recently he has published a more comprehensive study titled *Woly³ 1939-1944: Eksterminacja czy walki polsko-ukraiƒskie. Studium historyczno-wojskowe zmagaƒ na Woly³nyn w obronie polskoÊci, wiary i godnoÊci ludzkiej* [Volhynia 1939-1944: Extermination or Polish-Ukrainian Battles. A Historical and Military Study of the Struggles in Volhynia in the Defense of Polishness, Faith and Human Dignity] (Toru³: Wydawnictwo „Adam Marsza³ek”, 363
Representatives of other disciplines, such as political science (Wiktor Polischuk) and sociology (Tadeusz Piotrowski), or authors associated with Polish veterans’ organizations (Józef Turowski, Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko), have a better record in terms of dealing with the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia. Their works are discussed or cited in later parts of this paper.


22. For the prevalent Ukrainian émigré interpretation, see the next part of this essay. A different Ukrainian account of the Volhynian events, totally incompatible with the Ukrainian Nationalist tradition in the West, is presented by Wiktor Poliszczuk in his many publications, two of which stand out: *Górka Prawda: Zbrodniczość OUN-UPA (Spowiedź Ukraińca)* [The Bitter Truth: The Criminality of the OUN-UPA (The Testimony of a Ukrainian)] (Toronto-Warsaw-Kyiv: n.p., 1995), which was also published in a Ukrainian version (1995) and English translation (1999), and *Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA: Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmienna faszyzm. Działalność ukraińskich struktur nacjonalistycznych w latach 1920-1999* [Evidence of OUN and UPA Crimes: Ukrainian Integral Nationalism as a Form of Fascism. The Activities of Ukrainian Nationalist Structures in the Years 1920-1999] (Toronto: n.p., 2000), vol. II.  
24. These efforts involve mainly, but not exclusively, the work of Stowarzyszenie Upamiętnienia Ofiar Zbrodni Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów [Association for Remembrance of the Victims of Ukrainian Nationalist Crimes] in Wrocław and their periodical *Na Rubieży* [On the Frontier] (65 issues have appeared as of 2003), Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Krzemienca i Ziemi Wółyńsko-Połodolskiej [Society of the Friends of Krzemieniec and the Wolynia-Podolia Territory], and various regional branches of the Środowisko 27 Wółyńskiej Dywizji
Piechoty Armii Krajowej [Circle of the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army]. The following are true gems for historia ns: Jerzy D´bski, Leon Popek (eds.), Okrutna Przestroga [A Cruel Warning] (Lublin: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Krzemieniec i Ziemi Wołyńsko-Podolskiej [Association of the Friends of Krzemieniec and the Volhynia-Podolia Territory], 1997), Leon Karłowicz, Leon Popek (eds.), Śladami ludobójstwa na Wołyni: Okrutna Przestroga [Tracing the Genocide in Volhynia: A Cruel Warning] (Lublin: Późnynia, 1998), a two-volume collection of well over five hundred testimonies. (A third volume is forthcoming.) See also Leon Popek, Tomasz Trusiuk, Paweł Wikra, Zenon Wikra (eds.), Wołyński testament [The Volhynian Testament] (Lublin: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Krzemieniec i Ziemi Wołyńsko-Podolskiej, 1997), a collection of 63 personal testimonies of survivors of the massacres in Wola Ostrowiecka and Ostrówki that occurred on August 30, 1943 and claimed more than a thousand victims. These accounts are supported by forensic evidence from the partial exhumation that took place in these two localities in August 1992.

25. For a very critical approach toward the OUN-UPA by a historian from Ukraine, see Vitalii Maslovskyi, Z kým i proty koho voinyly ukraynsky natsionalisty v roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny [Who the UPA's Allies and Enemies Were during World War II] (Moskva: Slavianskii Dialog, 1999). For a selection of letters of Ukrainian citizens and organized bodies that supported or were against the Ukrainian state granting the OUN-UPA members official status as veterans of war, see Stanyslav Kulchytskyi (ed.), Natsionalne pryamyrennia chy konfrontatsiia? Zbirnyk dokumentiv [National Reconciliation or Confrontation? Collection of Documents] (Kyiv: Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1999).

26. „Visti z uskh zemel Ukrainy” [News from all of the Ukrainian Territory], Ideia i Chyn, 2, 4 (1943), p. 35, reprinted in Iurii Maivskyi, Ievhen Shtendera (eds.), Litopys UPA (Toronto: Vydavnytstvo Litopys UPA, 1995), vol. 24, p. 211. It is worth noting that OUN-UPA reports always refer to Polish villages as colonies, and their inhabitants as colonists. For the OUN, all Poles were occupants and foreigners, even if their families had lived in the area for centuries. Significantly, the Soviets had already deported to the Gulag the real „colonists” (i.e., Poles settled in the area in the interwar period) in 1940.

27. „Ukraiinska Povstanska Armiia diie,” Do zbroii, 2 VIII 1943.

28. The following quotation provides is even more demonstrative: „Throughout the three years of German occupation, Ukrainian towns and hamlets became well acquainted with the Polish agents of the Gestapo and Kripo, the Polish officers of the Baudienst and Liegenschaften, the Polish mistresses of the German Kreishauptmaenner and Landwirte, the Polish punitive expeditions into Ukrainian hamlets, and the Polish Sonderdienst and many other German-Polish snatchers.” It is found in O. S. Sadovyi, „Kudy priamuui poliacy?” [In Which Direction Are the Poles Going?], in Peter J. Potichnyj, Ievhen Shtendera (eds.), Litopys UPA (Toronto: Vydavnytstvo Litopys UPA, 1977), vol. 2, p. 50.


32. Mykola Lebed, ibid., pp. 74-76.
33. Ibid., p. 75.
35. Ibid., pp. 31-32. A similar line of argument, where the „Volhynian events” are reduced to Polish participation in the German-sponsored police, can be found in Ju. I. Rymarenko, I. F. Kurpas et al., (eds.), *Etnonasionalniy rozvytok Ukrainy: Termyny, ryznachennia, personali* [The Ethno-national Development of Ukraine: Terms, Designations, Biographical Entries] (Kyiv: Instytut derzhavy i prava AN Ukrainy, 1993), pp. 117-18.
36. Lev Shankovskyi, „Ukrainska Povstancha Armiia” [The Ukrainian Insurgent Army] in Ivan Krypiakevych (ed.), *Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska* [The History of the Ukrainian Army] (Winnipeg: Kliub priatelniv ukrainskoi knyzhky, 1953), pp. 695-700. For the most recent example of a similar approach from Taras Schevchenko National University in Kyiv see Volodymyr Serhiichuk’s „Secret Repositories Have Revealed the Truth” in P. Sokhan, P. Potichnyi et al. (eds.), *Litopys UPA. New Series* (Kyiv-Toronto: Natsionalna Akademia nauk Ukrainy et al., 2002), vol. 4, pp. 40-44. Here the ethnic cleansing campaign against the Poles is reduced merely to „reprisals above all against those Polish villages that were becoming bases for the anti-Ukrainian war in Volhynia.”
37. Ibid., p. 562.
39. This number includes 9 trustees (muzh doviria) of the Ukrainian Central Committee, 1 chief village administrator (viit), 1 village head (soltys), 4 teachers (uchytel), 1 Orthodox priest (sviashchenyk) and his daughter, and 16 villagers (selianyn). The victims come from a number of different villages.
40. The list can be found in the Provincial Archives of Alberta, Michael Chomiak Papers, Accession number 85.191/59, unnumbered pages.
42. Ievhen Pasternak, *Narys istorii Kholmshchyny i Pidliashhia* [Outline of the History of the Cheǐm/Kholm and Podlasie Areas] (Winnipeg: Research Institute of Volyn, 1968), appendix 16. Many recent publications from Ukraine are also based on the aforementioned sources and include the same lists. For example, Vitalii Protsiuk, *Knyha pamiati* [Remembrance Book] (Lviv, 1996), pp. 51-80, and Ivan Sulituk, Mykhailo Hornyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy* [The History of Ukraine] (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo “Svit,” 1996), pp. 126-28. Fedir Stehlii, Iaroslav Hrytsak (eds.), *Istoriia Ukrainy* [History of Ukraine] (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo „Svit,” 1996) and A. H. Sliusarenko et al. (eds.), *Novitnia istoria Ukrainy* [The Twentieth Century History of Ukraine], (Kyiv: „Vyschua Shkola,” 2000) are very telling examples of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education officially allowing the argument that it was the Poles who started and were responsible for the bloody massacres. This argument does not stray far from the OUN-UPA propaganda. Volodymyr Serhiichuk’s *Trahediia Ukraintsiv Polshchi* [The Tragedy of the Ukrainians in Poland] (Ternopil: Knyzhkovo-Zhurnalne Vydavnytstvo, 1997), a richly documented book, speaks about the destruction of the Ukrainian population as a result of an organized Polish action in 1942 and 1943 (p. 36), but fails to provide any evidence to prove this thesis. See Serhiichuk’s list of Ukrainian
victims (pp. 53-58). This list, from the Kyiv archive, is merely a briefer version of the list I discussed above and provides no dates of death.


44. Ibid., pp. 244-54.

45. Ibid., pp. 244-54.

46. Osip Shuliak, V imia pravdy: Diisnist pro Ukrainsku Povstanchu Armii [In the Name of Truth: The Reality about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army] (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1948), p. 34. Similar views can be found in Vasyl Mykhalechuk (ed.), Tudy de bii za voliu: Zbirnyk visoko-politychnykh materialiv v pamiat Maksyma-Skorupskoho-Maksa, Karinshoho UPA [Where They Fought for Freedom: A Collection of Essays on the Military and Politics Devoted to the Memory of Maksym Skorupskyi (Maks), the UPA Battalion Commander] (London: Fundatsiia im. O. Olzhycha v Velyki Brytanii, 1989). This publication also throws significant light on the issue of the OUN-UPA terror directed against its political opponents and the Ukrainian population.


49. In fact, „the most influential circles” in the Ukrainian community belonged to the OUN and promoted the idea of ethnic cleansing among ordinary Ukrainians. The Ukrainian bishops (both Uniate and Orthodox) were silent until much of the ethnic cleansing campaign in Volhynia was over. The Ukrainian Central Committee showered all levels of German administration with petitions asking for the removal of all the Poles and Jews from the territories they considered to be ethnically Ukrainian. See Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, pp. 245-46; Tadeusz Piotrowski, Genocide and Rescue in Volhynia, p. 231; Wiktor Poliszczuk, Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA, p. 124.

50. Peter J. Potichnyj, „Akcja Wisła“: The Forcible Relocation of the Ukrainian Population in Poland,” The Ukrainian Quarterly, vol. XLIV, 1-2 (1988), p. 78. In the same vein, the authors of a historical handbook published in Ukraine confuse chronology and historical facts: „This struggle (inflamed by the German administration, which took advantage of the hostility between two oppressed nations) assumed the character of ethnic cleansing from both sides: the UPA and the AK. The peaceful population suffered the most. The AK people exterminated the defenseless population of Ukrainian areas in the Kholm (Chełm) region; the OUN men terrorized the Poles in Volhynia.” See M. Kothlar, S. Kulebytskyi, Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy [Ukrainian Historical Handbook] (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo „Ukraina”, 1996), p. 388.

51. Orest Subtelny, Ukraina: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 474-75. (Subtelny’s book has been published in Ukrainian translation.) A similar approach can be found in Jaroslav Hrytsak, Narys istorii Ukrainy: Formuvannia modernoi ukrainskoi natsii XIX-XV stolittia [An Outline of Ukrainian History. The Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Nation in the 19th and 20th Centuries] (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo „Ieneza,” 1996), pp. 253-54. (Hrytsak’s book has been published in Polish translation.) Both of these authors belong to the elite of Ukrainian historians and their books are widely read in Ukrainian high schools and universities.


54. Jaroslaw Pelenski, „Ukraina v polskii opozitsii publitsytstyi,” [Ukraine in Polish Oppositionist


57. See Ivan Javorsky’s introductory comments in Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1984), p. XVIII.

58. Ivan Javorsky’s Introduction to Danylo Shumuk, op. cit., and Roman Szporluk, op. cit., p. 95.

59. I would like to draw attention to two of them: Danylo Shumuk, op. cit. and Myhailo Podvorniak, Viter z holyni: Spohad [Wind from Volhynia: Memoirs] (Winnipeg: Tovarystvo "Volyn," 1981). Although they are necessarily limited to reporting on what they actually witnessed, the authors seem honest and sincere in their observations.

60. In the author’s opinion, the best monument built to symbolize this almost complete silence, mixed with self-exculpatory remarks (such as the themes of Polish collaboration with the Germans and the Soviets) is the more than thirty volumes of Litopys UPA [The Chronicle of the UPA].


65. Ibid., doc. 479. It is important to note here that the claims concerning both the role of Borovets and of „Soviet agents” are unsubstantiated to this day.

66. Ibid., doc. 513.


69. Ryszard Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w okresie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej [Poles and Ukrainians: The Ukrainian Question on the Territory of the Second Polish Republic during World War II] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993), pp. 260-61. It is worth noting that attacks on the Polish population also took place in the Ukrainian-populated part of Polesia where Poles were an even smaller minority than in Volhynia.


75. Grzegorz Motyka, op. cit., p. 147.


82. The authors’ remark, placed at the very end of the book, that the total number of Poles who died in all of the former provinces of south-eastern Poland/Western Ukraine at the hands of OUN-UPA should be estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000, is not credible. Ibid., p. 158.

83. Władysław Siemaszko, Ewa Siemaszko, op. cit. This large volume is far more comprehensive than the book published by Turowski and Siemaszko in 1990. It includes detailed registers of individual victims, attacks on entire communities involving the burning of villages, successful escapes and mass slaughter, and is supplemented by Home Army reports, Catholic Church and court documentation, and some Ukrainian Nationalist documentation.

84. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1038.


86. This comment does not mean that the methodology employed by the authors and the obtained results should be rejected. We should remember that, like Józef Turowski and Władysław and Ewa Siemaszko, many authors attempting to estimate the scope of Jewish losses during the war also gleaned their data from memorial books and testimonies of survivors. The following are valuable memoirs describing the terror inflicted by the OUN-UPA in Volhynia: Zofia Grzesiakowa, *Między Horyń i Słucz* [Between the Horyń and Słucz Rivers] (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1992), Tadeusz Piotrowski, *Jeniusz of the Scourauros: Memoirs of a Polish Family’s Ordeal Under Soviet Aggression, Ukrainian Ethnic Cleansing and Nazi Enslavement, and Their Emigration to America* (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland, 1995), Władysław Hermaszewski, *Echo Wołyń* [Echoes of Volhynia] (Warszawa: Bellona, 1995), Wincenty Romanowski, *Kainowe dni* [The Days of Cain] (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1990), Czesław Piotrowski, *Krwawe żniwa za Styrhem, Horyniem i Słuzcem* [Bloody Harvests Beyond the Styr, Horyń and Słucz] (Warszawa: Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej Okręg Wołyński, 1998). Interesting personal testimonies of Poles who found themselves in the West after World War II were collected by Jędrzej Giertych, op. cit., pp. 300-352.


88. Władysław Siemaszko, Ewa Siemaszko, op.cit., vol. II, p. 1083. In fact the authors record 39 „German-Ukrainian” pacifications of Polish settlements between 1941–1944. Czesław Piotrowski’s work deals only with settlements where Poles constituted more than 50% of population.


90. Ironically, the issue of Polish reprisal actions against Ukrainians has been most compellingly portrayed in Polish literature. Włodzimierz Odojewski is the author of a very ambitious and difficult literary works on the complicated reality of Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II. See his trilogy: *Zmierzch świata* [The Dusk of the World], (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1995), *Wyspa ocalenia* [The Island of Salvation], (Białystok: Zakłady Wydawnicze „Versus,” 1990), *Zasypie wszystko zawieje...* [It Will All Be Buried, Covered Over... ] (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1973). These books describe events in Eastern Galicia. The last work, although purely fictional, abounds in psychological and sociological insights based on personal experiences.


94. Officially, the reason that Ukrainian historians did not take part in the joint Polish-Ukrainian project to gather data concerning the victims was a lack of funding on the Ukrainian side. In reality, this pulling out from the project caused significant difficulties for Polish historians as Polish-based donors were not interested in a project that would be continued without the Ukrainians.

95. The same list that, as discussed above, many Ukrainian authors use to support their claim that the Poles bear responsibility for initiating the attacks on the civilian population.

96. This is the same list that, as discussed above, many Ukrainian authors use to support their claim that the Poles bear responsibility for initiating the attacks on the civilian population.

97. See Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, op. cit., and their two tables presented in Appendix I.


99. The cynicism of the OUN-UPA leadership regarding its attitude toward Polish peasants reveals itself best in the following propaganda instructions from the highest level of Nadraionovy Propagandynyj Oseredok [The Propaganda Office of the Nadraion], signed by „Chumak” and „Hrek,” after the main onslaught on the villages in Volhynia had long been over: „Our policy toward the Poles should follow the decisions taken during the Conference. Let the squad hit and we will shout that nobody from the peaceful population will be harmed, only those who want Poland on the Ukrainian land, informants and the murderers of our people.” See „Instruktsii do vykonannia” [Instructions to Be Carried Out] (March 25,1944), TsDAVO, 3833/2/1, p. 368.

100. „Kazaky na pershy dni orhanizatsii derzhavnoho zhyttia” [Instructions Concerning the Organization of the First Days of State Life] (May 1941), TsDAVO, 3833/2/1, p. 38.


102. Ibid., p. 83.

103. Ibid., p. 84.

104. Ibid., p. 85.

105. Ibid., p. 85.


107. Zіednannia Pіvničnych Hrup Ukrainskoi Povstanchoi Armii („UPA-Pivnične”), Vіskova Okruha „Zahrava” [The Formation of the Northern Groups of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA-North), Military Group „Zahrava”], reported by „Politychnyi referent na draisnou” [Political Department Head of the Nadraion], „Zvit z terenu Kovel” [Report from Kovel Territory] (October 15, 1943), TsDAVO, 3833/1/58, p. 29.

108. Kraievyi Provіd OUN na ZUZ, reported by Yaroslav, „Zvit ch. 19” [Report no. 19] (October 19, 1943),
This report deals with the situation in the Lutsk (Luck) nadraion. The author here uses the terms „nadraion” and „okruh” interchangeably for the same area. The term „okruh” is not used here in the sense of the „Visskova Okruha” of the UPA territorial structure; „Visskova Okruha” would cover several nadraions. „Okruha” appears in the sense of the German administrative unit that more or less corresponded territorially to the UPA’s Lutsk (Luck) nadraion.

109. These are three identically structured reports filed by three officials of the same high rank (heads of Political Departments) at the same time in three different territorial units of the same level (nadraions) of the „Turiv” UPA Visskova Okruha [UPA Military Group „Turiv”].

110. Kraievyi Provid OUN na ZUZ, “Korotkyi kurs ideolohichnoho vyshkolu na selo” [A Short Course on Ideological Training in the Villages], TsDAVO, 3833/1/253, pp. 1-5a. This document was written after the fall of France in 1940 and before the German attack on the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note what the difference was between a „patriot” and a „nationalist” according to this document: A „patriot” thinks about the people (narid) and the fatherland (batkivshchyna) and his goals are the freedom, happiness and welfare of his people, whereas a „nationalist” thinks about the nation (natsiia) and the state (derzhava) and his goals are the expansion, strength and power of his nation. Ibid., p. 4a. The same document identifies Dmytro Dontsov as the leading theoretician of Ukrainian Nationalism. Ibid., p. 5a.

111. Those insights are based on my archival research and are mentioned here only to signal those aspects that are completely overlooked in the historiography. It is true that all the concepts connected with Ukrainian Nationalism that I have mentioned were already identified as important components of the OUN ideology. (See, for example, Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. III, pp. 552-55.) It is also true, however, that no professional historian has ever systematically analyzed the content and significance of these concepts during the war and investigated their relation to the implementation of the campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Poles. Wiktor Poliszczuk, a political scientist, has done pioneering work on these issues. See Wiktor Poliszczuk, Ideologia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego [The Ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism] (Toronto and Warsaw: n.p., 1996). For a different interpretation see Tomasz Stryjek, Ukrainska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego: Analiza wybranych konceptów (Wrocław: „Funna”, 2000).

112. Kraievyi Provid OUN na ZUZ, „Do problemy revolutsii” [On the Problem of the Revolution], written after April 1942, TsDAVO, 3833/1/36, pp. 69-70. These types of concepts and attitudes did not originate in a vacuum. During the war, they were systematically drilled into the OUN members during ideological training.

113. Kraievyi Provid OUN na ZUZ, „Pravyla zhyttia” [The Laws of Life], (September 3, 1941), TsDAVO, 3833/1/37, p. 2.