Searching for Sidney Reilly: The
Lockhart Plot in Revolutionary Russia,
1918

JOHN W. LONG

On 5 July 1918, in a speech to the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow, Lenin informed his audience that Soviet Russia had reached 'the direst period' in its then brief history. In fact, during the next several weeks, Lenin's sombre analysis was more than confirmed by the impact of a succession of untoward events that soon reduced the size of the young Soviet state to a territory roughly equivalent to that of 16th-century Muscovy. In turn, by the late summer of 1918, this grim situation was still further exacerbated by persistent rumours of an impending Allied military intervention in Russia, the ostensible purpose of which would be to overthrow the Soviet government in favour of a new regime willing to rejoin the ongoing war against the Central Powers.

In these ominous circumstances, on the morning of 3 September 1918, Pravda and Izvestiya suddenly released sensational front-page stories announcing the liquidation by the police of an apparently vast Anglo-French conspiracy allegedly directed at the destruction of the Soviet government. This plot, according to the papers, was centred in Moscow and was led by the chief of the special British diplomatic mission to Russia, Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, together with his French colleague Consul-General Fernand Grenard and several other Allied officials then resident in Russia. In particular, it was reported, the plot had featured a certain English Lieutenant Reilly, who had expended over a million rubles in an effort to suborn the Red Army troops then guarding the Kremlin. Fortunately, the papers concluded, the whole conspiracy had been exposed thanks to the loyalty of the Red Army officers to whom the plotters had offered bribes.

For the next several days the Soviet press divulged additional details surrounding this so-called 'Lockhart Plot'. Thus, it was revealed, it was specifically to representatives of the Latvian Rifle regiments, then serving as the Praetorian Guard of the Soviet government, that the Lockhart plotters had made their approach, offering bribes even larger than those initially reported in order to effect the arrest of the entire membership of the Council of People's Commissars at its meeting scheduled for early September. Thereupon, on 24 September, the scope of the alleged plot was substantially expanded by the publication in the press of a sensational letter purportedly written by correspondent René Marchand of the Paris Le Figaro to the French President, Raymond Poincaré, describing his attendance at a meeting of Allied
From the outset, the history of the Lockhart Plot occasioned a host of critical questions. Did an Allied plot to overthrow the Soviet government really exist in the late summer of 1918? If so, did it truly entail, as Soviet reports claimed, such elements as the wholesale employment of bribery, a programme of extensive Allied sabotage and the planned arrest and murder of Soviet leaders, beginning with Lenin? Or, as Western sources long contended, was the whole conspiracy merely a Soviet fabrication contrived in response to deteriorating relations culminating in the recent initiation of Allied intervention in Russia? In fact, for more than five decades after its suppression, these and related questions surrounding the Lockhart Plot produced an extensive, often sharply contradictory, historiography strongly influenced by shifting personal and political considerations. Curiously, however, by the mid-1970s Soviet and Western commentators reached a clear, if unintended, consensus on the nature and consequences of the alleged conspiracy. According to this view, which was based on the exhaustive employment of both published and archival sources as well as the testimony of a then still-living Soviet participant, an amateurish plot concocted by Bruce Lockhart and his associates had from the outset been penetrated and managed by Dzerzhinsky, the crafty chief of the Soviet police, the dreaded Cheka (Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage). As a result, according to the consensus, the Lockhart Plot had, in effect, been turned into a gigantic Soviet 'sting' operation, the upshot of which was not merely the apprehension of the reckless Bruce Lockhart and his confederates but the substantial impairment of the entire Allied intelligence apparatus in revolutionary Russia.

Since the mid-1970s a variety of new materials bearing on the history of the Lockhart Plot have become available, the collective employment of which allows for the creation of a new, supplemented and updated version of the 1918 conspiracy. Of these materials, the most significant include Bruce Lockhart's recently published diaries and miscellaneous private papers, several detailed histories of the chief British and Soviet intelligence agencies and some more or less extensive documentation, deriving primarily from files in the US National Archives, on the activities in 1918 of the mysterious American agent Xenophon Kalamatiano. Finally, and most spectacularly, the past 25 years have witnessed the appearance of a veritable spate of
biographies of the celebrated ‘master spy’ Sidney Reilly, virtually all of which have depicted the enigmatic British operative as a Soviet double agent. Although this accusation still lacks definitive proof, the implications of the possible duplicity of the British superspy require consideration, if not full integration, in any attempted reconstruction of the Lockhart conspiracy.

The prolonged process by which special agent Bruce Lockhart gradually became engaged in the conspiracy destined to bear his name unfolded against the background of an unusually tense and difficult period of Anglo-Soviet relations. Thus, in early 1918, having recalled its official diplomatic mission from Petrograd in order not to imply recognition of a regime that had withdrawn Russia from the war and initiated peace talks with the hated Germans, the British government at once realised the need to remain in contact with the Soviet authorities if only to stiffen their resistance to German peace demands and thereby, perhaps, to achieve the recreation of the Eastern Front. In these circumstances, the British authorities promptly negotiated an informal arrangement whereby M. M. Litvinov would become the unofficial Soviet representative in London and a special, equally informal, British diplomatic mission would be dispatched to Russia. It was precisely to head this important mission that the young Bruce Lockhart, though then only a junior member of the British Foreign Office, was selected personally by the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. Talented and energetic but erratic and self-indulgent, the youthful diplomat spoke fluent Russian and had a superb knowledge of the country based upon a recent five-year stint as British Consul in Moscow.

Determined to succeed, Bruce Lockhart arrived in Russia in late January and began at once to implement his twofold instructions to establish unofficial relations with the Soviet government while, at the same time, doing everything possible to undermine its ongoing relations with Germany. Unfortunately, by mid-April, his sustained inability to prevent improved Soviet-German relations (epitomised by the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) together with a protracted and unsuccessful campaign to achieve Allied intervention in Russia by Soviet invitation, had earned for the young envoy the intense hostility of powerful forces in London. At that point, acutely conscious of the fact that the increasingly likely failure of his mission might also mean the destruction of his diplomatic career, the ambitious agent abruptly reversed his previous attitude of apparent sympathy with Bolshevism and began instead a vigorous campaign in favour of the initiation of immediate and full-scale Allied military intervention in Russia.

Perhaps the first product of Bruce Lockhart’s sudden volte-face was a sharp increase in his contacts with the emerging anti-Bolshevik movement. Thus, in mid-May, the British envoy reported on several meetings with ‘an agent of Boris Savinkov’, whose so-called Union for the Defence of the Fatherland and Freedom advocated armed opposition to Soviet rule. Although Bruce Lockhart favoured the maintenance of ‘informal contacts’ with Savinkov, the Foreign Office remained cool, deterred perhaps by the ex-terrorist’s unsavoury reputation. In early July, however, Bruce Lockhart reported with much greater enthusiasm on a new anti-Bolshevik organisation called ‘the Centre’, which had links both to Savinkov and to the fledgling Volunteer Army of General A. V. Alekseev in South Russia. Joined by a number of
prerevolutionary leaders, many of whom he had known personally in earlier days, the Centre was more acceptable both to Bruce Lockhart and to London. Accordingly, during July and August, the British agent contributed substantial sums to the financial support of the anti-Bolsheviks and became deeply engaged in their counterrevolutionary machinations.18

Even more important to the history of the Lockhart Plot were the British envoy’s increased contacts with the chief representatives of the other allied powers resident in Russia in 1918. Prompted by a directive from London, these contacts led Bruce Lockhart to establish regular communications with Fernand Grenard and DeWitt C. Poole, the Consuls-General in Moscow of France and the United States respectively.19 By the same token, but less directly, the British agent also became aware of French and American intelligence operations in Russia which were headed, in turn, by Colonel ‘Henri’ de Verte ment and Xenophon Kalamatsian.20

Finally, and most important, Bruce Lockhart’s new anti-Bolshevik orientation also brought him into touch with the apparently very extensive network of British intelligence operatives in revolutionary Russia. This network, which functioned under the general aegis of the British secret service (M11c), was centred in Moscow and Petrograd but included agents active throughout the country as both intelligence gatherers and anti-Soviet saboteurs. Headed nominally by Lieutenant Ernest Boyce in Petrograd, British secret service operations in Russia were apparently only very loosely coordinated and included many agents who functioned more or less independently.21 With few exceptions, Bruce Lockhart was disdainful of these ‘secret service idiots’ about whose devious activities he later professed to have been ‘completely in the dark’. Of the exceptions, the British agent singled out naval attaché Captain E. N. A. Cromie in Petrograd, with whom he maintained ‘very friendly’ relations, and especially, the audacious Lieutenant Sidney Reilly, whom he then described as ‘extremely able’ and ‘by far the cleverest of our agents in Russia’.22

In fact, by the time of his first meeting with Bruce Lockhart in mid-1918, the enigmatic Reilly had already enjoyed a spectacular career in both commerce and espionage. Russian-born but employed as an occasional agent of the British secret service since at least 1900, the so-called master spy had cultivated a lifestyle based upon a combination of personal self-enrichment and a complex web of individual and political loyalties. For example, from 1911 to 1914, while engaged as a naval contracts broker in tsarist Russia, Reilly had both amassed a great personal fortune and functioned as a British spy, collecting valuable data on German naval designs. By the same token, from 1914 to early 1917, while lucratively engaged in the munitions business in New York City, the industrious agent was apparently also covertly employed in British intelligence, in which role he may well have participated in several acts of putatively German sabotage deliberately calculated to provoke the United States to enter the war against the Central Powers.23 In any case, in early 1917, Reilly had applied for and received a full-time commission in M11c from its head, Commander Mansfield Smith-Cumming (the legendary ‘C’), who at once assigned him to ‘special duties’ in Germany.24 In turn, it was his apparent success in this assignment that earned Reilly his 1918 dispatch to Russia on a mission the exact nature of which, notwithstanding the dramatic account contained in his later memoirs, remains essentially uncertain.25
Although his precise instructions are unknown, it seems likely that Reilly’s orders from “C”, who gave him the codename ‘ST 1’, were to help prepare the way for Allied intervention in Russia by, *inter alia*, supporting the recently initiated anti-Bolshevik activities of Bruce Lockhart. Having arrived in Petrograd in early May, the master spy at once sought the assistance of an old acquaintance, the radical lawyer A. N. Grammatikov, who promptly arranged a friendly interview between Reilly and V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, a leading Soviet official in Moscow. This contact, in turn, seems to have gained the British superspy some considerable measure of access to various institutions of the Soviet government.\(^{26}\)

At the same time, the master spy also met Bruce Lockhart, with whom an accord was soon reached regarding their future *modus operandi* in Russia. According to this agreement, Bruce Lockhart, whose diplomatic status made his engagement in clandestine activities delicate, would exercise general supervision and be responsible for the financial support of anti-Bolshevism, while Reilly would take over the actual organisation and direction of the movement.\(^{27}\) Useful in helping to maintain Bruce Lockhart’s ‘cover’ during June and July, this arrangement became critical after the onset of Allied intervention in early August, as a result of which the Allies’ consulates in Moscow were raided and closed and their employees placed under more or less close police surveillance.

For his part, exploiting both an extensive network of personal contacts and his celebrated amorous charms (in addition perhaps to surreptitious Soviet support), the energetic Reilly immediately went underground and began his efforts to stimulate the anti-Bolshevik movement. From the outset, although his orders were probably limited to organising support for Allied intervention, there are indications that the irresistible agent planned to effect nothing less than a full-scale anti-Bolshevik *coup d’état* in Russia.\(^{28}\) In any case, Reilly’s initial efforts seem to have focused on the recruitment of an armed force to be composed primarily of former Russian officers. For this purpose, he made early contact with the fiery Savinkov, whose Union for the Defence of the Fatherland and Freedom contained a large proportion of ex-officers.\(^{29}\)

At the same time, the indefatigable agent also made vigorous efforts to recruit his own independent armed force from among the large reserve of unemployed and disaffected former officers located in both Moscow and Petrograd.\(^{30}\) To facilitate this work, which required a constant shuttling between the two capitals, Reilly somehow obtained a position with the criminal branch of the Petrograd Cheka.\(^{31}\)

Operationally, Reilly’s networks in both of Soviet Russia’s key cities relied heavily on women. In Moscow, where he operated in the guise of a Greek businessman named Mr Constantine, the wily agent established his headquarters at the flat of one Dagmara K., a dancer with the Moscow Arts Theatre and the niece of his friend Grammatikov. Together with her roommate Elizaveta E. Otten, and a fellow dancer, Mariya V. Frid, Dagmara and company became Reilly’s chief couriers in the new capital.\(^{32}\) Even more important, Mariya was the sister of Colonel A. V. Frid, a member of the staff of the Bolshevik Chief of Military Communications, who soon became one of Reilly’s main sources of Soviet military intelligence.\(^{33}\) For his part, Colonel Frid was simultaneously one of the key operatives in the information-gathering organisation of the American agent Kalamatiou and thus represents an
important link between Allied and American intelligence operations in revolutionary Russia.  

Meanwhile, in the old capital of Petrograd, the ubiquitous Reilly organised a second conspiratorial network. Here, using the alias of Mr. Massino, a Levantine merchant, the tireless agent set up shop at the flat of still another female acquaintance, Elena M. Boyuzhovskaya. In contrast with his operations in Moscow, which were substantially independent of other agents, in Petrograd Reilly worked closely with Bruce Lockhart’s friend Captain Cromie in joint efforts to recruit and prepare anti-Bolshevik armed forces. In this regard the two agents were especially interested in penetrating local units of the Latvian Rifle Division (Latdivizii), whose various regiments were then functioning throughout Russia as the best ordered and most reliable elements in the entire Red Army. As it turned out, it was precisely this interest in the Latvians that initiated the chain reaction of events that eventually became known as the Lockhart Plot.

Having gained access to the British diplomatic codes at an early date, it is virtually certain that the Cheka had been monitoring Bruce Lockhart’s anti-Bolshevik activities since at least May. It was not, however, until rumours began to circulate about the Allies’ intention to subvert the Latvian Rifles, upon whose uncertain loyalties the Soviet state was then heavily dependent, that police leaders were at last galvanized into appropriate counteraction. For this purpose, sometime in June, Dzerzhinsky and his deputy Jacob Peters, both longtime veterans of the prerevolutionary struggle against tsarism, decided to use against the Allies the tactics of penetration and provocation that had so often been employed by their old antagonists in the tsarist Okhrana. Accordingly, in late June, two young Chekists, ex-Latvian officers named Jan Buikis and Jan Sprogis, using the pseudonyms Shmidkhen and Bredis, were dispatched to Petrograd with orders to infiltrate the local anti-Bolshevik underground. At length, posing as disaffected Letts, Buikis and Sprogis finally succeeded in making contact with the organisation of Captain Cromie and Sidney Reilly. Readily convinced of their sincerity, the credulous Englishmen, who were especially anxious to gain access to the vital Latvians, soon suggested that the two Letts should travel to Moscow for discussions with Bruce Lockhart. Having received their prompt agreement to this proposal, the naive Cromie at once provided the delighted Chekists with an appropriate letter of introduction.

Arrived in Moscow in early August, nearly simultaneously with the initiation of Allied intervention at Archangel, Buikis and Sprogis proceeded immediately to the Lubyanka headquarters of the Cheka. There, Jacob Peters, in apparent consultation with N. A. Skrypnik and the then ‘retired’ Dzerzhinsky, discussed the situation and arrived at an interim decision. According to this resolution, Buikis and Sprogis were directed to meet Bruce Lockhart and elicit as much information as possible about his anti-Soviet activities, using as an inducement the possible defection to the Allies of disaffected Latvians like themselves.  

During the first two weeks of August Buikis and Sprogis held at least two meetings with Bruce Lockhart. At the first of these, which must have occurred prior to 5 August, the two Letts simply presented the British agent with their letter of introduction from Cromie. Thereupon, at an additional meeting held on or before 13
August, Buiķis and Sproģis, their bona fides having in the meantime been verified by Bruce Lockhart, assumed the guise of disgruntled but patriotic Latvians deeply concerned about the fate of their nation in the then increasingly likely event of Allied victory in the World War. In this attitude, they insisted, they were joined by many of their fellow nationals, several of whom occupied leading positions in the Latvian Rifles. Suspicious but intrigued by the prospect of the possible attraction to the anti-Bolshevik cause of the critical Latvīziya, Bruce Lockhart asked to be introduced to one such disaffected Latvian commander. Delighted by the opportunity thus afforded to delve further into the British agent’s operations, Buiķis and Sproģis agreed at once to provide a suitable candidate.

Informed of Bruce Lockhart’s request, Peterson immediately contacted K. A. Peterson, the political commissar of the Latvīziya. Acting jointly, their choice as the British agent’s potential interlocutor soon fell on Lieutenant Colonel E. P. Berzin, the commander of the Special Light Artillery detachment then on duty guarding the Kremlin. Though not a Chekist, Berzin, according to Peterson, was nonetheless ‘an honest commander’ who was ‘devoted to the Soviet government’. Briefed by Peters, the Latvian colonel was directed to present himself to Bruce Lockhart as a ‘disillusioned Bolshevik’ who, like Buiķis and Sproģis, was deeply disturbed about the fate of his native Latvia in view of the impending victory of the Allies in the World War. In particular, Berzin was instructed to stress to the British envoy that Latvian troops on the recently formed Archangel front might well be induced to defect to the Allies provided that guarantees for their subsequent safety could be assured. Clearly, at this initial stage, the Cheka plan was to use Bruce Lockhart to open the northern front to units of the Latvian Rifles, who would then endeavour to cripple, if not wholly destroy, Allied intervention at Archangel.

Accompanied by Buiķis, Berzin made his first visit to Bruce Lockhart’s flat in Moscow on 14 August. Playing to the hilt his assumed role of disenchanted Bolshevik, the Latvian colonel dwelt at length on ‘the Lettish question’, emphasising Latvia’s desire for peace with the Allies which, he hinted, might even extend to the defection of Latvian forces on the northern front. To this proposal, although he later admitted that Berzin had made ‘a favourable impression’, Bruce Lockhart responded ‘guardedly’. Of course, he acknowledged, the Allies were ‘naturally’ interested in Latvia with which, he was sure, they would want to deal fairly. Before, however, he could make any definite commitments on the subject, he would need to consult with his diplomatic colleagues. Accordingly, the British agent requested, and promptly received, Berzin’s agreement to return for further talks the next day.

As promised, during the next 24 hours, Bruce Lockhart discussed Berzin’s ‘interesting and plausible’ proposal with both Consuls, Grenard and Poole, his French and American counterparts in Moscow. Since it seemed ‘probable’ that the Letts did not wish to oppose the Allies, it was decided that their encouragement could do ‘little harm’ so long as care was taken not to compromise the diplomats, who were then expecting to leave Russia at any moment. In these circumstances, the Allied representatives made the fateful decision to leave the matter in the hands of Sidnei Reilly, who was staying on in Russia and would thus be in a position to stimulate the Latvian’s ‘reluctance to oppose our troops’.

For his part, Colonel Berzin repaired at once to Cheka headquarters for further
instructions. Although documentation on their conversation is lacking, Berzin’s report on his meeting with Bruce Lockhart was certainly highly satisfactory to Peters and his colleagues, who immediately instructed the Latvian colonel to use his next interview with the British agent to develop in depth their plan to entrap the Allied forces at Archangel. At the same time, suggested the Chekists, Berzin might try to exploit the situation still further by attempting to extract financial support from the Allies for the ostensible purpose of consolidating the loyalty of the Latvian troops they were proposing to induce to defect.

On 15 August Berzin and Buikis again met Bruce Lockhart, who was now joined by Grenard and one ‘Mr Constantine’, the Moscow alias of Sidney Reilly. Seizing the initiative, the diplomats at once pledged Allied support for the future self-determination of Latvia. Pronouncing himself satisfied on this point, Berzin passed to the question of the Lettish regiments on the fighting fronts which he now linked to their subsequent recruitment to assist the Allies in the future liberation of Latvia. This work, claimed Berzin, would cost from three to four million rubles, a sum which the diplomats promptly agreed ‘to consider’. Thereupon the Latvian colonel turned to the more immediate matter of the Archangel front and asked Bruce Lockhart to provide him with two or three passes so that several Latvian officers could pass through Allied lines in the north in order to arrange a surrender. Agreeing to this request, the British agent indicated, however, that this transaction and all further contact with Berzin would thereafter be accomplished through the medium of Mr Constantine.

Two days later, after consultations between Bruce Lockhart, Consul Grenard and Poole and French General Jean Lavergne, it was agreed to give Colonel Berzin his requested financial support. These funds, which were to be raised jointly by Britain, France and the United States, were to be distributed in discrete instalments by Sidney Reilly, who, during the course of this disbursement, would meet frequently with the Latvian in order both to monitor his progress and strengthen his resolve. In addition to funds, which were actually of secondary interest to Berzin and company, Bruce Lockhart also entrusted Reilly with passes made out to three Latvian officers requesting ‘free passage’ through Allied lines in the north, a matter which, at least at that point, was of far greater import to the crafty leaders of the Cheka.

On that same evening of 17 August the first of several meetings between Sidney Reilly and Colonel Berzin took place. On this occasion the English agent promptly presented the Latvian commander with the prearranged safe conduct passes as well as, to the latter’s undoubtedly pleasant surprise, the sum of 700 000 rubles. Promising still larger amounts in the future, Reilly urged Berzin to acquire a conspiratorial flat in Moscow in order to facilitate their further cooperation. Thereupon, completely unexpectedly and apparently on his own initiative, the irrepressible Reilly suddenly made a proposal that went far beyond anything previously discussed between the Allies and the Latvians. Why, inquired the master spy, could not the surrender of the Letts on the military fronts be accompanied by the simultaneous staging of a coup d’etat by those Latvian units stationed in and around Moscow? Such a movement, said Reilly, would have as its objective the replacement of the Soviet government by an interim anti-Bolshevik dictatorship which, he intimated, might include Berzin.

Finally, concluded the audacious agent, since the proposed coup would have to include the arrest of Lenin and Trotsky, it would need to be coordinated with a
coming meeting of the Executive Council of the Sovnarkom. To this grandiose proposal, in which he must immediately have perceived opportunities for Cheka provocation going well beyond anything previously contemplated, Berzin responded with enthusiasm, promising in fact his full cooperation. On that note the two agents parted, having agreed to meet regularly for further planning.

Shortly after his meeting with Berzin, perhaps as soon as the next day, Reilly reported to Bruce Lockhart that his discussions with the Latvian were proceeding ‘very well’ and suggested that ‘with Lettish help’ he might even be able to stage a counter-revolution in Moscow. In response, the British chief replied that, although he personally could see no point in such an undertaking, he would nevertheless arrange a joint meeting with ‘the American and French Consuls and General Lavergne’ to discuss the matter. At this gathering, which took place ‘about the 25th of August’, Reilly’s proposed movement in Moscow was unanimously rejected by the Allied representatives who, according to Bruce Lockhart, sternly admonished the master spy ‘to have nothing to do with so dangerous and doubtful a move’.

Notwithstanding the apparent opposition of the diplomats, the headstrong Reilly persisted with his plans to overthrow the Soviet government. Thus the master spy repeatedly met Colonel Berzin during this time, on the last occasion travelling to Petrograd in order to coordinate their activities with the ‘similar organisation’ being operated in the old capital by Captain Cromie. At these meetings Reilly made at least two additional cash payments to Berzin in instalments totalling 200,000 and 300,000 rubles respectively. In addition, the two agents reached agreement on various matters of preparatory detail, including the proposed disposition of Latvian troops, issues of strategy and tactics and the actual timing of their movement, which was eventually fixed for 6 September during a joint meeting of the Executive Council of the Sovnarkom and the Moscow Soviet. Finally, in a clear case of Cheka provocation, Berzin attempted to convince Reilly of the need to shoot (rather than merely arrest) Lenin and Trotsky, who, he argued, might otherwise be able to employ their great oratorical skills to escape their captors and thwart the coup. This proposal, however, was firmly rejected by Reilly, who insisted that his objective was not to make martyrs of the Soviet leaders but rather to destroy them by public humiliation in the streets.

Meanwhile, at 11 Lubyanka, the grandiose plan of Sidney Reilly opened up new vistas of opportunity for the shrewd leaders of the Cheka. Indeed, no longer greatly concerned about Allied intervention at Archangel, which by then had been revealed as essentially small-scale, police chiefs Peters and Dzerzhinsky (who had resumed his leadership of the Cheka on 21 August) now decided to use the Reilly scheme in a new effort to expose and destroy as much as possible of the entire foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary network in Russia. Accordingly, in his conversations with Reilly, Colonel Berzin was now instructed to encourage the ebullient agent to develop the broadest conceivable plan of operations so as to draw into the ultimate clutches of the Cheka the largest possible bag of both Allied and Russian counterrevolutionaries.

That this new Cheka conception then succeeded far beyond the expectations of its formulators was due in part to intelligence provided by Berzin but even more, apparently, to some timely good fortune. Thus, on 25 August, Consuls Poole and
Grenard convened a meeting at the American Consulate in Moscow for the purpose of bringing together Sidney Reilly, Colonel 'Henri' de Vernet and Xenophon Kalamatiano, the then heads of the British, French and American intelligence services in Moscow. Intended to arrange the coordination of Allied intelligence operations in Russia following the expected imminent departure of the diplomats, this meeting was also attended by the French journalist René Marchand. Apparently privy to a private conversation between Reilly and de Vernet regarding some planned sabotage operations in and around Petrograd and Moscow, the shocked Marchand, who was later exposed as a Bolshevik sympathiser, reported at once to the Soviet authorities.

Meanwhile, virtually simultaneously with the information obtained from Marchand, the Cheka received from Berzin a list of the names and addresses of most of the Allied agents in Moscow which he had just discovered at the Petrograd address given to him by Sidney Reilly. Armed with these sources of information, which revealed the existence of a broad network of foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary operations in Russia, the leaders of the Cheka determined to initiate necessary countermeasures at the earliest possible opportunity. At that point, on 30 August, the assassination of M. S. Uritsky, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, and, on the same evening, the near fatal assault by Fanny Kaplan on Lenin, provided the police with the necessary pretexts to take action. Accordingly, on the next day, the Cheka raided and closed the former British Embassy in Petrograd (an action resulting in the death of secret agent Cromie) and, at the same time, carried out a series of actions in Moscow including raids on the flats of all three Allied intelligence heads and the initial arrest, in the early hours of 1 September, of Bruce Lockhart. Among others detained at this time were Elizaveta Otten, the 'chief girl' of Sidney Reilly, Colonel A. V. Fride, an agent of the American intelligence service, and his sister Mariya, who had been the main courier between the Americans and Reilly.

On 3 September, just three days before its role in provoking the conspiracy would have become clear, the Cheka broke the story of the so-called Lockhart Plot replete with such embellishments as the alleged support of the Orthodox Church and the intended murders of Lenin and Trotsky. Three weeks later, renewed raids in Moscow resulted in the apprehension of the American agent Kalamatiano and his associates as well as the re-arrest and incarceration of Bruce Lockhart. Although an arrangement was finally worked out whereby the latter was exchanged for the Soviet representative, M. M. Litvinov, who had been detained as a retaliatory gesture in London, the Soviet investigation of the Lockhart conspiracy was not halted. On the contrary, on 25 November, a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal indicted Bruce Lockhart, Grenard, Kalamatiano and Reilly as well as two Czech and 16 Russian 'counterrevolutionaries' on charges of espionage and conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government. On 3 December this high court decreed the death penalty for Kalamatiano and Colonel Fride, sentenced eight other defendants to varying terms in prison and condemned in absentia Bruce Lockhart, Grenard and Reilly, any or all of whom were to be shot if ever apprehended on Soviet soil.

With the notable exception of the true role of Sidney Reilly, the history of the Lockhart Plot now stands more or less fully revealed. To begin with, an actual, if pitiful, Allied plot to overthrow the Soviet government really did exist in revolution-
ARY RUSSIA IN THE LATE SUMMER OF 1918. HOWEVER, THIS PLOT, WHICH WAS CONCOCTED (OR PERHAPS DELIBERATELY PROVOKED) BY THE MEGALOMANIAC SIDNEY REILLY IN LIKELY COLLUSION WITH THE EAGER BUT INEXPERIENCED BRUCE LOCKHART, WAS EASILY PENETRATED AND MANIPULATED BY THE CUNNING LEADERSHIP OF THE CHEKA IN THE PERSONS OF DZERZHINSKY AND PETERS. IN THE PRACISED HANDS OF THESE VETERAN REVOLUTIONARIES, THE ALLIED CONSPIRACY WAS GRADUALLY TRANSFORMED INTO A SWEEPING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION THAT FINALLY RESULTED IN THE ENTRAPMENT AND NEAR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY NETWORK IN SOVIET RUSSIA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEYOND EXPANDING THE EXTENT OF CHEKA ORCHESTRATION OF THE CONSPIRACY, ANY FUTURE SUBSTANTIATION OF DuplicITY ON THE PART OF SIDNEY REILLY WILL NOT ESSENTIALLY ALTER ITS HISTORY.


RIDER UNIVERSITY

2. Pravda, 3 September 1918; Izvestiya VTsIK, 3 September 1918. Partial translation in James Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 145–146.
3. Izvestiya VTsIK, 4, 5 and 24 September 1918; Pravda, 5 September 1918.
4. See Izvestiya VTsIK, 24 September 1918. Also René Marchand, Allied Agents in Soviet Russia (London, 1918). In fact, Marchand was known to be sympathetic with the Bolsheviks and the "discovery" of his letter during a search of his quarters in Moscow was considered by many to have been more than fortuitous. See also below, note 70.
5. In addition to the American, Bruce Lockhart’s staff and numerous other Allied subjects were also detained. Among those who evaded arrest were Grenard, who took refuge in the American Consulate (then under the protection of neutral Norway), and the elusive Lieutenant Reilly, who "escaped" into hiding.
7. The basic sources on the plot included published memoirs (most notably those of Bruce Lockhart and Sidney Reilly), official documents from the British Public Record Office (especially Bruce Lockhart’s contemporary reports to the Foreign Office) and some material from Soviet archives (in particular the so-called Peterson Report). For details see below, notes 12, 19, 25 and 38. On the evidence of the still-living participants see below, note 40.

10 See, e.g., Robin Bruce Lockhart, Ace of Spies (London, 1967); R. I. Pimenov, "Kak ya iskal shpiona Reilly", Radio Liberty Samizdat Archive AS No. 1089 (Munich, 1972); Edward Van Der Rhee, Master Spy (New York, 1981); Michael Kettle, Sidney Reilly (New York, 1983); and Robin Bruce Lockhart, Reilly: The First Man (New York, 1987). All of these, except the initial effort of Robin Bruce Lockhart (which he then reversed in his later study), suggest the treachery of the British master spy. On the other hand, an independent scholar, G. L. Owen of Hamilton, Montana, has produced a massive manuscript, with the tentative title 'The Career of Sidney Reilly, 1895–1925", which presents a spirited, if highly speculative, defence of Reilly's loyalty to Britain. At this point, only access to the Cheka/KGB archives in Moscow could provide a definitive answer to the question of Reilly's alleged duplicity. To date, however, no such access has been granted nor, according to a recent analysis, is there any likely prospect for such an eventuality. See Amy Knight, 'The Fate of the KGB Archives', Slavic Review, LI, Fall 1993, pp. 582–586.


12 See R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York, 1933), pp. 197–208. Cited hereafter as BL, British Agent. Notwithstanding the Foreign Office's apparent irritation, it was later suggested that Bruce Lockhart had been selected precisely because his youth and relative inexperience would make easy his disposal in the event of failure. See Joseph Noiils, Mon ambassade en Russie sovietique, 1917–1919 (Paris, 1933), II, p. 115.

13 Bruce Lockhart had been Consul in Moscow from 1912 until just before the Bolshevik Revolution. During that time he was routinely described by his diplomatic colleagues as Britain's 'best man' in Russia. See ibid., citing the opinion of Ambassador Sir George Buchanan. Also Diary of Sir Francis O. Linstead, Counsellor, British Embassy, Petrograd, entry for 24 August 1917 (unpublished manuscript).

14 Among others, Bruce Lockhart was attacked as 'hysterical' by Permanent Undersecretary of State Lord Harlinge and his reports to London characterised as 'criminal misleading' by Major-General Alfred W. F. Knox, then Britain's leading military authority on Russia. See Debo, 'Dzarezhinskii Plot', p. 424 and Ullman, Intervention, p. 132.

15 As Ullman, p. 188, n. 67, first pointed out in 1961, Bruce Lockhart's famous reversal on intervention came about somewhat earlier (23 May) than he had claimed in his memoirs (29 May) and was far less reluctant than he therein maintained. Cf. British Agent, pp. 281–289. In fact, as reflected in his contemporary reports to the Foreign Office (to which Ullman did not have full access), Bruce Lockhart was already a vigorous champion of intervention as early as 30 April. See Lockhart (Moscow) to Balfour, 30 April 1918; Public Record Office [PRO], London, Foreign Office [FO] 371/3285/88696.

16 In his published memoirs Bruce Lockhart denies any significant contacts with the anti-Bolsheviks before late July at the earliest, See British Agent, p. 262. As in the case of his reversal on intervention, however, his contemporary telegrams to London tell a different story. See, e.g., Lockhart (Moscow) to Balfour, 21 April 1918, cited in Ullman, Intervention, pp. 163–164.

17 See Lockhart (Moscow) to Balfour, 17 and 26 May, 1918; PRO, FO 371/3332/92708 and 95780. Also Ullman, Intervention, p. 190. Curiously, in both his memoirs (British Agent, p. 288) and his final report to the Foreign Office (Lockhart (London) to Balfour, 7 November 1918; PRO, FO 371/3337/185499) (hereafter BL Final Report, PRO), Bruce Lockhart consistently misidentified Savinkov as the League (Union) for the Regeneration of Russia, which was actually a competing anti-Bolshevik group that did not maintain armed forces.

18 In British Agent, pp. 309–310, Bruce Lockhart says that this aid was not extended until August. Once again, however, his contemporary reports to the Foreign Office indicate otherwise. See, e.g. Lockhart (Moscow) to Balfour, 13 and 16 July 1918; PRO, FO 371/3287/129986 and 131278.

19 See Balfour to Lockhart (Moscow), 30 May 1918; PRO, FO 371/331,394198. Referring to a somewhat later period, Bruce Lockhart reported on 'daily meetings' with Grenard and Poole at the American Consulate. See Lockhart (London) to Balfour, 5 November 1918; PRO, FO 371/3348/190442. Cited hereafter as BL Plot, PRO.

20 Beyond the fact that they were somewhat reckless and rabidly anti-Soviet, little is known about French secret service operations in revolutionary Russia. See BL Final Report, PRO. Also Boris Savinkov pered voenosoi kollegiei Verkhovnogo sova SSSR (Moscow, 1924). Partial translation in Boris V. Savinkov Papers, HI, Stanford. By contrast, Kalamaniano's American network, which had been organised in March and comprised about thirty agents dispersed throughout Soviet Russia, was devoted almost exclusively to intelligence gathering, albeit of an increasingly anti-Bolshevik character. See Foglesong, 'Kalamaniano', pp. 156 ff.

22 See BL, British Agent, p. 274. The British envoy may also have had a good opinion of Captain Hill. See BL, Plot, PRO. As regards Reilly, it should perhaps be noted that Bruce Lockhart's initial positive assessment of the master spy apparently deteriorated over time. See BL, Diaries, I, pp. 152, 165, 183.

23 See Richard B. Spence, Sidney Reilly in America, 1914–1917, Intelligence and National Security, X, January 1995, pp. 92–121, which is heavily based on materials from contemporary US intelligence files located in the National Archives.

24 See Robin Bruce Lockhart, Ace of Spies, pp. 58–60. Also Norman Thwaites, Velvet and Vinegar (London, 1932), pp. 183 ff. However, that Reilly was in Germany in 1917 is vigorously disputed by Spence, Reilly in America, pp. 111–113, who insists that the master spy was engaged during that time in various nefarious activities in the US and Russia.

25 Egotistical entitled Britain’s Master Spy, or the Adventures of Sidney Reilly (London, 1931), Reilly’s memoir was probably written in 1925, shortly before his final mysterious disappearance in Soviet Russia. Written jointly with his ‘wife’ Pepita Bobadilla (Reilly was an apparent trigrammatist), the master spy’s melodramatic account of the Lockhart Plot (pp. 6–102) cannot be fully accepted (especially if he turns out to have been a double agent) but perhaps deserves more credibility than it has usually been accorded. See below, note 26.

26 In describing this meeting, Master Spy, pp. 12–16, Reilly confuses V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, then Secretary of the Sovnarkom, with his brother General M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, a commander in the Red Army. In any case, his close relationship with Grammatikov, whose Bolshevik credentials had once been attested by no less than Lenin, lends some credence to the suspicions about Reilly’s loyalty. Could Grammatikov have been his ‘contact’ with Soviet intelligence? See R. C. Elwood, Lenin and Grammatikov, Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXVIII, September 1986, pp. 304–313. For his part, in his later memoirs, British Agent, pp. 273–274, Bruce Lockhart recounts a fantastic story of how Reilly, having arrived in Moscow, pounded on the Kremlin gates and demanded an audience with Lenin that ultimately resulted in his interview with Bonch-Bruyevich. Here as elsewhere, Reilly’s memoir, however florid, seems closer to the truth than the apparently more sober recollections of Bruce Lockhart.

27 On this point, see Peter Sedgwick’s superb notes to his translation of Victor Serge’s Year One of the Russian Revolution (New York, 1972), p. 403, n. 13. In support of his proposal of a ‘conscious division of labour’ between Bruce Lockhart and Reilly in 1918, Sedgwick cites evidence of their close relationship both during and after their sojourns in Russia as well as a very suggestive photograph (now among the Bruce Lockhart Papers, H) of a silver cigar box presented by Reilly to Lockhart bearing the following inscription: ‘To R. H. Bruce Lockhart H. B. M.’s Representative in Russia in 1917–1922.’ In remembrance of events in Moscow in August and September of that year from his faithful Lieutenant Sidney Reilly’. In addition, Sedgwick addsuce two very friendly letters with the British government. These letters, which are slightly misdated and possibly misplaced by Sedgwick, are in the Alfred Lord Milner Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Box 365(C). Finally, in a brief personal letter written shortly before his death, Bruce Lockhart described Reilly as a man ‘with whom I was linked’ during ‘my time in Russia’. Letter to the author, 28 June 1968.

28 Most notably, from the beginning of his activities in Russia, Reilly projected the creation of a post-Soviet Russian government, which was to include A. N. Grammatikov, E. P. Chubersky (a former business partner), General N. N. Yudenich and, presumably, himself. See Master Spy, p. 25.

29 According to Richard B. Spence, ‘The Terrorist and the Master Spy: The Political “Partnership” of Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly, 1918–1925’, Revolutionary Russia, IV, June 1991, pp. 111–131, it is not clear whether this contact constituted cooperation or competition. In any event, Savinkov’s force was soon decimated in the abortive Yaroslavl revolt of 6–23 July.

30 See Owen, ‘Career of Reilly’, pp. 467–468, 527–528. From the outset, it seems, Reilly was concerned about the discipline and reliability of these forces.

31 According to Reilly, Master Spy, pp. 21–22, this position was due to Grammatikov’s friendship with Vyaacheslav Orlovsky (Vladimir Orlov), the head of the criminal investigation branch of the Cheka. Again, this apparently fortuitous circumstance raises the possibility of Reilly’s double agency, especially in view of his adoption for this purpose of the rather transparent pseudonym of Sidrei Georgievich Refinsky.
Although Reilly was aware of Kalamatiano's operation, it appears that, at least until late August, their relations were limited to the sharing of information from Colonel Pride. See Reilly, *Master Spy*, p. 14. In his account, Owen, 'Career of Reilly', pp. 413 ff., posits a long-term relationship between Reilly, Kalamatiano and Pride on the basis of wartime activities in New York City. This assertion, however, lacks corroboration.

On the Cromie-Reilly relationship see Kettle, Sidney Reilly, pp. 33 ff., which is apparently based on Cromie's reports to the Admiralty.


See BL, *British Agent*, p. 276. Also Sir George Clerk's minute on Lockhart (Moscow) to Balfour, 17 May 1918; PRO, FO 371/3332/92708.

The Soviet role in the Lockhart Plot became known only very gradually over a period of some 50 years. At first, all such knowledge derived from the early accounts of two Cheka officials: M. Ya. Latas (Sidnra) and A. A. P. Peters, 'Vospominanija o baze v VChK v pervom god revolutsii', *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya*, 1924, 10 (33), pp. 21–29. In 1962 this original evidence was supplemented by an important documentary article featuring a contemporary report on the plot by K. A. Petroson, Političeskii Komissar of the Latvian Rifle Division. See 'K izvestii zagovora R. Lokkarta (1918 g.)', *Istoricheskiy arkhiv*, 1962, 4, pp. 234–237. A copy of the original of this document from recently opened Russian archives (Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GARF], Moscow, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 207) has been kindly provided by Professor David S. Fogleson of Rutgers University. Cited hereafter as Petroson Report, GARF. Finally, valuable additional information, based on the testimony of a then still-living participant in the Plot, began to appear in 1965. See below, note 40.

The question of who directed the Lockhart investigation is moot. The probe was certainly initiated by Dzerzhinsky, who, however, was in self-imposed 'retirement' from 8 July to 21 August, allegedly motivated by his failure to detect and prevent the assassination of the German Ambassador, von Mirbach, on 6 July. For his part, Peters later insisted that he had headed the investigation ('Vospominanija', op. cit. 22) and the calendar largely bears him out. Of course, it may well be, as most Soviet sources insist, that Dzerzhinsky directed throughout from the sidelines.

The role of Bukis and Sprogis in the Lockhart investigation was first revealed in 1965 in an article written by one V. F. Kravchenko, a KGB officer who had allegedly 'discovered' Bukis living in retirement in Moscow. See 'Taina Shmidtshena raskryta', *Pogranichnik*, 1965, 23, pp. 12–14. Published originally in an obscure police publication, the Bukis revelations were then given wide publicity in 1966 in a mass circulation weekly. See V. Kravchenko, 'Pod imenem Shmidtshena' and 'Porucheno partiie', *Nedelya*, 1966, 11, 6–12 March, p. 7 and 1966, 13, 20–26 March, p. 7. Scholarly treatment followed in 1967. See V. F. Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', *Sovetskie gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1967, 3, pp. 97–102. At the same time, Bukis himself published two articles: 'Trudnosti nado preodolivat' a ne boyotya ikh' in *Kvziet revolyutsii* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 113–120, and 'Proshchet Lokkarta', in *Osobes zadanie* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 93–103. Finally, in the early 1970s, the Bukis story was the subject of a non-fiction novel that quickly went through two large editions and turned the former agent into something of a national hero. See V. F. Kravchenko, *Pod imenem Shmidtshena*, 1st ed. (Moscow, 1970) (50 000 copies); 2nd edn. (Moscow, 1973) (100 000 copies).

See Bukis, 'Proshchet Lokkarta', pp. 96–97. According to the author, it took at least a month to achieve penetration of the Cromie-Reilly organisation.

For his part, Cromie, who was not a trained agent, was apparently both trusting and suggestible. For example, in a telegram to the Admiralty on 5 August he reported that a panicky Lenin was then in hiding in Petrograd preparatory to fleeing the country. Cited in Kettle, *Sidney Reilly*, p. 35.

From this point, the exact sequence of events comprising the Lockhart Plot cannot be established with certainty. The following reconstruction is based upon a careful consideration of all presently available primary sources.


See Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', p. 100. The meeting took place at Lockhart's mission headquarters and therefore must have occurred before 5 August, when all British and French diplomatic establishments in Moscow were raided and closed in retaliation for Allied intervention at Archangel.

See Bukis, 'Proshchet Lokkarta', p. 100. In his memoirs, *British Agent*, pp. 311–312, Bruce
Lockhart gives a dramatic account of how he verified the Letts' good faith on the basis of Captain Cronic's idiosyncratic spelling. This story, however, like his earlier version of Sidney Reilly's visit to the Kremlin (above, note 26), appears to be another example of the former agent's penchant for creative effect. In fact, the Cronic misspelling incident is recounted in a deleted passage from Bruce Lockhart's official report on the plot (see BL Plot, PRO) in an altogether different context having to do with the captain's apparent premonition of his impending death. The real confirmation of the Letts' authenticity was probably provided by Sidney Reilly.

47 See Peterson Report, GARF. Writing in the post-Stalinist era of Dzerzhinsky's idolatry, Buikis, 'Trudnost', p. 118, and Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', p. 100, claim that it was 'Iron Felix' who selected Berzin.

48 Peterson Report, GARF. Reilly later denounced as 'a vile scandal' the suggestion that Berzin could possibly have been a Cheka 'plant'. See Master Spy, p. 26.

This interpretation was first propounded by Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', p. 100, and Buikis, 'Pochet Lokkarta', p. 102, and is convincingly reiterated in Debo, 'Dzerzhinskii Plot', p. 432.

50 See the release of the Press Bureau of the VTsIK, 2 September 1918, in Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSR, A. A. Gromyko et al. eds (Moscow, 1957), p. 725, cited hereafter as Dokumenty. Also Peters, 'Vospominaniya', p. 22. In his published recollections, British Agent, p. 311, Bruce Lockhart sets the date of his first meeting with Berzin as 15 August but in his contemporary official report (BL Plot, PRO) admits to some uncertainty. For his part, Buikis' presence was apparently dictated by the fact that Berzin was not then a member of the Cheka and thus required supervision. See Buikis, 'Pochet Lokkarta', p. 101 and 'Trudnost', p. 118.

51 See BL Plot, PRO. Herein, the British agent admitted that he had been duped by Berzin, who, he later learned, had been acting on 'instructions from Peters' but, he insisted, too late had been French Consul Grenard and Sidney Reilly (the latter, of course, may have been in on the deception).

52 The following is reconstructed from BL Plot, PRO and British Agent, pp. 312–313, which largely coincide except for the curious fact that the American Consul, Poole, is replaced in the latter account by General Jean Lavergne of the French Military Mission. Both then and afterward, the Americans waged a substantially successful campaign to avoid any implication in the Lockhart plot. See, e.g., Poole's very evasive testimony at the Russian Propaganda Hearing before the US Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, March 3–4, 1920 (Washington, 1920), pp. 349–378. For his part, Bruce Lockhart complained bitterly about this American attitude in 1918 (see BL, Diaries, 24 and 30 September 1918 and BL Plot, PRO) but, in his later recollections, completely accommodated the Americans' wish to be left out of the plot. See also below, notes 53 and 62.

53 See BL Plot, PRO, Peters, 'Vospominaniya', pp. 22–23. Conspicuous by his absence at this meeting was the American Consul, Poole, whose failure to attend may have been due to the fact that the US had not yet been compromised by participation in the Archangel intervention and was still operating its consulate. In any case, as indicated above (note 52), the Americans were uneasy about any connection with the Lockhart affair and were greatly incensed when the later suppression of the plot resulted in the arrest and trial of their agents, Kalamatiano and Colonel Frize. See below, notes 62 and 76.

54 According to the Hill Report, PRO, the defection of Lett units on the Czech (Volga-Ural) front was also proposed.

55 See BL Plot, PRO. Of an installment of 700,000 rubles, the French provided 500,000 and the Americans 200,000 rubles.

56 Of these passes, two were made out to Lt. Jan Buikis and Capt. Krish Kringle (an alias = Kris Kringle!). The recipient of the third pass is unknown: possibly Jan Sprogis or even Berzin himself. See Dokumenty, p. 726; Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', p. 101. Bruce Lockhart (BL Plot, PRO) indicates that the passes were distributed at his second meeting with Berzin on 15 or 16 August. However, a photographic reproduction of the Buikis pass (Kravchenko, 'Pervye shagi VChK', p. 101) bears the date 17 August. For the rest, the Peterson Report, GARF, describes with some amusement how Berzin made a great show of reluctance about accepting money in return for the Latvians' 'defection'. According to Peterson, all the funds collected by Berzin were later distributed, with Lenin's approval, as war relief compensation to veterans of the Latdivizya and their families.

Documentation on the Reilly–Berzin talks is confined, on the one hand, to the testimony of Reilly and his colleague Captain Hill and, on the other, to such Soviet sources as Peters and Peterson. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the meetings were authentic. If, however, Reilly was in fact a Soviet agent, the entire series of conversations with Berzin may have been nothing more than an elaborate 'cover' manufactured by the Cheka.

58 See Peterson Report, GARF. This contemporary Soviet source accurately describes how the British contributions were raised. Cf. BL, British Agent, p. 310.
See Reilly, *Master Spy*, pp. 21 ff. It is possible that the Reilly scheme was prepared jointly with Bruce Lockhart and the diplomats but this seems unlikely. See Debo, *Dzerzhinskii Plot*, pp. 437–438. Of course, if Reilly was a Soviet agent, the inspiration for his plan belongs to the Cheka.

In any case, Soviet sources (e.g. the VTsIK press release, *Dokumenty*, p. 725 and Peters, *Vospominaniya*, pp. 23–24) soon added several embellishments including the alleged support for the plot of Patriarch Tikhon and the Orthodox Church and the planned 'murder' of Lenin. See below, note 66.

According to the Hill Report, PRO, Berzin promised to mobilize the Lettish civilian population in support of the proposed coup. Later, he even claimed to have formed a committee to direct this effort. *Ibid.*

BL, *PLOT*, PRO and BL, *British Agent*, p. 313. According to the latter, this discussion took place on 18 August.

**63** The number of Reilly-Berzin meetings is impossible to determine since even the most reliable sources do not coincide. The following are possible dates and their sources: 19 August (Peters); 21 August (Peters, possibly Hill); 22 August (Peterson, *Dokumenty*); 27 August (Peters, Hill); 28 August (Peters, Reilly, *Dokumenty*); and 29 August in Petrograd (BL, *Dokumenty*, Hill).

According to Bruce Lockhart's official report (BL, *PLOT*, PRO), the total amount disbursted was 1,000,000 rubles. Soviet sources (e.g. the Peterson Report, GARP) confirm 1,200,000 rubles. According to the latter, on at least one occasion, Berzin and Peters organized a false demonstration of 'disaffected' Latvian officers in order to convince Reilly that his payments were being well spent.


**66** See Hill Report, PRO. Specifically, it was Reilly's plan to place Lenin and Trotsky on public display without their pants and thus to destroy their power by ridicule. In fact, a plan to murder Lenin and/or Trotsky was ever a part of the Lockhart Plot can now certainly be discounted. No such intention was ever acknowledged by any Western principal nor is there any reference to such an objective in either the Peterson Report or the memoirs of Peters, the two most reliable Soviet sources on the conspiracy.

**67** See Debo, *Dzerzhinskii Plot*, p. 437.

See D. C. Poole (Archangel) to Secstate, 8 February 1919; National Archives (NA), Washington, Department of State, Record Group (RG) 59, Decimal File No. 811.202p1/53. Cited hereafter as Poole Report, NA. Also Deposition of K. Kalamatiano, Riga, 22 August 1921, enclosed in E. E. Young (Riga) to Secstate, 23 August 1921; NA, RG 59, Decimal File No. 361.1121K121/50. Cited hereafter as Kalamatiano Deposition, NA. See also Reilly, *Master Spy*, pp. 30–32 and Hill Report, PRO.

According to Poole, Marchand had been invited by the French Consul, Grenard, for reasons unknown. See Poole Report, NA.

**68** It was originally believed that the Marchand evidence was not known to the Bolsheviks until a raid on his flat in Moscow turned up his letter to President Poincaré (see above and note 4). However, that he had at once reported to the Cheka was later admitted by Peters in his testimony at the trial of the Lockhart conspirators. See Kalamatiano Deposition, NA. In any case, Peters' Marchand's charges were essentially 'true' was later acknowledged by Bruce Lockhart. BL, *PLOT*, PRO.

Reference is to the flat of Elena M. Boyuzhovskaya, who Reilly used as Mr. Massino. See the account of Berzin's testimony at the Lockhart trial in Kalamatiano Deposition, NA. Also Peters, *Vospominaniya*, pp. 25–26.

Soviet sources, e.g. *ibid.*, p. 25, unanimously insist that the Lockhart investigation had had to be ended 'prematurely' owing to the 30 August crises. In fact, this action had in any case to be taken before 6 September, when the failure of the planned coup in Moscow to materialize would have revealed the provocative role of Berzin and the Cheka.

According to Peters, *Vospominaniya*, pp. 26–27, about 30 people were arrested in the original Cheka sweep. See also Hill Report, PRO and X. B. Kalamatiano Report, 26 October 1918, enclosed in Poole Report, NA. Cited hereafter as Kalamatiano Report, NA. The arrest of Mariya Fride, while she was delivering documents from her brother to Dagmara K's flat, enabled the Cheka to establish a link between American intelligence and the Lockhart Plot which, though tenuous, was widely exploited at the subsequent trial. See below, note 76.
For his part, Kalamatiano was arrested on 18 September while trying to enter the American Consulate. See Kalamatiano Deposition and Kalamatiano Report, NA. According to the American agent, the Cheka detained a total of about 80 persons on evidence obtained partly from him and his agents and partly from Marchand. On the exchange agreement, which included the staffs of the two diplomats, see Dokumenty, pp. 468 ff.

Izvestiya VTsIK, 25 November 1918. Also Kalamatiano Report, NA. Kalamatiano was especially disturbed by the lumping together of the cases of him and his agents with those of persons implicated in the Lockhart Plot which, he believed, was the result of either incompetence or treachery on the part of Sidney Reilly.

Izvestiya VTsIK, 10 December 1918. Another foreigner, the French intelligence agent Colonel "Henri" de Vernet, may also have been condemned in absentia but is not included in the Izvestiya version of the indictment handed down on 25 November. Of those sentenced to death, Colonel Prido was shot on 14 December. Kalamatiano, however, after many tribulations, was finally reprimanded and expelled from Soviet Russia in 1921. See Department of State Records, NA, RG 59, Decimal File No. 861.00/8980.