


# Civilian Research Project USAWC Fellow

## National Strategy for Religious Leader Engagements: Interagency Challenges Supporting Combatant Commands

by

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United States Army War College  
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## Abstract

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# **National Strategy for Religious Leader Engagements: Interagency Challenges Supporting Combatant Commands**

## **Introduction**

New national policies and strategies will require the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to address future interagency challenges for the strategic engagement of foreign religious leaders in their areas of responsibility. Key challenges will involve the planning, coordination, and implementation of a strategy across multiple Defense Department (DOD) and non-DOD organizations. The Department of the Army (DA), responsible for U.S. strategic landpower, will face increasing foreign policy responsibility when engaging religious leaders and implementing the new Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mandates.<sup>1</sup>

Army Chaplains have an extensive history of interacting with local religious leaders throughout the world. These meetings were at the request of their commanders and considered a minor additional duty. The vast majority of these meetings were at the tactical or small unit level and primarily involved relationship building for a specific unit. A small group of senior chaplains have successfully made the move into strategic religious leader engagements (RLE) since 2002 but their actions were not part of a formal, national strategy.<sup>2</sup> The situation is now changing with the advent of several new actions concerning religion by the US Government in 2013 that will require new resources, skill sets, attitudes and flexibility for the US military, its leaders and especially the Army Chaplaincy.<sup>3</sup>

The White House announced the first National Strategy on integrating religious leader engagements into US foreign policy. Secretary of State John Kerry established the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives (OFBCI) and the first Special Advisor with the mission to integrate foreign policy and religious leader engagements. At the 2014 National Prayer Breakfast, the President of the United States remarked, "We're moving ahead with our new strategy to partner more closely with religious leaders and faith communities as we carry out our foreign policy... So around the world we're elevating our engagement with faith leaders and making it a regular part of our diplomacy... On all these issues, faith leaders and faith organizations here in the United States and around the world are incredible partners, and we're grateful to them."<sup>4</sup>

The Army has a new opportunity for strategic, interagency chaplain integration in conflict mitigation. Through their strategic advisory role senior Army Chaplains can positively influence worldwide missions within the new national strategy.<sup>5</sup>

It is the thesis of this paper that with a new national strategy on religious leader engagements there is a critical need for interagency understanding, coordination, and collaboration at the strategic level. The key word is strategic. The opportunity exists to begin to examine the complexities involved in fulfilling the potential mandates of the strategy. This mission can best be accomplished when shaped by an effort to examine the capabilities and limitations of the Department of State (DOS), the Combatant Commands, and the Military Chaplaincies.

This paper will examine in turn what constitutes a religious leader engagement, why it is important, the new national strategy, the new DOS office and advisors role, the

interagency challenges for the Combatant Commands, the Army Chaplaincy and its potential role and then conclude with recommendations.

### **What Constitutes a Religious Leader Engagement?**

The descriptive title of Religious leader engagement (RLE) is not universally used by all military chaplaincies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), or even within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army has used several different terms over the last 13 years alone. But since the focus of this paper is clarification for strategic interagency understanding and across the DOD, for the sake of simplicity and based on the new National Strategy, this paper will use the term religious leader engagement (RLE).<sup>6</sup>

When describing an RLE, this paper will address the actions by using the joint definition from Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 as “any command-directed contact or interaction where the chaplain, as the command’s religious representative, meets with a leader on matters of religion to ameliorate suffering and to promote peace and the benevolent expression of religion. It is a focused and narrow role that addresses religion in human activity without employing religion to achieve a military advantage.”<sup>7</sup> This definition will provide a common reference for the main topic of this paper to improve interagency understanding.

### **Why is Religious Leader Engagement Important?**

In the field of statecraft, religion has been debated as a neglected area for United States’ foreign policy. It began to receive greater attention beginning with a seminal work in the early nineties. In 1994, Douglas Johnston published *Religion, The Missing*

*Dimension of Statecraft.* In exploring the role of religion and statecraft Johnston made the observation that “Policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars...are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict, and even in reporting their concrete modalities. Equally, the role of religious leaders, religious institutions, and religiously motivated lay figures in conflict resolution has also been disregarded—or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting.”<sup>8</sup> He advanced the position that the United States needs religion added to the lexicon of statecraft and diplomacy while calling for a national strategy for engaging religious leaders around the world as a factor in our diplomacy. He further stated that one must have an understanding of the potential religious issues and background of a conflict to have an accurate and complete understanding of it.<sup>9</sup> The process involves meeting with religious leaders and listening to them and their perspectives while adding to their knowledge base about other perspectives and options through education and relationships.<sup>10</sup>

Is it a confirmation of Dr. Johnston’s critique that the current 2013 Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Director of National Intelligence contains not one single reference to religion or its role in any of the current threats to the United States?<sup>11</sup> This is not to argue that a specific religion as a whole is a threat, but there is not a single acknowledgement of the role of religion, religious beliefs, or religious leaders in potential threats to the United States or its policies. But it is to argue for the urgency of the analysis in this paper.

Based on his 1994 work, Dr. Johnston formed the International Center for Diplomacy in 2000 as an NGO to put his ideas in faith-based diplomacy into action. He

followed up with his second book in 2003, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Dr. Johnston states there is a paradigm shift in religions' enhanced role which includes four reasons why religious leaders' input should be added for their influence in peacemaking: "First, they are a well-established and pervasive influence in the community; second, they have a reputation as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values; third, they have unique leverage for reconciling conflicting parties, including an ability to re-humanize relationships; and lastly, they have the capability to mobilize community, national, and international support for a peace process. Most importantly, religions possess a transcendent authority for their followers that is the envy of most temporal leaders."<sup>12</sup> If just one of these areas adds an ability for a military or diplomatic leader to reduce a conflict, they should be examined. These are key areas where a religious leader at the strategic level could be engaged in dialogue and a relationship of trust and understanding built to bring his or her influence to bear on the situation in question.

Not everyone believes engaging religious groups and leaders will benefit conflict resolution. It is Ralph Peter's assumption that "we have returned to the historical norm of wars of blood and belief, of conflicts driven by faith and tribe...wars will be fought over religion and ethnic identity."<sup>13</sup> Following his position, he proposes the only way to end a conflict with religious undertones is to commit to the total annihilation of all the enemy participants. The United States will never pursue this manner of warfare; it is not the American way of war. It is better to engage the leaders of those organizations or groups that hold such beliefs at the core of their conflicts. To involve local and national religious leaders is to provide them room to be part of a solution they support and are

willing to suffer for to improve the situation of their people. Without engagement of the religious leadership we commit ourselves to the role of bystanders. Peters would have one believe these conflicts have no answers and involve the “age of insoluble conflicts.”<sup>14</sup>

The United States maintains a central role in conflict prevention and resolution as a world power. It's one of the few nations that has the capability to bring its' national resolve to bear in a timely manner while having the potential to enforce policies, both militarily and diplomatically, on those involved in conflicts. Despite past neglect in addressing the role of religion and religious leaders in conflict prevention, the United States has a unique perspective that goes wherever its forces and diplomats are found. “The American vision of tolerance does not require painting one specific idol on the wall of the spiritual cave...the atheist, the agnostic, and the pantheist should be no less capable than a Catholic, Jew, Buddhist, or Muslim of appreciating the value of faith as such, the value of being left free to ponder the meaning of one's existence.”<sup>15</sup> For the first time the United States has a national strategy to coordinate and direct RLE efforts globally.

### **New National Strategy for RLE**

The White House last published the unclassified National Security Strategy in 2010. The administration disseminates a security strategy every few years, to both a national and international audience, to provide an overview of America's challenges and general views on the strategic vision, priorities, and direction of the United States.<sup>16</sup> One area barely mentioned in the national security strategy was religion. There were five general references to religion in the document with no discussion of the engagement of

religious leaders.<sup>17</sup> Jonathan Shaw at the Army War College has written, “That religion and national security policy largely share a common base—the experience of human suffering, failed duties towards one’s neighbor, the hunger for enduring values, and the desire for peace—suggests an integrative approach for religion within national security policy.”<sup>18</sup>

Beginning in late 2012, the U.S. National Security Council Staff (NSCS) at the White House led an inter-agency group involving fourteen organizations in examining the implications of a national strategy that would place religion and national security policy together for the first time in a presidential strategy. They studied the potential implications of such a strategy and the requirements for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.<sup>19</sup> In June of 2013, the White House published the *National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy* to representatives of select governmental organizations. The document is not part of the openly published National Security Strategy and it did not have a public release.

The DOS published a one-page, non-sensitive, descriptor of the strategy on its open web site. It details the new national strategy on religious leader and faith community engagement “to focus engagement on key policy objectives, promote best practices, and spur greater department and agency coordination” and details three strategic objectives for more “robust engagement with religious leaders and faith communities.”<sup>20</sup> The three national objectives listed are to promote sustainable development and more effective humanitarian assistance; advance pluralism and human rights, including the protection of religious freedom; and prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict and contribute to local and regional stability and security.<sup>21</sup>

The third objective has the largest potential impact on COCOMs and the military chaplaincies as a specific objective for their future involvement. To accomplish the three objectives, the document specifies that the U.S. will “build our capacity and the capacity of our international partners to engage religious leaders and faith communities through increased guidance and training; institutionalize our efforts by embedding religious leader engagement in policy and practice; and further develop our exchanges and dialogues with religious leaders.”<sup>22</sup> Each one of these criteria has major challenges inherent in them even if they were the mission of just one agency but less the whole of U.S. Government. To plan, coordinate, and collaborate these objectives will be very difficult since the complete national strategy has a protection level of “sensitive but unclassified (SBU).”<sup>23</sup> This level requires the complete nineteen page document to be available only to official U.S. Government organizations. It will challenge the collaborative efforts and effectiveness of every organization involved with RLE. This designation for unclassified information is similar to the “For Official Use Only” level that restricts non-governmental organizations from receiving access to the information.<sup>24</sup>

A challenge of this new strategy is determining the impact of the SBU designation on the many non-governmental organizations involved in RLE. With a stated purpose to “advance a more robust engagement” with global religious leaders into the nation’s foreign policy, how might this restriction hinder the strategy from producing a policy that is understood and seeks to advance its three objectives?<sup>25</sup> With 84% of the world’s population stating they adhere to some form of religious belief, it is evident that a national RLE strategy can have a positive impact by listening and responding to those centers of influence around the world.<sup>26</sup>

The challenges of planning, coordinating, resourcing, and collaborating on engagements with religious leaders across the world are ongoing and not new. Many hard working, well-meaning and engaged leaders and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, have been involved in this endeavor in the past.<sup>27</sup> However, past activities were not the result of a coordinated strategy across inter-agency boundaries. The new strategy will face serious issues if it may not include the non-governmental organizations that are currently involved in engaging worldwide religious leaders. World Vision, The Institute for Global Engagement and the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy are all involved in programs that currently engage foreign religious leaders, just to name a few.<sup>28</sup> Without coordination and collaboration with these important organizations, the strategy will remain fragmented. Staff members of over fourteen governmental organizations alone will need to resolve the key questions involving what is being done, by whom, who has the required information, who has the lead for objectives and what are the business rules for imparting it across all the governmental organizations involved in the new strategy. The NSCS has to deliver a one year progress report to the President in June of 2014. It will be a key indicator of progress to see if the report is a compilation of individual efforts catalogued together or if the strategy has resulted in progress in building, coordinating and conducting strategic RLEs.

Currently the only chaplain link to the NSCS and the new national strategy is the Joint Staff Chaplain. His position and input was included in the working group to devise the strategy. The NSCS does not have a military chaplain on its staff but does coordinate directly with the Joint Staff Chaplain when required. The position is currently

held by an Army Chaplain well versed and experienced in RLE. This experience level is not a requirement for any future chaplain assigned to the position.<sup>29</sup>

The challenge of disseminating the strategy across U.S. governmental organizations is daunting.<sup>30</sup> Even though the complete strategy is technically available to governmental organizations, the leadership needs to address the fact that it is not currently widely distributed for discussion and implementation. One risk is to view the strategy so simplistically as to question its ability to make a difference in any organizations' future missions. All involved organizations, especially the military chaplaincies, need an understanding of the strategy before they may implement and evaluate its effectiveness. The military is accustomed to clearly identified lines of authority and responsibility that are not apparent in the new strategy. If the governmental organizations in this strategy do not have a clear understanding of the leadership and oversight of this strategy, it will be difficult to coordinate across all organizations. The net result will not be a collaborative strategy that uses the strengths of each organization to compliment other ongoing efforts, but a catalogue of individual endeavors that will be difficult to track and evaluate.

### **New State Department Advisor for RLE**

The relationship of the government to religion is not an easy topic. The U.S. principle of separation of church and state protects citizens from having a religious faith imposed upon them by their government. This does not mean that U.S. domestic and international policies disregard faith or the impact of religion. Andrew Preston has written an extensive study of how "religion has shaped America's engagement with the wider world involving not only foreign policy but foreign relations. The distinction is

critical...foreign relations includes policy but also the wider array of American interactions with the world.” His impressive work is a blending of religious and diplomatic history from the founding of our nation to the present day. Current U.S. policies on religion and diplomacy were not created in 2013. Rather, they are the result of various times of attention and neglect since the founding of Jamestown in 1622.<sup>31</sup>

In 1998, the State Department began a new period of attentiveness toward religion and foreign policy interaction. They established the Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF), recognizing the influence of religion on foreign policy primarily due to the resurgence of religious militancy. From negative actions by religious organizations around the world came the seeds for adding religious concerns and impact back to the U.S. diplomatic worldview. During this time period, a military chaplain was brought into the DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for a short time period but the position was not continued.<sup>32</sup> The OIRF initiative did not make a lasting impression in the diplomatic world. Writing on religion and world affairs, one author commented that despite the positive proof for religious mediation and facilitation that coincided with periods of interfaith dialogues between opposing sides in conflict, even in 2008 he found it “regrettable that the U.S. Government is so ill equipped to handle religious issues and relate to religious actors...religious conflict and religious peacemaking are too frequently neglected.”<sup>33</sup>

In the past, scholars proposed for the inclusion of a new position in the DOS to raise the level of attention to religion and religious leaders around the world. In 2002, it was proposed for the DOS to have a new position for “religious attaches” as part of the Foreign Service Officer Career path. The initiative would involve thirty attaches

assigned to key diplomatic positions around the world. They would focus on a portfolio that specifically developed relationships of trust with global religious leaders to work on the complex issues of religion in the field of diplomacy.<sup>34</sup> The initiative did not receive support in the DOS and was never enacted. In 2012, the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group for the Secretary of State made a proposal to create a national strategy on religion, direct the DOS to develop products to improve religious engagements, and establish an office within the DOS for an official mechanism to direct this specific area of diplomatic attention.<sup>35</sup> This white paper was instrumental in setting the stage for implementation in 2013 of the new strategies and DOS position.

On August 7, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced the creation of a new office at the DOS for engaging religious leaders around the world. This was a positive move in an area previously neglected in the realms of statecraft and diplomacy.<sup>36</sup> The Secretary established the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives (OFBCI) in the DOS and the role of Special Advisor to the Secretary of State. This is the first office at the DOS to coordinate a national strategy to engage religious leaders and organizations around the world.<sup>37</sup> This ambitious mission follows the implementation of the new national strategy for RLE that Secretary Kerry and the White House representative both referenced in their speeches that day. Secretary Kerry said of the new office, "Its mission is as clear as it is compelling: It is to engage more closely with faith communities around the world, with the belief that we need to partner with them to solve global challenges, and there is an enormous partnership, I believe, there for the asking." He went on to state, "I want to reinforce a simple message: I want you to go out and engage religious leaders and faith-based communities in our day-to-day work.

Build strong relationships with them and listen to their insights and understand the important contributions that they can make individually and that we can make together.”<sup>38</sup> Secretary Kerry was not only directing his comments to the new advisor, but to the whole of the DOS. This statement in itself can be a culture changing moment for the DOS.

Dr. Shaun Casey, a Christian Ethicist from Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C., is the first Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for OFBCI. He is a theologian with no prior experience at the DOS but comes to the position with strong credentials as an ethicist and scholar who reports directly to Secretary Kerry. His role is to design the new position not only with the DOS, but as a senior government official who is responsible for examining religious diplomatic engagement policies in the DOS. He additionally has coordination responsibilities with the Director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships (OFCNP). This office works to build bridges between the federal government and nonprofit organizations, both secular and faith-based, to better serve Americans in need.<sup>39</sup>

This is a massive undertaking for an individual with no prior experience in the DOS and whose office consists of himself and one administrative assistant. The DOS describes the responsibilities of Special Advisor as, “The Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives is the DOS’s portal for engagement with religious leaders and organizations around the world. The office reaches out to faith-based communities to ensure that their voices are heard in the policy process, and it works with those communities to advance U.S. diplomacy and development objectives. In accordance with the U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement, the

office guarantees that engagement with faith-based communities is a priority for Department bureaus and for posts abroad, and helps equip our foreign and civil service officers with the skills necessary to engage faith-communities effectively and respectfully. The office collaborates regularly with other government officials and offices focused on religious issues, including the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, the Department's Office of International Religious Freedom, and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships."<sup>40</sup> This is a complex mission description for a new, one person position in the DOS. This brings to mind the old military maxim taught to cadets: If you want to see where leaders place their priorities, look where they assign people, funding, and resources. The OFBCI will struggle to meet the stated mission requirements if it is not resourced properly.

For years many professionals have advocated for an office like the OFBCI. This is a positive start and Dr. Casey is in a position with direct access to the Secretary of State to design a comprehensive portfolio on RLE. In an interview Dr. Casey commented, "I'm not naïve. I understand that this territory is fraught. But having said that, I think we ignore the political impact of religion at our peril."<sup>41</sup> This is a healthy perspective on a complex subject and provides hope that this policy and his new position will move the national strategy forward in a positive manner. It is important to educate the whole of government on a critical area facing continuing conflicts that have religious underpinnings and can involve religious leaders.

As with any new endeavors there are challenges. The OFBCI will help the U.S. Government wrestle with the decision of who is worthy of engagement as a religious leader or faith community. This is a question fraught with many risks as the potential to

discriminate or ignore minority faith groups or leaders is a reality. This problem alone requires great sensitivity to theological understandings and perspectives. This is not a light undertaking, but it moves from the academic world to the practitioner world with a capability to dialogue with leaders on conflicts with religious considerations. It is not a simple practice for a government agency to decide who is an extremist, who is a conservative, or who is a liberal while trying to understand what those terms mean in a globally religious context. Considering that the U.S. has embassies and consulates in over 254 locations internationally, it begs the question of how this office can provide oversight for diplomatic RLEs globally; maybe it cannot in the beginning. But this is a good start that provides access and visibility to a previously neglected area of diplomacy. The OFBCI plans to conduct three pilot country studies. The planning for what this strategy will entail is currently being devised with potential implementation in 2014.<sup>42</sup>

One area the OFBCI advisor may have more influence on is the diplomatic educational system for the DOS. The Foreign Service Institute is responsible for all diplomatic training programs. Until 2013, they did not offer training on religion or its diplomatic impact. Now the institute offers a four day elective program, twice a year entitled "Religion and Foreign Policy, PP225." This program is only a short overview of religion and foreign policy but it offers briefings from various agencies across the government and NGOs and is a start. The challenge is to move from its elective nature and short instructional timeframe to a required course in order to get it into the "DNA of the DOS."<sup>43</sup>

The OFBCI will need assistance to move the strategy forward. The DOS has a direct connection to the military for liaison and coordination efforts. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the principal link to the Department of Defense. They provide policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade with a mission to “integrate diplomacy and defense, and forge strong international partnerships to meet shared security challenges.”<sup>44</sup> There are approximately one hundred military officers assigned to the DOS. None of the bureaus in the DOS or special advisors have military chaplains assigned to their offices as military chaplain liaisons. There is no one in the DOS that advocates for military religious affairs conducted by chaplains.<sup>45</sup> Why is this a concern? Military chaplains are deployed and assigned throughout the world as the only government officers responsible for religious affairs who are religious leaders. The need for both agencies to have their cultures and methods of operation translated for the other from a subject matter expert is an additional function that is missing. The COCOMs have political advisors from DOS but these senior Foreign Service Officers are not religious experts or practitioners.<sup>46</sup> The COCOMs need a conduit for interagency information sharing that is neglected currently for the field of religion. A senior military chaplain at the DOS OFBCI will enhance coordination for RLE within multiple agencies responsible for global diplomatic portfolios and provide a method of information sharing on the responsibilities and requirements for the COCOMs.<sup>47</sup>

### **Interagency Challenges for Combatant Commands and RLE**

Decision maker’s at the most senior levels of the US Government have discussed interagency challenges concerning global religious engagements in the past.

One example is now a de-classified, Top Secret document where Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote to President George Bush on July 30, 2004 of the need in a global conflict strategy to counter ideological support for terrorism. He clearly identified that one concern had religious implications when he stated that one of the main problems involved “clerics, teachers, and journalists.” He went on to tell the President that U.S. and non-governmental organizations should play a leading role in supporting moderates through resources, education, help abroad and in the develop of metrics to track US progress. While acknowledging that there had been some good work on the issue, the Secretary of Defense proposed a department lead to expedite the effort.<sup>48</sup> There is no indication that this strategic report was ever followed up with an interagency strategic plan.

In 2012, The DOD published new priorities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in which it states: “We developed a defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’s efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending.”<sup>49</sup> The priorities described in this document describe major changes to a military that has been very focused on one specific area in the world to shift or “rebalance” to a global perspective.

The execution of the 21<sup>st</sup> century strategy will fall heavily on the nine military COCOMs.<sup>50</sup> They are the four star, war-fighting commands of the military who must focus on their responsibilities in all their assigned countries. In just one example, US Africa Command has 38 countries in its regional area of responsibility.<sup>51</sup> When the

magnitude of the geographical size and multi-service responsibilities are examined, one realizes the challenges and risks of commanding such a large and diverse command.<sup>52</sup> They need an RLE capability that is trained, supervised and can execute with a measurable efficiency while understanding the strategic importance and impact that a meeting could potentially have on military and diplomatic operations. Strategically, this means RLEs across the COCOM.

The importance of interagency support for a COCOM's needs and global priorities cannot be underestimated. Congress received a report in 2012 detailing issues and proposals with building civilian interagency capacity for missions abroad. The report detailed three current interagency problems that impact foreign policy, and it is the author's contention the same issues may impact the COCOMs. These areas of concern prevent the U.S. from fully utilizing its abilities. The problems identified are: "First, a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies; second, a variety of structural deficiencies for conducting missions abroad that leads to 'stove-piping' responses and agencies operating independently; and lastly, personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies."<sup>53</sup> The authors of the report concluded that there is no consensus on how to address the issues and that they still exist. These problems could negatively impact the execution of strategic RLEs.

As recently as February 2014, the potential re-organization on the COCOMs and their areas of responsibility was debated for potential changes but these actions were dismissed by the DOD as "too controversial and hard to complete." Despite this news,

the commands will be required by DOD to reduce their headquarters staff by 20%.<sup>54</sup> This reduction comes with no public announcement of limiting the responsibilities and influence of the COCOMs. It is not known how reductions will impact the chaplain positions or missions at this point in time. Considering the small size of the COCOM chaplain staffs, this could have a serious impact on any future strategic missions.

A new mission capability impacting the COCOMs is the Army strategy called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). In the implementation of this strategy, COCOMs are receiving Army units assigned to them or allocated for specific mission sets in their geographical areas for limited periods of time. The volume of RAF missions planned for 2014 is staggering with approximately 5,640 missions planned in over 162 countries and involving in excess of 60,000 soldiers.<sup>55</sup> This provides the commands with a scalable and mission tailored force from small units to joint task forces headquarters. The units receive country specific training at home and provide a level of regional expertise that has not been part of Army Strategy, except in special operations units. This strategy brings with it new challenges and risks. The large spectrum of missions a unit must prepare for can be very diverse. A brigade of 3900 soldiers can have over sixty different missions. This complicates training and manning policies for units in their preparation and deployment timeframes.

For senior chaplains, RAF missions will complicate what is already a limited chaplain's presence. When junior chaplains deploy, they may not have direct chaplain supervision, but will need to provide religious advice to their command. They will potentially be the only chaplain on the ground meeting religious leaders. At the tactical level this has been done but a command never knows when a situation will escalate to

one with strategic implications. This is important considering past issues that have occurred with the burning of religious items, damage to religious sites, prisoner abuse, mistreatment of the dead, rapes, and even murders that took on strategic importance. The provision of chaplain supervision for RAF units is an area that needs attention. The Army Chaplaincy would benefit by further defining doctrine for the challenges that come from RAF missions sending small units of soldiers all over a continent.

Global military mission requirements come from the country teams assigned to the embassies making the request that are then sent to the COCOM through the military service component command. In the case of a request for Army Forces in Africa, a request would go through U.S. Army Africa to U.S. Africa Command.<sup>56</sup> If this system is bypassed, oversight of ongoing missions is not available nor is there coordination of activities in the area. This has been a concern raised regarding the National Guard State Partnership Program (NGSPP). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) currently has 65 state partnerships with 71 nations around the world, where the National Guard deploys forces for missions and exercises internationally. These programs are conducted by each state with its assigned nation or nations. The recommendation is for improving coordination between the states and the Army Service Component Commands to ensure all responsible organizations have the information they need for mission accomplishment.<sup>57</sup> The National Guard Bureau does not have a policy or staffing procedures to track chaplain activities on these missions unless the state volunteers the information. Out of the 65 state partnerships, the NGB Chaplain has visibility on six states efforts at best. The valid concern is to respect each states independence while improving capabilities and coordination.<sup>58</sup> This is an area of

oversight that if directed by policy can improve coordination and support in all COCOMs and service component commands.

Interagency challenges impact COCOM and senior chaplains at the strategic level. The Joint Staff Chaplain position rotates among the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chaplain Corps every three years. This senior chaplain manages the COCOM chaplain assignment program for the military but is not assigned as their senior chaplain. There are only two active duty chaplains assigned to the Joint Staff Chaplains' office although this year they are augmented with a Naval Reserve Chaplain. Even with such a small staff, the Joint Staff Chaplain is available for advice and guidance, but does not direct the activities of the COCOM Chaplains. The Joint Staff Chaplain has started a quarterly video conference as a method to provide improved coordination and collaboration at the strategic level of religious support and advice. This is an important improvement as the chaplain staffs at the commands are small and are made up of chaplains from different services with various experiences.<sup>59</sup>

In the COCOMs, the chaplaincies rotate the assigned senior chaplain from among the three chaplaincies approximately every three years. The COCOM Chaplains are responsible to their four star commanders. Specific training for a senior chaplain to become a COCOM Chaplain among the services does not exist other than a service requirement to have been a graduate of a War College, Military Education Level 1 (MEL 1). The three Chaplain Corps do not conduct joint training at their training centers, so each chaplain comes to this position primarily prepared by their military service and experience. One educational possibility is to provide a joint training course for all designated chaplain staff personnel prior to being assigned to a COCOM.<sup>60</sup>

The duties and missions of the COCOM Chaplains are found in the Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. This is the one document that guides strategic level chaplain operations. The chaplaincies do not have inter-service memorandums of understanding (MOU) or memorandums of agreement (MOA) for strategic level religious support other than the joint publication. The document directs eleven specific duties, with one being strategic level religious leader engagement for local and national religious leaders.<sup>61</sup> With very small staffs and large geographical responsibilities, COCOM Chaplains cannot provide RLEs for all countries on a continent. It is questionable if they have the capacity to provide oversight of ongoing RLE with their small staffs, various single service and joint missions ongoing in their area, and current NGSPR RLEs. There is not a requirement within the NGSPRs to report chaplain actions to the COCOM Chaplain or their military service representatives. In the case of the Army, The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) would be one office to coordinate Army Chaplain Activities in COCOMs. Without oversight there is no mechanism for strategic level supervision or tracking of engagements on multiple global missions. This is not to imply that caring and professional chaplains have not engaged in successful RLEs in the past. As individuals they have. Under the current situation, it is a challenge to track the information, level of engagements, and their potential impact on strategic relationships.

The Army Chaplaincy is the largest of the three chaplaincies and has been deployed in large numbers for at least the last thirteen years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Having executed religious engagements at the tactical level, the new opportunity for strategic, interagency chaplain integration with the new strategy and focus at the DOS

provides senior Army Chaplains a new capability to support the COCOMs and ASCCs. The challenge is to raise the tactical awareness of RLEs to a strategic capability that can be replicated anywhere the military has a need in the future.

### **The Army Chaplaincy and Strategic RLE**

The Army Chaplaincy is guided and directed by specific regulations and doctrine that frame the strategic requirement for this paper. The Religious Support Field Manual, FM 1-05, clearly states, “Chaplains operating at the strategic level enable combatant commanders to engage at senior levels with national religious figures.”<sup>62</sup> This is but one potential mission out of many that a senior chaplain may be assigned by their commander. The RLE mission must be assigned and approved by the commander. Restrictions on chaplains and potential missions are there for a multitude of reasons and commanders need a clear understanding of the restrictions.

Chaplains will always place their first priority on providing and performing religious support to the soldiers and command they serve. The Army Chaplain Corps exists under the authority of Army Regulations for a specific mission; to provide for the free exercise of religion for the Army through the conduct of religious worship and services. Chaplains are not establishing a religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, but ensuring the rights of Americans to freely practice a religion, or not, and express it while they serve in their nation’s military. For this reason, the chaplaincy was codified under public law known as U.S. Code Title 10.<sup>63</sup> Of all the three service chaplaincies, Army regulations and doctrinal publications are the most in depth and detailed. This may be due to the fact that the Army Chaplaincy has had to defend its existence, successfully, from multiple constitutional challenges in the past.<sup>64</sup>

Army regulations describe various chaplain duties as both a religious leader and religious advisor. Regulations provide that one of those advisor duties may be what was called “religious leader liaison” without describing the details of the mission.<sup>65</sup> This is only one of ten major religious support functions that doctrine states chaplains may perform for their commands. In 2013, the Army Chaplaincy published Army Techniques Publication 1-05.03 on *Religious Support and External Advisement*. This document provides detailed guidance on what the chaplaincy now calls Soldier and Leader Engagements (SLE), but was previously named RLE. It is an in depth “how to” manual for engaging religious leaders abroad. It details differing requirements for RLE at the three levels of war from tactical, to operational, and ending with the strategic level. Concerning RLE, it provides foundational guidance on several key criteria for chaplains and commanders: Chaplains will not be involved in religious leader engagements without their commanders’ directive, this is not their primary mission, the missions will be narrow and focused on their advisement capability, chaplains will not engaged in or be used for the purpose of collecting intelligence, chaplains will not be the lead negotiators, and they will not jeopardize their non-combatant status.<sup>66</sup> It is critical that chaplains and those they serve clearly understand these parameters at all levels, but especially at the strategic level. At this level chaplains now engage national religious leaders and work in cooperation with “interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and contractor organizations and individuals.”<sup>67</sup>

Of importance for the strategic level of engagement, the Army is the only chaplaincy to have a specific, doctrinal publication dedicated to RLE and recognizing the differences for higher level engagements that also involve interagency

organizations. The Army is the only chaplaincy that has RLE as part of the training curriculum in its chaplain school and has a Center for World Religions (CWR) at the chaplain school for the training and passing on of lessons learned from previous engagements. The Army Chaplaincy has the only training program and personnel pipeline where one to two chaplains are sent yearly to civilian institutes to earn a degree in the field of world religions. They are then assigned in the chaplaincy as subject matter experts in world religions. The three chaplaincies do not currently coordinate information systemically on strategic RLEs that are being conducted by senior leaders across the COCOMs. The Air Force and Navy Chaplain Schools do not have plans to change their current status. Currently the Army has seven World Religion Chaplain Billets with four at DOD and Army schools and three in the standing Corps headquarters.<sup>68</sup> The Army has set a foundation for providing a coherent, systemic RLE capability to the Army and interagency organizations. This capability can be expanded by providing future joint efforts to improve RLE information sharing among all three services.

The Army has several decisions to consider that may change some of these criteria in the future. The mission and status of the CWR needs to be re-examined and a decision made on how the two chaplains assigned to it can effectively meet the needs of the future. Should they revert to primarily teaching basic religious area analysis classes at the chaplain school while providing research resources for chaplains in the field? The personnel management and education of world religion chaplains for assignments needs to examine the criteria for schooling, the duty management of these skilled chaplains, and the availability of the few chaplains with these skill sets and their future assignments, with an eye to building a strategic staff capability for commands.

Previous strategic studies have proposed a diverse set of ideas indicating that RLE can be effective and included recommendations for major changes to the Army Chaplaincy, Army commands, and even other governmental organizations. They would require major adjustments to training, interagency cooperation and assignments, and, in some cases, designating specific commands that would be responsible for all RLE efforts. They all proposed interesting points and addressed areas that took extensive risk. What was not always addressed was how the major changes proposed would affect the current chaplain force structure or responsibilities. With a limited number of chaplains, a wide variety of mission requirements, limited RLE experience at the strategic level, a small population of strategic level chaplains in the Army, and a watchful eye on doctrinal and denominational requirements, it is critical to ensure that the primary religious support mission of the chaplain and realistic force structure concerns are taken seriously.<sup>69</sup> All of these studies were written before the major changes of 2013 that are discussed in this paper.

So where is the Army Chaplaincy in 2014 in relationship to strategic RLE? Chaplains bring a position of strength to strategic levels of religious engagements. They are “practitioners” of faith who come with a position of respect and authority as a religious leader; more importantly, they are trained to think theologically and bring a unique perspective to RLEs different than would a regular staff officer.<sup>70</sup> Other officers can be trained to think culturally and learn about religions but they do not come with the credentials that a religious leader brings based on their calling or ordination when meeting with senior religious leaders. Army Chaplains are adept at working in a pluralistic environment, an environment where all peoples and beliefs are treated with

respect. The vast majority of deployed chaplains have shown the ability to do the basics of relationship building at a local level with respect to local religious leaders. Not all chaplains are able to conduct strategic RLEs. It may be due to a personal bias, a denominational concern, no experience, or a lack of interpersonal skills. These factors are critical when selecting chaplains for strategic RLEs.

Currently, the default leads for RLE in deployed theatres are the chaplains of the U.S. Military. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, commented in a 2012 speech that US soldiers are in 160 countries conducting missions.<sup>71</sup> Chaplains go wherever the military deploys in the world and are already engaging religious leaders. Future interagency roles and responsibilities will require new coordination responsibilities for chaplains while engaging religious leaders at the request of their commanders.<sup>72</sup> Some senior chaplains have pursued strategic RLEs that were coordinated and involved interagency cooperation successfully in the past on a limited basis but the majority have not.<sup>73</sup> Currently no one tracks strategic RLE's in any of the services. The new national strategy can empower the strategic role of the senior service chaplains to support national objectives and policies.

Providing senior chaplain liaisons in governmental organizations involved in RLEs will improve future coordination while providing experience with the practices of other organizations. Despite being the largest chaplaincy, a challenge for the Army is that the Army Chief of Chaplains has approximately 93 chaplains at the strategic level of Colonel and they have not all received MEL 1 training at the strategic level. With force structure requirements for the Army, the Chief of Chaplains has a limited pool of potential strategic chaplains to draw from for assignments that will involve RLE beyond

the tactical level. These factors will impact the Army's ability to have a sustainable strategic RLE capability for senior leaders within the Army and other governmental organizations that goes beyond a handful of senior chaplains.<sup>74</sup>

There are religious challenges specific to chaplain involvement in RLE that do not impact other military officers. Chaplains are sent into the military by a faith group and "endorsed" for the mission with the understanding they represent their faith tradition.<sup>75</sup> The challenge for a sensitive strategy is that chaplains must keep open lines of communication to their faith groups and seek their advice about what they may and may not do in the military. The "endorsers" as the military chaplaincy calls them, are non-governmental entities and currently may not receive the new national strategy.<sup>76</sup> This places the chaplaincies in the position of deciding who gets the strategy and who does not. It places the individual chaplain in a potentially precarious position on information coordination. Additionally, the chaplaincies' strategic challenge is to coordinate multi-service efforts to provide a common capability for governmental organizations. The Joint Staff Chaplain oversees national policy development but cannot contact religious endorsers. That purview is at the Chief of Chaplains level for the three services.<sup>77</sup>

Training concerns will impact strategic RLEs. The Army Chaplain School currently does not teach RLE at the strategic levels. If this area becomes a critical skill, the school would need to address a new paradigm for training its strategic RLEs at a level greater than many chaplains have experienced. They need to address diplomacy and negotiation skills; build communication skills for strategic bridge building; and teach conflict resolution and mediation skills. This would provide senior chaplains the ability to

assist during negotiations with the goal of helping to restore relationships or build new paths for resolving deep issues of identity and conflict. It would require a review of the parameters on the doctrine guiding strategic RLEs to provide a service wide capability.<sup>78</sup> Chaplain (Colonel) Thomas Vail, Ph.D., proposed a “Joint Religious Engagement and Diplomacy Course” program in 2011 that would offer three levels of training from basic, advanced, to senior leader. The senior leader program would involve two weeks of on-site instruction for RLE at the strategic level. His program proposal addresses the need for specific training for senior chaplains.<sup>79</sup> These are not easy topics to teach in a short time period but are skills better gained over a lifetime of experience, but the chaplaincy requires a starting point to make changes.

An individual with extensive DOS and White House experience, Dr. John Lenczowski, states that, “for U.S. foreign policy to be successful, it requires a capability to conduct ‘full spectrum diplomacy...an integrated strategy...a concept that requires the coordination of all the instruments of statecraft.”<sup>80</sup> The Army Chaplain Corps has an opportunity to design an integrated approach to strategic RLE that will enhance its abilities to serve the national strategy, the Army and the COCOMs with their global responsibilities.

## **Recommendations**

With the new RLE strategy and greater involvement from the DOS in future global RLE, the COCOMs have a vested interest for a strategic RLE capability; one that requires senior chaplains who understand and work in a joint, interagency environment. Strategic RLE is similar to a three dimensional chess board. There are different pieces on the playing fields involved in a coherent strategy that have various movement

options on all levels. Ten interagency recommendations are proposed that encompass the topics discussed in this study and cover the whole of government due to national and international implications.

First, the NSCS downgrade the national strategy “sensitive but unclassified” level and publish the strategy in the same public manner as the White House publishes the National Security Strategy. The new strategy is an acknowledgement that religion and religious leaders are an important component of a diplomatic solution. It will have major challenges if it is not available for discussion, coordination, collaboration, resourcing and execution like the National Security Strategy. A strategy this vast needs assessment for its effectiveness and potential areas of improvement. The administration can promote the positive results from the strategy as points of success and interagency collaboration. If not widely disseminated, the strategy will not meet the objective to “focus engagement on key policy objectives, promote best practices, and spur greater department and agency coordination.”<sup>81</sup>

Second, the Army Chaplaincy, as the lead service for the DOD on strategic landpower, provides a senior chaplain (MEL 1) to the new DOS OFBCI to provide staff coordination and integration for all DOD Chaplaincies. The chaplain would work as an action officer on interagency, strategic religious leader engagements and assist the DOS, DOD, and Joint Staff Chaplain. This individual would report through the Joint Staff Chaplain to all of the chaplaincies. The position needs an individual with a strategic education and understanding of the joint, interagency process as well as an understanding of the national security process. If the DOS will not provide a position, it

can be a borrowed military manpower position from the Army Chaplaincy with the chaplain assigned to the Chief of Chaplains with duty at OFBCI.

Third, the three military chaplaincies institute a joint committee under the Joint Staff Chaplain's office for monthly coordination and information sharing to provide improved coordination on strategic RLE. The ideal result would be an MOU/MOA on RLE. At a minimum the meeting would ensure the concerns and needs of all services are voiced and coordinated to better support the COCOMs.

Fourth, both the DOS Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the Army Chaplain School add strategic RLE training for both departments. The bi-annual elective religion program at FSI becomes required training for all Foreign Service Officers and Ambassadors to instruct the importance of RLE for the DOS and enhance their capabilities. The Army Chaplain School add senior level training on RLE and institute the two week program discussed in this study for twenty chaplains yearly at the senior level to systemically grow a strategic pool of chaplains with specialized skills.

Fifth, the three chaplaincies coordinate an MOA on COCOM Chaplain Staff Positions for training and reporting requirements. This action will provide the DOD a joint chaplain collaboration effort across COCOMs on strategic RLE and ensure the specific strategic needs of all three military services and COCOMs are addressed.

Sixth, increase the Joint Staff Chaplain section from two chaplains to four chaplains to provide timely and accurate advice and guidance to the Joint Staff, the NSCS, the COCOMs and the three chaplaincies as well as inquiries from Congress. Currently no one tracks or monitors strategic RLE's. Only this office could achieve this across the three services based on joint doctrine. A simple one page report submitted

prior to strategic RLE's and followed up with a standard AAR could go into a data base to track and assess RLE's. Two chaplains cannot adequately meet all the requirements that the new strategy entails.

Seventh, based on increasing RAF missions, the Army Chaplaincy provides supervisory guidance for junior chaplains involved in these global operations. Specific ASCC guidance should state how deployed chaplains will receive assistance from senior chaplains for RLE questions.

Eighth, The Army Chaplaincy addresses the oversight and coordination of the NGBSPPs. With the potential deployment of NG chaplains into multiple regions throughout the world, coordination is needed at all levels and should not be an internal state driven process alone. As a minimum, the NGB Chaplain should require all states to notify them of planned missions and provide procedures to track chaplain deployments and activities with their ASCC chaplain. By establishing policy and procedures, the chaplaincy will ensure all organizations that are involved in the country in question would know when chaplains are in theatre and conduct preparations to support and track them.

Ninth, evaluate the mission of the Army Chaplain Center of World Religions to determine what capability, responsibilities, and authorities are required and possible at a center composed of two chaplains. If it is designated as a repository for world religion information and its scope for teaching to revolve around the chaplain courses at Ft. Jackson alone, then no change is required. If it is to become a center for the whole of the chaplaincy on world religions information and instruction, to include all levels of RLE, then it will require the authority and personnel to support an Army wide mission.

Lastly, conduct an assessment for the Army World Religions Chaplain Program. Currently the program provides four chaplain instructors for schools and has the capability to provide a chaplain for each of the three Corps Chaplain staffs. To direct the strategic future of world religions chaplains, the students selected yearly need to be screened for a strategic path of RLE and assigned to positions accordingly. The chaplaincy should direct where they go to school and what they study. A central point of leadership and supervisory oversight needs to manage the world religion program.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Army has an opportunity in 2014 for strategic, interagency chaplain integration that can support conflict mitigation and resolution. Through their strategic advisory role to commanders and interagency officials, senior Army Chaplains will positively influence worldwide missions within the new National Strategy of RLE and in support of the new DOS OFBCI through interagency understanding, coordination, and collaboration for RLE at the strategic level. The Army Chaplaincy will grow a corps of strategic leaders who excel in joint and interagency environments while enhancing its level of strategic support to the Department of Defense. Through these actions, the COCOMs will have a strategic RLE capability that is coherent and systemic in support of their overall regional responsibilities.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Raymond T. Odierno, *Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Strategic Priorities*, briefing, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, October 16, 2013, [http://www.army.mil/article/113256/CSA\\_lays\\_out\\_strategic\\_priorities\\_for\\_uncertain\\_future](http://www.army.mil/article/113256/CSA_lays_out_strategic_priorities_for_uncertain_future) (accessed October 28, 2013).

<sup>2</sup> George Adams, *Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Jonathan Fox and Shumel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 2. Fox and Sandler provide a unique way to discuss religion by not relying on a specific definition of the concept. Instead they state, "We accept that it (religion) exists and influences human behavior and focus our efforts on discovering these influences. There are several such basic influences. First, it can influence people's worldviews, which in turn influences how they think and behave. Second, it is an aspect of identity. Third, it is a source of legitimacy, including political legitimacy. Fourth, it is associated with formal institutions that can influence the political process.

<sup>4</sup> Barack Obama, *Remarks by the President at the National Prayer Breakfast*, public speech, White House, Washington, DC, February 7, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/06/remarks-president-national-prayer-breakfast> (accessed 8 February 2014).

<sup>5</sup> Jacqueline E. Whitt, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Context and Consequences of Operationalizing Military Chaplains," *Military Review* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2012): 53.

<sup>6</sup> The terms religious leader liaison (RLL), religious leader engagement (RLE), and most recently, soldier leader engagement (SLE), have been used with SLE as the currently correct doctrinal term for the Army. The Air Force regulations make one reference to chaplains as "liaisons" for local religious leaders. The Navy uses the term "executive liaison and external liaison" to describe interactions with local religious leaders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint publications use the term "chaplain liaison in support of military engagement" while also describing duties of senior chaplains to "engage" local and national religious leaders. The DOS and White House use the term religious leader and faith community engagement. NGOs do not have a standard term, but two major organizations in Washington, D.C. involved in this field, the Institute of Global Engagement and the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, use the term religious leader liaison. For specific guidance see U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Support and External Advisement*, Army Training Publication (ATP) 1-05.03 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, May 2013), 2-1; U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Chaplain Corps Readiness*, Air Force Instructions (AFI) 52-104 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 4 September 2013), 6.; U.S. Department of the Navy, *Chaplain Advisement and Liaison*, SECNAV Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1730.10 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 23 January 2009), 3-4.; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 20 November 2013), x.; White House, *National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The White House, June 5, 2013), 1.; <http://globalengage.org> and <http://icrd.org> for more information on both international organizations.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05, x.

<sup>8</sup> Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8-9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 287.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 333.

<sup>11</sup> See James R. Clapper, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Washington, D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, 12 March 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13-14.

<sup>13</sup> Ralph Peters, *Wars of Blood and Faith: Conflicts that Will Shape the Twenty-First Century* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2007), xii-xiii.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>15</sup> Juliana G. Pilon, *Why America is Such a Hard Sell: Beyond Pride and Prejudice* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, Pubs., 2007), 266.

<sup>16</sup> Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 1-6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 21, 28, 30, 43.

<sup>18</sup> Jonathan E. Shaw, *The Role of Religion in National Security Policy Since September 11, 2001* (Carlisle, PA.; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 2.

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Ames, *Joint Staff Chaplain's Involvement in National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into US Foreign Policy*, briefing notes, Washington, DC, National Defense University, March 26, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of State, *US Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement*, June 18, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/strategy/index.htm> (accessed 23 October 2013).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> White House, *National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into US Foreign Policy*, 1.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Information Security Program*, Army Regulation 380-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 29, 2000), 59. The United States has an intricate classification process for its secrets that makes it

challenging to coordinate strategic policies across governmental and non-governmental agencies. Military organizations are familiar with the terms unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret. Originating in the DOS, the SBU classification is not as familiar in the military.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Pew Research Center, *The Global Religious Landscape*, December 18, 2012, <http://www.pewform.org/2012/12/globalReligion-full.pdf> (accessed November 4, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> For recent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan see George Adams, *Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> For additional information see <http://www.icrd.org>, <http://www.globalengage.org>, and <http://worldvision.org> (accessed October 25, 2013).

<sup>29</sup> Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, Joint Staff Chaplain, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., September 12, 2013.

<sup>30</sup> John Kerry, *Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives*, public speech, US State Department, Washington, DC, August 7, 2013, additional remarks from Shaun Casey, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm> (accessed 23 October 2013).

<sup>31</sup> Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), 6.

<sup>32</sup> Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, 3-4.

<sup>33</sup> David Smock, "Religion in World Affairs: It's Role in Conflict and Peace," *Special Report* 201, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, February 2008), 7.

<sup>34</sup> Douglas M. Johnston, *The Case for a Religion Attaché*, February 1, 2002, originally in *Foreign Service Journal* (February 2002), <http://icrd.org/rp9> (accessed 13 October 2013).

<sup>35</sup> Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group, *A Working Paper of the Religion and Working Foreign Policy Working Group of the Secretaries of State Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society*, (Washington D.C.: Secretary of State, October 16, 2012), [http://globalengage.org/content/1300\\_Religion\\_foreign\\_Policy\\_Working\\_Group\\_Submitted\\_WP\\_16Oct2012.pdf](http://globalengage.org/content/1300_Religion_foreign_Policy_Working_Group_Submitted_WP_16Oct2012.pdf) (accessed 28 Oct 2013).

<sup>36</sup> John Lenczowski, *Full Spectrum, Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of US Foreign Policy* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), 8.

<sup>37</sup> John Kerry, *Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives*, public speech, US State Department, Washington, DC, August 7, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm> (accessed 23 October 2013).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., additional speech remarks by Melissa Rogers, Director of White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships.

<sup>39</sup> From the White House web site, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp> (accessed February 3, 2014).

<sup>40</sup> Mission statement from the State Department web site, <http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/> (accessed February 5, 2014).

<sup>41</sup> Elizabeth Tenety, "State Department Seeks to Broaden Religious Reach," *The Washington Post*, July 26, 2013.

<sup>42</sup> Dr. Shaun Casey, State Department, OFBCI, interview by author, State Department, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2013.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> The mission description is quoted from the State Department website at <http://state.gov/t/pm/index.htm> (accessed February 3, 2014).

<sup>45</sup> Gregory M. Kausner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *Panel Remarks at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis*, public speech, USSOCOM Conference 2013, Washington, DC, June 5, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2013/210571.htm#.UwLKOOaQBdQ.gmail>, (accessed February 5, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> Tom Kelly, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *Remarks to Visiting Students from the Joint Forces Staff College*, public speech, Department of State, Washington, DC, January 13, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2014/219684.htm#.UwLKxirxenQ.gmail>, (accessed February 5, 2014).

<sup>47</sup> LTC Matthew Yandura, Joint Staff J38, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., October 7, 2013.

<sup>48</sup> Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (New York: Harper Collins Pubs., 2008), 564-565.

<sup>49</sup> Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 5, 2012), 1.

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, December 15, 2013), 41. Joint doctrine defines a COCOM as, "A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The nine Combatant Commands include three functional COCOMs with worldwide operations (Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, and Transportation Command) and six COCOMs with regional areas of responsibilities (Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command). The COCOM's execute their missions under the guidance of the classified Unified Command Plan

(UCP). The last UCP was published on April 27, 2011 per the DOD slide at [www.defense.gov/specials/unifiedcommand/](http://www.defense.gov/specials/unifiedcommand/).

<sup>51</sup> For a very detailed, behind the scenes look at the power and responsibilities of a Combatant Commander see Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W.W Norton and Co., 2012). The author was given exceptional access to several COCOM's leaders for a remarkably open perspective.

<sup>52</sup> For a comprehensive review of the Combatant Commands and future recommendations see two key resources; Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, January 3, 2013) and Edward J. Drea et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan* (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013).

<sup>53</sup> Nina M, Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, February 9, 2012), summary.

<sup>54</sup> Marcus Weisgerber, *US Shelves Combatant Command Proposals*, Defense News Online (February 9, 2014), <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140209/DEFREG02/302090011/US-Shelves-Combatant-Command-Proposals> (accessed February 9, 2014).

<sup>55</sup> Lance Bacon, "Regional Alignment May Boost Soldier's Career Stability," *Army Times*, December 16, 2013.

<sup>56</sup> LTC Jay Charland, US Army G3, DAMO-SSO, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2013.

<sup>57</sup> For a current study of the successes and challenges see Government Accountability Office, *State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners*, GAO-12-548, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, May 15, 2012).

<sup>58</sup> Chaplain (COL) John Morris and Chaplain (LTC) Peter Lawson, NGB Headquarters, interview by author, NGB Headquarters, Arlington, VA, December 18, 2013.

<sup>59</sup> Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, Joint Staff Chaplain, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2013.

<sup>60</sup> Chaplain (COL) Daniel Ames, Joint Staff Chaplain, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2014.

<sup>61</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05, II-6.

<sup>62</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Support*, Army Field Manual (FM) 1-05, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2012), 2-3.

<sup>63</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Chaplain Corps Activities*, Army Regulation 165-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 3, 2009), 1.

<sup>64</sup> For a history of the constitutional challenges to the Army Chaplaincy and the legal proceedings see Israel Drazin and Cecil B. Curney, *For God and Country: The History of a Constitutional Challenge to the Army Chaplaincy* (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1995).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>66</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Support and External Advisement*, Army Training Publication (ATP) 1-05.03, 2-2 -2-4.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-4.

<sup>68</sup> Chaplain (MAJ) Guy McBride, Army Chaplain School, CWR, phone interview by author followed up by emails, Ft. Jackson, SC, December 12, 2013. The author is indebted to CH McBride for gathering this information from all three services Chaplain Schools co-located at Ft. Jackson, SC.

<sup>69</sup> The following studies were written during the war years from the period 2005-2013 and included aspects on RLE with differing proposals: Kenneth Sampson, *Engaging Afghanistan: The Mullah Connection* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 2, 2006); George Adams, *Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006); Stephen L. Cook, *U.S. Military Chaplains on the Ambassadors Country Team* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005); Scottie Lloyd, *Chaplain Contact with Local Religious Leaders: A Strategic Support* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005); Thomas L. Solhjem, *Integrating the Religious Dimension into U.S. Military Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2009); Ira C. Houck, *Strategic Religious Engagement for Peacebuilding* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 17, 2009); Kenneth E. Duvall, *The Strategic Use of Chaplain Liaison in a Policy Projection Platform to Resolve Conflict and Promote Peace* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 26, 2010); Todd W. Ferry, *DOD Strategic Religious Engagement: A Luxury or a Necessity?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2013).

<sup>70</sup> See Robert L. Kinast, *What are they Saying about Theological Reflection* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000) and Howard W. Stone and James O. Duke, *How to Think Theologically* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996).

<sup>71</sup> Raymond T. Odierno, *CSA Remarks at AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon*, public speech, AUSA Conference 2012, Washington, DC, October 23, 2012, [http://army.mil/article/89823/October\\_23\\_2012\\_CSA\\_Remarks\\_at\\_AUSA\\_Eisenhower\\_Luncheon.mil](http://army.mil/article/89823/October_23_2012_CSA_Remarks_at_AUSA_Eisenhower_Luncheon.mil) (accessed October 28, 2013).

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Religious Support and External Advisement*, Army Training Publication (ATP) 1-05.03, 2-2.

<sup>73</sup> S.K. Moore, *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), 185-204.

<sup>74</sup> Chaplain (COL) Duncan Baugh (Ret), Office of the Chief of Chaplains, DACH 3, interview by author, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2013.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Chaplain Corps Activities*, Army Regulation 165-1, 11.

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 380-5*, 58.

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05, II-10.

<sup>78</sup> Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, 18-19.

<sup>79</sup> Thomas Vail, "Religious Engagement and Diplomacy: Training the 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. Military Chaplaincy" *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 37.1 (January-March 2011), 37-42.

<sup>80</sup> John Lenczowski, *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), xi.

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Department of State, *US Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement*, June 18, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/strategy/index.htm> (accessed 29 October 2013).