SOVIE T ANTIPACIFICISM
OF THE “UNOFFICIAL” PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.S.R.

Overview

The Soviet Union has traditionally encouraged, supported, and occasionally financed “peace” and antiwar activities aimed against the policies of Western nations. This effort is spearheaded by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP, known abroad as the “Soviet Peace Committee”), the U.S.S.R.’s peace propaganda arm.

Inside the U.S.S.R., however, Soviet authorities consider independent manifestations of pacifist and antiwar sentiment by individuals or groups not only an “antisocialist” threat to the Soviet system but also an impediment to Soviet influence over peace movements in the West. This is clear, for example, in court documents from the 1983 trial of one “unofficial” Soviet peace activist. Four months after the June 1982 emergence in the U.S.S.R. of the unofficial pacifist “Group To Establish Trust” (the “Group”), the Soviet foreign affairs monthly International Affairs (October 1982) declared: “There can be no political or moral basis for an antiwar movement that is directed against the policy of the socialist governments.”

Three years later, Pyotr Fedoseyev, vice president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, summed up Moscow’s view of Western pacifist and antiwar organizations that did not endorse Soviet “peace” initiatives but do support unauthorized pacifist entities in the Soviet bloc, such as the “Group”:

Certainly subversive forces which have taken root in the antiwar movement in the West try to lump together some “independent” groups of anti-socialist elements in socialist countries and to pass them off as the “real” antiwar movement. This is basically a policy aimed at undermining the socialist system from within. (World Economics and International Relations, No. 2, February 1985)

Statements of Soviet leaders over time show that Moscow long has viewed pacifism as more than an ethical problem of individual opposition to war or refusal to bear arms on moral or religious grounds. Since Lenin, the party has condemned pacifism as an obstacle to its historic mission of convincing workers that only the downfall of capitalism will remove the scourge of war. Detached from the “anti-imperialist struggle,” said Lenin, pacifism is “one of the means of duping the working class” (see p. 4).

At the same time, Soviet leaders have sought to form tactical alliances with and redirect the activities of foreign pacifist and antiwar organizations campaigning for disarmament and world peace. This ostensibly contradictory approach is reflected in Soviet publications, where warnings against pacifism and ideological slackening often are juxtaposed with antiwar propaganda and encouragement of anti-Western “peace” activities. Increasing calls in recent years for stepped-up military/patriotic education of Soviet youth reflect concern within the U.S.S.R. military over the susceptibility of youth to pacifist ideas.

Ideological Conflicts

Soviet hostility to pacifism may be attributed to the Leninist tenet that the demise of capitalism and its replacement by socialism is inevitable. As noted in the new party program adopted at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), February-March 1986:

The revolutionary parties of the working class are...distinguished by their conviction of the historical inevitability that capitalism will be replaced by socialism [and by] their clear understanding of the objective laws of socialist revolution in whatever forms-peaceful or non-peaceful-it is implemented... (Pravda, March 7, 1986, pp. 3-8).

In this context pacifism and all actions connected with it are seen as obstacles to what the Soviets call the “world revolutionary process,” defined as the merger of a variety of...
revolutionary movements (anti-imperialist, national liberation, anticolonial, etc.), headed by the U.S.S.R. and its allies, "ultimately spearheaded against capitalism" and "objectively promoting socialism and bringing its worldwide victory nearer." Soviet ideologists have always maintained that "abstract bourgeois values," such as democracy, freedom, and pacifism, are of little importance outside the class context. Col. Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate and a long-time critic of pacifism (see Appendix C), recently observed:

The communist and workers' parties have always considered that it was not enough to bring up man in the spirit of abstract humanism, goodness and justice in general, because these ideological notions, taken outside their class context, are passive, and have no social significance in the struggle for justice, peace and progress.6

Additionally, pacifist doctrine contradicts Lenin's notion that "just" revolutionary wars, or any conflict which hastened the demise of imperialism, were acceptable. For example, in 1916, he wrote:

We are not pacifists. We are opposed to imperialist wars for the division of spoils among the capitalists, but we have always declared it absurd for the revolutionary proletariat to renounce revolutionary wars that may prove necessary in the interests of socialism.5

Seven decades later, the new CPSU program notes that "the ideas of Marxism-Leninism ... are winning people's hearts and minds through the... resolute rejection of aggressive wars," implying the acceptability of at least "defensive" wars (Pravda, March 7, 1986, pp. 3-8). Subsequently, Pravda editor-in-chief Viktor Afanasyev, echoing Lenin of 1916, declared: "Marxists are not pacifists; they regard just—defensive and liberation—wars as natural and normal." (Pravda, December 5, 1986). Novosti chairman Valentin Falin told Moscow News (No. 45, November 8, 1987) that pacifism, "once a form of struggle by certain social groups against militarism looming on the horizon," had "deteriorated into a passive protest and nonresistance to the evil of war, which made no distinction between wars, just and unjust."

The Soviets, in short, consider pacifism a "bourgeois ideology" whose adherents fail to recognize what the CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist (No. 12, 1984) called the "primary importance" of "the social and class causes" of war and the arms race.5 According to Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the CPSU International Department (ID):

From the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninists, peaceful coexistence in no way presupposes reconciliation in the ideological sphere. ... Communists defend their Marxist-Leninist ideology and will struggle against hostile, anticolonial, bourgeois ideology.6

Today the U.S.S.R.'s campaign against "bourgeois ideologies," such as pacifism, persists. The new party program, for example, echoes Zagladin's hard-line on ideological irreconcilability:

The very acute struggle between the two world outlooks in the international arena reflects the opposition between the two world systems—socialism and capitalism. The CPSU sees its task as being to... reveal in a thrusting, well-reasoned way the antipopular, inhuman nature of imperialism and its exploiting essence. (Pravda, March 7, 1986, pp. 3-8).

The "Struggle for Peace"

The Soviets have consistently sought to promote "peace" and antwar activity abroad, principally as part of the broader effort to undercut popular support for the foreign and defense policies of Western nations. The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace—which has long headed this effort—seeks to unite Western peace, antinuclear, and other social and professional groups in what Soviet ideologists call a "struggle for peace" which would focus peace and antinuclear activities exclusively against the policies of the West while ignoring those of the U.S.S.R. (see Appendix A). Yuriy Krasin, a CPSU International Department consultant and prominent author of numerous articles on mass social protest movements, has called the "struggle for peace" an "independent strategic goal for the communists, a goal which has undoubted priority over others" (World Economics and International Relations, No. 1, January 1986).

The "struggle for peace" is an important element in the U.S.S.R.'s effort to discredit pacifism. Dmitriy Volkogonov recently explained the concept, underscoring its one-sided nature:

... the real struggle for peace is not a kind of abstract form of pacifist condemnation of war "in general." It is above all the exposure of the true culprits of the terrible danger threatening mankind. It is a struggle against those who are blocking the peace initiatives of the socialist countries.... (Kommunist, No. 9, June 1986)

And in an address last May to the board of directors of the U.S.S.R. Writers Union, Volkogonov drew a sharp distinction between pacifism and the "struggle for peace":

... it is important to take into account that pacifism and the struggle for peace are not one and the same. Pacifism is, if it is possible to say, a politically vegetarian tendency, although nonetheless pacifism in a limited sense is our ally. But this does not at all mean that pacifism is a position of communists. Pacifism places us in the same ranks with those who block our peaceful initiatives and, as before, place a great stake on force. (Literaturnaya Gazeta, May 6, 1987)

Moscow's contention that "imperialism" is solely to blame for international tension is central to the notion that the "struggle for peace" should be waged exclusively against the West. In his address to an international gathering in Moscow celebrating the 70th anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, General Secretary Gorbachev declared that it "is well known" that the "main military threat" to the world is "rooted in imperialism" and asked rhetorically if it was possible to "limit the range of destructive actions of the egocentric, narrow, class-based features of the capitalist system" (Moscow television, November 2, 1987).

However, the notion that a "struggle for peace" must be waged solely against the United States and its allies clashes with the beliefs and actions of many Western pacifist and antinuclear groups that not only level evenhanded criticism

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2 The Psychological War, Dmitriy Volkogonov, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 29.
4 Kommunist also attacked pacifists for refusing to participate in the practical struggle of masses against the initiators of wars, i.e., under the umbrella of such Soviet-controlled fronts as the World Peace Council. Kommunist further noted that "the communists ... naturally cannot accept such views of the pacifists as, for example, those on the abolition of military service and the renunciation of the defense of the socialist fatherland." The article, entitled "The Antinuclear Movement: Achievements and Prospects," was authored by Vladimir Orel, first SCDP vice president.

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against the policies of East and West but also refuse to recognize the SCDP as a genuine peace movement.8

In this context, the Soviets have acknowledged that tactical and political rifts between communists and pacifists undermine the "struggle for peace." The CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist (No. 12, 1984), for example, asserted that "differences" between pacifists and communists exist, particularly in the "analysis of the cause of international tension and of the arms race and of the sources of nuclear threat" but also in their "attitude toward the defensive countermeasures" taken by the U.S.S.R. and its allies "in response to the aggressive actions of imperialism."

"Every ‘peace program’ is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses need for a revolution, and to support, aid and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses."


The Soviets recently used historical allusion to underscore their commitment to a one-sided "struggle for peace." In a review of the history of the antiwar movement, the foreign affairs weekly New Times (No. 17, 1986) profiled Bertha von Suttner (1843-1914), prominent pacifist and the first female recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. The commentary criticized pacifist organizations which Suttner helped found for their "limitations and at times the fallacy of their basic premises" and pointedly noted that "Suttner shared all the weaknesses of typical pacifists—chiefly inability to perceive the real causes of imperialist wars and faith in naive appeals to the ‘common sense’ of the ruling class."

New Times contrasted Suttner with French socialist leader Jean Jaures (1859-1914), founder of the French communist party newspaper L’Humanite, who purportedly helped develop "antiwar sentiment based on Marxist theory."

“Equal Responsibility.” In an effort to solicit noncommunist support and legitimization for their concept of the "struggle for peace," Moscow consistently has sought to redirect foreign pacifist activity away from "vague condemnations of war" and into specific, anti-Western "peace" campaigns. Soviet writers complain that pacifist protests against war "in general" lead to criticism of the policies of both superpowers. For example, the SCDP journal 20th Century and Peace (No. 9, 1986) observed:

Naturally enough, we [communists and pacifists] have different, sometimes opposite, comprehensions of some events and problems, their causes and consequences... The myth about the ‘Soviet threat’... is being artificially created [and] unfortunately holds rather many people captive.

Two years ago, CPSU International Department consultant Krasin summed up Soviet irritation with this "equal responsibility" theory:

The negative political role of this theory lies in the fact that it masks the real source of the danger of war... Those who adhere to the position of dual responsibility are for all intents and purposes contributing to weakening the struggle for peace, since they cannot concentrate on the genuine enemy-imperialism." (World Economics and International Relations, No. 1, January 1989)9

Military Concerns About Pacifism

Pacifism is seen by the regime as reinforcing public disenchantment with communist ideology, undermining vigilance, and weakening support for the Soviet armed forces. With the growth of independent peace groups within the bloc in recent years, Soviet spokesmen repeatedly have warned domestic audiences that pacifism must not be confused with the "struggle for peace." Soviet officials—particularly those in the military—attach high priority to stifling any criticism of Soviet foreign and defense policies by groups inside the U.S.S.R.

Col. Gen. G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet deputy chief of the armed forces general staff, recently told a Soviet daily newspaper:

Pacifist sentiments also arise among young people. This is worrying, to put it mildly. If our country, they argue, is fighting for peace, then what is the point of military service? Some young men simply do not understand that one of the main means in the struggle for peace is the strengthening of our country’s defense capability” (Sotsialistscheskaya Industriya, December 5, 1987, p. 4)

Krivosheev’s interview was followed 4 days later by an article in the military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (December 9, 1987), which accused the “Group” of “malevolence toward [the] motherland” and attacked it for allegedly seeking to “incite young people” to evade military service.

(The unofficial peace movement in the U.S.S.R., represented by the “Group,” advocates the right to conscientious objection, see p. 5. See Appendix C for information on the Soviet military’s concern about pacifist sentiment.)

Peace and Soviet Youth: Contrasting Views

Soviet officials have long sought to balance traditional Soviet declarations urging increased ideological vigilance, hatred of “class enemies,” and readiness to defend the motherland against “imperialist aggressors,” with calls for greater youth involvement in peace activities. Contrasting statements by

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8Ironically, Moscow’s “peace offensive” against NATO deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe in late 1983, including publication in Soviet political and military newspapers of “peace” propaganda, seems to have stimulated pacifist sentiment within the Warsaw Pact, particularly in the aftermath of Soviet counterdeployments of medium-range nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in early 1984. A member of the state-controlled East German Peace Council told the Amsterdam daily De Waarheid (August 24, 1984) that he “didn’t see the sense” in basing SS-22 and SS-23 missiles on East German territory.

9Kommunist (No. 12, 1984) once advised SCDP activists tasked with helping Western pacifists overcome their “confusion” regarding the source of the military threat to use “dialogue, persuasion, and patient explanation... as well as a considerate attitude toward the position of others even when...these positions are inconsistent or wrong.”
The Soviet Definition of Pacifism

"Pacifism, an antiwar movement whose adherents believe that the principal means of preventing war is to condemn its immoral character. Pacifists condemn all wars, denying the legitimacy of just wars of liberation. They believe that by means of persuasion and peaceful demonstrations it is possible to prevent wars, without eliminating the socio-economic and political conditions that give rise to them. Associated with bourgeois liberal ideology, pacifism draws fairly broad democratic circles under its influence.

The first pacifist organizations were founded in Great Britain and the USA after the Napoleonic Wars. By the late 1880s and early 1890s the pacifist movement had a large following. International congresses of pacifists repeatedly made proposals for the prohibition of wars, the implementation of universal disarmament, and the settlement of disputes between states in international courts of arbitration. Pacifism distracted the masses from an active struggle against imperialism during periods of revolutionary struggle. Under the conditions that emerged during World War I, V.I. Lenin regarded the pacificists abstract preaching of peace—pronouncements without any relation to the anti-imperialist struggle—as "one of the means of duping the working class" (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 26, p. 166).

Since World War II the balance of forces in the world arena has shifted in favor of socialism, and broad strata of the population in various countries have become involved in the struggle for peace. In connection with the postwar developments, the Communist and workers' parties, noting the inadequacy and the limitations of pacifism, have endeavored to unite all peace-loving forces—including pacifists who sincerely seek to prevent war—in a struggle against the threat of war posed by imperialism. Many pacifists and some pacifist organizations have joined the peace movement."

Propaganda Attacks Against Pacifism

Over the years, the Soviets have increased propaganda attacks against antiwar groups, particularly those noncommunist pacifist organizations which adhere to the "equal responsibility" thesis and those supporting "unofficial" pacifist entities in the U.S.S.R.:

- The monthly journal International Affairs (May 1983) lambasted "pacifists ... who whitewash the imperialist powers' aggressive foreign policy." The same publication (June 1983) attacked "bogus 'peace groups' created to counter the genuine antiwar forces. ... The same forces are trying to speculate on the slogan of 'equidistance' of the peace movement, that is, place 'equal responsibility' for the arms race on the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in a bid to weaken and divide the peace movement."
- New Times (No. 11, 1986) conveyed Soviet irritation with the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council:

  At a crucial point in the antimissile campaign ... the Interchurch Peace Council initiated a debate on the "equal responsibility of the superpowers" for the arms race in Europe ... and then began looking for malcontents in the Soviet Union and pompously held them up as "the true peace movement" in the U.S.S.R.

- Politicheskoye Sammaborzovaniye (No. 4, April 1986) observed that:

  "... the development of cooperative relations between communists and pacifists is very difficult, at times even painful. Unfortunately, substantial pacifist circles have a biased attitude toward real socialism and the communist movement, and start from the thesis of the "equal responsibility" of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. for the increased threat of nuclear war."

- The 1986 edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (2d ed., Voyennizdat, 1986, pp. 542-543), criticized pacifists for failing to distinguish between "just" (revolutionary/liberation) and "unjust" (imperialist) wars, and condemned their inability to "see direct causes in the sociopolitical essence of wars."

  Individual forms of nonviolent resistance or nonviolent coercion, commonly associated with pacifism, also are described in Soviet literature as a barrier to the creation of a communist order. According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:

  "... the isolation of individual actions and the impossibility of applying such methods on a massive scale result in a departure from the main liberative and revolutionary aims of the [communist] movement. The greatness of the heroic feat derives not from abstract individual self-sacrifice but from its world-historical content, from its place in the progressive movement of the peoples toward the victory of communism."  

Tactical Compromises. While attacking pacifists and antiwar activists for evenhanded criticism of both superpowers, Soviet propagandists, nevertheless, are quick to call for unity in the face of "imperialist aggression." As Kommunist (No. 12, 1984) noted: "Today, the positions of pacifists and communists are virtually identical in relation to..."
the main issue of the contemporary period, that is, the need to preserve peace and prevent a nuclear war from breaking out."

Indeed, support for foreign peace and antiwar activity was depicted as a cornerstone of U.S.S.R. foreign policy at the 27th CPSU Congress (February-March 1986, Moscow). The new party program it adopted made clear that Moscow perceives foreign noncommunist peace movements as a powerful source of opposition to Western policies and emphasized increasing contacts with them.13

The “Unofficial” Soviet Peace Movement and the “Group”

Moscow views the emergence of the “unofficial” peace movement in the U.S.S.R. as part of an alleged Western “plot” intended not only to discredit the party-controlled SCDP but also to undermine the socialist system by stimulating organized “opposition” to the regime.

In this context Soviet spokesmen question the motives of those who seek to express “sentiments for peace” outside officially sanctioned channels, such as the SCDP, and blame the West for the emergence of “unofficial” social protest movements inside the U.S.S.R. Gen. Filip Bobkov, first deputy chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB), wrote in mid-1986:

Bourgeois propaganda is trying in every way to create ... social protest movements in our country. In this regard attempts are being made to exploit slogans that reflect the aspirations of broad circles of the public—the struggle for peace, for social and moral progress, and environmental protection—and on this basis to instigate antisocial manifestations.14

Founded in 1982, the “Group To Establish Trust Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.”, or the “Group,” is one of several independent pacifist entities that have emerged throughout the Soviet bloc in recent years (others have appeared in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).15 The “Group” is an independent body of concerned Soviet citizens whose even-handed criticism of both superpowers sharply contrasts with the one-sided statements of the party-controlled SCDP. The “Group’s” latest “statement of principles” calls for the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, freedom of emigration and movement within the U.S.S.R., antimitlistic education for Soviet children, and the right to conscientious objection to military duty, not permitted in the U.S.S.R.

(See Appendix D.)

Soviet authorities have shown some tolerance of such groups since the advent of General Secretary Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost.16 Nevertheless, they continue to monitor closely and disrupt the work of the activists. For example, SCDP officials blocked “Group” representation at last July’s European Nuclear Disarmament (END) conference in Coventry, England (see p. 6), despite the fact that “Group” members had received individual invitations to attend. They also have been systematically denied visas to attend similar international peace gatherings outside the U.S.S.R.

Soviet authorities have employed a variety of tactics to disrupt the unofficial movement since its founding. These have included disconnection of telephones, repeated searches and interrogations, house arrests, beatings, exile, and, in some instances, detention in a psychiatric institution (under Gorbachev, the majority of those confined in such institutions have been released). Today most of the original activists of the “Group” have emigrated or have been exiled. (See Appendix B for a chronology of actions against “Group” members.) The Soviet regime’s attitude has been conditioned clearly among young people, and concern that the peace issue might become a new focus of dissident activity in the U.S.S.R.

The “Group’s” Formation. The “Group” was launched on June 4, 1982, by a small number of Soviet scientists, engineers, and artists (New York Times, June 5, 1982). Reportedly, membership soon climbed to a few thousand; the regime moved just as quickly to disrupt it.

The “Group” developed from an unofficial seminar conducted by Moscow intellectuals that concentrated on group behavior and psychology. In their decision to focus on disarmament, members seem to have been influenced by the growth of the West European peace movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. “Group” spokesman Sergei Batovrin told a June 4, 1982, press conference in Moscow that impulse for its establishment flowed from a perception of the official SCDP as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, incapable of advancing disarmament proposals not previously sanctioned by the Kremlin (New York Times, June 5, 1982). In early July, Batovrin was arrested and placed in a psychiatric institution (New York Times, July 8, 1982). (He left the U.S.S.R. in May 1983.)

In its founding appeal, the “Group” called for a “four-sided dialogue” on peace between the peoples and Governments of the United States and U.S.S.R., urged disarmament in both the East and West, and advocated a free flow of information on questions of disarmament between the Soviet Union and the West, as well as unrestricted movement across national borders of people involved in working for peace. The “Group” claimed to have advanced numerous proposals for building bridges between ordinary people in the East and West in order to foster a climate for disarmament. Many of these proposals paralleled official Soviet initiatives.

14Politicheskiye Samoobrazovaniye, No. 6, June 1986. While critical of domestic pacifist groups, the KGB actively encourages the development of such groups abroad. In a report to the annual Great October Socialist Revolution celebration in the Kremlin on November 6, 1985, KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov praised both the antiwar movement, “unprecedented in its scope and mass character,” as well as foreign “public organizations” (Moscow’s euphemism for the network of Soviet-controlled front groups) for actively supporting the peace struggle (Pravda, November 7, 1985).
15One of the numerous unofficial pacifist movements to have been established in Eastern Europe recently is the “Peace and Freedom” movement in Poland. The Soviet military daily Krasnaya Zvezda (June 28, 1987) criticized this “pseudo pacifist grouping” for not seeing “any threat to peace in U.S. policy” and focusing its criticism only on the policies of the Warsaw Pact. See footnote 1, Appendix B, for sources of information on East European suppression of independent pacifist organizations.
16In one indication of increased tolerance for contact between “unofficial” Soviet activists and Western groups, human rights activist Lev Timofeyev on January 27, 1988, was permitted to speak before a meeting in Moscow of the International Helsinki Federation on Human Rights and representatives of an official Soviet commission on “humanitarian cooperation and human rights” headed by Fedor Burlatsky. Timofeyev, who at first was refused permission to speak by the Soviet commission, made an appeal on behalf of some 200 Soviet political prisoners (AFP, January 27, 1988).
U.S.S.R. Blocks the “Group” From Attending END Convention

The “Group” was one of several unofficial Eastern peace groups refused permission by their governments to attend the sixth END convention in Coventry, England, in July 1987. In a statement released at the gathering, 23 “Group” supporters told of negotiations with Soviet authorities for permission to be represented in Coventry.

According to the “Group” statement, negotiations between Soviet authorities and activists started in May of that year when five “Group” members received personal invitations to attend the convention. The five asked the SCDP to request permission from the Department of Visas and Registrations for them to travel abroad; the SCDP refused. END organizers, however, insisted that the Soviet delegation to Coventry include at least two “Group” members. The SCDP said it might consider accepting one after it knew more about the “Group’s” activities. The “Group” advised the SCDP of their principles and activities and also provided documents.

In subsequent talks SCDP executive members sought, to devalue the role of the “Group” in the Soviet peace movement, alleging that it had limited support, had taken its declaration of principles from the U.S.S.R.’s official peace program, and had “worthless” ideas. (SCDP chief Borovik, by contrast, told a Copenhagen daily Information on June 9, 1987, that the conversations were wonderful, very informative, very productive.” SCDP sources,” said Information, claimed that the discussions with the “Group” had “created strong internal debate.”)

In the end the “Group” accepted an SCDP proposal that only one member be included in the official Soviet delegation, electing Yuriy Kiselev to represent them. The “Group” was then ordered to develop a common strategy with the SCDP, fully supporting Soviet disarmament proposals, to disassociate themselves from their own seminar program, and to submit written information about their activities. “Group” representation in Coventry would be contingent on these conditions. The “Group” refused all conditions and, ultimately, was represented at Coventry only by an activist based in Paris, Alexei Korostetev.

According to a July 22 TASS report on the Coventry session, SCDP Secretary Grigoriy Lokshin criticized attempts by some groups that had wormed their way into the antiwar movement to divert debate away from global problems of war and peace.” His explanation of why “Group” representatives were not included in the official SCDP delegation to Coventry: the organization’s program “had nothing in common with the tasks of the antiwar movement.”

“Group” Tactics. The “Group” began by holding a weekly seminar at members’ homes to discuss nuclear disarmament. It then developed tactics to publicize its views, gain Western attention, and ultimately influence public opinion inside the U.S.S.R.

In July 1982, a member was arrested and charged with anti-Soviet propaganda for trying to obtain the signatures of Siberian workers on a petition for disarmament. In May 1984, the “Group” led a petition drive in support of a U.S.-Soviet summit. In October 1984, it presented U.S. Embassy officials with an open letter addressed to both President Reagan and then-General Secretary Chernenko proposing intergovernmental programs to work on global problems. In February 1985, activists sent a petition to the official SCDP, calling for the organization to participate in a rally seeking the release of two imprisoned “Group” members.

In February 1983, two members began a hunger strike to protest police surveillance of apartments. The strike lasted for a month and ended in response to a plea from a European disarmament group. The arrest of a “Group” leader in September 1984 for reportedly disobeying a militiaman prompted another hunger strike by another member, who was transferred to a hospital and subsequently released.

In its first year, the “Group” tried to promote pacifist ideas by holding art exhibitions on antwar themes in members’ apartments. These exhibitions were ended by the authorities. The most prominent participants were arrested and the exhibits confiscated.

Western Connections. Many of these “Group” initiatives were designed to increase its visibility abroad. In addition to the activities described above, it has made many attempts to attract the support of Western peace organizations.

- In 1982, the “Group” began correspondence with the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) organization in London.17
- In 1983, it met with the British Greenham Common peace group; in October, activists succeeded in getting a Dutch peace organization to plead publicly for the release of a jailed “Group” leader.
- In April 1984, members of a visiting West German peace organization invited the “Group” to join them in meeting with the official SCDP (which declined the opportunity).
- In May 1985, activists from a Dutch peace organization joined the “Group” in an attempted peace rally.

In their efforts to discredit the “Group” and the unofficial peace movement represented by it, Soviet officials have counseled noncommunist pacifists abroad to sever their contacts with it. Foreigners who have met with members inside the U.S.S.R. have been questioned by the KGB and warned to decline further contacts. As former SCDP chairman Yuriy Zhukov put it:

“If the peace champions allow discord among various trends in the antia war movement to grow and slogans having nothing to do with the struggle for peace to be imposed on some members of the movement, and if they are oriented to supporting subversive elements in the socialist countries who style themselves as peace champions, then the cause of peace and the struggle against a nuclear war will suffer.” (International Affairs, April 1986)

17Harsh criticism of Soviet repression of unofficial peace activists surfaced at the END convention in Perugia, Italy (July 17-21, 1984). That convention opened with a demonstration by 70 Italian peace activists and East European emigres protesting the denial of exit visas to 59 unofficial Soviet and East European activists who wanted to attend the gathering. Two days later, an SCDP press conference was interrupted by outbreaks of “shouting, bursts of laughter, and protests,” according to the Milan Corriere Della Sera (July 20, 1984), when SCDP Secretary Grigoriy Lokshin stated that there was “no repression against activities for peace” in the U.S.S.R. (London Times, July 25) and that the SCDP was a “totally independent and democratically elected” movement. Neither SCDP nor representatives of other state-sponsored East European peace committees participated in END’s fourth convention in Amsterdam, July 3-6, 1985.
Regime Reaction. For several months after the “Group’s” establishment in June 1982, Soviet officials refrained from public comment on the organization. In November, TASS political analyst Yuriy Kornilov alleged that the “Group” was set up by “foreign subversive centers” which “manufactured and smuggled into the U.S.S.R. a ‘program of the movement’ and a ‘document’ stating its ‘theoretical foundations.’” He called the members “a handful of anti-Soviets who maintained secret contacts with fascist-like emigre organizations... criminals of every ilk and moral degenerates” (Tass, November 26, 1982).

A year later, Pravda editor-in-chief Viktor Afanasyev,18 in an interview with Vienna Radio (November 15, 1983), denied that the Soviet regime persecuted “unofficial” peace activists in the U.S.S.R. or that such a “problem” even existed.

Vienna Radio: You are a leading functionary of the Soviet peace movement. The Soviet Union and its allies support the peace movement in the West. But one hears again and again that in your country any independent peace movement is persecuted on the strength of the argument that the official government policy is a policy of peace anyhow, and that there is no need for such a movement.

Afanasyev: I cannot agree... with the assertion that there is an independent peace movement in the Soviet Union. What this is all about is actually a handful of people—10, 15, no more—among them also a few criminal types, who actually have only one aim: to assert their private, personal interests, and who to this end are abusing the emotions for peace, the longing for peace. The problem of the so-called independent peace movement has been thought up, made up, and developed by the West and has nothing whatsoever to do with the reality in the Soviet Union. We absolutely do not have this problem.

APPENDICES

A. The U.S.S.R.’s “Official”, Peace Movement

Under the direction of the CPSU International Department and KGB, the Soviets have refurbished a vast internal “peace” bureaucracy known as the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Unlike peace movements in the West, the SCDP receives its directives and overall guidance from the CPSU. As an official body, the SCDP supports all Soviet-sponsored peace and disarmament initiatives and totally abstains from criticizing any aspect of Soviet foreign or domestic policy. It long has sought to gain acceptance as an authentic “peace” movement by foreign pacifist organizations.

The SCDP currently is headed by Novosti commentator Genrikh Borovik, identified during a recent London libel trial as an agent of the Tenth Department of the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate (responsible for recruiting foreign journalists) during the 1960s. Borovik has retained close ties to the KGB through his brother-in-law, Vladimir Kruychkov, head of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, which oversees all Soviet intelligence activities abroad.

SCDP “commissions” target specific Western interest groups interested in disarmament, religion, and the mass media. Through these special interest subsidiary bodies, the SCDP seeks to mobilize noncommunist pacifists, journalists, clergy, scientists, and representatives of other interest groups in support of Soviet foreign policy. All commissions are headed by well-known Soviet media, academic, literary, and scientific personalities in order to facilitate contacts with foreigners in those professions.

The SCDP has been at the forefront of Moscow’s efforts to discredit the unofficial Soviet peace movement represented by the “Group.” Its primary objective—to generate support for the “struggle for peace” and anti-Western peace protests abroad—stands in direct contrast with efforts of END-affiliated organizations and the “Group” to link such issues as human rights and disarmament.

SCDP secretary Grigory Lokshin has taken a personal role in trying to discredit the “Group” and undermine its ability to interact with independent foreign peace organizations. He claimed that END leaders, for example, were “openly proclaiming the goal of destabilizing the political system” in the Soviet Union by attempting to “portray all sorts of dissidents and turncoats as their allies in the struggle for peace.”

1END, an umbrella group of noncommunist European peace and anti-war groups, tries to maintain contacts with Soviet-bloc unofficial and official peace movements. It often has had differences with the official state peace commit lees in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe because of its determination to link peace with human rights issues. See END Special Report, Moscow Independent Peace Group by Jean Stead and Gabrielle Grunberg, The Melin Press, London, 1982.

2International Affairs, June 1984. See the New Yorker (September 7, 1987, p. 50) for the text of an exchange between Lokshin and an Australian peace activist and “Group” member Irina Kirova. Lokshin attempted to prevent Kirova from addressing a conference of international peace activists in Moscow, despite Kirova’s having previously received oral permission from the SCDP chairman to speak.
B. The Fate of Soviet Pacifists

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by the U.S.S.R. and 34 other states and adopted on August 1, 1975, stipulates in article VII, section A (“Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States”), that the participating states will “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms.” Soviet-bloc violations of article VII have been documented in other U.S. Government reports. The following lists known regime actions against “unofficial” Soviet pacifists.

- Founding member Mikhail Ostrovsky was exiled abroad within a month of the “Group’s” formation in June 1982.
- Several other original members, including Yurui Medvedkov and Yurui Khronopulo, were arrested in 1982 and served 15-day jail sentences. Khronopulo withdrew from the “Group” but rejoined in early 1985. Medvedkov was detained by the KGB in May 1985. Since then, he has emigrated with his family.
- In late October 1982, “Group” member Oleg Radzinsky, a young teacher, was arrested and charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Shortly before Christmas, Radzinsky underwent psychiatric tests in Serbsky Institute. He was convicted in October 1983 on unknown charges and sentenced to 5 years internalexile. He recanted, reportedly under KGB pressure.
- Aleksandr Shatravka and Vladimir Mishchenko were arrested in July 1982 and sentenced in April 1983 to 3 years and 1 year respectively for slandering the Soviet regime. Shatravka was sentenced in February 1985 to an additional 5 years of labor camp on narcotics charges but was released in late 1986.
- Sergey Batovrin, another “Group” founder, left the U.S.S.R. in May 1983.
- “Group” member Olga Medvedkova was tried in March 1984 for allegedly disobeying the orders of a militiaman on the day of Radzinsky’s trial. Five months pregnant, she was given a suspended sentence of 2 1/2 years in a labor camp. She has emigrated since then.
- “Group” members Nikolay Khramov and Aleksandr Rubchenko were each jailed twice for 15-day periods during the summer of 1984 on charges ranging from “hooliganism” to disobeying Soviet authorities. Marina Chertakova and Vladimir Brodsky also were incarcerated for 10- and 15-day periods, respectively, for similar reasons. Brodsky was reportedly physically beaten and then hospitalized by his captors. He was allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. with his family on September 19, 1986.
- “Group” member Nikolay Khramov was ab ducted on October 24, 1984, and taken to the Soviet Far East where he was ordered to join the army. Upon his refusal, Khramov was placed in prisons and psychiatric hospitals and was told that a criminal case was being opened against him for resisting military service. After almost 4 months of detention, Khramov was unexpectedly set free in February 1985, given a military deferment on medical grounds, and permitted to return to Moscow.
- Kirill Popov, a prominent human rights activist also involved with the “Group,” was arrested in June 1985 and convicted on charges of anti-Soviet slander. He has been released.
- On May 15, 1985, two “Group” members, Olga Kabanova and Natalya Akulenok, were taken by police to a psychiatric hospital and detained there for 2 weeks. Akulenok reportedly was given injections of the drug sulfa zin.
- Nikolay Khramov, detained 2 days before the July 1985 Moscow World Youth Festival, was confined in Venereological Hospital Number I in Moscow, although he had obtained a clean bill of health from a doctor only days earlier.
- Police prevented two peaceful meetings in February 1986 by placing “Group” participants under house arrest or taking them into custody. On these occasions, at least four members were taken to psychiatric hospitals and reportedly were administered drugs causing great discomfort but of no known therapeutic value.
- Several members were repeatedly warned by Soviet authorities to stop their activities during 1986, especially meetings with visiting foreign peace activists, and were harassed by having their telephones cut off. Larisa Chukayeva

“I can tell you openly and frankly that there is no repression of activities for peace in our country. On the contrary, there is no activity which is more respected. Perhaps you are referring to a group of individuals whom you regard as strugglers for peace. We believe that they are doing the opposite. But nobody is repressing them. They are free and are working.”

SCDP secretary Grigoriy Lokshin at the 1984 END-sponsored conference in Perugia, Italy, when asked to comment on Western reports that unofficial Soviet pacifists are subject to harsh repression (Milan Corriere Della Sera, July 20, 1984).

was sentenced in July to 2 years in a labor camp on charges of “systematic falsification of official documents.” Chukayeva was released from a labor camp in Mozmaysk on December 25, 1986, under terms of an amnesty for certain women prisoners.

- Moscow Pentecostalist Aleksandr Zaytsev was arrested in September 1986 and jailed for 15 days on charges of “petty hooliganism” after participating in a “Group” seminar.

- Artist “Group” member Nina Kovalenko, who participated in a street demonstration on September 20, 1986, in support of Nicholas Daniloff and environmental protection, reportedly was taken to a psychiatric hospital on September 25, where she had spent several months earlier in the year. She was told that she could be charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda due to her activities. Kovalenko was released from the hospital on December 12, 1986, and allowed to depart the Soviet Union on January 6, 1987.

- “Group” member Sergey Svetushkin was arrested in November 1986 and tried on January 23, 1987, under charges of failing to make a child support payment. He was

C. Military Concerns About Pacifism

The Soviet military’s fear that public cynicism can lead to pacifism and to antipathy toward the armed forces parallels broader regime concern over public disenchantment with communist ideology.

Under Khrushchev, Marshal Filipp Golikov, chief of the armed forces’ Main Political Directorate, complained at the 1961 Party Congress that “elements of pacifism” had crept into the works of Soviet writers. Golikov did not elaborate but warned that such mistakes could make it more difficult to instill in youths “love for the army and military service.”

A parallel theme reappeared 20 years later. At the height of the Polish crisis, speeches during a high-level ideology conference in Moscow in April 1981 linked foreign influences to the breakdown of authority in Poland and stressed the need to correct similar problems at home. Soon thereafter, an editorial in Kommunist (May 1981) expressed the Soviet leadership’s distress over the growing penetration of Western materialist values and offered as an alternative a version of Soviet patriotism stressing Russian culture and historical traditions.

This nationalist-patriotic emphasis must continually be reconciled with the “internationalist mission” of the U.S.S.R. and its armed forces. (That adjustment was accomplished in the case of Afghanistan by stressing that the threat to an embattled fraternal ally is, in fact, a direct threat to the Soviet Union as well.)

Following are some Soviet military expressions of the dangers of pacifism.

An unsigned article in Pravda (November 30, 1981) on mass indoctrination, published at the height of the Polish crisis, insisted that internal propaganda must be “decisively rid of sudden outbursts of pacifism, which sometimes occur in certain materials designed for informational and propaganda purposes.”

Then-General Staff chief Nikolay Ogarkov warned that the present generation of Soviet youth “and not only youth” were underestimating the threat of war emanating from the West, and attacked “complacency, placidity, and elements of pacifism” in a published booklet Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982).

A startlingly frank admission of antipatriotic attitudes among the Soviet population appeared in Izvestiya (January 28, 1982). In an allusion to Afghan war draft resistance, Anatoliy Marchenko condemned Soviet parents who inculcated antimilitary attitudes in their offspring and discouraged their sons from serving in the army. His criticism was directed particularly at the “ordinary person” who instills in his draft-age son “the rotten, thoroughly harmful idea” that years spent in the army are a waste of time.

A complaint by then-Main Political Directorate Chief Aleksey Yepishev to the May 1982 Komsomol congress, about “isolated” cases of new recruits displaying attitudes of “political naivete, pacifism, and unconcern in evaluating the military threat from our class enemies” (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 20, 1982). Two years later, Yepishev expressed heightened concern when he urged a “resolute ideological offensive” against manifestations of “equanimity, lack of concern, slackening of vigilance, or underestimation of the military danger” among young soldiers (Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil, No. 2, January 1984).

Recent Trends: “Nuclear Pacifism.” Under Gorbachev, warnings of the dangers of pacifist sentiment within the military continued, as have calls for improvements in agitation-propaganda work.

More importantly, a sharp public debate over the morality of nuclear deterrence has developed. Discussions of “nuclear pacifism” appears to reflect concerns by the military that antiwar statements by the Soviet leadership could foster anti-nuclear sentiments and undermine the resolve to respond to attack.

Ales Adamovich—an outspoken critic of past practices, including censorship, in the U.S.S.R. Writers Union—early last year directly challenged the morality of launching a retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. In a retrospective article in Moscow News (No. 10, March 15-22, 1987) following Moscow’s international peace forum “For a Nuclear Free World, For the Survival of Mankind” (February 1987), Adamovich recounted what he described as a conversation with the commander of a nuclear submarine. He stated that if he were in the commander’s position he would refuse to launch the submarine’s missiles, even in response to a first strike. “Retribution,” he said, “would surely catch up” with the “destroyers of mankind” in the form of “deadly radiation from their own warheads and the bombed nuclear reactors,” adding that “we do not want to participate in the killing of mankind, to participate in either a first, second, or any other strike.”

1Three years later, Krasnaya Zvezda (December 5, 1985) detailed several cases of young men avoiding military service, indicated that draft-dodging to avoid the war in Afghanistan was becoming a problem. Krasnaya Zvezda gave no reasons why youngsters were failing to sign up for their 2-year service from the age of 18 but stated that no one would escape punishment. On October 22, 1987, the paper reported that draft-dodgers received prison sentences of up to 2 years.
Military Counterattack. Adamovich’s article drew a sharp response from Col. Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, deputy chief of the Army and Navy Main Political Directorate and a defender of hard-line views on East-West relations. In an address to a Writers Union conference in April with Adamovich present, Volkogonov attacked the Moscow News article for erroneously equating the “struggle for peace” with “pacifism” and placing the Soviet Union “in the same ranks” as the West. He branded pacifism as a “politically vegetarian tendency” and likened the author’s position to that of the “nuclear pacifists” of 20 years ago who supported “unilateral disarmament” (Literaturnaya Gazeta, May 6, 1987).2

Subsequent public condemnations of pacifism by senior military officials appeared to reflect concerns that antinuclear sentiments might erode the logic and substance of the military’s deterrent posture and undermine the willingness of soldiers to perform their duties.

• In a May 22, 1987, Krasnaya Zvezda article Volkogonov again criticized Adamovich, accusing him of “damning nuclear weapons outside a political context,” which Volkogonov characterized as an approach leading to “unilateral disarmament” by the Soviet Union. Volkogonov charged that Adamovich had “cast doubt on the expediency of Soviet servicemen fulfilling their military duty” and went on to say that if the West should “proceed to monstrous actions,” the Soviet officers and soldiers of the strategic forces “would be forced to fulfill their duty to the end.”

• Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Chief Aleksey Lizichev, in an address to the Ninth Congress of the U.S.S.R. All-Union Znaniye Society in early 1987, expressed similar concern about Soviet military propaganda lectures which apparently confused the “struggle for peace” with ordinary pacifist sentiment. Lizichev noted that “undertones of pacifism have begun to appear in certain statements. But the struggle for peace and pacifism are by no means one and the same thing” (Izvestiya, May 29r 1987).

• Defense minister Dmitriy Yazov hinted strongly to military newspaper editors in Moscow in mid-August 1987 that publication of official Soviet peace propaganda in Soviet military journals and newspapers had the effect of instilling the wrong ideas in young recruits. Yazov declared that “the struggle for peace does not preclude but presupposes everyone’s constant readiness to fulfill his military duty to the end” (Krasnaya Zvezda, August 14, 1987).

2Just 5 months after it published Volkogonov’s remarks, Literaturnaya Gazeta referred to the “brutal and difficult war” in Afghanistan and urged the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to erect a memorial in Moscow commemorating soldiers who have “died brave deaths” an foreign soil (October 14, 1987). The next day, Sovetskaya Kultura published letters of a Soviet soldier killed in Afghanistan (October 15, 1987).

D. Excerpts from the “Group’s” Statement of Principles1

We are of the opinion that the causes of the existing tension in the world, threatened by total nuclear destruction, are in the lack of trust between countries and people. The way to the elimination of this lack and the establishment of stable peace lies, in our opinion, in the people’s study of each other, changing of our behavior toward people with different viewpoints, elimination of forced stereotypes about “the enemy” from people’s awareness, elimination of “barricade” thinking.

We see our goals as:

• elimination of anti-Western viewpoints, countering of xenophobia and chauvinism in [the Soviet Union];
• close cooperation with activists in foreign peace movements to overcome lack of trust toward the Soviet people in Western countries, in the Third World and in countries allied with the Soviet Union;
• countering the growing militarism of social consciousness, primarily the system involving “military-patriotic upbringing of children”;
• introduction into social ethics of antimilitaristic education of children as a necessary element in the humanization of social morality.

Here [in the Soviet Union] we consider it necessary:

• to strictly uphold the citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms;
• to give amnesty to all prisoners of conscience, meaning people who are imprisoned because of their ideas, if they have not committed violence or advocated it;
• to change legislative and judicial practices in the Soviet Union so that the persecution of ideas can be stopped;
• to eliminate the death penalty;
• to create a “right of pacifism,” meaning the creation of alternative social service for people who cannot enter the army because of their beliefs;
• to create a total right of free movement and choice of residence both outside the country (freedom to travel out of the country, with the right to return) and inside the country (elimination of the system of directed residence).

In its activities the trust group [strives] for the broadest cooperation with Western peace groups and with unofficial movements of peace activists in the East European countries. Only through combined inputs can we build a stable, just and secure peace, without war, violence and oppression.

1Copenhagen Information, June 9, 1987, p. 3.

Further Information
