Reagan Statements on
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF),
Nuclear Freeze Issues

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Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981

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Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons

November 18, 1981
Officers, ladies and gentlemen of the National Press Club and, as of a very short time ago, fellow members:

Back in April while in the hospital I had, as you can readily understand, a lot of time for reflection. And one day I decided to send a personal, handwritten letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about 10 years ago in San Clemente, California, as he and President Nixon were concluding a series of meetings that had brought hope to all the world. Never had peace and good will seemed closer at hand.

I’d like to read you a few paragraphs from that letter. “Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.”

I went on in my letter to say: “The people of the world still share that hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world, despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual lives, their destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around.

“If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of self-government, then where among them do we find any who are capable of governing others?

“Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our peoples? Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan? Is life better for the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate who shall govern the people of Angola?

“It is often implied that such things have been made necessary because of territorial ambitions of the United States; that we have imperialistic designs, and thus constitute a threat to your own security and that of the newly emerging nations. Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that the United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.

“When World War II ended, the United States had the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military might was at its peak, and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the nuclear weapon, with the unquestioned ability to deliver it anywhere in the world. If we had sought world domination then, who could have opposed us?

“But the United States followed a different course, one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, including those of the nations who had been our enemies. May I say, there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries, by use of force.”

I continued my letter by saying—or concluded my letter, I should say—by saying, “Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our people, those you and I represent, from achieving their most cherished goals?”

Well, it’s in the same spirit that I want to speak today to this audience and the people of the world about America’s program for peace and the coming negotiations which begin November 30th in Geneva, Switzerland. Specifically, I want to present our program for preserving peace in Europe and our wider program for arms control.

Twice in my lifetime, I have seen the peoples of
Europe plunged into the tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime, Europe has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars that statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to contain, and ordinary citizens unable to escape. And twice in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil of those battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but to restore the peace and independence of our friends and Allies.

All of us who lived through those troubled times share a common resolve that they must never come again. And most of us share a common appreciation of the Atlantic Alliance that has made a peaceful, free, and prosperous Western Europe in the post-war era possible.

But today, a new generation is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Its members were not present at the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Many of them don’t fully understand its roots in defending freedom and rebuilding a war-torn continent. Some young people question why we need weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, to deter war and to assure peaceful development. They fear that the accumulation of weapons itself may lead to conflagration. Some even propose unilateral disarmament.

I understand their concerns. Their questions deserve to be answered. But we have an obligation to answer their questions on the basis of judgment and reason and experience. Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Wouldn’t a rash departure from these policies, as some now suggest, endanger that peace?

From its founding, the Atlantic Alliance has preserved the peace through unity, deterrence, and dialog. First, we and our Allies have stood united by the firm commitment that an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack upon us all. Second, we and our Allies have deterred aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to ensure that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could possibly gain. And third, we and our Allies have engaged the Soviets in a dialog about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West.

These three elements of our policy have preserved the peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them with sufficient will and vigor.

Today, I wish to reaffirm America’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and our resolve to sustain the peace. And from my conversations with allied leaders, I know that they also remain true to this tried and proven course.

NATO’s policy of peace is based on restraint and balance. No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack. NATO’s defense plans have been responsible and restrained. The Allies remain strong, united, and resolute. But the momentum of the continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the conventional and the nuclear balance.

Consider the facts. Over the past decade, the United States reduced the size of its Armed Forces and decreased its military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number of men under arms. They now number more than double those of the United States. Over the same period, the Soviets expanded their real military spending by about one-third. The Soviet Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000, compared to our 11,000. Historically a land power, they transformed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with transoceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.

During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear warheads on the new SS-20 missiles alone.

Our response to this relentless buildup of Soviet military power has been restrained but firm. We have made decisions to strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad: sea-, land-, and air-based. We have proposed a defense program in the United States for the next 5 years which will remedy the neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security depends.

I would like to discuss more specifically the growing threat to Western Europe which is posed by the continuing deployment of certain Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has three different type such missile systems: the SS-20, the SS-4, and the SS-5, all with the range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe. There are other Soviet weapon systems which also represent a major threat.

Now, the only answer to these systems is a comparable threat to Soviet threats, to Soviet targets; in other words, a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by the counter-threat of a like response against their own territory. At present, however, there is no equivalent deterrent to these Soviet intermediate mis-
siles. And the Soviets continue to add one new SS-20 a week.

To counter this, the Allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision, to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over our NATO Allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States.

Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link cannot be broken. Deterring war depends on the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively. The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that we’ll have to use them. So, we and our allies are proceeding to modernize NATO’s nuclear forces of intermediate range to meet increased Soviet deployments of nuclear systems threatening Western Europe.

Let me turn now to our hopes for arms control negotiations. There’s a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex. I want to be clear and concise. I told you of the letter I wrote to President Brezhnev last April. Well, I’ve just sent another message to the Soviet leadership. It’s a simple, straightforward, yet, historic message. The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional intermediate-range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective in my letter to President Brezhnev.

The first and most important point concerns the Geneva negotiations. As part of the 1979 two-track decision, NATO made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear forces. The United States has been preparing for these negotiations through close consultation with our NATO partners.

We’re now ready to set forth our proposal. I have informed President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to the negotiations on intermediate range, land-based nuclear missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the Moon, would be a giant step for mankind.

Now, we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts, but let me call to your attention the background against which our proposal is made.

During the past 6 years while the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1,100 warheads on the SS-20s, SS-4s and 5s. And the United States has no comparable missiles. Indeed, the United States dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.

As we look to the future of the negotiations, it’s also important to address certain Soviet claims, which left unrefuted could become critical barriers to real progress in arms control.

The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate range nuclear forces already exists. That assertion is wrong. By any objective measure, as this chart indicates, the Soviet Union has developed an increasingly overwhelming advantage. They now enjoy a superiority on the order of six to one. The red is the Soviet buildup; the blue is our own. That is 1975, and that is 1981.

Now, Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their SS-20s behind the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to Europe. Well, as this map demonstrates, the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that puts almost all of Western Europe—the great cities—Rome, Athens, Paris, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more—all of Scandinavia, all of the Middle East, all of northern Africa, all within range of these missiles which, incidentally, are mobile and can be moved on shorter notice. These little images mark the present location which would give them a range clear out into the Atlantic.

The second proposal that I’ve made to President Brezhnev concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next year.

I have instructed Secretary Haig to discuss the timing of such meetings with Soviet representatives. Substance, however, is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the Geneva talks this month illustrates, we can make proposals for genuinely serious reductions, but only if we take the time to prepare care-
The United States has been preparing carefully for resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we don’t want a repetition of past disappointments. We don’t want an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Now, I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity, rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals.

To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The third proposal I’ve made to the Soviet Union is that we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-Day. The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe, and in the world, than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.

Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to maintain peace we must reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation.

I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the current Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we’re laying the foundation for a Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. This conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability and security in Europe. Agreement in this conference is within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.

All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded principles—substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.

My administration, our country, and I are committed to achieving arms reductions agreements based on these principles. Today I have outlined the kinds of bold, equitable proposals which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment, if it will demonstrate that its often-repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by positive action.

Preservation of peace in Europe and the pursuit of arms reduction talks are of fundamental importance. But we must also help to bring peace and security to regions now torn by conflict, external intervention, and war.

The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence of war. We foresee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world at peace.

At the economic summit conference in Cancun, I met with the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives to growth, and we’re working to develop new programs to help the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth.

And terms like “peace” and “security”, we have to say, have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual whose state has stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as states. We must recognize that progress and the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. These accords have not yet been translated into living reality.

Today I’ve announced an agenda that can help to achieve peace, security, and freedom across the globe. In particular, I have made an important offer to forego entirely deployment of new American missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union is prepared to respond on an equal footing.

There is no reason why people in any part of the world should have to live in permanent fear of war or its specter. I believe the time has come for all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn’t threaten other states. I believe the time is right to move forward on
arms control and the resolution of critical regional disputes at the conference table. Nothing will have a higher priority for me and for the American people over the coming months and years.

Addressing the United Nations 20 years ago, another American President described the goal that we still pursue today. He said, “If we all can persevere, if we can look beyond our shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.”

He didn’t live to see that goal achieved. I invite all nations to join with America today in the quest for such a world.

Thank you.
Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Soviet Announcement Concerning Missile Deployment

March 16, 1982
Upon examination, the “unilateral moratorium” offered by President Brezhnev is neither unilateral, nor a moratorium.

The offer, President Brezhnev makes clear, is limited to the European Soviet Union, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. free to continue its SS-20 buildup east of the Urals, well within range of Western Europe. As we have noted on many occasions, given its range and mobility, an SS-20 is a threat to NATO wherever located.

President Brezhnev clearly links his “unilateral” offer to the condition that Western preparations for the deployment of ground launch cruise, missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II, agreed upon in December 1979, do not proceed. This condition, plus the fact that the Soviets have already prepared sites for new SS-20’s west as well as east of the Urals, demonstrate that this is a propaganda gesture and that the Soviets do not really intend to stop their SS-20 buildup.

The Soviet SS-20 force already exceeds the dimensions of the expected threat when NATO took its decision of December 1979 to deploy U.S. GLCM and Pershing II missiles in Europe and to seek, through arms control, to reduce planned levels of long-range intermediate nuclear force (INF) missiles on both sides. The Soviets now have 300 SS-20 missiles deployed, with 900 warheads. Brezhnev’s freeze proposal is designed, like previous Soviet statements over the past 3 years, to direct attention away from the enormous growth of Soviet capabilities that has already taken place and the enormous preponderance that the Soviet Union has thereby acquired.

It is unfortunate that the Soviets did not choose to exercise real restraint before their SS-20 buildup began. NATO, for its part, has been observing restraint on INF missiles for well over a decade, which the Soviets simply exploited.

In sum, President Brezhnev’s offer is neither evidence of Soviet restraint, nor is it designed to foster an arms control agreement. Like previous such Soviet freeze proposals, this one seeks to legitimize Soviet superiority, to leave the Soviet Union free to continue its buildup, to divide the NATO Alliance, to stop U.S. deployments, and thus to secure for the Soviet Union unchallenged hegemony over Europe.

The United States has put forward concrete proposals in Geneva for the complete elimination of missiles on both sides, cited by Brezhnev in his remarks of today. We regret the Soviet Union apparently prefers propaganda gestures to concentrating on serious negotiations in Geneva. For its part, the United States, with the full support of its allies, will continue to implement both tracks of the December 1979 decision on the deployment of new systems to Europe and the pursuit of genuine arms control, which we hope will make those deployments unnecessary.

President Brezhnev’s proposal to place limits on the operations of missile submarines is also not a serious proposal. U.S submarines, by deploying to extensive ocean areas, are able to remain invulnerable to Soviet attack, and thus constitute a stable deterrent force. Reducing their area of operations in the world’s oceans would increase their vulnerability and erode our confidence in their deterrent capability. The Soviet proposal, therefore, is entirely self-serving. Having made a large fraction of our land-based ICBM force vulnerable through their large ICBM buildup, the Soviets in this proposal are attempting to reduce the confidence we have in the sea-based leg of our deterrent.

The proposal for a ban on the deployment of ground-based, long-range cruise missiles is yet another transparent effort to disrupt NATO’s 1979 two-track decision. Moreover, in focusing on sea-based as well as land-based, long-range cruise missiles, the proposal ignores the hundreds of shorter-range cruise missiles that the Soviet Union currently deploys aboard its warships.

Finally, we want to reiterate the four principles underlying the Reagan administration’s approach to arms control. These are to seek agreements that:
1. produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
2. are equal, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
3. are verifiable, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based simply upon trust; and
4. enhance U.S. and Allied security, because arms control is not an end in itself, but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They underlie our position in the current Geneva negotiations on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missile forces. They also form the basis for our approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of strategic arms—the START talks.
Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on United States-Soviet Union Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions

December 16, 1982
As you know, the U.S. has proposed the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet land-based, longer range INF missiles—the zero-zero solution. As you also know from Soviet public statements, the Soviets have proposed that after 5 years, the U.S.S.R. and NATO reduce to a ceiling of 300 “medium-range” nuclear missiles and aircraft located in or “intended for use in” Europe, to include British and French forces. This longstanding position, which is basically unchanged, would allow them to maintain their monopoly over the U.S. in longer range INF missiles, especially their mobile, triple-warhead SS-20 missiles in Europe and the Asian U.S.S.R. The number of deployed SS-20’s currently stands at 333 launchers.

A missile subceiling, as mentioned in recent press accounts, would at most require the reduction of some of these highly mobile systems in or “intended for use in” Europe, while requiring us to cancel entirely our deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles planned to begin in December 1983. This would leave the Soviets with a substantial monopoly over the West in long-range, land-based INF systems, would not constrain the overall levels of Soviet systems, would draw into the bilateral negotiations the nuclear forces of other countries, and is patently inadequate as a solution to the INF issue, since it would not eliminate the political and military threat to the alliance posed by Soviet longer range INF missiles.

We will continue the negotiations on a serious basis. During these negotiations, we and the Soviets have elaborated our positions in both formal and informal contacts. We will continue to study the Soviet position, and it will be among the things we will be discussing when the next round begins on January 27.

We have kept our allies fully informed about negotiations as they have occurred. We and they have reaffirmed in three recent NATO meetings at the Foreign Minister or Defense Minister level that the zero-zero solution remains the best arms control result, since it would eliminate the systems of greatest concern to both sides. The President and his administration are fully convinced of the reasonableness of this carefully developed proposal. Nothing could be fairer to all concerned.

June 4, 1987

June 4, 1987

I welcome the statement today by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Bundestag supporting deep reductions in an entire class of nuclear weapons. This decision sets the stage for establishing a common NATO position at the coming foreign ministers meeting in Reyjavik.

The position which our country takes with the Soviet Union on SRINF affects both the security of the NATO alliance and the entire West. I am confident that based on discussions within NATO and those that will occur here in Venice, a foundation will be laid for equal and verifiable global constraints on United States and Soviet SRINF missiles in the near future. Once that is established, I will instruct our negotiators in Geneva to incorporate this into the United States position.

NATO actions on INF represent a major success story. The alliance has been resolute in responding to the deadly new threat to the West sparked by the Soviet deployment of new triple-warhead SS-20 missiles targeted against our allies. NATO has steadfastly implemented its 1979 double-track decision which countered this threat. It is the fact that NATO was willing to deploy its own INF missiles, while simultaneously seeking a balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreement, that brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table in 1985 and gave us the opportunity to achieve-for the first time in history-deep reductions in, and possibly the elimination of, an entire class of nuclear weapons.

Our actions on INF have always been characterized by close consultations with our friends and allies in both Europe and Asia. Chancellor Kohl’s announcement today should be seen in that context. I commend the Chancellor on the leadership he has shown on this issue. I am determined to continue working closely with our allies on these issues and to sustain the strength of our alliance.
Remarks to Reporters on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions
March 3, 1987
Remarks to Reporters on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions
March 3, 1987

Working closely with our friends and allies in Europe and Asia, the United States has pursued—ever since my initial proposal of November 1981—deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions of land-based U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles, with the objective of their complete global elimination. Most recently we’ve been preparing a detailed treaty text to implement these agreed objectives and to follow the specific formula on which Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed at our meeting in Iceland last October. This calls for reductions to an interim-global ceiling of 100 warheads on U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles, with none in Europe, along with constraints on shorter range INF missiles and provisions for effective verification. I remain firmly committed to these objectives.

Having long sought progress in this area, therefore, I welcome the statement by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on Saturday that the Soviet Union will no longer insist on linking agreement on reductions in INF to agreements in other negotiations. This removes a serious obstacle to progress toward INF reductions and is consistent with the understanding which Mr. Gorbachev and I reached at our 1985 Geneva summit meeting: that we would indeed seek a separate agreement in this important area. I want to congratulate our allies for their firmness on this issue. Obviously, our strength of purpose has led to progress. To seize this new opportunity, I have instructed our negotiators to begin the presentation of our draft INF treaty text in Geneva tomorrow. I hope that the Soviet Union will then proceed with us to serious discussion of the details which are essential to translate areas of agreement in principle into a concrete agreement. And I want to stress that of the important issues which remain to be resolved none is more important than verification. Because we’re committed to genuine and lasting arms reductions and to ensuring full compliance, we will continue to insist that any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

To explore further the implications of these latest developments, I have also asked our senior negotiators in Geneva—Ambassadors Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman, and Ron Lehman—to return to Washington to meet with me later this week. Following these discussions in Washington, I will send a team back to Geneva to take up once again the detailed negotiations for an INF reductions agreement. We’ll continue, at the same time, our very close consultations on INF issues with our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. It was, after all, allied firmness and unity in carrying out NATO’s 1979 decision which helped to bring the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table and led to this opportunity to achieve a reductions agreement to the mutual benefit of both East and West. And as we proceed, it is well to remember that nothing is more important to the cause of peace than the credibility of our commitment to NATO and our other allies and to the vitality of these alliances of free nations.
Statement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions
March 6, 1987
I have just met with Ambassadors Kampelman, Glitman, and Lehman to hear their report on the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The level, intensity, and seriousness of the effort in Geneva have brought us closer to significant reductions in nuclear arms. As you know, the Soviet Union has recently offered to move ahead with an agreement to cut longer range INF missiles. This is something the United States and our allies have long urged. This week, at my direction, the American delegation in Geneva proposed a draft treaty incorporating the understandings which General Secretary Gorbachev and I reached on this subject at Reykjavik. Because of the opportunities for progress that are opening up, I have asked Ambassador Glitman to return to Geneva immediately. He and his team will continue working hard to remove the remaining obstacles to an INF agreement. I hope this will in turn spur progress in other aspects of the Geneva negotiations, particularly agreement on deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

I am determined to maintain the momentum we have generated. For that reason, Secretary of State Shultz will go to Moscow to meet with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The Soviet Government has agreed that this visit will take place from April 13-16. These talks will provide a good opportunity to review the entirety of our relationship—including regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral issues—and to consolidate the progress we have made. Most important, I hope these discussions will result in recommendations to General Secretary Gorbachev and me on further steps we might take to move forward in all aspects of our relations, including the Geneva negotiations.
Statement by the President on Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Reduction Negotiations
March 27, 1987
Statement by the President on Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Negotiations  

March 27, 1987

Yesterday marked the close of the special extended session of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), a part of the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. We extended this session beyond the March 6 closure of the other NST negotiating groups in order to make further progress toward our long-held goal of deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, with the ultimate objective of their complete global elimination.

On March 4, at my direction, our U.S. negotiators tabled a draft INF treaty text which follows the formula that General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed upon at our meeting in Iceland in October 1986. We have now presented and explained in detail to the Soviets our draft treaty text, which calls for reductions to an interim global ceiling of 100 warheads each on U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles, with none in Europe, along with constraints on shorter range INF missiles and provisions for effective verifications.

United States and Soviet negotiators have established working groups to facilitate discussion of the draft treaty which we put forward, and they are working to develop a joint text. These discussions with the Soviets have been businesslike and productive. I want to emphasize that our position on these negotiations is based on very close consultations with our friends and allies in Europe and Asia, whose security is most directly affected by the Soviet INF buildup. Our allies, moreover, made substantial contributions to our proposals.

We and our allies have made clear to the Soviets that an INF agreement must be effectively verifiable. As I have pointed out previously, of the issues remaining to be resolved, none is more important than verification. Our draft treaty text, therefore, includes a comprehensive verification regime to ensure compliance with the treaty. We have three key objectives in seeking such verification provisions:

- to enhance confidence in the agreement, which in itself will contribute to greater security and stability in Europe and Asia;
- to deter violations by increasing the risk of detection; and
- to permit quick detection of any troublesome activities, thereby providing timely warning of a potential or real threat to allied security.

On-site inspection will be an important element of any effective verification regime. Such inspections will assist in verifying the initial exchange of data on INF systems and the subsequent destruction, dismantlement and conversion of LRINF systems, and will play an important role in ensuring continued compliance with treaty limitations. Another key provision of our draft text concerns shorter range INF (SRINF) missiles. We and our allies have made clear since 1981 that constraints on SRINF are essential in an initial INF agreement so that the Soviet Union cannot undercut LRINF limitations through a buildup in shorter range INF missiles. These constraints, therefore, must provide the United States with a right to equality with the global level of deployed Soviet SRINF systems.

At Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed the important principle agreed by our negotiators during the INF negotiations of 1981-1983. Namely, that an interim INF agreement must include constraints on SRINF systems in order to “ensure the viability and effectiveness of an agreement on longer range missiles.” In recent weeks, however, the Soviets have backtracked from this position and are now saying that the question of shorter range INF missiles should be taken out of the current INF negotiations and be dealt with instead in separate negotiations. This new Soviet position on shorter range missiles would allow the Soviet Union a continued monopoly of these systems and would leave them free to increase their existing force. This clearly is not acceptable to us or our allies.

The crucial issue now is whether the Soviet Union is prepared to accept equal constraints on SRINF missiles in the context of an initial INF agreement, or whether it will insist on maintaining superiority over us in this important area and, with this superiority, the
ability to undercut any INF agreement. Since the United States obviously cannot permit such an outcome, we will continue to insist that equal constraints on shorter range INF missiles must be an integral element of an initial INF treaty. I remain fully committed to achieving an equitable and verifiable INF reductions agreement. For this reason, I welcomed Mr. Gorbachev’s recent statement on INF, which removed an obstacle to progress that the Soviets had imposed at Reykjavik. The United States then put forth a comprehensive, realistic draft treaty for Soviet consideration. Now is the time, therefore, for the Soviet Union to live up to its previous commitments on INF and to come to terms on an equitable agreement.

Finally, let me say a word about the strength and unity of our alliances. It was, above all, NATO’s cohesion in carrying out its 1979 two track decision on INF that helped to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table and persuaded them to negotiate seriously. Our own commitment to the security of our friends and allies in both Europe and Asia, all of whom have been threatened by Soviet INF missile deployments, remains as strong as ever. We will continue to work closely with them, as we seek Soviet agreement to equitable and verifiable INF reductions.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin round eight of the NST negotiations on April 23. Thus, the INF negotiating group, along with the strategic arms and defense and space negotiating groups, will resume their work on that date. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed at the same time, however, that this date could be adjusted when Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze meet in Moscow on April 13-15 to discuss these and other issues on the broad U.S.-Soviet agenda.
Statement on Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Negotiations

April 23, 1987
Today marks the opening of the next session of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces, one of the three elements of the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The United States returns to these negotiations determined to build on the progress made during Secretary Shultz’ meetings in Moscow last week. Although a number of central issues require resolution and much remains to be negotiated, prospects for an INF agreement have moved forward.

The basic structure of an INF agreement—the nature and level of LRINF missile reductions—was agreed upon by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself at Reykjavik and is reflected in the draft treaty text presented by U.S. negotiators last month. This calls for reductions to an interim global ceiling of 100 warheads each on U.S. and Soviet land-based longer range INF missiles, with none in Europe, along with concurrent global constraints at equal levels on shorter range INF missiles and provisions for effective verification. The United States and our NATO Allies continue, however, to prefer a zero LRINF outcome—the elimination of this entire class of missiles.

One of the central issues remaining to be resolved is that of shorter range INF missile systems. We and our allies have long sought appropriate global constraints on SRINF in an initial INF agreement. The Soviets earlier agreed that they would include constraints on SRINF in an initial INF agreement, but they now appear to wish to deal with SRINF both within an INF agreement and in a separate negotiation. During Secretary Shultz’ recent meetings in Moscow, the Soviets made explicit that their position in separate SRINF negotiations would be a zero outcome, and they suggested that this would be on a global basis. Much of the Soviet position remains to be elaborated, however, and we hope this will be done during the coming round. Meanwhile, we are already consulting closely with our allies on this issue and are in touch with congressional leaders as well.

It is U.S. and allied determination to maintain our security, which I continue to view as indivisible, that has given us this opportunity to achieve an historic agreement which, for the first time, would actually reduce nuclear weapons. Ambassador Glitman and the members of the U.S. delegation have been doing a fine job in this endeavor, and they continue to have my strongest support.

Verification is another central issue that must be resolved. We cannot make progress on this fundamental issue until the Soviets respond in detail to the comprehensive verification proposals which the United States has already made in Geneva. Verification would be facilitated if the Soviets were to accept a global zero outcome for LRINF. This is the preferred outcome of the United States and our allies, and we will continue to seek Soviet agreement to it.

As we return to these talks, we are hopeful but also realistic. We know that there are a number of issues whose resolution will demand considerable hard bargaining. But, working closely with our allies in Europe and Asia, we are ready to do our part and hope that the Soviets are returning to the table with similar resolve.
Message to the Senate Transmitting the Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

January 25, 1988
To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols, was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.

In addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December 11, 1987. The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. The Report of the Department of State discusses in detail the terms of the Basing Country Agreement. Also attached for the information of the Senate are the notes exchanged between both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the United States. The notes acknowledge that these countries agree to the United States’ conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their territory. Identical notes also are being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.

The Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects. It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their missile systems. Significantly, the eliminations will be achieved from markedly asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union. The Treaty includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections, including the continuous monitoring of certain facilities, to aid in verifying compliance. To a much greater extent than in earlier arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed information has been, and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties in order to facilitate verification of compliance. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance verification by national technical means.

The missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers. They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection as an aid to verifying compliance.

In the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is required to provide updated data on a routine basis.
after the Treaty enters into force.

The Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty are or have been located. The different types of “short-notice” on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S. and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.

In addition to “short-notice” on-site inspections, the Treaty provides for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.

The Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO’s “dual-track” decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which include over 300,000 U.S. troops.

I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate’s advice and consent to its ratification.

RONALD REAGAN
Radio Address to the Nation Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit Meeting in Brussels, Belgium
March 5, 1988
My fellow Americans:

As many of you know, I recently returned from Brussels, Belgium, where I met with the leaders of the North Atlantic alliance. I’m glad to say that the Western alliance remains a strong and unified guardian of the free world, ready to meet the many challenges before US.

In all of my meetings with allied leaders there was a unity of purpose and resolve that I found heartening and uplifting. That strength and unity have never been more sorely tested or better proven than in the events leading up to, and making possible, the recent signing of our historic treaty with the Soviet Union to eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Let me, if I may, review those events, because they provide a lesson that was much on my mind this week in Brussels, a valuable lesson about the only effective way to deal with the Soviet Union: from a position of strength.

INF refers to intermediate-range nuclear forces. They only became an issue in the seventies and early eighties when the Soviets began targeting their new SS-20 missiles against every major city in Western Europe and our friends in Asia, as well. The free nations had no comparable weapon to counter this new threat. So, NATO agreed on what we called a dual-track policy. We would negotiate with the Soviets to get them to remove their missiles or to reduce them to the lowest possible equal level, and we would also deploy our own forces to counter their new threat.

Well, the Soviets tried every play in the book to keep NATO from deploying these weapons. They stalled; they threatened. Finally, they walked out of the negotiations in Geneva when we did begin deploying. The political pressure brought to bear on Western Europe was immense. Many said our allies couldn’t take it and they’d cave in. Demonstrations erupted in many of the capital cities in Europe, and the demonstrators’ line was very similar to the Soviets’ No NATO deployments. In the United States, the so-called nuclear freeze movement gained strength. Well, if those demonstrators had gotten their way, there would be no INF treaty. There would be no agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce, for the first time in history, nuclear armaments. The Soviet SS-20’s would still be in place, threatening the populations of Western Europe and Asia. The lesson learned: One must always negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength.

At this NATO meeting, we talked with our allies about ways to apply this lesson. After the removal of the Soviet intermediate-range missile threat, our highest priorities are: first, to negotiate a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms; second, to address the fact that the Warsaw Pact conventional forces, arrayed offensively along the Iron Curtain, far outnumber NATO’s; and third, to address the problems treated by the continued Soviet maintenance of the world’s largest chemical weapons arsenal.

That’s why continued modernization of NATO forces, nuclear and conventional, is essential. Most of you have heard of SDI our Strategic Defense Initiative that may one day make ballistic missiles obsolete. At the same time, we must continue to pursue NATO’s conventional defense initiative to develop high-tech conventional weapons that may be an important part of the answer to the Soviets’ aggressive strategy on the European continent.

These issues were on our agenda in Brussels. We resolved there to press for large, asymmetrical reductions to Warsaw Pact conventional forces, for example, tanks and artillery. General Secretary Gorbachev talks at home about perestroika---that’s Russian for restructuring. Well, it’s time for some restructuring in the Warsaw Pact. It’s time for the abandonment of the Soviet offensive strategy on the continent.

We must never forget that arms reduction is not enough. Armaments are only the symptom, not the cause, of a much deeper division between free societies and the unfree. That division is at its heart a moral division. Perhaps it is best symbolized by the Berlin Wall and the horrible barrier that cuts down the center of Europe, dividing nations, peoples, families. The question must be asked: When can we ever hope to
achieve a real and lasting peace with a regime that is so fearful of its own people that it must imprison them behind barbed wire? That’s why, when I visited the Berlin Wall last year, I issued a challenge to Mr. Gorbachev: If you really want glasnost, if you really want openness, tear down that wall!

So, let me conclude by saying, I found this week in Brussels what the Atlantic alliance has demonstrated now for 40 years: that a peace built on strength can and will endure. And I am convinced, after our meeting, that the alliance of free nations has never been stronger.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.
Interview With Alastair Burnet of ITN Television of the United Kingdom (Excerpts)
March 10, 1988
Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Q. Do you agree with Mrs. Thatcher that it would be foolish for anyone to expect a nuclear-free Europe for many, many years?

The President. I do agree. And I think that probably what she is saying is something that I’ve also said, but that hasn’t been recognized as much. And that is that this idea that came into being of a nuclear-free Europe at the same time that we’re all aware that in conventional weapons the Soviet Union is far in advance of NATO and it is only the presence of some of the nuclear, particularly tactical weapons, that have redressed that imbalance. So that before you could ever look to a nuclear-free Europe or world you would have to have an establishment of parity between the forces in conventional weapons.

On the other hand, I believe that as we continue with our Strategic Defense Initiative, the seeking of a defensive weapon there never has been an offensive weapon yet in the world that has not led to a defense, even the sword and the shield. And I believe that it is possible to come up with a defensive system that can render the nuclear weapons obsolete. Because I have said as a matter of fact, to your Parliament, when they graciously allowed me to address them-I have said a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Where do we live after we have poisoned the Earth?

Q. Are you reinforcing America’s nuclear capacity in Britain?

The President. I try to refrain from speaking in such details, as matters that are strategy, that I don’t think should be discussed. So, I can’t go beyond that. I don’t want to talk about systems that-that, I think, is information that should be held.

Q. But many people do think that the INF treaty, for example, made it necessary for you to reinforce American nuclear capability.

The President. Well, the truth is that there are still a great many nuclear weapons in NATO, in the tactical and battlefield-type weapons. We still have our Trident submarines and so forth and are going forward with those programs. And I think the enemy’s well aware of that. So, I don’t think that first fear that was expressed by some people that INF was in some way lowering our defensive strength.

Let me point out that it was the Soviet Union that came along with a nuclear weapon that was targeted on all the leading targets and cities and so forth of Europe. NATO had nothing to match it. NATO appealed to us—this was before I was in office here—for weapon systems to provide a defense—or not a defense, a deterrent, I should say. And when I came in office, I inherited this situation.

Well, first we asked the Soviet Union to withdraw those weapons. And they refused. And then we went forward with the deployment of our own match to their weapons. And if you’ll remember, there was great objection on the part of many people to that. At the same time, however, that we went forward, and the Soviets were quite upset and left the table. I proposed to the Soviets that we would join them in a zero-zero option. And again, there was some scorn about that—as if I had done something that could not possibly happen. And the Soviets left the bargaining table. But they returned.

Soviet-US. Relations

Q. Would that be the special advice that you would give to your successor

The President. Yes.

Q. -after 7 years in the White House?

The President. Yes. The special advice and was proven very simply with this particular thing we’re talking about—and that is: Deal from strength. Twice the Soviet Union walked away and said they wouldn’t discuss things with us. We persisted in implementing and putting the weapons in, deploying them, and they came back. And now we have a treaty. That zero-zero has eliminated an entire weapon system for both sides. So, peace through strength is very common sense.
Remarks at the Exchange of Documents Ratifying the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Excerpts)

*June 1, 1988*
Mr. General Secretary, these are historic moments. As we exchange these documents, the instruments of ratification, this treaty, the terms of which we formally agreed to last December in Washington, enters into force.

Mr. General Secretary, you know that our way here has not been easy. At crucial moments your personal intervention was needed and proved decisive, and for this we are grateful. So, too, Mr. General Secretary, you are aware of how important the objective not just of arms control but of arms reduction has been to my own thinking and to the policy of my administration since its outset. Seven years ago, when I first suggested the concept of a double-zero treaty, there were those who said that this was so unrealistic an idea that it was irresponsible to even propose it. Others simply dismissed the concept as a propaganda ploy or a geopolitical gambit. But skepticism and doubt bring a barren harvest. And today, on this table before us, we see the fruits of hope, evidence of what candor and realism can accomplish. We have dared to hope, Mr. General Secretary, and we have been rewarded.

For the first time in history, an entire class of U.S.-Soviet nuclear missiles is eliminated. In addition, this treaty provides for the most stringent verification in history. And for the first time, inspection teams are actually in residence in our respective countries. And while this treaty makes possible a new dimension of cooperation between us, much remains on our agenda. We must not stop here, Mr. General Secretary; there is much more to be done. As will be seen in our joint statement later today, more progress has been made toward a strategic arms treaty during our meetings. We must try to move forward in the months ahead to complete this START treaty as soon as possible. So, let us continue to expand the frontiers of trust, even as we verify, Mr. General Secretary—even as we verify.

Mr. General Secretary, we’ve agreed many times that there remain differences, important fundamental differences, between us. Yet as we work over the long run to narrow these differences, as we work for what I hope will be a new era of peace and expanded human freedom, we must also acknowledge our solemn responsibility to take steps now to reduce the chances of conflict and to prevent war. This we have done today, a first step toward a brighter future, a safer world. America’s allies and friends welcome this treaty, too. We consulted them fully during its negotiation. We made clear that we would never put their security or their interests at risk, that on the contrary we would sign a treaty only if it enhanced their security, as this one does.

And finally, if I may, I would like to take a moment to thank the United States Senate for their work on this treaty. The way of democracy is sometimes a complicated way and sometimes trying, but it is a good way, and we believe the best way.

And once again, Mr. General Secretary, I want to extend to you and to all those who labored so hard for this moment, my warmest personal thanks.

December 8, 1988

December 8, 1988

One year ago today, on December 8, 1987, in the East Room of the White House, President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed a historic document, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF treaty. Under this agreement, for the first time in history an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles will be eliminated, based on the zero-option proposal first put forward by President Reagan in 1981. This achievement is a direct consequence of the President’s steadfast commitment to real arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and allied security rather than merely limiting increases as in previous treaties. It is also the result of allied solidarity in responding to the threat posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

The INF treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles), along with their launchers, support equipment, and support structures by June 1, 1991, 3 years after the treaty entered into force. The treaty also bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force. Once the missiles are eliminated, the treaty prohibits either party from possessing any INF missiles, launchers, support equipment, or support structures.

From the beginning of the INF negotiations, President Reagan emphasized that it would be better to have no treaty rather than one that could not be effectively verified. The INF treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control, including extensive data exchanges, on-site inspections, resident inspectors at a key missile facility in each country, and prohibitions on interference with national technical means of verification.

The elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems is well underway: the Soviets have eliminated about 433 missiles, while the U.S. has eliminated about 108, in the presence of inspectors from the other side, since eliminations began in August of this year. In addition to monitoring the destruction of missiles, U.S. and Soviet inspectors have also conducted inspections at 130 Soviet facilities and 31 U.S. INF facilities, and each side has established a continuous monitoring presence at a key missile facility in the other’s territory.

The signing of the INF treaty last December was a remarkable success for U.S. foreign policy and for the NATO alliance as a whole, a success made possible by allied unity and ‘Perseverance. NATO demonstrated that it has the political will to make and stand by the tough decisions necessary to ensure its security. Our common objectives were achieved: the elimination of both longer-range and shorter-range Soviet INF missiles-limitations that are global in order to prevent transfer of the INF threat from one region to another-and agreement that INF limits apply only to the forces of the U.S. and the USSR. The treaty also affirmed the principle of asymmetrical reductions to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet levels, an important precedent for future arms negotiations.

Since the signing of the INF treaty, the U.S. has continued its efforts to achieve a safer world, including through negotiations for deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic arsenals, a stable balance in conventional forces in Europe, an effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons, and effective and verifiable agreements on nuclear testing limitations. The signing of the INF treaty 1 year ago today was a good first step.