British Patriot or Soviet Spy? Clarifying A Major Cold War Mystery

AN ANALYSIS OF CHAPMAN PINCHER’S

INDICTMENT OF SIR ROGER HOLLIS

Part I: Using Argument Mapping To Visualize The Case Against

Part II: Chronology of The Life and Career of Sir Roger Hollis

Sir Roger Hollis
British MI5 Director General
1956-65

Presented At The Institute of World Politics, Washington, D.C.
April 10, 2015
By
Paul Monk, Ph.D.
Melbourne, Australia
and
John L. Wilhelm
Washington, DC

© Copyright 2015 Paul Monk and John L. Wilhelm
All Rights Reserved
Table of Contents

PAGE
1   Title Page
2   Table of Contents
3   Project Overview
4-5  Forum Background

Part I: Using Argument Mapping To Visualize The Case Against
6   Map #1: There was a GRU mole codenamed ELLI in MI5 between 1941 and 1945
7   Map #1: Comments and conceivable lines of objection
8   Map #2: The GRU mole ELLI in MI5 between 1941 and 1945 was NOT Leo Long
9   Map #2: Comments and conceivable lines of objection
10  Map #3: Given that Leo Long was not ELLI, suspicion reverts to Hollis
11  Map #3: Comments
12  Map #4: Gouzenko's testimony was unimpeachable
13  Map #4: Comments and conceivable lines of objection
14  Map #5: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 1)
15  Map #5: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 1)
16  Map #6: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 2)
17  Map #5: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2)
18  Map #6: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 3)
19  Map #5: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 3)
20  Map #6: Leaks about the Fuchs interrogation
21  Map #6: Comments and conceivable lines of objection
22  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 1)
23  Map #7: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 1)
24  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2)
25  Map #7: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2)
26  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2a – Krivitsky)
27-28 Map #7: Comments (Part 2a)
29  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Parts 2b and 2c – Warnings and Fuchs)
30  Map #7: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Parts 2b and 2c)
31  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2d – the Kuczynskis)
32  Map #7: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2d)
33  Map #7: Hollis best fits ELLI's profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2e – Quebec Agreement)
34  Map #7: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2e)
35  Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis' having been ELLI (Part 1 – The key claims)
36  Map #8: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 1)
37  Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis' having been ELLI (Part 2a – China connection)
38  Map #8: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2a)
39  Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis' having been ELLI (Part 2b – SONIA at Oxford)
40  Map #8: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2b)
41  Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis' having been ELLI (Part 2c – Nuclear espionage Trioka)
42  Map #8: Comments (Part 2c)
43  Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis' having been ELLI (Part 2d – Protective hand inside MI5)
44  Map #8: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2d)
45  Map #9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Part 1 – Level 1 claims)
46  Map #9: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 1)
47  Map #9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Part 2a – Failure and defectors)
48  Map #9: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2a)
49  Map #9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Part 2e – Treatment by superiors)
50  Map #9: Comments and conceivable lines of objection (Part 2e)

Part II: Chronology of The Life and Career of Sir Roger Hollis
51-63

Part III: Acknowledgements
63
PROJECT OVERVIEW

Argument mapping is a relatively new and powerful technique that utilizes graphical display tools to clarify complex issues of intelligence analysis as well as government, corporate, and individual decision-making. However, many students of the craft - future analysts as well as current practitioners, historians, business persons, journalists, and students - are not familiar with its sophisticated techniques and methodology.

In order to educate a wider base of interested parties, the Institute of World Politics (IWP) in Washington, D.C. hosted a public forum April 10, 2015 to demonstrate in detail the techniques of argument mapping. The Forum used as a case study the decades-long debate about former British MI5 Director General, Sir Roger Hollis, and whether he was an agent of Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU).

It should be emphasized that the Forum’s purpose was not to conduct a mock trial of Hollis, but to demonstrate argument mapping by examining the largely circumstantial body of evidence surrounding the accusations against him, which, after half a century, still remain unresolved — despite several official investigations by British authorities.

Questions posed:

- What do we know for certain about the case?
- Where is the consensus among experts and lay persons alike on these questions?
- Can such issues truly be clarified by using argument mapping?
- What new paths of investigation uncovered by this technique might advance the case, either for or against Hollis?

PROJECT DIRECTOR / CO-CHAIR

John L. Wilhelm — Former U.S. Navy Air Intelligence Officer, TIME Magazine correspondent, independent Writer/Producer of PBS television documentaries, including one about the CIA; and author of a forthcoming history of Russian Military Intelligence (the GRU).

ARGUMENT MAPPING SPECIALIST / CO-CHAIR

Paul Monk, Ph.D. — Former Senior Official, Australian Defence Intelligence Organization and Co-founder of Austhink Consulting, recently renamed van Gelder and Monk Pty Ltd, a critical-thinking skills training and consulting firm in Melbourne, Australia. Dr. Monk was unable to attend and made his presentation by four videos he prepared expressly for this Forum; they are posted separately on this site.

PANELISTS

Raymond Batvinis, Ph.D. – For 25 years an FBI Supervisory Agent concentrating on counterintelligence and counterterrorism. IWP Professor of counterintelligence history, and author of The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence;

David Charney, M.D. -- A practicing psychiatrist, Dr. Charney has studied firsthand the psychology of insider spies for nearly 20 years. He also heads NOIR for USA, a non-profit organization that advocates new methods of dealing with insider spies.

Harvey Klehr, Ph.D. -- Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Politics and History, Emory University. Historian of intelligence and American communism; Co-author of Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America;

Charles R. Twardy, Ph.D. -- Research Assistant Professor, C4I Center, George Mason University. Areas of specialization: Philosophy of Science, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Bayesian Networks, Probabilistic Causality.
FORUM BACKGROUND

The distinguished Cambridge University Professor Christopher Andrew published his authorized history of MI5 in 2009.\(^1\) In the Preface, he writes that suspicions that Sir Roger Hollis had been a Soviet spy "were entirely fictitious"; and the author exorcizes the "disruptive minority" for even raising what he terms are "intellectually threadbare conspiracy theories"\(^2\) about Hollis. A year following publication of this authorized history, Paul Monk wrote a lengthy review of it in a major Australian journal.\(^3\) Dr. Monk concluded that the authorized historian’s account of both Hollis’ career and of Soviet espionage in Britain on Hollis’ watch are seriously inadequate, and by no means put an end to the Hollis debate. Monk’s review was well received by a number of intelligence veterans. As a result, he was asked if he would be willing to subject some of the vast number of Chapman Pincher’s complicated conjectures and circumstantial charges against Hollis to serious analysis, as a way of demonstrating the usefulness of argument mapping. This result is this Forum.

Dr. Monk, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Australian Defence Intelligence Organization, is a founder and principal of the Australia-based firm which specializes in decision analysis and techniques for clarifying complex debates through the visualization of inference processes. He concluded that the authorized historian had failed to address the case against Hollis and had made claims at various points that were demonstratively false, while omitting from his history of MI5 almost everything that went wrong with counterespionage against the Soviet Union between the 1930s and the 1960s. Andrew had been given unprecedented access to MI5 archives. Yet he revealed very little from them that focused on the core question of Hollis’ probity. He also did not provide any precise references to security service archives that he did draw upon, making it extremely difficult to cross check any of his claims or inferences. Professor Andrew was the second person invited to participate in this event. We sincerely regret that he declined our invitation, since we believe that a factual critique by him of the following argument maps would have contributed greatly to our collective understanding of this complex case.

By coincidence, the authorized history appeared in print the same year as Chapman Pincher’s final book on the subject: Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups – Six Decades of Espionage against America and Great Britain (Random House, New York, 2009)\(^4\). Here the case against Roger Hollis was laid out in great detail by a veteran journalist of high standing who had been on the trail of traitors and cover-ups for half a century. In the final edition of the book, published in 2012, he repeatedly drew attention to the omissions by the authorized historian of well-documented evidence that counts against Hollis. The purpose of this Forum is to import such evidence into a systematic analysis of the case.

Unfortunately, Pincher (who died in August 2014), also did not provide either endnotes or an appendix of documents to support his claims. He depended upon his reputation, but wrote as a journalist, not an academic scholar. His papers have been deposited at King’s College, London, but are not yet available. He has left us considerable work to do in going over those papers to cross check his use of sources and his inferences from them. Unfortunately, the resources were not available to support such work for this Report. If, however, this Forum persuades observers that the case is both important and has not been resolved by the authorized historian, then serious scholars of intelligence and counterintelligence might well go to work among Pincher’s papers in an effort to further clarify what is now a very challenging “cold case.”\(^5\)

What has been done to this point is an extraction from Pincher’s 688-page book of the central arguments that demand a response from anyone claiming Hollis was not a Soviet mole. These arguments are presented in the form of argument maps, visualizations of the reasoning involved that make it more explicit and accessible than linear prose is able to do. This helps to pinpoint exactly what claims the defence of Hollis must address. This prompted the review and inquiry, the mapping, and many professional discussions that culminated in the IWP Forum.

The simplest way in which Pincher’s indictment of Hollis can be summed up is as follows:

- Between at least 1940 and 1945, there was a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) mole within MI5 whose codename was ELLI.
- The authorized historian claims that ELLI was Leo Long, but this is an untenable claim. Long never worked in MI5; he was not a GRU agent but a KGB one; he never had access to the materials for which ELLI was so highly valued; and his codename on his KGB file was RALPH, not ELLI.
- This means that suspicion reverts to Hollis as the prime suspect, as he has been for many years. Early on, Graham Mitchell, later Hollis’ deputy, was the MI5 figure suspected of being ELLI; and both Sir Dick White and Guy Liddell also were investigated in the 1960s. It was Hollis who was the central suspect of both the Fluency Committee and its successor, MI5’s permanent investigative section, K7, in the 1960s and early 1970s. The authorized historian made no attempt to directly address the causes of concern about Hollis that those internal inquiries held. He dismissed all such concerns as destructive “conspiracy theories,” a term he uses repeatedly.
- The internal inquiries, and evidence that has surfaced in much more recent years, suggest that ELLI, under that or another codename, continued operating long after 1945.

---

\(^1\) Christopher Andrew, DEFEND THE REALM: The Authorized History of MI5, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2009, p. 351

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 520


\(^4\) Pincher’s Treachery has been updated three times, the latest being a paperback edition by Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 2012. Citations in this Report are drawn from this latest edition. They are noted in parenthesis by a (T, followed by the page number of the reference).

• When we look at the crucial cases of the treachery of Soviet atomic spy, Klaus Fuchs, and the role of the “Super-Agent of Military Intelligence” SONIA, who handled Fuchs, the evidence of who ELLI was points directly to Hollis and to no one else.

• Hollis’s career bears a disturbing similarity to that of Kim Philby, with whom he was good friends. But whereas Philby was accidentally exposed by the depravity of Guy Burgess and the flight of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, Hollis was never hostage to such fellow spies and was never exposed. Philby was so highly regarded within MI6 that he may well have risen to become Director General by the late 1950s or early 1960s had he not been exposed. Hollis, rising in partnership with Dick White, did rise to that level, despite his track record and not because of it.

• Philby was not fired from MI6 in 1951 because there was proof he was a Soviet mole, but because the accumulation of anomalies in his record combined with the association he had had with Guy Burgess made him too suspect to be retained. His friends and admirers insisted for 12 years that it was all a conspiracy theory; but they were in error. Philby was, indeed, a KGB mole. This was proven without a doubt by his defection and later writings.

• Hollis was forced into retirement when the 1965 Gray/Coyne Report to the U.S. Government prompted Washington to insist to London that Hollis had to go. This was fully consistent with the findings of the Fluency Committee and K7. It is not mentioned by the authorized historian.

• As soon as Hollis retired in 1965, the problems that had bedevilled MI5 throughout his career came to an end. For example, when London KGB officer Oleg Lyalin defected in place in 1970, he was not betrayed, as others had been before him. This pointed to the high probability that MI5’s penetration by a mole had ceased. Had there still been a GRU mole inside MI5 at that point, especially one in a position, as Hollis would have been as Director General, to know of all such defections, Lyalin most probably would have been betrayed to the Russians. That he was not suggests that the mole he had been was no longer in place by 1970.

• It was only after the April 1972 retirement of Hollis’ erstwhile Deputy and long-time protégé, Martin Furnival Jones as Director General of MI5, that the K7 investigation, put back to work by his replacement, Michael Hanley, who was suspicious of Hollis, pieced together the significance of SONIA and realized that Hollis allegedly had been not a KGB, but a GRU mole. Both these facts are central to the indictment of Hollis and failure to discern them earlier had been a major reason for confusion over claims against him.

What follows is an analysis of these central claims and a detailed chronology of the career of Roger Hollis to aid those seeking to grasp the complexities of the case. The analysis consists of nine argument maps, several of them broken into several parts because of their large size. They are visual diagrams of the reasoning and evidence, with comments and reflections on where the defence of Hollis might raise objections to the indictment. The primary purpose of the IWP forum and of this Report is to elicit a response; to see what defence can actually be made of Hollis in the light of the actual case against him and to shed light on possible new avenues of investigation, either to confirm his guilt, or his innocence. The academic purpose of the Forum and the Report is not, in other words, to insist on the guilt of Hollis, but to demonstrate that if his innocence is to be established there is a great deal of work yet to be done.

There is, however, a further point to be made about evidence and inference in a case of this nature. Those who are determined sceptics may conclude that the evidence against Hollis is not conclusive, or that it is all just “circumstantial." They would demand a rigorous standard of proof that leaves any conclusion beyond all doubt. Yet this is not, in general, how we make judgments about most matters and it should not be the way we assess the Hollis case. Rather, we should be asking ourselves, what is the degree of probability that Hollis was a mole, when the various considerations are weighed? For our judgments should not responsibly remain in limbo in a case of this importance.

As the maps show, there was a GRU mole in MI5 who has never been identified. It was not the man the authorized historian pointed to, so it must have been someone else. If the evidence consistently points to Roger Hollis, does that not indicate that the balance of probability is that he was the mole? Those who would argue “case not proven” must come up with a substantive case that it was someone else, and that looks to be almost certainly a fruitless quest. The authorized historian of MI5, Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University, decries as a “conspiracy theorist” anyone who even deigns to ask the question, “Why not Hollis? But if not Hollis, then who?”

It would seem that the long-time, British policy of “amicable elimination” to avoid governmental embarrassment may have dictated the canonical version of the Hollis case. Then too, there is always the possibility that SONIA’s designation as “Super-Agent” may have been a not so subtle ploy of Russian disinformation meant to stoke a continual flame of distrust between Western allies. That thesis too, should be examined.

That is the point of this analysis, a quest to clarify this still muddled, pivotal history of Cold War intelligence. Our efforts are by no means complete. For centuries, critics of Herodotus continued to critique the ancient historian’s sources and methods, seeking to clarify the true from the false in the events of the wars of ancient Greece. Why not also with the Hollis case? Our challenge to all the would-be Herodotan scholars out there, young and old, is to continue the examination of this important cold case using all the latest tools of research, analysis, and evidence. Hollis was either a British patriot or Soviet spy. Your mission: Find out, yea or nay.

6 One year after her death in 2000, Vladimir Putin bestowed this unique honor on SONIA for deeds never explained. Her birth name was Ursula Kuczynski; she also went under the names Ursula Hamburger (married to Rolf Hamburger) and Ursula Beurton (married to Len Beurton), and a pen name, “Ruth Werner.” Both her husbands also were officers of the GRU.
Part 1: Using Argument Mapping To Visualize The Case Against
Map #1: There was a GRU mole codenamed ELLI in MI5 between 1941 and 1945


References marked by a number followed by a capitalized letter identify a specific nodal element within each argument map.)
Map #1: Comments

Map #1 is foundational to the whole case. Pincher’s indictment of Hollis is not based on speculation as to whether MI5 was penetrated. There is complete acceptance that, in fact, it was penetrated by both the KGB and the GRU. The KGB mole was Anthony Blunt. The GRU mole was codenamed ELLI and has never been identified. Crucial to understanding the case itself and the evidence brought to bear by Pincher is the fact that ELLI was a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) mole, not a mole for the KGB (Commissariat of State Security). Failure to grasp this elementary fact and the related fact that the GRU and the KGB ran separate networks bedevilled official British inquiries for years. Yet Walter Krivitsky had made precisely this point in his debriefing by MI5’s Jane Archer in early February 1940. Anthony Blunt was a KGB mole within MI5 and there was a period when the claim was made that he had been ELLI. But ELLI was inside MI5 before Blunt (as Hollis was) and stayed there long after Blunt (as Hollis did). Note that successive defector claims (in 1942 and 1945) of GRU penetration of MI5 were ignored; but the existence of ELLI within MI5 was confirmed by Moscow Centre in the weeks and months immediately after GRU officer Igor Gouzenko’s defection in Canada in September 1945 (see Node 2D of Map #1). The fact that Moscow Centre learned so quickly about Archer’s debriefing of the GRU defector Walter Krivitsky, in early 1940, is telling. Blunt was not working for MI5 at that time.

Conceivable lines of objection

It seems beyond dispute that there was a GRU mole codenamed ELLI inside MI5 in at least the period 1941-45. There are so many redundant lines of evidence confirming the existence of ELLI, on both sides of the Iron Curtain and both sides of the Hollis case, that even looking for lines of attack seems pointless. The points most in need of buttressing, however, and therefore, possibly vulnerable to attack, are the claims that ELLI leaked the Krivitsky report to Moscow in 1940 and the claims that Oliver Green and Ismail Akhmedov alerted their interrogators to the existence of a GRU mole inside MI5. Akhmedov spoke of the ‘British intelligence services’, rather than MI5 specifically. Oliver Green, as Christopher Andrew quite reasonably objects, was a field asset, not a GRU officer. He would surely never have been told by his own controllers that the GRU had a mole within MI5, much less what that mole’s codename was. Andrew suggests that all Green knew about were Communist Party informants inside MI5, though Andrew ventured no suggestion, even in 2009, as to who these might have been. But as Andrew – unlike Gordon Brook-Shepherd in the 1980s - accepts that ELLI existed, this objection to Green as a witness is largely immaterial. Brook-Shepherd had claimed that Gouzenko did not mention ELLI in 1945, but made up the story later. We know this is untrue, if only because of the documents from the former Soviet Union confirming in 1945 that Gouzenko had betrayed ELLI as a mole inside MI5.
Map #2: The GRU mole ELLI in MI5 between 1941 and 1945 was NOT Leo Long

Contention
The GRU mole in MI5 was Leo

1A Expert
The authorized historian of MI5, Christopher Andrew, made this claim in 2003.

1B Long
Leo Long was a Soviet

1C GRU
Long was specifically a GRU mole within

1D ELLI
The mole's codename was ELLI.

1E Initials
The codename ELLI derives from Long's initials: LL.

2A Evidence
He was discovered and confessed to his

2B Evidence
His file has since been brought West from the KGB's

2C Not GRU
Long did not work for the GRU.

2D Not in MI5
Long did not work in MI5.

2E Defectors
This was the testimony of both Akhmedov (in 1942) and Gouzenko (in 1945).

2F RALPH
Long's codename was RALPH.

3A KGB
Long was a KGB asset recruited by Anthony Blunt well after ELLI was in place within MI5.

3B MI14
Long worked in the War Office for MI14 on the German order of

3C Publication
(T230)

3D KGB file
RALPH is the only codename on

4A Elaboration
The KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky claimed he had seen the codename ELLI on Long's file, but Gordievsky never had access to that file and we now know that his claim was untrue in any case.
Map #2: Comments

This map is the next crucial step in understanding the case. Strangely, given that the authorized historian’s entire defence of Hollis depends upon it, he made no attempt to establish that Long ever worked for MI5 or that he had been recruited by the GRU. He takes at face value the claim by Oleg Gordievsky that he had seen Long’s file in the KGB archives and that the file had written on it in large letters the codename ELLI. It had been well-established long before 2009 that Gordievsky had never had the access he claimed, and that Long’s codename had never been ELLI. In fact, the codename RALPH that was written on Long’s KGB file. But the even bigger stumbling blocks are that Long had been recruited at second hand by Anthony Blunt to work for the KGB, while ELLI had been a high level mole in MI5 for the GRU. In short, if he could be drawn out into the open and cross-examined, Andrew would have either to argue that Long actually worked for the GRU, not the KGB and inside MI5 at a high level (which are insupportable claims); or he would have to admit that he had erred egregiously and had failed to account for who ELLI really was. A central part of the indictment of Hollis is, in fact, a challenge to MI5 and its authorized historian to respond to these concerns. On the basis of argument and evidence, they have no place to hide. Their only refuge is in secrecy and refusal to open up fully to the facts of the case.

Conceivable lines of objection

It is very difficult indeed to see a credible line of attack in this pivotal part of the case. If Hollis was not ELLI, he (according to Gouzenko, ELLI was male) must have been someone other than Leo Long. The fact that Gordon Brook-Shepherd (1918-2004) claimed that ELLI was a fantasy concocted by Gouzenko and that Christopher Andrew then admitted this was not true, but himself made the claim that ELLI was Leo Long, points to something fundamentally awry in the search for ELLI. Pincher’s claim or working hypothesis here is that MI5 and its political masters have striven since the 1960s to avoid reaching the deeply embarrassing conclusion that the head of MI5 at the height of the Cold War could possibly have been a Soviet mole since the 1930s. Yet their failure to mount any credible defence of Hollis or to find a credible alternative candidate for having been ELLI inevitably draws us back to Hollis. As we shall see, the redundancy of evidence that ELLI existed and that he was not Leo Long is complemented by a comparable redundancy in lines of evidence pointing to Hollis as having been a mole who was recruited by the GRU no later than 1938 and who served its purposes from within MI5 in regard to early warning, protection of operations, clearing nuclear spies, providing intelligence directly on nuclear and strategic matters and finally becoming a remarkably well placed early warning source on possible nuclear first strike deliberations.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #3: Given that Leo Long was not ELLI, suspicion reverts to Hollis

Contestation
Given that Long cannot have been ELLI, suspicion reverts to Hollis.

1A Small pool
There is a very small pool of possible candidates other than Hollis.

1B Others cleared
Those other candidates have long since been cleared.

2A Access
The candidate would have had to enjoy unrestricted access to files on Russia, counter-espionage and nuclear secrets between 1941 and 1945.

2B Limits
This limits the possible candidates for ELLI to a very small pool.

2C Three others
White, Lidwell and Mitchell are the only other plausible.

2D No case
There is no sound case against any one of those three.

1C Uniquely identified
No other candidate has ever attracted the sustained suspicion that has fallen on Hollis.

1D Not dealt with
That suspicion has never adequately been dealt with.

2A De Mowbray
Stephen de Mowbray of MI6 resigned in 1979 because he believed the Hollis case had been a miscarriage of justice.

2B De Mowbray
American suspicions
Hollis aroused the suspicions of senior and responsible US intelligence and counter-intelligence officials for much of his career.

2B Pincher
Chapman Pincher has written four books—same with multiple, updated editions—accusing Hollis, as well as an autobiography adding new material.

2E Trend
The Trend inquiry in the late 1970s did not deal adequately with the case against Hollis.

2F Historian’s brief
The authorized historian singled out Hollis as the suspect he claimed to have cleared by 1982.

2G Recalls on Hollis
The failure of his case that it was Long takes us back to his starting point: Hollis.

3A Fluency
The Fluency Committee between 1964 and 1969 was chaired by Hollis.

3B K7
K7 between 1969 and 1973 was exclusively concerned with Hollis.

3C FBI
Hoover and Lamphere at the FBI distrusted Hollis.

3D CIA
Heimans and Angleton at CIA distrusted Hollis.

3E Gray/Coyne
The 1965 Gray/Coyne Report singled out Hollis for criticism and demanded he be forced into retirement.

3F Elaboration

3G No real inquiry
Trend conducted no new investigations, was ignorant of too much and reached an equivocal verdict.

3H Vacancy
Long being reduced, the identity of ELL1 remains to be ascertained.

3I Failed defense
He set out to exonerate Hollis and failed abysmally.
This next step is again important. If it is to be contested, it would have to be on the basis that a plausible case could be made against some figure other than Hollis (or Long). No one has attempted to make such a case in more than 40 years. There was a time when the Fluency Committee looked at Dick White, Guy Liddell and Graham Mitchell as possible candidates for ELLI, but all three were ruled out and all the lines of evidence kept coming back to Hollis. Plainly, if a hitherto unexamined figure could be identified within MI5, who had worked there from at least 1940 until around the time Hollis retired in 1965, and who had contrived to obtain access to all the materials to which Hollis had access throughout those years, then a case might be mounted against that person. But at this point such a person has never been so much as pointed to. The first order of business, therefore, is to clarify what the case is against Hollis and press for it to be transparently addressed.

This is perhaps the most appropriate point at which to observe that the authorized historian's dismissal of Peter Wright and one or two of his colleagues as mentally unhinged and nothing but "conspiracy theorists" is a red herring. Arthur Martin was the key figure in pressing for a hostile interrogation of Anthony Blunt in 1964. Martin was suspended from all duties by Hollis for his pains and finally driven out of MI5 entirely on the grounds that he was the leader of a "Gestapo" that was undermining morale within MI5. This was for demanding a closer interrogation of an admitted KGB mole and traitor. In other words, the precise claim made by Christopher Andrew in defence of Hollis in 2009 was made by Hollis himself against those pushing for a tighter internal security regime in the early 1960s. Moreover, when the Fluency Committee was set up and Peter Wright was put in charge of it, the anomalies quickly pointed to Hollis. It took the U.S. Gray/Coyne inquiry of 1965 to pressure London into retiring Hollis. Why, however, would that have been done if all suspicion of Hollis was the product of mentally unstable individuals?

We have, therefore, come full circle. There is a case against Roger Hollis and it has not satisfactorily been addressed. It is not the product of paranoid conspiracy theory, but of a long trail of evidence, which shows that throughout the decades in which Hollis worked in MI5, counterintelligence failures and betrayals were legion and seem consistently to point back to the very roles that Hollis fulfilled within MI5 throughout his career—on the Russia desk and on nuclear matters; on the Joint Intelligence Committee; and strategic affairs. We have seen that there was a GRU mole in MI5 during the Second World War. There is a strong prima facie case for deducing that that mole was Hollis. Until that case is addressed, there is no basis for assuming that he has been wrongly accused. And until someone is identified as ELLI, there is no answer to the question: Who was the GRU mole inside MI5 pointed to by Gouzenko in the 1940s, whose existence was confirmed by very high level Soviet documents from the time that have only more recently come to light?

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #4: Gouzenko’s testimony was unimpeachable

Gouzenko's testimony in general was:

1A Detailed
   His testimony was very detailed.

1B Consistent
   He was highly consistent under cross-examination and over time.

1C Invariably
   His claims were invariably borne out by the facts.

1D Definition
   These three conditions mark his testimony as unimpeachable.

2A Names
   He supplied the names or identities of numerous GRU spies in North America.

2B No contradictions
   He was never known to contradict himself during his early interrogations.

2C No change
   He did not change his story over time.

2D RCMP
   The RCMP rated him an outstanding witness.

2E Memory
   In no case was his memory or testimony found to be at fault.

2F Royal Commission
   The 1946 Canadian Royal Commission was impressed by his honesty and credibility.

2G Moscow
   Moscow reacted massively to his defection and assumption.

2H assumption
   This would not have happened had he been a fabricated or a false

3A Nunn May
   He exposed the scientist Alan Nunn May as a GRU spy.

3B Hiss and others
   He fingered several GRU spies in the United States, including Alger Hiss.

3C Spies in Canada
   He exposed more than 20 GRU spies in Canada.

3D Publication
   1981

3E Publication
   1985

3F GRU Ops
   The GRU immediately suspended all contact with its spies in Canada.

3G Publication
   Vladimir Lota
   The GRU and the Atomic Bomb (2000)

3H Conference
   The April 2004 historical re-examination of his testimony upheld his claims.
Canadian and American authorities followed up Igor Gouzenko’s testimony vigorously and in doing so unearthed numerous Soviet spies in North America, never once finding that he had misled them or been in error. Yet, Roger Hollis waved aside Gouzenko’s claim that there was a GRU mole inside MI5 and seems to have been supported in this by others at the top who simply refused to believe such penetration was possible. At the suggestion of Kim Philby, in MI6, who was simultaneously handling the attempted defection of Konstantin Volkov in Istanbul—and in the process betrayed him to the KGB—Hollis went to Canada to interview Gouzenko on behalf of MI5. By Gouzenko’s account, Hollis seemed wary of him, afraid of being identified by him, and uninterested in what he had to say. Gouzenko later told sources that Hollis spent less than 10 minutes interviewing him. Hollis’s report of the matter has been kept in obscurity by MI5 since 1945, with no reason given for keeping it secret. What seems clear is that Hollis cast doubt on Gouzenko’s bona fides or value as a source and dismissed out of hand the notion that MI5 could have been penetrated. Yet we know for certain that he was wrong on both counts.

Gouzenko was an excellent source and his claim that there was a mole inside MI5 was correct. We know that many people at both MI5 and MI6 clung for decades to the fiction that penetration of their services by the Soviets was inconceivable; that very few of those who held and declared such a belief were themselves Soviet agents; but that they were egregiously mistaken in their belief. Hollis was, therefore, at the very least, egregiously mistaken. But more than anyone else at that time and through to the end of his career, given his positions at MI5, it was his responsibility to ensure that Soviet penetration of MI5 and MI6 (among other things) did not occur. He was not, therefore, like others, merely mistaken in dismissing the possibility that MI5 (or MI6) had been penetrated; he was singularly negligent and grossly incompetent – unless, of course, he was himself the mole, as his critics have long suspected, in which case, far from being negligent or incompetent, he was both fortunate and masterful. The known facts of the matter – that Gouzenko was extremely reliable, that the existence of ELLI has been independently confirmed, that ELLI was a GRU mole not a KGB one, that Hollis went out of his way to dismiss the significance of Gouzenko’s claim; and that ELLI has never been identified to this day – surely make it necessary now, at long last, to rigorously examine the case that Hollis himself was ELLI and that he was a mole who proved even more successful and more damaging than Kim Philby.

Conceivable lines of objection

This is another early point in the case where a compelling objection could, in principle, cut off the prosecution at the proverbial pass. Yet what objection can be raised? The record of Gouzenko’s revelations is openly available and confirmation of his reliability has come from multiple sources, on both sides of the Iron Curtain over sixty years – from the high level Soviet memoranda of late 1945 to the 2004 conference on Gouzenko held in Canada. Efforts to discredit Gouzenko began with Hollis himself and have consistently come only from MI5 or authors it has sponsored, down to Gordon Brook-Shepherd. Once this basic premise is accepted, one cannot evade the requirement to check out Gouzenko’s description of ELLI, which was detailed and precise. He described ELLI as a GRU mole inside MI5 who was male; was rated so highly that, to protect his identity, personal contacts with him were forbidden; was a full-blooded agent and not a mere confidential contact; had direct access to MI5’s holdings on Russian affairs and Soviet espionage activities, such that he could consult and remove files dealing with such matters (as of 1942, which was Gouzenko’s key reference point, those files were located at Blenheim outside Oxford and so was Hollis); as an agent some of whose missives were so important that they were passed directly to Stalin; and that ELLI himself had something Russian in his background. Hollis’s family, as his brother Christopher wrote, believed they were descended from Peter the Great (T30). How does this description, then, not point to Hollis? The defence has no choice but to come up with some credible alternative candidate meeting this description; but in all the years since 1945 no such candidate has appeared.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #5: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 1)

**Contention**
ELLI was still at work in MI5 between 1945 and

**1A Major leaks**
Fundamental strategic documents were leaked to Moscow between September 1945 and August

**1B GRU source**
Those documents were leaked to Moscow from a GRU source in London.

**1C Only ELLI**
There were no known GRU agents in place after 1945 who could have accessed such documents other than ELLI at

**2A Security**
'The Security of the British Empire' (67 pp) from CIOS planning staff prefiguring NATO and specifying the USSR as the next aggressive opponent was

**2B Summary**
'The Summary of War Results' (30 pp), dated 11 July 1945, was leaked.

**2C Position**
'The Overall Strategic Plan' prepared by Sir Alan Brooke in the War Office was

**2D Pre-emption**
Two American documents about Plan CHEVALIER for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the USSR

**2E Strength**
'The Strength and Structure of the British Armed Forces' (186 pp) dated 28 Feb 1949

**2F Strategy**
'Defence Policy and Global Strategy' (70 pp) dated 1 May 1950 dealing with the role of nuclear weapons in potential war with the USSR, was

**2G Korean War**
'The Foreign Office Instructions concerning the Korean War' (50 pp) dated July 1950 were leaked.

**3A Explanation**
Russian records show that Stalin saw it in September 1945, nine weeks after it was submitted to

**3B Explanation**
It was on Stalin's desk on 10 September 1945, an interval of two months.

**3C Explanation**
It reached Stalin on 17 October

**3D Explanation**
They were supplied to the Russians in London in June and July 1948 by a British officer in a secret service, believed to have been MI5 because he was a close colleague of Guy

**3E Explanation**
It reached Stalin on 6 August 1949, a lapse of five

**3F Explanation**
It was in Stalin's hands by 15 August 1950, after three

**3G Explanation**
It reached Stalin's desk by 6 August 1950, or little short of immediately.
Map #5 (Part 1): Comments

Note the three part reason at the top level. This first part of the argument map simply sets out the evidence regarding the nature of the high level leaks. Pincher wrote of this body of top secret documents:

The perpetrators of this massive treachery remain unknown, because [Oleg] Tsarev [former head of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, who gave a paper on the subject at an Oxford University conference in 1999] did not have access to the original copies of the pilfered reports, which might have revealed the identities of the British spies who had provided them. He saw only the Russian translations, and as he could not find the originals in the KGB archives, assumed that they had been lost. From what he called ‘the circumstantial facts’ he deduced that the reports could have been supplied by various members of the Cambridge group...There is, however, a simpler explanation – all the documents were supplied by the same agent who operated for the GRU, in whose archives the originals may still be stored, never having left them. Support for that possibility may be contained in Tsarev’s statement that one of the reports was ‘sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria on 17 October 1946.’ At that time, Beria was head of the KGB and, had it arrived at KGB Centre, he would have been shown such a prestigious coup immediately after translation to give him the option of taking it to Stalin in person, as he liked to do. Further, in both papers that Tsarev delivered...he was careful to give the credit not to the KGB but only to the ‘Soviet Intelligence Service’ – the joint name for the KGB and GRU. (T362-65)

Conceivable lines of objection

Here is where, if I were attempting a defence of Hollis, I would attempt to draw a line, by arguing that ELLI may have been in place up to 1945, but that there is scant evidence of his having operated after that time, while Hollis’s career went on for another 20 years. The place to start would be by attempting to show where Pincher’s reasoning is flawed, regarding the sourcing of these highly classified strategic documents to a GRU mole in the UK. It won’t do to merely brush this set of claims aside and assert that it does not point unambiguously to Hollis. Either it points to a GRU mole at a very high level or it doesn’t. If it does, either that mole was ELLI or some other very high-level GRU mole operating in the five years after the end of World War II. Up to the end of the war, just possibly, that mole could have been James McGibbon, but he withdrew from both government service and work for the GRU in mid-1945. The only GRU mole known to have been in place during the war years for which there is no evidence of his or her retirement in 1945 is ELLI; and in the years 1945-50, if ELLI remained in place, he would very likely have had access to these kinds of documents, given his position within MI5. Hollis was in place and would have had such access in those years. How, then, to ringbark the attack and demonstrate that it cannot have been him who leaked these documents? One way could be to obtain the original documents and their distribution lists. Another would be to gain access to the GRU archives and establish once and for all who supplied them to Moscow. Both lines of inquiry are difficult, but no credible defence can be made that does not make clear reference to them.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #5: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 2)

1A Major leaks
Fundamental strategic documents were leaked to Moscow between September 1945 and August

1B GRU source
Those documents were leaked to Moscow from a GRU source in London.

1C Only ELLI
There were no known GRU agents in place after 1945 who could have accessed such documents other than ELLI at

2A Not KGB
None of the originals are in the KGB archives.

2B Originals
If the source had been a KGB agent, the KGB archives would contain the originals.

2C GRU
The GRU is the only other possible source.

2D Berlin
One of the reports was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria on 17 October 1946.

2E KGB
Beria was head of the KGB.

2F Already
If the documents had come from KGB sources in London, he would already have seen them.

2G GRU priorities
All the reports embodied the kind of military information of particular interest to the GRU and to which its agents

2H Probabilities
This makes it more likely that they were supplied by a GRU rather than a KGB assist.

3A Expert
Oleg Tsarev, former senior officer in KGB First Chief Directorate.

3B State Defence Committee
Both KGB and GRU submitted their prime intelligence findings to the State Defence Committee (the CenK) for processing before a decision was made about passing them to Stalin.

3C All passed
All the reports in question were passed on to

3D In translation
They would have been passed on to the SDC in Russian translation without disclosing the source.

3E KGB copies
This is all the KGB ended up

4A Publication
T365.

4B Expert
Oleg Tsarev, former senior officer in KGB First Chief Directorate.

4C No names
The private papers of Stalin and Molotov, now available for examination, do not contain the names of any intelligence sources.

4D Archives
There are only copies in Russian of the originals in the KGB archives.

5A Publication
T365.

5B Expert
Oleg Tsarev, former senior officer in KGB First Chief Directorate.

2I No credit
Tsarev did not give credit to the KGB for those priceless documents.

2J KGB man
As a KGB man, he would have taken credit if his agency had procured those priceless documents.
Map #5 (Part 2): Comments

This map lays out the kind of reasoning offered by Pincher in the passage quoted above. It is important to emphasize that these are not the only grounds on which to believe that ELLI was still at work after 1945. Similar maps could be constructed showing, for example, that the protection of Klaus Fuchs and of SONIA continued after 1945 on the same basis that it had been conducted during the war years. Since SONIA was a major GRU asset and since Hollis himself had direct responsibility for the clearances granted to Fuchs in every instance, these actions point not simply to ELLI still having been active, but to Hollis himself having been ELLI. The strategic documents are of interest, however, because they point to a mole at a high level filing extremely sensitive military intelligence information. That would be the natural job of a GRU mole and no GRU mole of whom we are currently aware was better placed than Hollis, between 1945 and 1950, to have got hold of them and sent them on via courier to Moscow. In fact, we do not know of any GRU mole other than ELLI who was still operating after 1945. Pincher’s reasoning from the evidence supplied by Tsarev is hard to fault, but is perfectly open to critical review. It does not depend on mere assertion or surmise. What would be needed is a serious review of who else had access to these documents in those years and a scrupulous review for any grounds to suspect that they may have been GRU moles. Even could such another suspected mole be found, however, so much other evidence points to Hollis that it would require very good evidence to conclude that someone other than he had supplied these documents to the GRU between 1945 and 1950.

Conceivable lines of objection

Where does a counter-attack conceivably come from in regard to these lines of inference? Both 2F and 2H in the above map might be probed for weakness, I suspect. But even if both were put in serious question, the case made by Pincher regarding the set of high level leaks would still look fairly sound. A problem that bedevilled the MI5 inquiries for decades was the failure to heed Walter Krivitsky’s warning in 1939-40 that the KGB and GRU operated separate spy systems and kept independent lines of reporting into Moscow and to the State Defence Committee headed by Stalin. Christopher Andrew inherited this confusion and thereby left himself open to the charge that he simply did not understand the ‘Russian Intelligence Service’, despite all his work on the KGB over many years. This specific set of inferences should be run past Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer, to see whether Pincher has erred in any way. Pincher plainly allows that the source could have been someone other than ELLI, but it will not do to assume this and with that lazy surmise put the matter aside. It defies complacency. These were very high level strategic documents, ELLI has not been identified, Hollis is the prime suspect as ELLI and we have reason to believe that he would have had access to these documents, just as he had custody of the February 1940 Krivitsky report. The ball is in the defence’s court, but it isn’t evident what counter-stroke it can make in defence of Hollis.
Map #5: ELLI was still at work in MI5 after 1945 (Part 3)

Contestation
ELLII was still at work in MI5 between 1945 and

1A Major leaks
Fundamental strategic documents were leaked to Moscow between September 1945 and August

1B GRU source
Those documents were leaked to Moscow from a GRU source in London.

1C Only ELLI
There were no known GRU agents in place after 1945 who could have accessed such documents other than ELLI at

2A MacGibbon
James MacGibbon had withdrawn his services once the war ended.

2B Only other
He was the only GRU agent with the relevant access apart from

2C Reason
The first two reports were leaked when ELLI was almost

3A Objection
There could have been other GRU moles whose identities we have not yet discovered.

3B Evidence
They were leaked in June and July 1945, months before Gouzenko's defection.

3C assumption
ELLII was still active at least until the time of Gouzenko's defection in September 1945.

4A Other GRU
Other GRU sources have indicated that there remain many other spies whose identities have never

4B KGB
There were far more KGB moles than was ever realized during the Cold

4C Parallel
What was true of the KGB could well be true of the

4D Lyubimov's
The GRU has said that the spies discovered so far are the tip of the iceberg from that era.

4E Rebuttal
The 'other' mole would have had to have had as good access as ELLI to such high level strategic planning

4F assumption
We have no evidence from any source at this time that such a GRU mole existed.
Map #5 (Part 3): Comments

Node 3A is crucial here, following on from the previous set of comments. The GRU during the Putin years has freely stated that there were other spies at work during the Cold War whose identities have never been disclosed. It is, therefore, conceivable that a GRU mole other than ELLI existed between 1945 and 1950 and supplied the documents in question to Moscow. It is important, however, (Node 4E/F) to discriminate between “spies” and “moles,” and between moles inside MI5 and any that may have existed elsewhere. A high level mole is a priceless asset, but very hard to put in place, especially within the Security Service itself. We know that by the late 1960s, there were literally hundreds of KGB and GRU spies in Britain. How many of these were high level moles within the British military or intelligence services is another matter. Besides, had there been other such moles in place by 1945 it seems probable that they, as well as ELLI, would have been named by Gouzenko, who named so many other spies and moles in Canada and the United States. Given the acknowledged existence of ELLI, the other evidence pointing to Hollis and the lack of evidence pointing to any other GRU mole, it seems reasonable to register the suspicion, as Pincher did, that the source of these high level documents was Hollis. But even the existence of another mole would not detract, as we shall see, from the main lines of evidence against Hollis, which also takes the case well beyond 1945.

Conceivable lines of objection

The obvious line of attack, as stated above, would be to claim that there are as yet undisclosed moles who were at work in the late 1940s and that one of these hypothetical figures, rather than Hollis, could have been responsible for these high level leaks. The authorized historian makes no such move. Clearly, until further documentation is obtained from British records or from those in Moscow, this matter cannot be definitively resolved. The problem for the defenders of Hollis is that until or unless some other such figure is identified, he is the most plausible, because in fact the only candidate for having supplied these classified materials to Moscow between 1945 and 1950.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #6: Leaks about the Fuchs interrogation

Contention
The KGB's warnings to its agents in America about the interrogation of Fuchs in 1949-50 were based on leaks from ELLI in MI5.

1A MIS
This updating could only have been coming from Skardon's questions and Fuchs's replies.

1B MIS
Only ELLI
There was no known Soviet mole within MI5 by 1949-50 other than Skardon.

1E No FBI
The warnings were based on leaks to Moscow about what the FBI was doing with the information gleaned from Fuchs.

1F No FBI
No leaks from within the FBI.

2A Skardon's qna
Moscow was getting the details of Skardon's questions and Fuchs's replies.

2B Phibby
It could have been coming from Phibby, after he was blackmailed by Hollis or someone else from MI5.

2C Blunt
Blunt had left at the end of the Second World War to return to the US.

2D Blunt
Blunt had been the only other Soviet mole inside MI5.

2F Suspensions
The FBI suspended all KGB agents in America for a period of 4 months.

3A Felix
Felix had been Fuchs's courier since 1943, and they met in his apartment.

3B Not in London
By October 1949, Phibby was in Washington.

3C MIS active
MIS was active in Fuchs's case by October 1949.

3D Rebuttal
Phibby's information about the exposure of Fuchs did not reach Moscow until after Fuchs's arrest on 2 February 1955.

3E KGB early
The warnings to the KGB agents in America began in October 1949.

4A Perlin
Perlin told White on 5 September 1949 that Fuchs was the

4B Publication
West and Tsarev in Crown Jewels, based on tantalising evidence from KGB documents.

4F Elaboration
Some suspects were urged to make arrangements to escape and
Map #6 Comments

It is well known that Hollis was responsible for clearing Klaus Fuchs repeatedly for highly sensitive work on the nuclear weapons programs first in Britain, then in the United States, and then again in Britain; Hollis also deflected any expressions of concern by others about Fuchs throughout the years 1941 to 1946. One could map the entire sequence of events surrounding Fuchs and hold it up for examination. But classically, what moles do is supply intelligence and, while Fuchs was under interrogation by MI5 in 1949-50, someone was giving Moscow detailed information about what he was coughing up regarding fellow agents and couriers in the United States. That information was also being passed to the FBI, which in turn was briefing MI5 on the actions it was taking to track down such agents. Suspicious about leaks from MI5, the FBI cut off its briefings (Node 2F) for four months in early 1950 and the effect was immediate on the KGB’s capacity to warn its field operatives about the dangers they faced. The fact that the KGB is in centre frame here calls for careful calibration, since there were no known KGB moles in MI5 at that time. It must be assumed, therefore, that intelligence on the FBI briefings was being passed to it via the GRU or at least the State Defence Committee in Moscow.

Conceivable lines of objection

The Fuchs argument is another intriguing line of inference by Pincher. If there is to be a defence against it, such a defence would presumably have to begin by checking the documentary basis for Pincher’s claims about the FBI cutting off its briefings to MI5 for some months in early 1950. The timing and the nature of the briefings are key. So is the detail in whatever Moscow was receiving from MI5. It seems clear that this might be done by looking at the relevant materials among Pincher’s papers at King’s College, London. Given that the briefings were to MI5, not MI6, and that Hollis would have had direct access to them, he has to fall under suspicion in this matter, given the evidence in other aspects of the case. If the proximate source for Moscow was someone in MI6, who had been back briefed by MI5, we would need to ask who could that have been? Philby in Washington? And who back briefed him, in that case? If it were Hollis, that would be of interest, though it would not exclude the possibility that Hollis had done so innocently and that Philby was the culprit. Where, however, is the documentation for any such claim?

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 1)

Contestion
Hollis is by far the best fit for both ELLI and the known anomalies throughout the

1A ELLI
Hollis is by far the best fit for Gouzenko’s description of ELLI in 1945.

1B Pre-1945 anomalies
Hollis was best placed to have been the source of anomalies in the early

1C Late 1940s
Hollis is by far the best fit for explaining the anomalies after

2A Description
Gouzenko described ELLI as having specific characteristics.

2B assumption
Hollis fit those characteristics better than anyone.

3A The fit
He was male, had access to the Russia files, had something Russian in his background; and was able to do priceless work because of his position on the nuclear question.

3B assumption
No other known figure in MI5 matched these precise

2C Ignored
Hollis denigrated Gouzenko as a source and connived in ensuring that there was no investigation into ELLI.

2D assumption
This is exactly what one would have expected the mole described by Gouzenko to have

3C Warning
Hollis’s behaviour in regard to Gouzenko strikingly resembles Philby’s in regard to Volkov at the same time.

3D Challenge
This behaviour in itself was consistent with the widespread attitude in MI5 and MI6 that it was inconceivable that there had been Soviet penetration of the intelligence services.

4A Elaboration
His family believed they could trace their ancestry back to Peter the Great.

4B Evidence
Nicholas Elliott at MI6 doggedly defended Philby for years after the flight of Burgess and Maclean - as did James Angleton.

4C Evidence
Martin Furnival Jones, Hollis’s deputy and then successor, dismissed the idea that Hollis could have been a Soviet mole as “too grotesque to
Map #7 (Part 1): Comments

This is the first and smallest part of a three part map covering a good deal of conceptual territory. We have established (Argument Map 4) that Igor Gouzenko was an unimpeachable witness as regards the identities of the spies he exposed. He provided a description of ELLI, as well as the codename and the information that ELLI was dug into MI5. That description was never followed up closely, even by the internal inquiries of the 1960s. It took Pincher to throw into high relief the fact that it matches Hollis uniquely, so far as anyone can ascertain. Hollis himself, sent to interview Gouzenko in 1945, at Philby’s urging, spent as little time with him as possible, asked few questions, then came away and denigrated him as a witness. His denigration of Gouzenko has no credibility, given how strongly all Gouzenko’s other claims stood up to investigation. Yet, Hollis was able to persuade his bureaucratic masters at MI5 that it was “unthinkable” that MI5 had been penetrated by a Soviet mole. As with so much in the Hollis case, one has to ask, “Cui bono?” Who benefited from this failure to inquire closely into the existence of ELLI at a time when Gouzenko’s claims in North America were turning up spies in all manner of places? The answer is: The Soviet Union, but also ELLI – whoever he was. As it happens, Philby behaved the same way with regard to defectors and their claims that MI6 had been penetrated and, until 1951, he got away with it.

Conceivable lines of objection

The most obvious line of counter-attack here is at 3D: that Hollis was simply subject to the same folly as so many of his colleagues, in insisting that it was inconceivable that MI5 had been penetrated in the manner that Gouzenko had described. This is a poor defence, but not without superficial merit. After all, both Hollis’s predecessor as Director General of MI5 (Dick White), to whom Hollis had been Deputy Director, and Hollis’s successor as Director General, Martin Furnival Jones, who had been Hollis’s Deputy Director, plainly fell for this. Furnival Jones declared the very idea that Hollis himself can have been a mole to be “so grotesque as to be inconceivable.” Yet, had Hollis been ELLI, it is just such an idea that one would expect him to have encouraged among his senior colleagues – and we know that that is what he did with specific regard to Gouzenko.

We also know that, as Director General, he went so far as to dismiss Arthur Martin for wanting to conduct a hostile interrogation of Anthony Blunt, when it was already well known that Blunt had been a KGB mole in MI5. The counter-attack is, therefore, surely a weak and tautological one at best. A far more convincing defence would, of course, have been possible had it been the case that Hollis strove with might and main to combat such complacency and urge that ELLI must be hunted down. Christopher Andrew, in his authorized history, claims that Hollis had suspected Blunt of being ELLI, in 1945. But this is a doubly poor defence of Hollis. Firstly, ELLI was not a KGB mole and Andrew was well aware of this by 2009; he knew Blunt could not have been ELLI - nor does Andrew claim that he was. Secondly, Hollis plainly discouraged any search for ELLI and later forbade hostile interrogation of Blunt himself.

An impressive defence could only be mounted here if Hollis’s papers were finally disgorged by MI5 without redaction, so that we could see what he did and did not write or mandate in 1945 and later. MI5, however, has consistently refused to release the Hollis files or has implied that they have been destroyed – which would have been a highly questionable act calling for a detailed explanation in itself. The records kept on Hollis are where to look, however. In all the circumstances, any other defence looks both feeble and self-serving.
Map 7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2)

1A ELLI
Hollis is the by far the best fit for Gouzenko’s description of

1B Pre-1945 anomalies
Hollis was best placed to have been the source of anomalies in the early

1C Late 1940s
Hollis is by far the best fit for explaining the anomalies after

2A Krivitsky 1940
The MIS debriefing of Krivitsky was suppressed in the West and leaked to Moscow.

2B Hollis custody
Hollis was best placed to have suppressed and leaked it.

2C Warnings ignored
Warnings subsequent to Krivitsky’s that there was a GRU mole in MIS were ignored.

2D Hollis’s call
Hollis was in the key position to follow them up and did not do so.

2E Fuchs cleared
Klaus Fuchs, a known communist, was cleared to work on nuclear weapons

2F Hollis’s acts
Hollis was the individual who cleared him.

2G Kuczynski
Robert Kuczynski and his children were all GRU spies and on MIS watch

2H Hollis’s hand
Hollis consistently brushed aside their significance.

2I Quebec Agreement
Someone got the Quebec Agreement to SONIA in early

2J Hollis fits
Hollis is the best candidate for having done so.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #7 (Part 2): Comments

Node 1B is a large map in its own right. What we see here is simply Level 2 – the most abstract high level claims against Hollis. But we can at once grasp the full set of major claims and assumptions about Hollis’s role that go with them. Here is where the debate really has to be joined by those who would defend Hollis. Yet, not one of these major issues is touched upon in the authorized history of MI5 or by other defenders of Hollis. There is no place to hide, however. As the fuller underpinnings of this Node show – see Maps 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d and 2e below - Hollis was up to his eye-balls in taking or omitting to take actions crucial to allied security during the Second World War and in every case his actions or omissions were consistent with the Soviet interest and with what a GRU mole would have done. It will not do to try to wave these things aside by airily asserting, in one case or another, that they could have some other explanation, are merely coincidences, or might conceivably have been the work of some other hypothetical spy. The questions they raise must be answered. To this point, the problem is not the answers provided by MI5 and its official historian, but the failure to so much as mention the subjects in question.

In the pages that follow we will look at the Krivitsky case (see Map 7/2a below); the ignoring of other warnings (Map 7/2b below); the repeated clearances given to Klaus Fuchs by Hollis (Map 7/2c); protection of the Kuczynski family and especially Ursula Kuczynski (Hamburger/Beurton), who was the super-agent of Soviet military intelligence, codenamed SONIA (Map 7/2d); and the case of the leaking of the Quebec Agreement via SONIA to the GRU in early September 1943, shortly after it was signed in great secrecy by FDR and Churchill (Map 7/2e). These map numbers should not be confused with the Node numbers on the above map (2A to 2J). Each map takes one whole reason (within a green border) and lays out the grounds beneath it. Thus Map 2a is the development of the reason consisting of the major premise 2A and the minor premise 2B; and so forth across Level 2 of Map7/Part 2, above.

Conceivable lines of objection

To mount a defence against any of these lines of attack, the defenders of Hollis would have to do two things: (1) Draw far more honestly and deeply on MI5 archives than the authorized historian or any other defender has done; and (2) Demonstrate that documentary records contradict the claims mapped out here, which were established on the basis of what evidence is currently in the public realm. This begins with the Krivitsky report of early 1940. The authorized historian makes mention of the report, but tells us very little about it, or about those who handled it, to say nothing of it’s having leaked to Moscow as soon as it was filed at MI5. He does not tell his readers that Hollis had anything remotely to do with it, but Hollis’s fingerprints were all over it. He claims, unconvincingly, that it ‘transformed’ MI5’s understanding of Soviet intelligence operations, but provides no evidence that this was in fact the case. He then claims that the real problem was MI5’s lack of resources for acting on that transformed understanding.

But this “lack of resources” argument is demonstrably untrue. MI5’s authorized historian claims that there was only a single officer on Soviet affairs, designated F2c, but fails to name that officer or the time period to which he is referring. He offers no account of the fact that there had been a Soviet affairs desk in B Division long before the creation of such a desk in F Division in late 1941. He also fastidiously avoids any mention of Hollis’s crucial role in Soviet affairs first in B Division and then in the new F Division, which he came to head in late 1941. Nor does he mention that the F2c he refers to was, from October 1941, one of Hollis’s staff and not the only one. Nor does he mention that that person, Millicent Bagot, had been on SONIA’s trail as far back as early 1940, or that it was Hollis who squelched her suggestions that SONIA be treated with suspicion and kept under surveillance. Nor does he mention that Hugh Shillito, another of Hollis’s F Division staff, twice urged, in late 1942 that SONIA be put under surveillance and her phone tapped, only to be ignored by Hollis. Nor does he mention that it was this same Hugh Shillito who interrogated Oliver Green between August and November 1942 and reported to Hollis that Green had claimed or confessed that MI5 had been penetrated by the GRU. Nor, again, does he mention that when a copy of the Krivitsky report was sent to Washington in 1944, it was bowdlerized by Hollis himself. It would be good to get this out in the open by putting into print a copy of both the original report and the version Hollis sent to the FBI. What is breathtaking is that all these matters should have been simply ignored by the authorized historian, despite his unprecedented access to the files of MI5.

In short, there is a good deal of work for the defence to do on the Krivitsky issue and its implications alone. Yet that is merely the beginning, as we shall see.
Map 7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2a - Krivitsky)

2A Krivitsky 1940
The MI5 debriefing of Krivitsky was suppressed in the West and leaked to Moscow.

2B Hollis custody
Hollis was beat placed to have suppressed and leaked it.

3A Leaked
The GRU and KGB learned almost at once and in detail about the debriefing, which MI5 had held in

3B Bowlerized
Krivitsky’s warnings about penetration of British intelligence and GRU tradecraft were removed from the report sent to the

3C No action
No action was taken to look for a mole in MI5 or track possible GRU tradecraft in servicing such a

3D Custody
Hollis took custody of the debriefing report from Jane Archer

3E Sign-off
It was Hollis who signed off on the version of the debriefing sent

4A Elaboration
K arrived in London 19
Jan 1940, was installed at the Langham Hotel as Mr. Thomas and interviewed by Jane Archer as Mrs. Woore.

4B Timing
It was completed in early February 1940 and they did it within that

4C Challenge
Did Moscow receive the report in Feb 1940 or not until 1941? If both, why twice? And how did Blunt get hold of it?

4D Warning
Krivitsky defected in Sept 1937 and knew nothing of ELLI. Hollis did not join MI5 until 1936 and even his visit to Paris in November 1937 was later than K’s

4E Elaboration
K warned about the GRU controller Colonie Simon Kremer operating out of the Embassy in

4F Explanation
In spring 1941 a bowlerized 28 page report was prepared for the FBI, but never sent. In late Jan 1944, Hollis prepared another sanitised copy for

4G Warning
MI6 ignored K’s warning that KGB and GRU operated separate networks and reporting channels. It persisted in thinking of a unified

4H Elaboration
Appendix to Archer’s report was a long list of Soviet agents’ names and codenames. They were never followed up.

5A KGB reaction
KGB reacted very quickly, shutting down its networks in London and recalling Anatoli

5B Evidence
At p. 87 Percher states that Blunt supplied the KGB with a complete copy of the Archer report in 1941 and that this copy now resides in the KGB archives.

6A Publication
Documents from KGB archives. T77

6B Publication
Documents from KGB archives. T77

6C Publication
Documents from KGB archives. T77
Map #7 (Part 2a-Krivitsky) Comments

Walter Krivitsky (born Samuel Ginsburg) was a Soviet military intelligence officer who was an illegal undercover operative in Western Europe in 1937 when Stalin’s purge of the Red Army officer corps and the intelligence services began. After his friend and colleague, Ignace Reiss, was assassinated in Switzerland, in September 1937, Krivitsky defected and joined the Trotskyist opposition underground in Paris. In late 1938, foreseeing war in Europe, he sailed to the United States. Once in New York, he was helped by Isaac Don Levine to write a memoir called In Stalin’s Secret Service, published in Britain as I Was Stalin’s Agent. The book was released in November 1939, when the Second World War was under way. Stalin had meanwhile signed a pact with Hitler; something Krivitsky had seen coming when the purges were in full swing.

In January 1940, he sailed to England under the pseudonym Walter Thomas. He did so under the protection of the British authorities and was kept in anonymity and safety in London for a month while MI5’s Jane Archer debriefed him. Archer, who was Hollis’s immediate superior at that time, wrote up a detailed report based on her debriefing of Krivitsky. Shortly after she completed the report, she was moved to totally different work. Hollis took over her job and with it custody of her report on Krivitsky. At almost exactly that time, the report was supplied to Moscow, well before it was supplied (in an edited form) to the FBI in Washington. We know that the edited version for Washington was prepared by Hollis and that it omitted a number of significant things. We don’t know who supplied it to Moscow; only that Hollis was in the immediate vicinity and had direct custody of the document.

Pincher’s commentary on all this is detailed (T76-80) and judicious. Crucial to his reasoning are two claims: (1) That Krivitsky had carefully delineated the difference between the KGB and the GRU and stated that they operated separate and parallel espionage networks; and (2) That the Krivitsky report was leaked to Moscow in February 1940, some four months before Anthony Blunt, the only other known Soviet mole to penetrate MI5, was recruited into the organization. In The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, Christopher Andrew asserts that Krivitsky’s debrief “transformed the Security Service’s understanding of the nature and extent of Soviet intelligence operations.” (p. 288)

Andrew, however, provides no evidence of such a transformation and Krivitsky’s warnings and briefings seem to have had no appreciable impact on Hollis’s watch. The authorized historian writes that even though this debriefing ‘transformed’ MI5’s understanding of the situation, it was “handicapped in investigating Soviet espionage by lack of resources. He writes: “War-time Soviet counter-espionage . . . was initially relegated to a single officer (F2c) in F Division (Counter Subversion).” The Service’s main handicap in countering Soviet penetration, however, was that with the recruitment of Anthony Blunt, in June 1940, it was itself penetrated.” This account of matters is systematically misleading in a number of important respects germane to the hunt for ELLI.

In May 1940, MI5 underwent a major reorganization. This was just before Blunt joined MI5; Hollis had been inside MI5 for two-and-a-half years (from early 1938), working on Soviet Affairs. In this reorganization, Jasper Harker, head of B Division (Counter-espionage), who had participated with Archer in the debriefing of Krivitsky, replaced Vernon Kell as Director General of MI5 and Guy Liddell became head of B Division. In April 1941, in a further reorganization, Harker was replaced by David Petrie and B Division was divided into three new divisions, B, E and F. Hollis was assigned to F Division, under Jack Curry. The “single officer” to whom the authorized historian refers as working in F Division (when it was created in 1941) may have been F2c, the diligent Millicent Bagot; but she was working for Hollis in B Division in 1940 and found him obstructionist when it came to following up leads about Soviet espionage.

To reiterate: In 1940 it was B Division, not F Division, which covered Counter-Espionage. Its Soviet Affairs Section (B4) had been responsible for debriefing Krivitsky; and Roger Hollis worked there for Jane Archer in the position nominated B4a, with Bagot working as B4b2. In that capacity, Bagot raised a number of pointed concerns about the Kuczynskis, including SONIA, all of which Hollis deflected. In short, there was more than one officer looking at Soviet affairs, and from 1939 on Hollis was in the thick of it. Those officers conducted the debriefing of Krivitsky and monitored the Kuczynskis in 1940, among other things – yet the monitoring went awry in ways that keep leading us back to Hollis. All this would have been relevant if one were trying to establish who ELLI had been; but the authorized historian was not doing that. He had already announced that ELLI had been Leo Long – though he provided no evidence of Long’s actual espionage within MI5.

The single most notable omission from the authorized historian’s account of this crucial period is that he makes no mention of Krivitsky’s report being leaked to Moscow. Pincher points out that in February 1940 “. . . the activities of the KGB’s station in the London embassy were suddenly closed down on orders from Moscow and its agents, including the highly productive Maclean and the rest of the Cambridge group were put on ice. Its chief, Anatoli Gorski, was recalled to Moscow for urgent and prolonged discussions.” (T77). The timing and the circumstances, Pincher suggests, indicate that this was a response to the realization in Moscow that Krivitsky had revealed the mole strategy of the KGB and GRU and the existence of a number of penetration agents. Given how closely the report was held, Pincher asks, who can have supplied the report to Moscow? Here is his reasoning, which is not counter-balanced by anything in the authorized history, where the subject is simply avoided:

If Moscow had been alerted about Krivitsky’s interrogation in London by an informant in MI5, who could it have been? It was held tightly secret from the media and, though several MI5 officers were aware of it, the only known Soviet spy then inside MI5 was ELLI. As Archer’s chief assistant, who had taken over her normal work and would shortly replace her, Hollis knew the details
and may have helped her to interpret the defector’s data. **Blunt is ruled out** as the source because he did not join MI5 until June 1940. **Philby, too, is a non-starter**, as he did not join MI6 until 1941. So, **Hollis is the sole known candidate**. If he was ELLI, it was certainly in his immediate interest to warn his GRU controller that a senior GRU defector was revealing dangerous information to MI5. (T78)

One might add, that Leo Long is also ruled out because he was recruited later by Blunt, once Blunt was working for the KGB inside MI5. But of course, Long is excluded, as we have seen, on multiple other grounds. In any case. Pincher adds that documents released by MI5 only in April 2011, revealed that a later Soviet defector, GRU officer Ismail Akhmedov, informed MI5 in 1942 that the GRU had an agent **codenamed ELLI** connected with the British intelligence services and *living in London in 1940*. Hollis had been living in London in 1940, but by 1942 had moved to Oxford, with the MI5 shift to Blenheim Palace.

In short, the handling of the Krivitsky report is a very early and very telling pointer not simply to the confirmed existence of ELLI within MI5, but to ELLI’s having been Hollis.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile...(Parts 2b and 2c -- Warnings and Fuchs)

2C Warnings ignored
Warnings subsequent to Kronfalk’s that there was a GRU mole in MI5 were ignored.

2D Hollis’s call
Hollis was in the key position to follow them up and did not do so.

3A Green 1942
Oliver Green told MI5’s Hugh Shillito in 1942 that the GRU had a mole inside MI5.

3B Akhmedov 1942
GRU defector in Turkey Ismail Akhmedov told his defectors that there was a Soviet mole codenamed ELLI inside.

3C Shillito
Hugh Shillito reported to Hollis after his interviews with Green, T180.

3D Evidence on file
The file on Green highlights his claim about a Soviet agent inside the Security Service, but there is no sign that any action was

3E Confirmation
Hollis never drew attention to the confirmation by Akhmedov of Green’s claim about GRU

4A Challenge
It is hard to believe that Green would have been in a position to know. Shillito’s notes on the interrogation would be of interest.

4B Challenge
Pincher does not provide his source on this and it has proven difficult to pinpoint one.

2E Fuchs cleared
Klaus Fuchs, a known communist, was cleared to work on nuclear weapons.

2F Assumption
Hollis was the individual who cleared him.

3F Cleared 1941
Fuchs was cleared for Tube Alloys (secret nuclear research) in May 1941.

3G Record
Fuchs’s communist connections were a matter of record by then.

3H In charge
Hollis was in charge of nuclear clearances along with Michael Parnin
Map #7 (Parts 2b and 2c) Comments

These are very simply, summary maps. They do not attempt to lay out all the detail underpinning the claims at Level 3. This can be found in Pincher readily enough. It is striking that, at p. 277 of his authorized history, Christopher Andrew mentions Green’s remark about a mole inside MI5, but he infers that ‘since it is inconceivable that any of Green’s case officers would have compromised Blunt’s role in MI5 by making reference to him, it is far more likely that they were referring to the fact (already known to Shillito and Liddell) that the CPGB (Communist Party of Great Britain) had informants within the Security Service.’ Why did it not occur to him to make reference of any kind in this context to ELLI, regardless of who he thought ELLI was? He has no excuse for not being aware that Green referred to a GRU mole, while Blunt was KGB.

In his treatment of the Fuchs case, Christopher Andrew omits all mention of the fact that it was Hollis who cleared Fuchs for secret nuclear work. He mentions, in passing, at p. 550, that Fuchs had “been successfully run by a female GRU controller.” Later, at p. 580, he provides her name (“Ursula Beurton, nee Kuczynski”), but not her codename (SONIA), as the controller for both Melita Norwood and Klaus Fuchs. However, neither SONIA’s codename nor her other names can be found in Defend The Realm’s Index. And Andrew never so much as hints at the early tracking and suspicion of SONIA by Millicent Bagot and Hollis’s dogged protection of SONIA from surveillance or American attention, from 1940 until 1949.

Conceivable lines of objection

Where does a line of defence dig in here? There seems to be no question that it was Hollis who cleared Fuchs three times for work on nuclear weapons. It might be argued that Hollis was merely negligent or overworked in clearing Fuchs so catastrophically, despite being aware of his communist affiliations. But the authorized historian attempted no such defence, preferring to leave the whole subject out of his history entirely. Even if Andrew was convinced, as he professed to be, that ELLI was Leo Long, the disaster of Fuchs’s espionage for the GRU, channelled through SONIA and then through the KGB, was such that an account of how he was able to get a clearance for such work not once but three times was surely called for. At the very least, any credible defence of Hollis would have to show, rather than merely assert, that there is a plausible explanation for this disastrous failure on his part other than his having acted consciously as an agent of Soviet intelligence. This is doubly so given the evidence that others at MI5 in November 1943 urged that the FBI be warned by MI5 of Fuchs’s communist past, only to be brushed aside by Hollis; and that the redoubtable Jane Archer (in December 1946) raised serious doubts about Fuchs only to be brushed aside again by Hollis and by White (who heeded Hollis’s advice on the matter). In certain respects, the Fuchs case could be used as a litmus test for the whole indictment of Hollis. If it could be shown that his handling of the matter was at worst incompetent, the defence might be able to establish a trench line from which to defend him on other matters. Yet Hollis’s very involvement in the Fuchs case was entirely omitted from the authorized history.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map 7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2d – the Kuczynskis)
Map 7 (Part 2d) Comments

This argument map is crucial to the indictment of Hollis. It covers ground wholly omitted from the authorized history of MI5 by Christopher Andrew. The evidence seems compelling that MI5 had kept tabs on the Kuczynskis, knew they were active and dangerous communists, and had reasons to at least suspect that they were in fact agents for the GRU. They knew these things before SONIA was moved into place outside Oxford in 1940. Hollis was expressly warned about them by his staff, of whom there were clearly several. He was by no means only the single officer as claimed by the authorized historian. Yet Hollis chose in every case to set aside such warnings and do nothing about them. He was personally responsible for preparing and sending reports to the U.S. intelligence services about dangerous communists in Britain who might be of possible concern to the United States and he omitted all mention of the Kuczynskis in every such report. He cleared Fuchs and others, whose ‘controller’ or courier was SONIA herself. On two separate occasions he refused permission for U.S. intelligence officers to interview “Mrs Beurton” (SONIA), arguing that this would serve no useful purpose and that she was merely a harmless housewife. He arranged for himself and Kim Philby to be the recipients of reports from the Radio Security Service and then, according to two key and credible witnesses, consistently marked their reports that there was an illegal wireless transmitter operating in the Oxford area “No Further Action.” If there is an innocent explanation for all this, the authorized historian makes no attempt whatever to provide one. Indeed, he omitted any mention of these things from his history of MI5.

To recapitulate on what we have seen to this point: there are 11 core realities that we must consider: 1) There was a GRU mole inside MI5 codenamed ELLI; 2) This mole was not Leo Long; 3) Hollis fits Gouzenko’s description of ELLI quite precisely; 4) Hollis did everything he could to denigrate and to dismiss Gouzenko’s claims; 5) Hollis was in the pole position to have leaked Archer’s report on Krivitsky to the GRU; 6) This report was indeed leaked to them; 7) Hollis was then appointed head of security clearances for the nuclear project and in that capacity cleared Klaus Fuchs not once, but three times; 8) SONIA was Fuchs’s courier; 9) Simon Kremer, the GRU officer in the Soviet Embassy whom Krivitsky had explicitly pointed out in 1940, brought SONIA and Fuchs together apparently without being monitored by MI5; 10) SONIA had been moved into position outside Oxford – close to where Hollis himself lived during the blitz - within weeks of MI5’s being moved to Blenheim; and 11) Hollis did everything in his power to prevent anyone from interfering with her operations or inquiring into her activities before, during and after her role in England in the 1940s; while knowingly omitting all mention of her and her family of spies from reports to the Americans for some eight years.

It surely becomes exceptionally difficult to sustain the belief that anyone other than Hollis could have been ELLI. If a defence of Hollis is to be made, it MUST address this whole set of concerns. That the authorized historian addressed none of them is a severe indictment of his work.

Conceivable lines of objection

Again and again we are led to ask, where does a defence begin to mount a credible case in exculpation of Hollis in this matter? Presumably, it would begin by seeking to isolate the Fuchs affair from any other considerations and to insist that Hollis acted in good faith in clearing Fuchs – every time – only to be badly in error in his judgements. It would, presumably, claim that he had many such clearances to work on and little assistance in the task; that doing such clearances was itself a difficult task and that it is only in retrospect that the folly into which Hollis fell can be seen for what it was. Yet, in 1943, Hollis expressly refused to alert the Americans to Fuchs’s communist past, while knowing that the FBI and the Manhattan Project security staff were specifically concerned about possible communist penetration. He did this despite the urging of his own colleagues to do so. He stuck to his guns even against his own former supervisor, Jane Archer, when it came to bringing Fuchs back into the nuclear project in the U.K. What is to be the line of defence in these cases? The worst possible line of defence is the one adopted by the authorized historian--refusal to so much as mention any of these claims against Hollis; although he does allow that Fuchs’ espionage caused a crisis in the special relationship between Washington and London.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map 7: Hollis best fits both ELLI’s profile and the many anomalies between 1940 and 1965 (Part 2e – Quebec Agreement)

1A Quebec Agreement
Someone got the Quebec Agreement to SONIA in early

1B Hollis fits
Hollis is the best candidate for having done so.

2A 4 Sept 1943
SONIA transmitted the gist of the QA to Moscow on 4 Sept 1943 from her home just outside Oxford, along with a list of the UK-based scientists cleared to work on nuclear weapons cooperation with the

2B Nuclear
Hollis probably had access to the text of the QA or at least summaries.

2C Clearances
Hollis was MI5’s man, working with Michael Perrin, on clearances for nuclear scientists.

2D Timing
Hollis went up to Blenheim and Oxford from London at precisely the time when SONIA must have received the QA and nuclear scientist lists from her source.

3A DG MI5
The text of the QA would have been provided to David Petrie as DG MI5.

3B Shown to Hollis
Petrie or MI5 have shared it with Hollis as head of nuclear security.

3C Registry files
Hollis had three reasons for being in Blenheim at the registry files of MI5 in the first few days of September

3D Moreover
Other evidence suggests Hollis was at Blenheim on and around 4 September

4A Special Branch
He wrote a letter to Special Branch dated 2 Sept 1943 based on Registry files about communists in Britain.

4B List of CP members
His assistants were preparing a list of Communist Party members working in the civil service or armed forces.

4C Nuclear clearances
He was working with Perrin on clearances for nuclear scientists.

4D Shillito letter
A letter from Box 500, Oxford, dated 4 September 1943, was dictated and signed that day by Hugh Shillito, one of Hollis’s key assistants.
Map 7 (Part 2e) Comments

This map is very much a summary of a more complex picture, but it draws attention to a crucial consideration in the indictment of Hollis by Pincher. We know that SONIA operated from Oxford from late 1940 until she fled England in early 1950. We know that she was the courier and even controller for Klaus Fuchs. Even the authorized historian acknowledges that much. We think it likely that among the accomplishments for which she was decorated by Vladimir Putin in 2000 as a ‘Super-agent of Military Intelligence’ (T15) was not only her work with Fuchs but the transmission of the Quebec Agreement so soon after it had been signed by Roosevelt and Churchill (on 19 August 1943). We know that between 1940 and 1949 Hollis did everything he could to deflect attention from her, protect her from surveillance and prevent what attention was directed at her from going anywhere (be it the RSS reports or the requests from U.S. intelligence officers to interview her).

This map shows that, in addition, there is a clear case to be made that Hollis could actually have delivered both the Quebec Agreement and the list of nuclear scientists being cleared for work in the United States to a dead drop (dubok) in or near Oxford, because he then was living in Oxford, commuting daily to and from nearby Blenheim where he worked in the Registry files. We also know that given his official duties at that time, he would have known who was being watched and when and by whom, making it easy for him to deliver his dead drop at his own discretion. Had the authorized historian been trying to address the question of who leaked the Quebec Agreement to Moscow – was it Blunt or ELLI? – he would have had to deal with these awkward facts. In reality, he addressed none of these things. In the Index to The Defence of the Realm, there is no entry under Quebec Agreement. We can be confident, however, that it was not Blunt who leaked the Quebec Agreement, since he was a KGB mole and SONIA worked for the GRU. Besides, there is no evidence that Blunt went up to Oxford in the first days of September 1943; or none that has surfaced. That leaves ELLI and so brings us back to Hollis. And who should turn out to have been at Blenheim and therefore in the vicinity of Oxford in the first few days of September 1943, but Hollis himself. The indictment is surely credible on all points.

Conceivable lines of objection

The defence has multiple challenges here. It is well established that SONIA was Fuchs’s courier on nuclear matters and that it was not until January 1944 that the GRU was required by Stalin and Beria to hand over its nuclear espionage networks to the KGB. Further, it was not until August 1944 that Fuchs began work at Los Alamos. Thus, it might be speculated that SONIA received her information about the Quebec Agreement from Fuchs. For this line of defence to be credible however, it would have to be shown that Fuchs had access to the Quebec Agreement. This seems implausible, given how closely it was held; much less plausible than Hollis’ having access to it, given his position at MI5. But there still would be the matter of the list of scientists cleared to work on Tube Alloys (the U.K.) and the Manhattan Project (U.S.). Fuchs would not have had access to that; nor would any other nuclear spies – but Hollis was the person who kept precisely that list and gave the clearances to the British-based scientists such as Fuchs. When we add to this the evidence that Hollis was in fact at Blenheim in the first days of September, the defence must concede that it is under enormous pressure. Given these circumstances, it hardly seems persuasive to assert that all this is merely circumstantial evidence. Least of all, is it persuasive to merely avoid the subject? Yet that is what the authorized historian did in 2009.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map #8: SONIA points to Hollis’ having been ELLI (Part 1 – The key claims)

1A Shanghai
SONIA was recruited by the GRU in Shanghai in 1930.

1B Hollis
Hollis was in China at that time, mixing with Communist.

1C Connection
This points to a connection between the two.

1D Posting to Oxford
SONIA was posted to Oxford in late 1940, as soon as it was clear that MI5 was being moved to Bletchley (near Oxford) during the London

1E Hollis, This points to
a link with

1F Nuclear espionage
SONIA was the courier for the key nuclear spy Klaus Fuchs.

1G Hollis & Fuchs
It was Hollis specifically who cleared Fuchs to work on nuclear issues, brushing over his communist links.

1H Protective
SONIA later that she always felt she had a protective hand inside MI5.

1I Hollis’s actions
Hollis specifically and repeatedly protected SONIA from serious investigation by either MI5 or the FBI.

[REST OF PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]
Map 8 (Part 1) Comments

Some of this ground has been touched on in the earlier maps and comments, but when the whole picture is drawn, the inference seems all but inescapable that Hollis was ELLI and that SONIA was his courier throughout the 1940s. Those were the years in which she won the praise that was only to be heaped upon her posthumously in 2000 by Vladimir Putin. That Hollis was recruited or at least courted while in China, between 1927 and 1936, seems probable, given the circles in which he moved. Under cross-examination in the late 1960s, he admitted having known Agnes Smedley in Shanghai. Years later, while Hollis was under investigation, it was learned that his Peking roommate—a retired British Army officer—recalled that Hollis had been visited there both by an American woman and a German man—Agnes Smedley and Arthur Ewert. Ewert was the Comintern’s chief secret agent in China. Could he have been Hollis’ recruiter? Many believe so. (Hornstein, pp. 136ff) That Hollis knew Karl and Luise Rimm (other GRU operatives in Shanghai), likewise came out only much later. For many years, Hollis also obfuscated that he had travelled via Moscow to and from England in the 1930s, immediately before applying for a job at MI5. He also said nothing about whom he met while he was there. But whatever uncertainties may still surround whether, when and where Hollis was recruited, the subsequent pattern of events points backward to the probability that he had been recruited. The cumulative probability that he was ELLI is a core concern for any serious inquiry. It won’t do to take each piece of circumstantial evidence separately, dismiss it as circumstantial, or ignore it altogether and then declare that there is insufficient evidence to mount a case. Rather, there is a great deal of evidence that points to the need for a serious examination of the case – and not internally at the discretion of MI5. In the following maps, the underpinnings of the above Level 1 reasons are set out in detail.

Conceivable lines of objection

The obvious line of defence in this matter is to assert that there is no direct evidence that Hollis was recruited and that merely having known Agnes Smedley and met Arthur Ewert hardly amounts to such evidence. That, taken in itself, is clearly true. Moreover, Hollis does not turn up in the Shanghai police files as having come to the attention of quite vigilant anti-communist sleuths, who were, it should be remembered, operating under the Guomindang dictatorship, which was seeking to systematically crush the Chinese Communist movement and had a close interest in the links between it and Moscow. But the defence has to do better than this. After all, it was only very late in the game that Kim Philby’s communist affiliations in the early 1930s and his efforts to obscure them finally registered with the British security authorities. The authorized historian, in any case, far from seeking to throw up a line of defence regarding the Shanghai or Peking evidence, has no entry in his Index under Shanghai or Ewert or Smedley. When we add to the linkages in Shanghai, the fact of Hollis’s 1934 and 1936 visits to Moscow, and his implausible fortnight’s visit to Paris in November 1937, then the suspicion that Hollis was recruited by the GRU must increase in probability. For example, his visit to France was made immediately after he had been offered a job at MI5 to start the following year. It is well-established among historians that at that time, Paris was the epicentre of Soviet intelligence operations in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom. But this probability itself surely must be compounded by the independent facts that SONIA visited London in 1938, the year Hollis began work at MI5; that she was then posted to Oxford by the GRU immediately after Hollis’s job at MI5 required him to move to that vicinity from late 1940 until 1943; that she then became the courier and controller of Klaus Fuchs, whom Hollis cleared; and that he insistently shielded her from all surveillance or interference throughout the 1940s. The defence of Hollis must account independently and cumulatively for all these considerations.
Map 8: SONIA points to Hollis’ having been ELLI (Part 2a – China connection)

1A Shanghai
SONIA was recruited by the GRU in Shanghai in 1935.

1B Hollis
Hollis was in China at that time, mixing in Communist circles.

1C Connection
This points to a connection between the two.

2A Sorge
Then named Ursula Hamburger, SONIA had been a Communist since 1924 and was recruited in Shanghai by Sorge for the GRU in 1935.

2B Smedley
Hollis socialized with Agnes Smedley in China.

2C Smedley was a Communist.

2D assumption
Hollis may well have met SONIA through Smedley.

2E Ewert
Hollis met Arthur Ewert in Beijing.

2F assumption
Ewert was a Communist.

2G Overlap
They were at the very least only one degree of separation apart and their careers subsequently overlapped to an extraordinary degree.

3A Sorge’s mistress
She was the mistress of GRU master spy Richard Sorge.

3B Reason
Smedley was best friends with Ursula Hamburger, the later SONIA.

3C Comintern
He was a leading figure in the Comintern’s China bureau.

4A Publication
Map 8 (Part 2a) Comments

Pinning down the recruitment of Hollis, if he were ELLI, might require an opening from the GRU archives. However, there is no difficulty at all in seeing how it could have occurred. He arrived in China after an abortive study period at Oxford, where he appears to have spent his time chiefly drinking and cavorting with Left-wing friends. This was the very time of the Northern Expedition, in which Chiang Kai-shek set out to reunify China by force. Shanghai, in 1927, was the epicentre first of Communist intrigue and then of the attempt by Chiang Kai-shek and the Right-wing of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) to crush the Chinese Communist Party. It was actually a dangerous time to be a Chinese communist, but perhaps an exciting time to be a Left-wing fellow-traveller mixing in émigré circles and talking revolution. Hollis claimed that he initially worked as a journalist in Shanghai, though there is little evidence of his having written anything for a serious newspaper. He later worked for British American Tobacco, which was a corporate target for Richard Sorge, a GRU spymaster.

Shanghai was the intelligence capital of the Far East in the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet agents of several nationalities were there in force. At least six of them, and possibly eight, were to impact on Hollis’s subsequent intelligence career – an unusual statistic by any standard. These included Kitty Harris and her partner, Earl Browder, later head of the Communist Party of the United States; Karl Sare, an Estonian communist and GRU operative; Richard Sorge, Comintern and GRU agent with a German father and a Russian mother; Agnes Smedley, with whose help Sorge built a multinational spy ring; and Ursula Hamburger (nee Kuczynski, later Beurton, codename SONIA, and pen name Ruth Werner), who arrived in Shanghai in 1930 aged 23 via the Trans-Siberian Railway and was recruited to the GRU by Sorge. There was also Arthur Ewert, a “very senior Comintern official, an active agent and recruiter who frequently attended the Smedley gatherings and became a close friend of SONIA”; and Smedley’s friend, Rewi Alley, who settled permanently in China and lived in Beijing under the Communist regime after 1949. Pincher claims that Alley later confirmed in letters to him, late in life, that he had been friends with Hollis in the late 1920s and early 1930s. To these other names could be added, including Karl and Luise Rimm, ill-fated GRU agents who were also in Shanghai around the time that Hollis was there.

Due to basic errors by MI5 Officer Peter Wright during the Fluency Committee investigation of the mid-1960s, Hollis was never questioned about Ewert. But Pincher notes that: “Recently released records show that MI5 had a file on Ewert stretching back to 1919 and continuing until 1950. Of all the Soviet agents then in China, Hollis could not have consorted with a communist of greater eminence.” (T49).

Conceivable lines of objection

On the face of it, Hollis in China mixed with far more, and much more significant group of communist intelligence cadre than any of the Cambridge Five did in the years before they were recruited by the KGB. It is, therefore, incumbent on the defence of Hollis to show that these facts should simply be ignored. Ewert’s biographer, the late David Hornstein, a former CIA officer, examined the case without arriving at a definitive conclusion, writing: “if Britain’s Cold War security chief was in fact a Soviet agent, Arthur Ewert’s role in the recruitment may have constituted his most significant service to the Comintern and the Soviet Union.” The defence would have to address his grounds for reaching this conclusion and show that they are unfounded. The Karl Sare case surfaced quite late in Pincher’s inquiries and the defence might choose to attack this as a tenuous line of evidence. The problem the defence has is that there are so many intersecting lines of connection here, and these must be interpreted in the light of all the other independent facts about Hollis’s career and the way in which it was shadowed so closely in its foundational years (between 1930 and 1950) by the presence of SONIA. This work is that remains even to be attempted. It would make an interesting and valuable contribution to this case and, in general, to counterintelligence history.

Map 8: SONIA points to Hollis’ having been ELLI (Part 2b – SONIA at Oxford)

1D Posting to Oxford
SONIA was posted to Oxford in late 1940, as soon as it was clear that MI5 was being moved to Blenheim (near Oxford) during the London

1E Link
This points to a link with

2A Overlap
Hollis was the only figure in MI5 who had the Shanghai overlap with SONIA.

2B Female courier
Krivitsky had warned that the GRU used female couriers for its moles, not Soviet intelligence officers.

2C Krivitsky report
Hollis had been sitting on the Krivitsky debrief within MI5 for a year by the time SONIA arrived at

2D Soviet affairs
Hollis was already at work on Soviet affairs and well placed to provide what the GRU was

2E ELLI’s courier
SONIA would have been necessary for such a mole to get materials to the

3A Timings
SONIA arrived in February 1944; Hollis inherited the K report from Jane Archer in February

3B B4
Hollis was promoted to B4 the very month that SONIA settled into Oxford and Klaus Fuchs arrived as a refugee from Nazi

3C B4
B4 was the key Soviet affairs desk within MI5.

3D GRU courier
With a mole inside MI5, the GRU needed an experienced female illegal to serve as a courier for the mole and able to operate ciphered radio

3E Super-agent
SONIA perfectly fitted these requirements.
Map 8 (Part 2b) Comments

The fact that SONIA was instructed to move from Geneva to England and base herself in the Oxford area within weeks of the announcement that MI5 would be moving almost all its staff (including Hollis’s section) from London to Blenheim because of the blitz calls for close scrutiny. As it happens, SONIA visited London in the year during which Hollis first joined MI5 (1938). In October 1940, Brigitte Kuczynski (who may have been Hollis’s London-based courier up to that point and again in the early 1960s, according to her boarder of that time, Michael Butt) moved from London to Bristol, when her husband was assigned there. Around the same time MI5 began its move from London to Blenheim, just nine miles from Oxford. The GRU then instructed SONIA to prepare to move from Geneva to England. She arrived in Liverpool in early February 1941 and without delay moved down to Oxford, where she was to remain until early 1950, working as a super-agent of the GRU. These circumstances beg the questions: Why SONIA, and why Oxford? We have to constantly remind ourselves, in weighing our answers to these questions, that, by that time ELLI was in place. According to Gouzenko, ELLI had direct access to the key files on communist activities in Britain and Soviet intelligence operations there. ELLI was male (ruling out Millicent Bagot) and he was a GRU, not a KGB asset. SONIA’s multiple residences, from the time she settled near Oxford, all were within easy biking distance of where Hollis lived.

Nodes 3D and 3E above point to the link that was to prove so fertile for the GRU between 1941 and 1944: Hollis/SONIA/Fuchs. Krivitsky’s debrief is vital to understanding all this; but despite the authorized historian’s claim that Archer’s report on Krivitsky ‘transformed’ MI5’s understanding of Soviet intelligence operations, there is no sign that anyone – with the possible exception of Hollis as B4 – had any clear idea what was happening in 1940-41. For months Hollis had been sitting on the Krivitsky report, knowledge about the Kuczynskis, and knowledge of Fuchs’ communist background when, in May 1941, he cleared Fuchs. Fuchs was recruited by SONIA’s brother, Jürgen, to the GRU and introduced by the GRU’s London agent, Simon Kremer, to SONIA. There is no indication that at any point – before or after Gouzenko’s defection and exposure of ELLI – Hollis pulled the Krivitsky report out of the files and raised the possibility within MI5 that one could connect the dots and pinpoint SONIA as a GRU courier.

It was in August 1941, when Hollis was appointed head of F Division, that the dogged Millicent Bagot became F2c. The authorized historian, as we have seen, would have us believe that this made her the only MI5 officer covering Soviet affairs and counter-espionage. That is patently untrue. Above her sat Hollis, who had been covering such affairs for more than three years and knew a great deal. Not least, he may well have known SONIA for a decade by then, going back to his days in Shanghai’s International Settlement and the émigré circles around Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge. The indictment holds together here, as well. But there has been no defence of Hollis in this regard. The authorized historian omits all these matters from The Defence of the Realm.

Conceivable lines of objection

This has become familiar ground now, but it helps to go over it again and again in order that the fundamental aspects of the case become drummed into the common understanding. The defence must address the question of the posting of SONIA and its timing; it must address the fact that Millicent Bagot was suspicious of SONIA’s movements, given her known background, but was waved aside by Hollis; that Krivitsky had warned that the GRU used experienced female agents with skills in secret radio transmissions as couriers and that SONIA perfectly fitted this description and is known to have performed precisely this role and performed it right under Hollis’s and MI5’s nose from the time she arrived in England until the time she left. During all those years Hollis systematically ignored all warnings about her. The only conceivable source of a defence here surely is hypothetical material in Hollis’s papers at MI5 – if they still exist – which might amplify our understanding of his actions in those years and point to possible other influences around him at MI5 that may have cramped his vigilance. But even to go looking for such possible documents would require that the authorized historian and the keepers of the MI5 archives give up their claim that all suspicion of Hollis is insubstantial and unfounded conspiracy theory. They would have to provide some actual evidence in extenuation of what, on the face of things, is a serious and troubling indictment of Hollis’s personal responsibilities and actions in the 1940s.
Map 8: SONIA points to Hollis’ having been ELLI (Part 2c – Nuclear Espionage *Troika*)

1F Nuclear espionage
SONIA was the courier for the key nuclear spy Klaus Fuchs.

1G Hollis & Fuchs
It was Hollis specifically who cleared Fuchs to work on nuclear issues, brushing over his communist links.

2A Birmingham
SONIA met Fuchs in Birmingham after he had been recruited by Sklyarov and Kremer for the GRU and given the codename

2B Until 1949
She remained his courier until 1943, when she handed him over to KGB handlers in New

2C Repeatedly
Hollis cleared Fuchs first for work in Britain in 1941 and then for work in the United States in 1943, then finally for further work in Britain

2D Hollis knew
Hollis knew of Fuchs’s communist links from the start.

3A Kahle
He knew of his friendship with Hans Kahle, a known communist.

3B Russians
He stated that Fuchs was more likely to leak secrets to the Russians than to the Germans.
Arguably, the key role of ELLI within MI5 was to provide warnings to the GRU about who MI5 had on its files, who was being kept under surveillance, and what matters were of chief concern to the British security services. Many of the longstanding charges against Hollis have been to do with his alleged performance for the GRU of such functions. But he was clearly in a position to do a good many other things as well. Not least of these was with regard to nuclear espionage in the 1940s. The authorized historian makes no mention of the fact that it was Hollis who thrice cleared Klaus Fuchs for work on nuclear weapons research. This enabled him to avoid the awkward questions as to why Hollis would have done so, and how he handled such clearances in general. Yet the espionage that those scientists - Fuchs chief among them - conducted on behalf of the GRU and for Stalin was of enormous assistance to the Soviet nuclear weapons program and to its success in testing an atomic bomb in 1949. At the very least, the failure of Hollis and MI5 to place the slightest obstacle in the way of those spies was a grave failure of the Security Service. The authorized historian seems unconcerned about that fact. He acknowledges that the Fuchs trial caused a crisis in the Anglo-American “special relationship,” but you would never guess from his account of the matter that Hollis had the slightest thing to do with this.
Map 8: SONIA points to Hollis’ having been ELLI (Part 2d – Protective hand inside MI5)

1A Protective
SONIA also later
that she always felt
she had a protective
hand inside MI5.

1B Hollis’s actions
Hollis specifically and
repeatedly protected
SONIA from serious
investigation by either
MI5 or the FBI.

2A Publication
SONIA memoirs

2B War years
He shielded her in
the early 1940s from
investigation of her
residence at Oxford
and her radio

2C FBI
He warded off FBI
interest in her in
1944 and 1946.

2D Interview
He neutered the
Skardon/Serpell
interview of her in
1947 and
wrote that it had
closed the case.

2E Flight
He, along with White,
lied for years afterwards
that she had fled
England in 1947 after the
interview, when she did
not leave until late Feb
1950, just before Fuchs’s

2F Domicile
Even as DG MI5 he went
to great lengths to
obscure the whereabouts
of her and her GRU spy

3A Warning
Both SONIA and the GRU have
hindered at this protective hand
and we know there was a mole
inside MI5 at the crucial early
stages of SONIA’s work in
England. But Moscow has
refused to reveal who it was,
even a generation after the end

3B Lynch 1944
In July 1944, Hollis
deflected the inquiry of M.
J. Lynch of the FBI into
the Kuczynski family and
laid about the date of
SONIA’s arrival in

3C Cimperman 1946
On 25 August 1946, John
Cimperman, intell US Emb, requested
permission to interview SONIA and
was denied on the grounds that this
could serve ‘no justifiable purpose’.

4A Lying
He stated that
she arrived in
1942, when he
knew very well
she had arrived
in early 1941.

4B assumption
The lie obscured
the coincidence
that she had
arrived just as MI5
moved to
Map 8 (Part 2d) Comments

Writing from behind the Iron Curtain as Ruth Werner, SONIA declared coyly that she often felt she had had a protective hand within MI5 during the 1940s. The record is clear that Hollis was that protective hand, for reasons that make no apparent sense unless he was ELLI and working, like SONIA, for the GRU. The above diagram is only a schema for discussion of this aspect of the case. If taken in isolation from everything else, it might just conceivably be put down to Hollis’s complacency and incompetence. But that lacks plausibility, given the prolonged period of time over which the protective hand was extended and Hollis’s undeniably pivotal role in that protection at every step. Those around him, with immediate access to field intelligence – such as Millicent Bagot and Hugh Shillito – urged that action be taken against her, but Hollis would not be moved.

The Radio Security Service warned that there was an illegal radio transmitter at work in the Oxford area, but Hollis scotched any suggestion that it be investigated. The FBI was suspicious about SONIA, but Hollis warded them off – from his early deletion of her name from lists of dangerous communists sent to the FBI, to denial of requests to interview her in 1944 and 1946. Was all this really just incompetence? The record itself surely suggests that Hollis was behaving with a consistent and highly competent intention – to shield SONIA from intrusion and attention. Why would he do that if he were, as the authorized historian insists he was, concerned about the danger of Soviet espionage? Why would he do it when he knew very well that Ursula Kuczynski and her siblings (as well as her father) had long been active communists and were suspected by his own subordinates of being GRU operatives? Why would he have deliberately lied to the FBI’s M. J. Lynch in 1944 by stating that “Mrs. Beurton” had first arrived in England in 1942, when it was a matter of record in MI5 files that she had in fact arrived in February 1941 and moved straight to Oxford? This is no ordinary incompetence. Taken in the context of what else we know, however, it beggars belief that Hollis was acting “incompetently.” He surely knew exactly what he was doing and why.

Conceivable lines of objection

There is no entry in the Index of the authorized history of MI5 under the name “Kuczynski.” This is a significant omission; like the omission of any entry under SONIA, Shanghai, Sorge, or Arthur Ewert. But any defence of Hollis that will have the slightest credibility must bring these names and their significance into the picture and provide a compelling case that Hollis’s own attempt to delete them from the record and shield them from attention was consistent with his having been a good, sound servant of his country and not the traitor ELLI. How could that be done? I confess I am at a loss for a possible defence of Hollis in this matter, but would be fascinated should one be mounted, based on both shrewd cross-examination of Pincher’s papers – regrettably, it is no longer possible to question Pincher himself - and the provision of fresh evidence.
Map 9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Part 1 – Level 1 claims)

1A Hollis: Oxford & China
Hollis mixed in communist circles in his youth then covered up these connections once in MI5.

1B Philby, too
Kim Philby did exactly the same.

1C Work within MI
Hollis quickly gravitated to work on Soviet affairs inside MI5 and matters of military intelligence.

1D Philby, too
Philby gravitated towards similar work in MI6.

1E Record of failure
On Hollis's watch an extraordinary number of counter-espionage operations failed for inexplicable reasons.

1F Philby, too
This was true, alas, of Philby, but we now know why in Philby's case.

1G Treatment of defectors
Hollis dismissed the claims by defectors of penetration of British intelligence.

1H Philby, too
Philby did the same.

1I Trusted by superiors
Hollis cultivated and won the trust of his colleagues and superiors.

1J Philby, too
Philby was also very good at doing this until Burgess and Maclean fed.
Hollis and Philby were very close from the last years of the Second World War, when they first became acquainted, until 1949 when Philby was posted to Washington. A review of the patterns their careers followed shows that they were close in other ways as well. In the London years, they hobnobbed and exchanged information very freely. Of course, Philby was a very good networker and socialized with quite a few people. One might spring to Hollis’s defence by saying that the relationship he had with Philby in London was no different from that which Angleton had with Philby in Washington – to Angleton’s later acute embarrassment. Yet, we know that Hollis was no James Jesus Angleton. He was Angleton’s antithesis in almost every way. Among the records that ought to exist within the archives of MI5 - unless they have like so many other papers been wantonly destroyed over the decades--would be Hollis’s papers on Philby. What reports did he lodge about his liaison with the man from MI6? What, in particular, if anything, did he put on the record regarding his reactions to the flight of Burgess and Maclean, the VENONA decryptions, the questioning of Philby, and the final flight of Philby from Beirut to Moscow in 1963?

Given that the authorized historian had unprecedented access to MI5’s archives and that he wanted to demonstrate Hollis’s innocence, one might have thought that he would look at these matters. There is no public sign that he did so. Having asserted that ELLI was Leo Long, he presumably felt that there was neither reason nor justification for digging deeper into Hollis’ record. But did he not stumble on anything? Unfortunately, even his account of the Cambridge Five is threadbare, and it seems possible he did not look very closely at the relevant files. Yet, what a coup it would have been for him, had he been able to produce documentary evidence of Hollis’s having been shocked by the defection of Burgess and Maclean, alarmed by the VENONA revelations, and worried about at least the possibility that Philby was a spy. Or if he could have produced evidence that Hollis, in 1963, by then Director General of MI5, was as dismayed and embarrassed at the flight of Philby as was Angleton. He produced no such thing. And, when we survey the careers of the two men, this occasions no great surprise; since the two look so alike as to have been peas in the same Soviet pod.

Conceivable lines of objection

The above considerations adequately cover the ground, surely. As so often, it is the glaring omissions in the authorized history that throw into high relief where any defence must go and what it must look for. That the historian who claimed so boldly to have once and for all buried the alleged canard about Hollis’s having been a traitor should have failed to so much as look for, much less produce any such evidence, is consistent with his pattern of omissions. It is also a worrisome fact that those omissions include the very kinds of consideration that finally persuaded the relevant authorities in the early 1960s that Philby had, after all, been a Soviet mole inside MI6. It is high time that such omissions were remedied. No credible defence can be sustained on the basis of such gaping holes in the evidentiary record.
Map 9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Parts 2a and 2b – Early Leftism and MI work)

1A Hollis: Oxford & China
Hollis mixed in communist circles in his youth then covered up these connections once in MI5.

1B Philby, too
Kim Philby did exactly the same.

2A Oxford
At Oxford he was very close to Cecil Day-Lewis, Claud Cockburn and others of decidedly communist

2B China
In China he mixed with outright Soviet intelligence agents such as Agnes Smedley and Arthur Ewert.

2C Cambridge
Philby mingled with the Left at Cambridge in his student days.

2D Vienna
He married a Communist in Vienna in the early 1930s, before he was recruited to the

1C Work within MI
Hollis quickly gravitated to work on Soviet affairs inside MI5 and matters of military intelligence

1D Philby, too
Philby gravitated towards similar work in MI6.

2E B Division
Hollis started work in B Division for Jane Archer and quickly became her successor as B2a and then B4.

2F F Division
With the April 1941 reorganization of MI5, Hollis was assigned to F Division, becoming head of F2 in August and then, in October head of F Division as a whole - with responsibility for all matters pertaining to Soviet espionage in

2G Nuclear security
Hollis quickly became MI5’s point man on nuclear security vetting and held this role right through and well after the Second

2H Section 9
Philby headed the Soviet counter-espionage section of MI6 from October 1944 until October 1949, when he was posted to

3A Elaboration
Hollis lobbied in the summer of 1944 for Philby to be given the job in
Map 9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Parts 2c and 2d – Failure and defectors)

1E. Record of failure
On Hollis’s watch, an extraordinary number of counter-espionage operations failed for inexplicable reasons.

1F. Philby, too
This was true, also, of Philby, but we now know why in Philby’s case.

2I. Communist watch lists
Hollis insisted and MI6 believed that the Soviets were unlikely to use actual communists as spies, but in fact they did so again and again.

2J. Russian spies
Hollis failed again and again to warn about Russian spies or to keep tabs on known ones.

2K. Nuclear scientists
Hollis cleared known communists, starting with Fuchs, to work on highly sensitive nuclear weapons research, not once but repeatedly and

2L. Infiltration agents
Philby betrayed hundreds of Western infiltration agents to their deaths behind the Iron Curtain.

3B. Whomack
This began in 1941 with George Whomack, a convicted Russian spy, when despite express notice Hollis failed to warn Special Branch about him and he took work once more where he could.

3C. Kremer
Despite Krivitsky’s express warnings about Simon Kremer, he was not kept under surveillance and was able to run or recruit agents, including Fuchs without.

1G. Treatment of defectors
Hollis dismissed the claims by defectors of penetration of British intelligence.

1H. Philby, too
Philby did the same.

2M. Krivitsky
Hollis sat on and bowdlerized Archer’s report on Krivitsky, which had provided numerous warnings about GRU penetration operations and

2N. Gouzenko
Hollis dismissed Gouzenko without any justification and deflected all inquiries into the claim that there was a GRU mole inside

2O. Akhmedov
Philby derided Akhmedov as a source and withheld most of the debriefing notes from MI6.

2P. Volkov
Philby betrayed Volkov to the KGB to his death.
Map #9: Parallels between the careers of Hollis and Philby (Parts 2e – Treatment by superiors)

1A Trusted by superiors
Hollis cultivated and won the trust of his colleagues and superiors.

1B Philby, too
Philby was also very good at doing this until Burgess and Maclean fled.

2A White
Hollis cultivated the naive and incompetent White and was consistently

2B Politicians
Hollis cultivated the favour of senior politicians and sought to make MI6 compliant with

2C Warning
Hollis seems to have been less liked and trusted by quite a few of his colleagues than Philby was. He was a much less charming individual.

2D Menzies
Menzies regarded Philby very favourably and came to think of him as a potential head of MI6 in due

2E Elliott
Nicholas Elliott was one of many MI6 colleagues who thought so highly of Philby that they refused to believe after 1951 that he could possibly be the traitor that he

3A Warning
The difference between Philby and Hollis is that Philby was exposed before he reached the top, largely by accident. Hollis conversely got all the way to the top and was never exposed - perhaps because he had no Burgess at hand to mess things up for him.
Part II. Chronology of the Life and Career of Sir Roger Hollis

1905 Roger Hollis is born December 2, 1905 at Wells, England, son of George Hollis, Anglican clergyman and later Suffragan Bishop of Taunton.

1924 Hollis commences studies at Oxford University. While there, his close associates are Cecil Day-Lewis, Evelyn Waugh, Graham Greene, Claud Cockburn and Tom Driberg, all of them given to carousing and openly left-wing political views. “Sir Dick White, his closest future colleague in MI5, who had been a remote contemporary at Oxford, told me [Pincher] in writing that Hollis had a reputation there for wasting his time on ‘wine, women and golf’, sowing his wild oats as a reaction to his upbringing in a ‘close Church atmosphere’. (T38)

Ursula Kuczynski, age 17, joins the Communist Youth League of Germany and in her first demonstration (May Day) of many, was truncheoned by the police.

1926 For unknown reasons, Hollis withdraws from Oxford a year and two terms short of a degree. In Tom Bowers’ official biography of Sir Dick White, Hollis’ departure from Oxford is described by White as “abrupt rustication”; i.e., expulsion.

1927 After working in a London bank for a year, Hollis goes to Hong Kong and then on to Shanghai, seeking work as a freelance journalist. In Shanghai, he meets Karl Sare, Estonian GRU officer who (allegedly) recruits him to communist service. This is according to Einar Sanden’s account of Evald Mikson’s recollection of an alleged interrogation of Sare in Tallinn in 1941.11

1928 Hollis takes a job at British American Tobacco in Shanghai. While there, he associates with Agnes Smedley, the well-known communist activist and mistress of Richard Sorge, a famous GRU spymaster.12

1930 Ursula Hamburger (nee Kuczynski) arrives in Shanghai with husband, Rudi Hamburger, a GRU operative. It’s likely that she too would have been active for the GRU. Later, she would become famous as a GRU courier, radio communicator, and agent handler. Soon after her death in October 2000, Vladimir Putin decorated her as “Super-Agent of Military Intelligence,” the only Russian spy ever to be so honoured publically.13

1931 Arthur Ewert arrives in China, as the highest ranking secret Comintern agent there. For reasons unknown, Hollis spends some time in Beijing. His roommate is a British army officer, Captain Anthony Staples. Years later, Staples tells MI5 investigators that, while in Beijing, Hollis met several times at their apartment with Ewert, together with Agnes Smedley.14

1932 Richard Sorge is posted to Tokyo and Karl Rimm takes over the GRU station in Shanghai. His wife, Luise, meets and allegedly begins a love affair with Roger Hollis that lasts for three years, until the Rimms are recalled to Moscow. (T601)15

1934 Hollis takes leave from BAT and travels back to England. He returns to China via the Trans-Siberian railway, breaking the journey in Moscow. According to Sanden, Mikson stated that Sare related that he was told that Hollis wanted to visit Moscow on his return journey to Shanghai and that they met in Moscow. (T605)

---


9 Hollis remained in friendly and frequent contact with Cockburn well after joining the Security Service, but never disclosed his link with him. Cockburn, a leading journalist for Communist publications, was a declared Comintern (and possibly GRU) operative. He also was close to Jürgen Kuczynski, leader of the German Communist Party in exile (KPD) and a GRU operative. Before Hollis arrived at MI5, the service tapped Cockburn’s phone and opened his letters.


11 See Einar Sanden, An Estonian Saga, Boreas Publishing, Cardiff, 1996. This account, if it could be substantiated, might prove compelling. This issue remains a primary avenue to explore.

12 Sorge has become especially famous as the head of a Soviet spy ring in Tokyo, who warned Stalin that Germany was going to launch Barbarossa – its massive invasion of the Soviet Union – in late June 1941; and was disregarded with contempt by the dictator. Sorge was later exposed, arrested, and executed by the Japanese.

13 A GRU memo cited by former KGB agent, Alexander Vassiliev, describes her, in the 1940s as “our illegal station chief in England.” (Yellow Notebook #1 p. 86)

14 David P. Hornstein, ARTHUR EWERT: A Life for the Comintern, University Press of America, Lanham, MD., 1993

15 This story is based on the testimony of Einar Sanden, which remains to be corroborated. It comes very late in Pincher’s account of the case and depends upon alleged tape recordings of interviews with Luise Rimm in her old age. If it could be authenticated, it would certainly add to the many threads of evidence suggesting that Hollis was recruited by the GRU and that those soundings began in China in the early 1930s.
1935 Karl Rimm and his wife Luise return to Moscow to work at GRU Centre.

1936 In June, The Great Terror begins in the USSR, with trials of the Old Bolsheviks. At this very time and through into 1937, Karl Sare is on recruiting missions for the GRU in Britain, the U.S., and Canada.17 (T605) Invalided out of China with tuberculosis in July, Hollis returns to England for good. He claimed that he returned to Britain via the Pacific, Canada and the Atlantic, but there is some evidence that he again travelled through the U.S.S.R. and visited Moscow. According to Sanden, Sare told Mikson that Hollis met Luise Rimm again in Moscow and they stayed in a GRU love nest. (T605) He was back in England by late August. On September 16 he dined with his brother Christopher and Evelyn Waugh.

1937 In April, John Cairncross is recruited by the KGB and goes to Paris to meet his controller. He then goes to work in the British Foreign Office.

Stalin purges the Red Army high command, the OGPU (KGB), and GRU, as part of the Great Terror. Walter Krivitsky, head of GRU operations in Western Europe, joins the Trotskyite underground in Paris in fear of his life, after his friend and fellow GRU illegal, Ignace Reiss, is murdered by a Stalinist hit squad in Switzerland.

Henri Robinson takes over the Red Orchestra’s operations against England from its continental HQ in Paris.

Jürgen Kuczynski moves into the Lawn Road complex of apartments in London, along with the Norwoods (also Soviet spies), Arnold Deutsch (a KGB master spy), and Simon Kremer (GRU officer).

Hollis applies for work in MI5 and after a couple of rejections is accepted for work, initially to start in early 1938.

Hollis and his wife travel to Paris on November 26, stay there briefly, then go to Loches, south of Tours, where they both take French lessons for two weeks, before returning to Paris for several days and then returning to England for Christmas. Paris, at that time, was the centre for both Comintern and GRU operations in Western Europe, including operations against Britain.

In December, Karl and Luise Rimm are arrested in Moscow, at the height of the Great Terror, and within weeks of Hollis’ visit to Paris.18

1938 The Anschluss takes place in March: Austria is annexed by the German Reich.

Hollis joins MI5 in the summer.19 SONIA visits London.

Climax of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union, with the mass executions of tens of thousands of ethnic Germans, Poles and Japanese in case they should constitute a fifth column in the event of a future war. In all, there have been some 750,000 executions in the two years to the summer of 1938, with many more being sentenced to the GULAG.

In late September, in Munich, Britain and France betray Czechoslovakia to Hitler, who annexes the Sudetenland shortly afterwards.

On November 9-10, there is an anti-Jewish pogrom in Germany called Kristallnacht: Scores of Jews are murdered in the streets; 1,000 synagogues are burned (95 in Vienna alone);, 30,000 Jews arrested and incarcerated in concentration camps; and 7,000 Jewish businesses destroyed.

1939 Hollis becomes B4a, assistant to Jane Sissmore Archer in B Division of MI5: Soviet Affairs. The section’s responsibility is to investigate suspected cases of Soviet espionage by individuals domiciled in the UK.20

---

16 This extended link – ‘according to Sanden, Mikson stated that Sare related that he was told’ – makes the line of evidence rather tenuous. But in a case of this nature many such threads are tenuous. They also were tenuous for years in the case of Kim Philby.

17 It’s tempting to think that Sare may have recruited some of those GRU spies who were to be exposed in 1945 by Igor Gouzenko.

18 Pincher observes that the arrest of the Rimms, coming hard on the heels of Hollis’ job offer from MI5 and visit to Paris, could mean that they were taken out of circulation because they knew too much about Hollis. (T602) Like many other details in the case, this merits further exploration. It should be tallied and examined alongside the purge and apparent execution in the GULAG, in 1953, of Maria Poliakov, who had been the GRU’s case officer for ELLI – at the very time that Hollis became Deputy Director of MI5. By Pincher’s account, Poliakov had been an excellent case officer. That she was purged in 1953 may have had nothing to do with ELLI or Hollis. Stalin died in March 1953 and the fall of Beria and quite a few other senior intelligence and security figures around that time could be the context for the downfall of Poliakov. But the case merits looking into; especially against the background of the fate of the Rimms.

19 Karl Sare allegedly stated to Mikson that, as soon as Hollis joined MI5, Sare was told by GRU Centre, which knew immediately, to sever all communications and connections with him. The Mikson papers were not handed over to Sanden and remain in the custody of his son Ali Evaldsson, a retired professional soccer player in Germany.

20 Note that this is well before Archer’s debrief of Krivitsky and the period for which the authorized historian claims MI5 had only a single officer assigned to Soviet affairs.
Hans Kahle arrives as a refugee from Nazi Germany. He makes contact with Jürgen Kuczynski and J. B. S. Haldane, both GRU agents.

In early September Nazi Germany invades Poland and Britain declares war on Germany. The Second World War officially commences.

In London, Jane Sissmore Archer debriefs defector Walter Krivitsky. He tells her that the GRU’s professional methodology is based on moles using couriers not intelligence officers, and dead drops not direct hand-overs. Krivitsky also describes how the couriers usually are female illegals, experienced intelligence operatives and holders of citizenship in the country in question, with skills in illegal coded radio transmissions.

Archer’s report on Krivitsky points to the separate operations of the GRU and KGB; deep penetration of British intelligence and the Foreign Office by Soviet moles; and the role of Simon Kremer as GRU officer at the Soviet Embassy. Archer’s report is lodged in files at MI5 over which Hollis assumes effective custody. Almost at once (February 1940) the GRU and KGB learn in detail about the debriefing and Krivitsky’s warnings, all of which were being conducted under extreme secrecy by MI5.

In May, because of World War II, MI5 undergoes a rapid expansion of personnel, and experiences a significant management overhaul. Jasper Harker, former head of B Division (Counter-Espionage) replaces Vernon Kell as Director General; Guy Liddell becomes head of B Division in his place.

Anthony Blunt (a KGB mole) joins MI5 in June. John Cairncross becomes secretary to Lord Hankey on the Scientific Advisory Committee, giving him access to an extraordinary range of scientific, technical, political and military intelligence, all of which he passed to the KGB.

In October, Brigitte Kuczynski moves from London to Bristol, when her husband is posted there.

With the onset of the blitz in late 1940, MI5 is moved from Wormwood Scrubs in London to Blenheim Palace, about 7.5 miles northwest of Oxford. Hollis’ section is set up within huts on the palace grounds.

In November, Jane Archer is sacked for insubordination after clashing with Harker. At the same time, SONIA, then based in Geneva with the Red Orchestra, receives orders to move to England and base herself in Oxford—just a few weeks after MI5 had moved to Blenheim Palace. MI5’s Millicent Bagot (B4b2) follows SONIA’s movements in detail and raises suspicions about her.

In December, Hollis sends a list of “Foreign Communists Considered Dangerous” to the FBI. He omits from it mention of any Kuczynski family members.

1941

On February 4, SONIA arrives in Liverpool and after a single night there moves to Oxford, where her father had set up accommodation for her.

Klaus Fuchs arrives in England as a refugee from Nazi Germany.

Hollis is promoted to B4. He neglects to warn Special Branch about George Whomack, a convicted spy who consequently gains employment at a munitions factory and promptly resumes spying. This act of omission on Hollis’ part raises Jane Archer’s suspicions about him for the first time.

In April, Harker is replaced as DG by David Petrie. B Division is divided into three new divisions: B, E and F. Hollis is assigned to F Division, headed by Jack Curry, whose responsibilities are to counter subversive activities of all kinds.

Klaus Fuchs is recruited in May to the British nuclear project by Rudolf Peierls and moves to Birmingham. Hollis is put in charge of the clearance process and gives Fuchs an unrestricted clearance for such work.

By mid-year, MI5 has 860 staff, of which 233 are intelligence officers.

---

21 This is clearly one of the earliest cases in Hollis’s MI5 career in which circumstantial evidence points to his betraying a major secret to the GRU. It should be looked into more closely. If it were anyone other than Hollis who supplied Archer’s report on Krivitsky to Moscow, no-one has so far even attempted to point out who that someone else might have been or how they got access to the report.

22 This is the second item that should be followed up systematically: Hollis’s protection of the Kuczynski family from surveillance or interference throughout the 1940s and, indeed, beyond. The complete omission of any mention of the Kuczynskis in general, or of SONIA in particular, by Christopher Andrew in his authorized history of MI5 is one of the book’s unexplained, and more significant puzzles.

23 This is the third “tick” against Hollis -- the clearing of Klaus Fuchs, a known communist, to work on both the British and later, the American nuclear weapons projects.
On June 22 Operation Barbarossa begins with the massive Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.

In August, Hollis is placed in charge of F2, whose duties are to cover the activities of the British Communist Party (F2a); the activities of the Comintern and Communist refugees (F2b); and Soviet espionage (F2c).

On August 8, Fuchs meets in Birmingham with Simon Kremer and Kremer's GRU boss, Ivan Sklyarov. Fuchs is formally recruited by the GRU and given the codename OTTO.

GRU chief Alexander Panfilov learns of the nuclear weapons project well before the KGB. The source seems to have been Fuchs. Even though Kremer had been pinpointed by Krivitsky as an important GRU spy, MI5 had not kept him under surveillance.

In September, John Cairncross, the Fifth Man in the Cambridge spy ring, informs his KGB controller of the nuclear weapons program.

In October, Jack Curry was moved on to other duties and Hollis was put in charge of the whole of F Division.25 On October 8, D. Griffiths of F Division put into the official files a note that a source had revealed that Fuchs was very well known in communist circles and the Ministry of Atomic Production should be notified. Nothing was done.

1942 Hollis is ill with tuberculosis and takes leave for several months at a sanatorium. During his absence, Fuchs and the GRU break off contact. When Hollis returns to active duty, so does OTTO.26

In August, John Cairncross moves to Station X and gets access to highly classified signals intelligence, especially on the German order of battle, which he passes to the KGB over the next 12 months.

Oliver Green, convicted GRU spy, is interrogated by MI5 Officer Hugh Shillito between August and November. Green states that the GRU has a mole inside MI5. Shillito reports this to Hollis on December 2. No action is taken to hunt for a mole.27

On November 29 and again on December 19, Hugh Shillito reports to Hollis his suspicions concerning SONIA and urges that she be put under surveillance, with a tap put on her phone. Hollis does nothing.

1943 MI5 moves back to London, but elements of it, including Hollis' F Division, remain at Blenheim. He moves with headquarters staff back to London, but continues to visit Blenheim regularly.

SONIA transmits the Quebec Agreement to GRU Centre in Moscow on September 4. Fuchs was not her source. She did not see him between August and November. Hollis is London-based at this time, but is considered MI5's resident expert on nuclear questions. He visits Blenheim in the first days of September on atomic security business.

Hollis meets Kim Philby for the first time, in London. Cairncross joins MI6 in London.

---

24 It would be useful to know exactly how many of these staff worked in F Division and under Hollis, in F2, in particular. If Hollis was not ELLI, the hunt for ELLI would surely have to start among them.

25 That at least some of the secret documents taken by GRU moles may have been stolen by moles other than ELLI is made plain by Pincher (T110-114), which is summarized as follows: Some information has come out from GRU archives pointing to a “super-agent” inside the War Office and then (from 1944 until the end of the war) in Washington at the offices of the combined Chiefs of Staff, operating with the codename, MILORD. In Washington he was part of a seven or eight man GRU spy ring known as OMEGA. There were other GRU agents in London at the time whose code names are now known, but whose true identities the GRU still refuses to reveal after all these years. All members of the OMEGA ring had codenames beginning with M. There is no suggestion, however, of another mole GRU mole inside MI5 other than ELLI. MILORD was a communist from 1936 who had undertaken such espionage freely and he stopped once the war ended and he had been discharged from the Army. He was never suspected until after he died in 2000 at age 88. He left a written confession. In the intervening years he had become a well-known figure in the London publishing world. His name was James MacGibbon. London police warned in 1940, when he first joined the Army Intelligence Corps, that he was not to be trusted, but MI5 ignored the warning. In 1944, MI5 asked the Special Branch whether MacGibbon could be trusted for posting to Washington. In 1950 William Skardon was sent to question him both about a communist friend of his and about his own rumoured contacts with the Russians. He denied everything and was then left alone. Throughout MacGibbon's period of espionage, Hollis was in charge of countering Soviet espionage at MI5. In this case, as in every other, he was at best, incompetent.

26 It would be useful to construct a chronologically precise diagram of this pattern suggested by Pincher: Fuchs' only being active (within Britain) while Hollis was on the job.

27 On at least three, specific occasions, Hollis deflected any suggestion that there could be a GRU mole inside MI5. That there was a general problem of complacency in this regard across the British government—until the Cambridge spy scandal rocked the establishment—may help to explain Hollis' attitude. However, his specific job, as head of F Division, was to look for spies and moles. His "complacency," if that is what it was, is therefore less excusable than that of anyone else across the entire British government.
Sorge’s replacement as the GRU’s Shanghai resident, Karl Rimm, is executed as an alleged British spy. His wife, Luise Rimm, is sent to the Vorkuta labour camp in the Arctic until 1957, when she is amnestied and Karl is rehabilitated.

In November, Hollis clears Fuchs for work on the U.S. nuclear program, specifically brushing aside suggestions that the Americans be told about Fuchs’ known communist past.

1944

In January, under direct orders from Stalin and Beria, the GRU hands over its atomic spy network to the KGB. By then, Fuchs had already handed over 570 pages of classified documents to SONIA and the GRU.

Hollis urges that Philby be placed in command of MI6’s Section 9, in charge of monitoring overseas Soviet espionage. Philby gets the job. Meanwhile, Hollis is responsible for monitoring all Soviet espionage within the British Isles.28

Operation BRIDE/VENONA is initiated—the interception and decryption of Soviet cable traffic in and out of New York. It will eventually raise suspicions about both Maclean and Philby. The Soviets learn about it within months. FBI Agent Robert Lamphere will later conclude that Hollis betrayed BRIDE/VENONA’s existence to the GRU as early as May 1945.

On July 24, FBI Agent M. J. Lynch, writes to MI5 inquiring about the Kuczynski family. Hollis insists on responding and states that Ursula Beurton (SONIA) is no more than a domestic housewife looking after her children. He misstates the time of her arrival in England, giving it as 1942, when he knew that it had been in early 1941.29 When the FBI persisted in its inquiries, Hollis directed them to MI6—knowing that their point of contact there would be Philby.

In August, Klaus Fuchs begins work at Los Alamos.

1945

In February, Fuchs hands over to the KGB a complete summary of the whole problem of making an atomic bomb. He was later described as the USSR’s principal, technical source on the whole atomic weapons question.

In April, Germany surrenders. In June, Cairncross, from within MI6, betrays to the KGB the identities of MI6 agents in several countries.

In July, Moscow receives a KGB report giving precise details of the structure of the plutonium bomb about to be tested in America. Fuchs may have been the source for this.

In August, the atomic bombs are dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrenders shortly afterwards.

In early September, Igor Gouzenko, a GRU cipher clerk in Ottawa, defects and names numerous GRU spies in North America. He also states that there is a highly valuable mole at a high level within MI5 by the codename of ELLI. On September 17, KGB Centre confirms to the Embassy in London that Philby’s information about Gouzenko—that there was a GRU mole in MI5—had been confirmed by the GRU.30 Placed in charge of the whole case, Hollis urges that nothing be done lest the affair disrupt relations with the Soviet Union. His advice is taken. ELLI remains in place. In late September and early October, Hollisbriefs Philby on the Gouzenko affair in detail. According to Pincher, we now know this from both KGB and MI5 documents.

In October 1945, the KGB, reacting to the Gouzenko revelations, break off contact with their agents in England. In the case of John Cairncross, then working in Treasury, contact would not be renewed until June 1948.

---

28 An early official history of MI5, published in 1999 (The SECURITY SERVICE 1908-1945), revealed that Hollis had not only been in charge of Soviet counter espionage during the war but had been initially responsible for assisting Philby into precisely the same position in MI6. This history was written in 1946, years before Philby’s treachery became known or MI5 suspicions against Hollis arose. While lauding Philby’s brilliance in securing such a prime position, The Authorized History of MI5, published in 2009, makes no mention of Hollis’s crucial role in the Philby saga.

29 This is only one in a long series of interventions by Hollis apparently intended to shield SONIA. These actions by Hollis extend throughout her stay in Britain and well beyond it. While it is faintly possible that some other motive may have lain behind all these actions, they are clearly strongly consistent with the hypothesis that Hollis was himself ELLI and was consciously protecting a major GRU asset and his own courier.

30 Simultaneously, in September 1945, Konstantin Volkov of the KGB sought to defect in Istanbul. He said he could expose seven KGB spies in London – two in the Foreign Office and five in the intelligence services, as well as offering clues to more than 300 other Soviet agents operating worldwide. Philby was under direct threat. In short, in September 1945, both Hollis (ELLI) and Philby (SONNY) were in acute danger of exposure. Both survived: Hollis, by deflecting any inquiry into the identity of ELLI; and Philby, by arranging to leave Volkov vulnerable long enough for the KGB to kidnap him in Istanbul, take him back to Moscow and execute him.

Hollis did nothing about either Gouzenko or Volkov. When asked later by MI5 Director General White, he responded, “It didn’t seem important.” Philby suggested to MI6 Director General Menzies that since ELLI was in MI5, his counterpart there, Hollis, should go to Canada, rather than he. Every detail about Gouzenko was passed through Philby at MI6 and straight to KGB Centre. This only became clear in the 2000s, particularly with the release of the Vassiliev Papers. GRU Centre cut contact with SONIA for months. Both KGB and GRU assumed that MI5 would make a major effort to identify ELLI and that this could cause all manner of problems for their networks. Yet nothing happened.
In October, meanwhile, MI5’s Michael Serpell reviews the Fuchs file and recommends that Fuchs be thoroughly reinvestigated, marking the file to that effect. But nothing is done – and, again, it is Hollis’ call.

November 24, Vsevolod Merkulov, Commissar for Soviet State Security, reports to Stalin and Beria that Gouzenko had revealed that the GRU had a mole within British intelligence codenamed ELLI.31

1946 A Canadian Royal Commission enquires into Gouzenko’s revelations and vindicates him and his testimony across the board.

Alan Nunn May is brought to trial for nuclear espionage. He had been a GRU spy. He lived until 2003 and remained unrepentant to his dying day. In the wake of his conviction, Hollis declines to reactivate his checks on Fuchs or any other communist scientists.

Vladimir Skripkin in Hong Kong puts out defection feelers to British naval intelligence. Two reports are sent to MI5 and are betrayed to the Soviets. When Skripkin returns to Moscow, he is arrested by the KGB and executed.

On 25 August, John Cimperman, intelligence officer at the U.S. Embassy, writes to Hollis seeking permission to interview SONIA. Permission is denied by Hollis on the grounds that such an interview would serve no justifiable purpose.32

In December, back at MI5, Jane Archer raises serious doubts about Fuchs, but is brushed aside by Hollis and White.33

1947 In July, GRU agent Alexander Foote defects in Germany and is flown to a British facility in Hanover. Hollis is put in effective control of his interrogation. He identifies SONIA as Ursula Beurton. He says she had been working for GRU while in Britain and gives details of her radio sets. Foote reveals her 1940-41 assignment to England and the Oxford area. He is then flown to London. Hollis keeps personal control of the case. The interrogation continues through August, September and into October. Foote exposes the entire Kuczynski family. As a result, there is a feeble interview of SONIA (by Skardon and Serpell), but she is basically left alone. It later will be alleged by Dick White and Hollis that SONIA fled England after this interview, as if intimidated by it. In fact she remained in place and at work until early 1950 – as they well knew.34

1948 Hollis becomes head of C Division, in charge of all security vetting for public service. In August, he visits Australia to provide advice on the creation of ASIO. During Hollis’ prolonged absence, Fuchs does not meet his KGB controller, Alexander Feklisov. He resumes such meetings in October, after Hollis’ return to London.35

1949 In February Hollis is again in Australia, consulting on the creation of ASIO.

August 22 – a senior U.S. cryptographer, Meredith Gardner, deciphers a VENONA message pointing to a Soviet mole in the U.S. nuclear program.

August 29 – the Russians test their first atomic bomb.

September 2 – Michael Perrin deduces that the atomic mole has been Klaus Fuchs. Moscow finds out almost at once and warns its KGB network in the United States.

October 10 – Philby arrives in Washington, D.C. as MI6 liaison officer.

31 It was this kind of archival data which made it impossible for MI5 to claim, in its authorized history, that there had never been an ELLI – as Gordon Brook-Shepherd asserted in the 1980s. Rather than conduct a thorough investigation, they instead allowed the authorized historian to publish the untenable claim that “We now know that ELLI was Leo Long” and then to assert that this “buried” the allegations against Hollis.

32 Note the growing string of deflections, specifically by Hollis, of attempts to check out SONIA.

33 Hollis reluctantly agreed to surveillance of Fuchs in early 1947 and when it turned up nothing after ten weeks insisted that Fuchs be given a clean bill of health and the surveillance lifted. Within two or three weeks, Fuchs renewed contact with his communist controllers. Who can have warned him and his controllers at either end of the surveillance? Not Blunt, as he had left MI5 in 1945. Moreover, Hollis persisted in defending Fuchs within MI5 throughout 1947 even as Fuchs, now again working in England, continued spying for the Russians.

34 The fact that White, who was not a Soviet mole, as well as Hollis, who is alleged to have been one, lied about this gives Hollis an oddly legitimate kind of alibi. Might he not have had the same motives as White? What was White himself thinking? White appears to have thought as highly of Hollis – for reasons unknown – as, for example, Nicholas Elliot long thought of Kim Philby.

35 This “coincidence” in timing should be diagrammed along with the hiatus in OTTO’s liaison with Feklisov during Hollis’s absence from his post due to tuberculosis six years before. See Note 18 above.
In October, MI5 puts together a three volume study of the Red Orchestra based on captured German documents. The British study concludes that there is no evidence that SONIA did any intelligence work in the British Isles between 1941 and 1949.

1950 In late January Fuchs, under MI5 interrogation, confesses to spying for Moscow, but lies to cover up the role of SONIA.36

On February 28, SONIA quietly slips out of Britain and back to the Soviet bloc. The next day, Klaus Fuchs pleads guilty to espionage in Old Bailey Court.

Between February and May, the FBI cuts off the supply of intelligence to MI5. This coincides with a hiatus in KGB warnings to its operatives in North America. When the ban is lifted, such warnings resume.37 MI5 belatedly becomes aware that SONIA has flown the coop. But they do not inform the FBI until mid-December.

1952 Dick White becomes D.G. MI5 and appoints Hollis as his deputy. John Cairncross is exposed through papers in Burgess’ apartment. He confesses and is given an amicable settlement, resigning and going abroad. There is no publicity in the matter. MI5 files dismiss Burgess as small fry and it is not until the end of the Cold War, almost forty years later, and the release of KGB records, that it is revealed that he was one of the biggest fish ever landed by the KGB, betraying atomic secrets, the ENIGMA codes, and 5,832 secret documents.38

1954 George Blake (in MI6) betrays the plans for the Berlin tunnel to the KGB before work on it has even begun.

1955 Blake is posted to Berlin by MI6, where he betrays scores of German and Russian agents recruited by MI6 and the CIA. Even at KGB Centre in Moscow, only three people were aware that Blake existed as a source. They did not inform the GRU or the Stasi of either the source or the Allied use of the tunnel.39

1956 In July, MI6 DG John Sinclair, his deputy, George Young, and Nicholas Elliott, all convinced that Philby had been the victim of paranoid conspiracy theories, arrange for him to resume MI6 work under journalistic cover in Beirut.

The Crabb Scandal and sacking of John Sinclair as DG MI6 leads Anthony Eden to move Dick White from MI5 to head MI6 and to appoint Hollis, on White’s recommendation, as DG MI5.40 Evidence was to surface decades later that Ivan Serov had visited London in March—a month ahead of the visit to England by Khrushchev and Bulganin—and had been contacted by a Soviet source inside MI5 who warned him of the planned Crabb mission. According to Pincher (T426), newly released KGB records have now shown “beyond doubt” that “Soviet intelligence had a rapid-action British source of top secret information known to very few.” Hollis was one of those very few in MI5 and MI6 who knew of the Crabb mission in advance.

It is speculated that once he became D.G., Hollis changed roles and switched from being an active agent to being a confidential contact, his chief role then being only to provide early warning of Anglo-American strategic intentions.41

36 A statement by Feklisov in his memoirs may be highly significant. He claimed that Soviet intelligence had been able to secure precise details of the interrogation of Fuchs because “We had enough sources within British intelligence at the time to find out all these details later on.” He reproduced details of Skardon’s questions and Fuchs’ replies, implying that the KGB had enjoyed access to written MI5 records. Philby was then based in Washington and had no access to such records or to his friend Hollis, who might otherwise have told him about them. At that time, there was no known spy in MI5 apart from ELLI. The relevant pages in Feklisov’s memoir, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs, (Enigma Books, New York, 2001), are pp. 248-49. He goes on, interestingly, to remark: “No doubt MI5 had come to the conclusion that Fuchs’ case officer was an illegal rather than an intelligence operative under diplomatic cover . . . .” He even names SONIA (Ursula Kuczynski) and her role as Fuchs’ courier, while stopping short of any suggestion that she or Fuchs a protective hand inside MI5 — as SONIA herself had already stated in her memoirs.

37 Detailed evidence from KGB documents (cited by Nigel West and Oleg Tsetsarev in Crown Jewels) shows that while Philby had been told of the code break evidence incriminating Fuchs in late September, his information did not reach the KGB until after Fuchs’ arrest, according to Pincher. He goes on: So, he is unlikely to have been responsible for Moscow’s advance knowledge of Fuchs’s danger. Satisfied that there had been no leaks from the FBI, Lamphere and others suspected MI5 as their source. This suspicion was strengthened when Hoover lifted his ban after the FBI was eventually allowed to interrogate Fuchs. Lamphere learned that throughout the time of the ban, which had lasted from early February 1950 until late May, the suspect American KGB agents had received no further warnings from Moscow. Yet, as soon as the ban was lifted and MI5 was told again what the FBI was doing, the warnings from Moscow resumed and some of the suspects were urged to make arrangements to escape, several of them being successful. Lamphere suspected that Soviet intelligence was being given a running commentary on the FBI operations by someone in MI5.

38 This extraordinary cover-up in the Cairncross case is, perhaps, the first really spectacular evidence of the British intelligence establishment’s willingness to suppress evidence of penetration at almost any cost rather than expose and exorcite it. This unstated policy of “amicable elimination” also was evident in how the British dealt with other major spys such as Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt.

39 How can White not have learned about the tunnel as a permanent member of the JIC? And if he did so, would he not have said something about it to Hollis? Yet, as far as we know, Hollis did not inform the GRU.

40 Harold Macmillan would later describe Hollis as “an insignificant man.” Michael Havers, when Attorney General, described him as “a blundering buffoon.” Alistair Horne, Macmillan’s biographer, concluded that MI5 during Hollis’ reign as DG was “inept and in disarray.” (T428). None of them seem to have suspected that this allegedly inept behaviour may have concealed the relentless work of a long term and inordinately successful GRU mole.
Living in East Berlin, Ursula Kuczynski (SONIA) becomes a full time writer under the name Ruth Werner. She later publishes her memoirs in German (Sonjas Rapport, Verlag Neues Leben, Berlin 1977), and later in English (Sonya’s Report, Chatto & Windus Ltd., London 1991).

Martin Furnival Jones becomes Deputy Director of MI5 under Hollis. He discovers to his consternation that the number of Soviet intelligence officers posing as diplomats, trade officials, chauffeurs, press officers and journalists has grown to 300 by 1956 and is steadily increasing. Hollis turns a blind eye and the numbers continue to increase throughout his time as D.G. MI5.

(T433)

1957 Frantisek Tisler, cipher clerk in the Czech Embassy in Washington, is recruited by the FBI and under the codename ARAGO provides intelligence suggesting that the Soviets have a spy inside MI5 who can be tapped at short notice. Hoover writes a personal letter to Hollis about this. He also reveals that a GRU officer had informed the Czechs about MI5’s surveillance program Coverpoint, which had been approved by Hollis and then leaked to the GRU almost immediately. To placate Hoover, Hollis appoints Peter Wright to investigate the possibility that there is a mole in MI5.

1958 Charles Bates is posted to London as head of the FBI station. He concludes that since the Second World War MI5 has never discovered a spy of consequence from its own resources, but only when tipped off by others and unable to avoid going public.

(T435)

1960 John Stonehouse MP is recruited by the Czech intelligence service and provides material to them for the next 10 years. Hollis receives a knighthood, as DG MI5. The CIA and FBI (drawing on their own sources, especially the Polish defector, Michal Golienewski) alert the British to the existence of a number of Soviet spies operating in England: Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, “Gordon Lonsdale” (real name Konon Molody), and “Peter and Helen Kroger” (real names Morris and Lona Cohen). All of them are arrested and sentenced to long jail terms and Hollis claims the glory for MI5. But Houghton’s Russian controller, Nikolai Korovin, left London for Moscow shortly before Houghton and Gee were arrested. Bates believed that the Krogers were arrested too soon and that “the big fish got away.”

In December, in Moscow, GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky approaches British businessman Greville Wynne and declares that he wishes to defect and has military secrets to reveal to the West. He is a senior officer for the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.

1961 In January, CIA and MI6 agree to jointly run Penkovsky as an agent in place within the GRU. Wynne agrees to help them. In April, Penkovsky comes to Britain with a cache of valuable intelligence and the observation that the KGB and GRU are rivals who “rejoice over each other’s failures.” This coincides with the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

(T436)

Anatoli Golitsyn defects to the CIA and provides a great deal of information about the KGB’s operations in the West.

(T437)

George Blake, fingered by both Golienewski (in 1959) and Golitsyn, confesses to having been a Soviet spy inside MI6 since 1953, including four years (1955–59) in Berlin. He admits to betraying more than 400 agents or sub-agents, many of whom were later executed; and to revealing to the KGB the building of the Berlin tunnel. He is sentenced to 42 years in prison, but Macmillan has a D Notice issued preventing the media from stating that he had worked for MI6.

In May, Peter Wright submits his first report to Hollis, expressing concerns that there is indeed a mole in MI5.

---

43 As DG MI5, he had right of access to any documents he wished, his own safe, his own private cipher, and almost complete immunity from serious investigation. As a permanent member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, he was privy to all the nation’s major intelligence secrets, with access to the intelligence gleaned by MI6, GCHQ and every other source. Nigel Bance, a colleague of Pincher, has secured tape recorded statements made in Moscow in December 2002 in which the author of a KGB internal history, Georgi Goncharov, working for Colonel General Grigori Grigorenko, then head of the KGB’s Counter-Intelligence Directorate, is said to have written of Hollis in the 1970s, before any suspicions about him had been raised in the West. The author describes Hollis as having been a GRU source, as having been in contact with SONIA, and as having been mentioned by SONIA in Moscow in the 1930s. This shows that there must have been a KGB file on Hollis by the late 1970s and probably much earlier. The document described Hollis a confidential contact in his last years. Yet no such KGB file has surfaced since the end of the Cold War, despite various openings in the KGB archives and the huge cache of documents brought to the West by Vasili Mitrokhin.

42 Colonel Michael Lyubimov of the GRU informed Pincher (T530) that the number of British Soviet agents so far exposed is “only the tip of the iceberg.” If that is so, one is left wondering where they all worked and, in particular, whether there was more than one of them inside MI5 after 1945.

43 This is twelve years after Gouzenko and wholly independent of him. Tisler doesn’t appear to have known of the source inside MI5 as “ELLI,” but by 1957, when Director General, Hollis likely would have had a new codename, as well as a new role.

44 There is no mention of any of this in The Authorised History of MI5.

45 “With Fuchs, Pontecorvo, SONIA, the other Kuczynskis, Maclean, Burgess and Philby, the 1950s had been eventful for Hollis. The 1960s were to be calamitous.” (T438). Calamitous, of course, not for Hollis, but for Britain. And Fuchs, Pontecorvo, SONIA et al were really all in the 1940s. Even Burgess and Maclean fled in 1951; after that Philby was gradually side-lined. In the meantime, the Oxford and London rings (for the KGB) and the relentless rise in the numbers of unchecked Soviet spies for both the KGB and the GRU were the real story of the 1950s.
1962 In April, Golitsyn reveals that the KGB had had a “Ring of Five” spies all recruited at Cambridge University around the same time, two of whom had been Maclean and Burgess.

Oleg Gordievsky joins the KGB.

In September, John Vassall, spy for the KGB for the previous eight years is arrested. He had been exposed by Golitsyn. His Soviet controller suddenly left London shortly before his arrest—as with Houghton. Hollis boasted “I’ve got this fellow! I’ve got him,” but Macmillan wrote in his diary that Vassall had only been exposed because of a defector—and a defector to the CIA at that.

In the middle of the Cuban missile crisis (October 14-28), Penkovsky is arrested by the KGB (October 22).

On November 11, George Wigg MP gets an anonymous phone call saying, “Forget about the Vassall case. You want to look at Profumo.”

1963 This was the year that old MI5 hands would declare that “the roof fell in.” In late January, Philby, having been confronted by Elliott in Beirut, flees to Moscow. Charles Bates reports that Hollis seemed unsurprised and unfazed by this development, (T477), which at least suggests that he was closely involved in it one way or another.46

On March 21, Wigg raises the matter of Profumo and Keeler in the House of Commons. Hollis is deeply informed about the whole situation, but does nothing to alert Macmillan.

Penkovsky is executed for treason in May. The Soviets had learned of his espionage 16 months before they arrested him and had allowed him to continue in order to protect a long term and extremely valuable mole (T459).47

In June, Michael Straight is offered an arts job in the United States and confesses to the FBI that in the early 1940s he and Leo Long had been recruited for the KGB by Anthony Blunt. Graham Mitchell, Hollis’s deputy, comes under suspicion of being a Soviet mole (T468). Wright and Martin had narrowed their mole hunt down to two candidates: Graham Mitchell and Roger Hollis. But Mitchell could never have been ELLI and was quickly ruled out. Mitchell then took early retirement on a reduced pension.46 (T484)

Colin Coote, editor of the Daily Telegraph, is informed that a KGB defector is in England being debriefed. This leads to press exposure citing him as Anatoli Dolfitsyn. Golitsyn flees the country. Hollis is the only suspect who fulfils all the requirements of Coote’s informant. (T491)

On 18 October, Harold Macmillan resigns as prime minister over the Profumo scandal. He had, months previously, confided to his diary that he feared there was a Soviet mole at a high level in MI5, but he did not name Hollis.

46 Yuri Modin later wrote in his memoir My Five Cambridge Friends, “It was as if the secret service had actively encouraged him to slip away. . . . To my mind, the whole business was politically engineered. A major trial, to the inevitable accompaniment of spectacular revelations, would have shaken the British establishment to its 38 continued— foundations, and the blundering incompetence of successive administrations from 1938 to 1963 would have been shockingly exposed.” As Pincher comments (T477) those years covered “almost the entire career of Roger Hollis”. Ben McIntyre in A Spy Among Friends (2014) would insist that encouraging Philby to slip away was exactly what MI6 did. The problem is that Dick White, as DG MI6, seemed horrified that Philby had been able to slip away. He told Elliott that he regretted having reopened the case at all. So whose plan was it?

47 “Given the dangers to themselves in allowing Penkovsky to travel abroad [should he defect] those who authorized it must have thought it would justify this. Hollis was one of them.”

—Former CIA Counterintelligence Officer, Tennent “Pete” Bagley, in 2010.

But Pincher then makes a curious statement, which seems to suggest that Hollis had NOT informed the GRU about Penkovsky: “It is clear that the KGB avoided alerting the GRU about their discovery. To what extent has only recently been revealed by extracts from the diary of the GRU chief, Ivan Serov, secured in Moscow by Nigel BANCE. Not until April 1962 did Serov know about Penkovsky’s treachery, when the KGB chief, then Vladimir Semichastry, told him about the long surveillance, because the arrest was imminent. Serov was furious that the GRU had been kept in ignorance but had to agree to the continuation of the surveillance. In his diary entry, Serov refers to ‘the traitor,’ so Penkovsky was not a GRU plant.” (T459).

Pincher then provides three reasons why Hollis might have refrained from tipping off the GRU:
1. His position as DG MI5 and member of the JIC was too important to be jeopardized by getting involved in such a comparatively lower level matter. 2. If Penkovsky was arrested there would be an inquiry into the source of the leak and he could not afford to risk that. 3. The internal investigation by Peter Wright had just gotten under way and the Penkovsky case would fuel suspicions that there was a mole in MI5. Moreover, he was able to learn early that Penkovsky had no knowledge of GRU assets in the Anglo-American services and so he was not in direct danger from Penkovsky himself.

48 It isn’t clear why Mitchell should have both taken early retirement and accepted a reduced pension if, in fact, he was cleared of having been a mole; but Pincher provides no further details about the case.
Anthony Blunt is interviewed by MI5 in January about the Straight allegations. Hollis and White collude in heading off any prosecution and deflecting any interrogation of Straight or Long about Blunt and the KGB.

In April, Hollis advises the Queen’s private secretary Michael Adeane that Blunt should be permitted to keep his job as keeper of the Queen’s pictures and his knighthood, in order to induce him to cooperate in confessing. The immunity deal for Blunt is then extended to all his confederates, including Straight, Long and even Caimcross, who Pincher describes as ‘the nastiest of all’, without quite explaining why. (T517) On 23 April, Arthur Martin finally visits Blunt’s apartment, informs him that he has been sprung as a Soviet spy, but also offers him immunity from prosecution and so forth, if he cooperates. Martin then sees Hollis and requests permission to begin at once a tough interrogation of Blunt. Hollis denies permission, saying that Blunt should be handled gently. There are arguments about this for two weeks and then Hollis suspends Martin from all duties.49

Ronald Symonds produces a report for Hollis which claims that Anthony Blunt had been the mole working for the ‘Russian Intelligence Service’—all very convenient, since Blunt had been exposed by then, at least behind closed doors. But Blunt had left the agency in 1945 and had never had the access necessary to account for most of the intelligence failures even before that. Hollis declares the mole hunt closed in October.50 He has Martin driven out of MI5 on the grounds that he is the leader of a “Gestapo” that is threatening MI5 morale. White takes Martin in at MI6. Wright takes over the interrogation of Blunt.

In that same month, Harold Wilson becomes Labour Prime Minister of England.

The joint MI5/MI6 Fluency Committee is set up to inquire into Soviet penetration of MI5 and MI6. It is chaired by Peter Wright. It finds Hollis’s fingerprints all over failed operations for decades, but it still does not conclude that he was a Soviet mole.

In May, the U.S. Gray/Coyne report singles out Hollis for criticism in a scathing review of British intelligence for the U.S. Government. James Angleton tells Wright in Washington that Hollis has to go. He notes that there had been no proof against Philby in 1951, but he was fired because of all the anomalies in his record. Hollis retires in November, under pressure from Harold Wilson in the wake of the Profumo affair, but “he was due to retire” anyway (T534).51 He resists the introduction of Positive Vetting to the last moment and avoids it for himself. Before retiring in November, according to Wright, he orders the destruction of many documents (T522). When he visits Washington on a farewell tour, both Helms and Angleton stay away from the CIA party in his honour.

The Fluency Committee recommends that Hollis be fully investigated. Martin Furnival Jones, the new DG, demurs, on the grounds that suspicion of Hollis is “too grotesque” to be entertained—despite the cases of the Cambridge spies, by then well known within MI5.

George Blake is sprung from prison and smuggled out to East Berlin. He later writes a memoir, published only in 1990, and called No Other Choice.

Fluency Committee reports to MI5 and MI6 DGs that MI5 had been penetrated by one or more Soviet agents after Blunt’s departure. It listed 28 anomalies that could not be attributed to any known spy. It highlighted the continuous nature of the apparent treachery over a long period and concluded that the “preponderance of probabilities” pointed to Hollis. Graham Mitchell, the new DG, demurs, on the grounds that suspicion of Hollis is “too grotesque” to be entertained—despite the cases of the Cambridge spies, by then well known within MI5.

49 Christopher Andrew accuses Peter Wright and Arthur Martin of being mentally unhinged conspiracy theorists. Being treated in the manner that Martin was over the interrogation of Blunt is the kind of thing that might help explain a measure of mental derangement. But it would take many years of patient detective work by Chapman Pincher to piece together the very long and detailed trail of such behaviour by Hollis. At any given point, viewed from a narrower perspective and with establishment assumptions, he may well have looked different for various reasons.

50 Under interrogation in 1964, Blunt named Philby, Burgess, Maclean and Caimcross, as well as Straight and Long and also ‘various friends who were deeply or marginally involved in espionage, but none was ever prosecuted, though some were moved from secret work. His interrogators were convinced that he concealed his knowledge about several other spies…’. Pincher adds that he confessed he had stayed in touch with Hollis, Liddell and Burgess after 1945, but he did not confess to having helped Burgess and Maclean escape. That was later fully confirmed from Russian sources (T520). He stated, according to Peter Wright, that one of Blunt’s controllers, in the early 1940s, had urged him not to seek work in Hollis’s F Division and admitted that this could have meant that Moscow already had a spy in there. He agreed that there could be another spy in MI5 and that it could be Gouzenko’s ELLI.

51 According to Pincher (T534), Wilson basically owed his election win to Hollis’s undermining of Macmillan and had many strange connections in the Soviet bloc himself. Yet he says that Wilson wanted to replace Hollis as DG MI5 with a sound policeman, Eric St Johnston. He was beaten to the punch, however, by Wigg’s shepherding of another MI5 hack into the job. Under Hollis, MI5 had not even informed Wilson of the Blunt case. That did not occur until 1966. In the meantime, a May 1965 report by US intelligence officers Gordon Gray and Gerald Coyne was heavily critical of the leadership of MI5 and MI6. Angleton urged White to renew the hunt for the mole in MI5 and to sack Hollis. It cannot have helped matters that Angleton himself was to be removed some years later on the grounds that his obsession with mole-hunting at the CIA had caused grave harm to the organization to no good purpose.
1969 The Fluency Committee is dissolved and replaced by a new body called K7, headed by John Day, “a former Royal Marines officer with a reputation for being tough,” (T541) The new group “...quickly agreed with the suspicion that there had been substantial penetration of MI5 after all allowances had been made for the activities of known spies. The evidence also points to a single guiding hand over many years. After reconsidering the old evidence and making new inquiries, the K7 officers decided that the seriousness of the situation warranted a hostile interrogation of Hollis, especially as the problems appeared to have ceased on his retirement. All that K7 required was a confession, so that an internal damage assessment could be made and the super-mole saga could be consigned to super-secret files.” (T542)

Furnival Jones was very reluctant to allow any of this, but acceded to a friendly interrogation with polite warning and without any prior surveillance. He did not inform either the Attorney General or the Prime Minister that Hollis was so much as being questioned. (T543) Hollis admitted knowing Agnes Smedley in Shanghai, but was not asked about SONIA because no-one at MI5 had joined up the dots on her. (T543). He was not asked about the RSS reports, the Fuchs case, his visit to Paris, or his visits to Moscow (T544), because no-one had yet pieced these things together either. Yet, even without pursuing these elements, they concluded that the case warranted hostile interrogation. Regarding ELLI, he said that he could not remember the details, doubted ELLI existed, and had thought penetration of MI5 impossible.52

SONIA is awarded the Order of the Combat Red Banner by the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin.

1970 Oleg Lyalin defects in place in London. He informs MI5 that the Russians have 450 intelligence officers based in London of whom at least half are agent runners. Furnival Jones pushes for robust action. Lyalin is not betrayed, which points to there no longer being a mole in MI5.53

1971 September 24, Operation Foot leads to the expulsion of 105 Russian intelligence officers. The Kremlin is informed that there is a list of 200 more if they retaliate.

1972 K7 submits its formal report to Furnival Jones and White. “It concluded that MI5 had almost certainly been penetrated by Soviet intelligence in the 1950s and 1960s and noted that there was no evidence of serious penetration in the six years since Hollis retired. A KGB defector named Oleg Lyalin, recruited in 1970, had provided valuable information for six months while remaining “in place” in London without being detected by the Russians.

“The report noted that Hollis had repeatedly avoided or even prevented action that could have been damaging to Soviet interests, but K7 had been unable to produce the kind of evidence that could have secured a conviction against him in a court of law. That was interpreted by Furnival Jones, a lawyer, and by White as a clearance amounting to a verdict of ‘not guilty’. . . . Nevertheless, the American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand governments were warned about the interrogation so that they could take remedial action to offset any possible damage that Hollis might have caused to them had he been a Soviet agent. This was a clear indication that the interrogation had not fully established his innocence.” (T545)

Furnival Jones retires in April. He is replaced by Michael Hanley, who had been involved with the ELLI inquiries and was not convinced of Hollis’ innocence. He set K7 back to work. They finally piece together the significance of SONIA and realize that Hollis was probably GRU, not KGB. They therefore go back to talk with Gouzenko.

1973 On October 26, Hollis dies of a stroke at Catcott, England, where he had retired.

1974 Stephen de Mowbray of MI6 takes his concerns about Hollis to the Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, who appoints Lord Burke Trend to assess whether the Fluency Committee and K7 had done their jobs properly. Trend was not required to look for any new evidence or make any new inquiries and was given no investigative staff. He also had known Hollis personally and as a former Cabinet Secretary in charge of the budgets for the secret services had an interest in giving them a clean bill of health. Trend became confused about Gouzenko and the whole ELLI lead, knew little of the China connection, and plainly did not appreciate the significance of the GRU/KGB divide, ascribing failures to Blunt and Philby rather than to Hollis on a circumstantial basis.

Michael Hanley tells the CAZAB in May that the case against Hollis remains open. (T550)

Oleg Gordievsky is recruited as a spy in place within the KGB in Moscow by MI6.

---

52 Pincher rightly points out that none of this is so much as mentioned in The Authorized History of MI5, much less gone over with a fine toothed comb as it should have been. (T544)

53 Note that the betrayal of defectors and deflection of their claims goes on continuously from the time Hollis takes custody of the Krivitsky report in 1940 until after he retires; then it ceases.
1975  Lord Trend submits his report in May to Hunt and Wilson. It is kept tightly secret. De Mowbray is given a briefing in which he is given to understand that Mitchell had been correctly cleared, but that “a greater degree of doubt attached to Hollis.” Despite his many omissions, limitations and confusions, all Trend could do was give Hollis the benefit of the doubt. Wilson wrote on his copy, “This is very disturbing stuff, even if concluding in ‘not proven’ verdicts.” (T549)

1976  Peter Wright retires from MI5.

1979  Stephen de Mowbrayretires, after 29 years of service, over the closing down of the Hollis case. Andrew Boyle’s The Climate of Treason is published, exposing both Blunt and the way in which his treachery had been papered over by MI5 and the government. Peter Wright, living in poverty in Tasmania, begins to write Spycatcher, hoping to cash in like Boyle.

1981  Publication of Pincher’s book, Their Trade is Treachery, is immediately denounced by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who asserts that each of the accusations against Hollis should more properly have been directed at Blunt and Philby. In an address to the House of Commons on the very day that Chapman Pincher’s first book about Hollis is published—Their Trade is Treachery—the Iron Lady drifted into further overstatement, saying that she had been briefed on the “grave allegation” that “the late Sir Roger Hollis, Director General of the Security Service from 1956 to 1965, was an agent of the Russian intelligence service. Lord Trend, with whom I have discussed the matter, agreed with those who—although it was impossible to prove the negative—concluded that Sir Roger Hollis had not been an agent of the Russian intelligence service.”

1982  Oleg Gordievsky is posted to London as a KGB officer.

1984  Peter Wright appears on the BBC TV in July and claims that he is 99 per cent certain Hollis was a Soviet mole and that Mrs Thatcher had misled the Parliament about the matter. Chapman Pincher’s book Too Secret, Too Long is published.

Víctor Suvarov, GRU defector, in his book Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, names SONIA as one of the outstanding intelligence officers of the service, but does not explain precisely why.

1985  Oleg Gordievsky physically defects to England while still in London.

1986  A court case begins in November in Australia over the right of Peter Wright to publish Spycatcher. The episode of Yes, Prime Minister titled, “One of Us,” is released in Britain, clearly based on the Hollis case.

Einar Sanden interviews Evald Mikson in Reykjavik about his Estonian political life and learns the story of Karl Sare, whom Mikson says he had interrogated in 1941 for the Germans in Tallinn. Mikson claims Sare had confessed to having recruited a young Englishman named Roger Hollis for communist service while in Shanghai in the late 1920s.54

1988  London Weekend Television broadcasts a six part series titled, “The Trial of Roger Hollis.” The series is introduced by former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who says: “It was indeed extraordinary that Mrs. Thatcher had to reassure the House of Commons, that a man who was once responsible for protecting Britain from spies was not one of those spies himself. . . . On the one hand, if he was a spy, he was probably the most highly placed mole ever to penetrate the Western alliance. On the other hand, if he was not, he has been greatly maligned, and MI5 has been greatly damaged.”

Among the witnesses for the prosecution, Chapman Pincher, former FBI Agents Robert Lamphere and Charles Bates (who was Legal Attaché/London during Hollis’ tenure as Director General, and Ray Cline, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence. All four considered Hollis guilty or highly likely to have been guilty. Cline, who weighed the odds of Hollis’ guilt at 80 per cent, concludes: “It’s almost a prima facie counterintelligence case.”

Witnesses for the defence included Phillip Knightley, journalist and historian, who opined that “The case against him (Hollis) is shoddy and immoral.”

Anthony Glees, Professor, University of Buckingham, testified that nothing in Hollis’ letters home to family from his days in China named any acquaintances there with leftist political beliefs.

Jack Hewitt, Guy Burgess’ roommate, offered details of the day that Burgess defected to the Soviet Union, suggesting that Hollis had nothing to do with warning the traitor that he was about to be arrested.

Ilya Dziurklov, a defector who worked in the KGB archives, had heard that the GRU indeed had agents in MI5 but had never seen any special files to confirm it.

54 But if Hollis had been recruited in the late 1920s, fully a decade before his appointment to MI5, what did the GRU do to develop him in that long period of time?
Donald Jameson, a retired CIA officer who had worked with defectors, translated a debated portion of the defector Volkoff’s interrogation describing the Soviet spy in British intelligence as an agent “fulfilling the head of a subunit of the English counterintelligence service,” which Jameson believed indicated MI6 and Philby, not MI5 and Hollis.

And lastly, Paul Greenglass, a TV producer who had ghosted a book with MI5’s Peter Wright, based on Wright’s investigations of Hollis, opined that the debate over Hollis was just “office politics.”

1990 Oleg Gordievsky goes on the BBC Panorama show to publicly rebut claims that Hollis had been a Soviet spy. But he had never been in a position to know. Moreover, he knew nothing of Geoffrey Prime who had been in place in 1974 when Gordievsky was first recruited, nor of the older cases of Kitty Harris or Melita Norwood. Oleg Tsarev established that Gordievsky’s signature is missing from files he claimed to have consulted, a failure that would not have been allowed under stringent KGB archive rules.

Michael Butt gets in touch with Pincher at Christmas. Butt had been a communist since 1960 and a boarder with Brigitte Kuczynski at the famous Lawn Road Flats in London between October 1959 and 1964. During that time, he had acted part-time as a doorman and was certain—though he did not realize this until looking at photographs in Their Trade is Treachery in 1984—that Hollis had visited Brigitte on several occasions (T582-84).

1992 Vasili Mitrokhin defects with a vast cache of KGB files. Among many other things, the files point to the espionage carried out by Melita Norwood. But MI5 elects to leave the aging grandmother undisturbed. The Estonian Foreign Ministry issues a statement that Evald Mikson was not a war criminal, had indeed interrogated GRU agent Karl Säre in Tallinn, and was probably sought after by the Soviet Union as an alleged war criminal for fear that Säre had revealed too much to him under interrogation (T606).

1995 Oleg Gordievsky publishes his memoir, Next Stop Execution. He makes contradictory claims about Hollis, stating on the one hand that before leaving Moscow for London he had discussed with his colleagues the “...totally fanciful claims by British authors that Sir Roger Hollis had been a KGB mole” and on the other hand that the GRU were more disciplined than the KGB and “I never had any idea who its contacts were.”

1997 Brigitte Kuczynski dies aged 87.

1998 John Cairncross’ publishes his memoir, The Enigma Spy. He ridicules MI5’s defence of Hollis and Gordievsky’s claims about Hollis, including the assertion that ELLI had been Leo Long.

2000 Ursula Kuczynski (SONIA) dies October 7 in Berlin, aged 93.

2002 Two books about SONIA are published in Russia—The GRU and the Atomic Bomb and Superfrau in the GRU. Neither mentions Hollis.

2007 Einar Sanden dies in Estonia. His papers remain there, awaiting examination.

2014 Chapman Pincher dies August 5, aged 100, just months after his autobiography is published. Not surprisingly, Pincher’s last book includes a final, intriguing nugget to add to the on-going Hollis debate. It is an allegation by a former member of the British Foreign Office—in writing—that Hollis’ family had revealed to him that “Roger’s work for the Soviet Union was an open secret in the family.”

2015 The final judgment of Paul Monk and John Wilhelm, authors of this Hollis Report and Chronology, is that the debate over Hollis still has several, potentially worthwhile avenues to explore before this cold case is finally settled, one way or the other. Hopefully, this argument mapping analysis has helped to clarify some of those paths and set others on the road to discovery. We hope this endeavor has been helpful and wish them, “Good hunting.”

55 “Infamous,” because, according to writer David Burke, some Soviet 32 agents or sub-agents lived together, either in the modernist flats themselves or near by in Lawn Road housing. In addition, a number of famous architects such as Walter Gropius and Marcel Breuer and writers such as Agatha Christie and Nicholas Monsarrat also lived in the Lawn Road flats. See David Burke, the lawn road flats: SPIES, WRITERS AND ARTISTS, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2014.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- The Institute of World Politics, the Hollis Forum Co-Chairs, and all the Panelists, express their thanks and gratitude to the Anonymous Donor without whose generous support this project could not have taken place.

- The entire Hollis Forum team acknowledges and thanks Chapman Pincher’s decades of diligent research and inquiry into the Hollis case, without which this project also could not have taken place.

- The Co-Chairs also deeply thank IWP President and Founder, Dr. John Lenczowski, and members of the IWP staff—Katie Bridges, Sarah Dwyer, Elaine Pinder, Joseph Connolly, and Jonathan Labuhn—for their able support and assistance throughout the lengthy process of planning and production of this event. They also thank Allison Bishop of the Spy Museum for supplying books for this event.

- John Wilhelm expresses his great thanks and gratitude to the Smith Richardson Foundation for supporting his research into the history of Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) and its many seeming links to Sir Roger Hollis. Mr. Wilhelm also thanks his Smith Richardson program officer, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Senior Program Officer, International Security and Foreign Policy, for her steadfast patience, support, and understanding.

[-0-]