

## What history suggests about terrorism and its future

CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON

*In late October 1954, an Algerian rebel military leader who helped initiate the coming revolution against French rule, Mostepha Ben Boulaid, gave detailed orders to a subordinate commander, Bachir Chihani. These included the usual tactics so commonly seen when guerrilla wars begin: sabotage phone lines, attack small military garrisons, and invade police depots to take weapons. But there was something else in those orders: ambush passing vehicles on the highways and kill any Moslem collaborator types found in them. The name for such Algerian persons, in this total war, was “Beni Oui Oui” – “yes men.” They were to die, not for taking action against the revolutionaries – because as yet there was no revolution – but merely for what they represented: comity among the mix of races, association with Europeans, and willingness to hold positions in the mixed political order controlled from Paris.*

That directive was a first step in a war that would come to include many wrenching forms of “terrorism.” That word has been most usefully defined as “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”<sup>1</sup> What the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) wanted, and used terrorism to advance, was polarization – social, political, and psychological. Few tools achieve it as readily as terrorism. The commander who wrote the orders of October 1954 understood that reality, although initially his victims might not have.

A year later, when Chihani himself wrote orders to subordinates, they included these lines: “Kill the caids [local Arab governors]. Take their children and kill them. Kill all those who pay taxes and those who collect them. Burn the houses of Muslim NCOs [noncommissioned officers] away on

<sup>1</sup> Definition by The Jonathan Institute in 1979, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York, 1986), p. 9.

active service.” By mid-1956, this brutish approach triumphed at the strategic level, when it was debated and approved in conference in the mountains at Soummam. The man most responsible for assembling FLN political and military leaders there, Ramdane Abane, was known for his calculus that “one corpse in a [suit] jacket is always worth more than twenty in uniform.” Soon after Soummam came the first horrific bombings in the capital, Algiers, where the targets were public gathering places, not exclusively French attractions, and certainly not security related. They had place names like Le Milk Bar and Lucky Starway dance hall. The carnage was shocking. That was precisely the point.<sup>2</sup>

The first and most powerful lesson about terrorism from this nationalist revolution of a half-century ago in Algeria is the one Alistair Horne illuminates and some other historians of that conflict have missed: terrorism is a deliberate choice – not merely the product of passion, nor of the environment of war, nor of the strength of feeling behind a cause. It is a method, not just a description.<sup>3</sup> That is central to the first of the four parts of this chapter.

#### WHY TERRORISM OCCURS

Terrorism is about power. It is, indeed, a complex phenomenon, challenging to understand, whether one is a social scientist, military commander, or political leader. There are indeed many tangled roots of the phenomenon in economic, social, and political conditions. In more cases than not, there is indirect or direct involvement of a sovereign state.<sup>4</sup> What is most evident,

<sup>2</sup> Jacques C. Duchemin, *Histoire du F.L.N.* (Paris, 1962), pp. 218–19. Yves Courriere, *La Guerre d’Algerie*, vol. II, *Le Temps des Leopards* (Paris, 1969), pp. 130–1, 195, 226–8, 427. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York, 1977), pp. 89, 135. The platform adopted at the Congress of Soummam described armed action as “a psychological shock that has freed the people from its torpor . . .” (trans. CCH, after Duchemin’s text, p. 181). Also useful on that political/psychological phenomenon are Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria* (Princeton, 1960), e.g., pp. 86–90.

<sup>3</sup> This is also a theme of Martha Crenshaw’s impressive essay “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> The documentation of state support of given terrorists is vast. Two commendable titles of the mid-1980s were Yonah Alexander and Ray Cline, “State-Sponsored Terrorism,” a report for the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, June 1985, and Uri Ra’anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Richard H. Shultz, et al., *Hydra of Carnage: The Witnesses Speak* (Lexington, MA, 1985). Dr. Harold W. Rood, reviewing my manuscript, pointed to a dozen relevant past examples of states’ involvement; e.g., there was an announcement by the Mexican government in March 1971 that many Soviet diplomats were being ejected because of the direct aid Moscow and North Korea gave to the “Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria” (MAR); letter to author of July 19, 2003 (6 pp.). After the fall of the USSR, admissions and new documentation flowing from the region’s archives literally ended years of public debate about whether communist states had been fostering international terrorism.

however, is that terrorism is about power. One might first explore that premise in the dual dimensions of psychological and political power.

It has become commonplace to read that violence by Moslem fanatics is rooted in the deep resentment and humiliation they feel. Some observers emphasize that in the rise and fall of great powers, Moslem and Arab peoples have done relatively poorly in modern times. Some argue that globalization has maximized the cultural influence of the West at the expense of the cultures of North Africa and the Middle East. Others allege that the United States pays too much attention to Israel (although it was Arab countries that were liberated in 1991 and 2003). The resentment is tangibly real: polling data published in 2002 drove home the point that even in countries with mixed or friendly relations with the West, anti-Americanism is deep. Such sentiment may inspire al Qaeda. Surely its supporters are buttressed by such feelings.<sup>5</sup>

There are numerous other historical examples of similar inspiration for terrorism. One may examine Palestinian resentment of second-class political status among the Jews, as well as Palestinian resentment of the Arabs. There was the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) expulsion from Lebanon in 1983, and before that the PLO's expulsion from Jordan in the Black September of 1970. The team that killed the Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972 was called Black September out of defiance, resentment, and humiliation, as much as hatred of Israel.

Resentment and humiliation are visible in the histories of what often are called "the first terrorists," known as the Assassins, Ismaili moslems of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. Their resentment was against the dominant Sunni faith. Their aim was physical and religious independence. Their strategy was a mix of manipulation of regional forces, alliance making, a network of strong castles, and audacious assassinations. They killed area rivals, irritants, conquerors, or leaders too proud to submit to Assassin requests or demands. For more than a century, they killed no westerners. Rather, their enemies were local and regional rivals for the moslem soul.<sup>6</sup> It

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, "Poll: Muslims Call U.S. 'Ruthless, Arrogant,'" CNN, Feb. 26, 2002, as well as "This Week," ABC TV, March 3, 2002. Of those questioned in nine Muslim countries, 53 percent had unfavorable opinions of the United States; most were "resentful" of the superpower. For suggestions of direct linkage between such muslim resentment and al Qaeda, see the articles on Kenya in the *New York Times* of Dec. 1, 2002.

"Humiliation" is now commonly referenced regarding causes of terrorism. For example, M. L. Cook's review in the Summer 2003 issue of *Parameters* directs us to this topic in Mark Juergensmeyer's book *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> This pattern whereby the Assassins' victims were nearly always other moslems is important and its corollary in terrorism today has been ignored. Yet, innumerable victims of the new moslem militants are other moslems – accused of apostasy, cultural infidelities, political despotism, submissiveness to the West, etc. In recent years, I suggested to

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was always the powerful who fell before their daggers – a notable distinction between the Assassins and their modern descendants who often inflict promiscuous human wreckage.

After resentment or humiliation, a second powerful psychological spur to terrorism through the ages has been revenge. One authority builds the word “revenge” into her definition of terrorism, so convinced is she of its significance.<sup>7</sup> The Levant since World War II has been a case study in this motive. Northern Ireland is another manifestation, requiring no footnotes for proof. Revenge is one of the most visceral of all human feelings, and when it becomes a motive for action, by terrorists, Sicilian mafia rivals, or antagonistic gangs in a U.S. city, it is supremely difficult to eradicate.

Any statesman or negotiator who can make substantial progress against a deepening cycle of revenge deserves generous understanding and support. One thinks of Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, laboring to make lasting peace between professional “retaliants,” in unending hours in council rooms, hallways, and the homes of new widows. Before him came others such as Winston Churchill, praised by historian Paul Addison for his “Search for Peace in Ireland” in 1920–22.<sup>8</sup> Despite being the son of a famous advocate for British Ulster, he won the overt admiration of Irish Republican Army (IRA) chieftain Michael Collins for his efforts to end Irish strife.<sup>9</sup> After principals and mediators, there are also war leaders, commanders who *could* have directed their fight into terrorist byways but chose not to do so. Robert E. Lee explicitly declined this option when implored by subordinates to undertake guerrilla warfare rather than surrender – thinking terrorism worse for his country than defeat.<sup>10</sup>

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some State Department officers, colleagues, and students that we should quantify and study this reality, especially evident in the Algeria of the 1990s and the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The long silence on this matter in American commentaries may have finally been broken by Zahir Janmohamed: “Radical Muslims Killing Muslims,” a *Washington Post* editorial, June 25, 2003. That paper’s Jim Hoagland made another cut at the problem July 13, 2003 in “Fighting for the Soul of Islam,” asking “Why do they hate *them*?” France’s Bernard Henri Levy has also addressed the subject in a Sept. 2003 interview about his book *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?*

<sup>7</sup> Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge MA, 1999), p. 11. Dr. Crenshaw’s article on the FLN, *op. cit.*, describes revenge as central to the Algerian war; see pp. 482–3. There are examples of Palestinian terrorism attributed to revenge in chap. 4 of Paul Pillar’s *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> See chap. 7 of *Churchill as Peacemaker*, ed. James Muller (Cambridge, 1997).

<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Winston S. Churchill in 1918 and 1919 was speaking out against revenge and for appeasing differences with the Germans, and again, seeking to do the same for French–German relations from 1945 onward.

<sup>10</sup> As the definition of terrorism offered at the outset indicates, it is different from “guerrilla war,” which is usually directed against military targets during a state of war. There is no record of Robert E. Lee contemplating the use of terrorism, as would some losing belligerents today.

From psychological motives such as resentment and revenge, one may turn to political sources of terrorism. History reveals something as important as it is obvious: disorder and the absence of good governance are a prime source of deliberate violence against the innocent. Some social scientists in the 1990s called this the “gray area phenomenon,” assigning it a descriptive acronym, GAP,<sup>11</sup> indicating a region of indefinite size or shape in which the absence of governance, more than malgovernance, leaves a population despairing for peace and civil order. In such an environment, the most brutal or ambitious or energetic may assume the powers of the absent governors. This can yield anarchy, despotism, or a dozen conditions in between. Any of these might lead to terrorism.

That was certainly much of the story of Lebanon in the 1980s, and the repercussions for France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were stinging. It was in part the story of the Sudan in the 1990s and of Afghanistan in that decade through 2001. Osama Bin Laden sought out both those states for their relative incohesion, as well as for the radical moslem authorities in their capitals.<sup>12</sup> There are other examples, such as the “tri border” area between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, a zone where legitimate authority seems to have collapsed in favor of blackmarketeers and violent political subcultures.<sup>13</sup> According to Argentine prosecutors, this area is where the Iranians found the terrorists they employed against two major civilian targets in Buenos Aires, attacks that left hundreds injured or dead.

The art and science of governance are almost beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo at this writing in mid-2003, with news of fresh horrors emerging steadily, another case of what journalist Robert Kaplan called “the coming anarchy.”<sup>14</sup> Two rival ethnic groups are striving for power, and tens of thousands of citizens have paid a devastating price for the absence of consensus and of legal and political authority. Shootings, beatings, and rape are the coin of the day – all aimed at gaining political power and security, or reflecting a fear of losing security and political power.<sup>15</sup> Today’s situation somewhat recalls the Congo in 1964. Then, too,

<sup>11</sup> Among the most productive working in this area were Peter Lupsha, Max Manwaring, and, at the National Strategy Information Center, Dr. Roy Godson.

<sup>12</sup> This useful observation about Bin Laden and GAP is owed to Col. Carl Shelton, USMC.

<sup>13</sup> This area including Brazil’s Foz do Iguacu and Ciudad Del Este of Paraguay drew attention in the mid-1990s, so I noted it in my book *Terrorism Today* (London, 2000), pp. 90, 127. For the latest evidence of terrorists basing there, especially Middle Easterners, see “Tres Fronteras” by Lawrence J. Martinez, *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2003, pp. 35–6.

<sup>14</sup> His article appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* in Feb. 1994 and later grew into book form.

<sup>15</sup> The idea that rape, used deliberately and systematically, can be accurately considered a form of terrorism has been explored in several articles in the Frank Cass journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

the country possessed little or no real government. Belgian withdrawal had left a political vacuum. In August 1964, it produced insurrection: the provincial capital Stanleyville fell and 1,500 foreigners from two dozen countries became hostages, some of whom were murdered. Year's end brought the first great airborne counterterrorism mission. Belgian troops on the ground liberated hostages and gathered in other terrified victims of violence, and a combined Belgian-American air evacuation – the all-but forgotten “Dragon Rouge” – removed them to safety abroad.<sup>16</sup> Today's intervention by France is just as necessary, for many of the same human reasons. For half a century, this equatorial country has lingered in the GAP.

From ungoverned areas, one may turn to a more common political source of terrorism. Countries in which strife and division are daily factors may also yield terrorism or terrorist groups. To paraphrase an admirable recent British Army field manual on counterinsurgency operations, it is not unusual for a soldier to find him- or herself serving in a nation or state where inherent social divisions based on racial, cultural, religious, or other differences drain away national cohesion.

Foreign commentators on Sri Lanka often seek the roots of that island nation's turmoil in British colonialism, but in reality British colonials had been gone for a generation when insurrection began in 1971. Its power-hungry sponsor was a man named Rohan Wijeweera; his organization was the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or People's Liberation Front], founded to enhance the majority status of the Sinhalese Sri Lankans and to maximize their advantages in the legal and political order of the country. Wijeweera himself reflected Chinese and Soviet influences, as well as a volatile combination of the left and right – a Patrice Lumumba University graduate who successfully exploited majoritarian nationalism. His JVP shredded the lovely island in the latter 1970s, and its decline facilitated the next phase of political violence by the Leninist “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” now one of the world's most significant terrorist groups as well as a capable guerrilla army.

The form of national separatism demonstrated by Tamil activists is similar to that of Basques within Spain, Irish Catholics within Ulster, and Palestinians within Israel. Despite the generous nature of the modern democratic state – against the backdrop of history, it is no overstatement to call the modern democratic state “generous” – there remain incentives for rebellion, deeply encoded and sometimes impermeably reflected in the traditions of certain families or the minds of certain leaders. National separatism has been and will remain a leading cause of terrorism, both domestic and international. When the Cold War ended, experts disagreed about whether the

<sup>16</sup> Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo* (Washington, DC, 1980).

picture would improve because of the end of Soviet sponsorship of terrorism or worsen because of emergent nationalist strife. In fact, terrorism has *not* become more common. Many national groups have rejected violence. But nationalist terrorism is unlikely ever to disappear from the globe.<sup>17</sup>

Religion has become a greater concern. That trend in the last decade has been documented in the journal *Terrorism & Political Violence*: fewer new terror groups formed in the last decade than in the 1980s or the 1970s, but of the seven groups created in the 1990s, five had a religious cast.<sup>18</sup> Among transnational terrorist groups active on the world stage today, the religiously based compete seriously with those based on ethnicity, ideology, or crime. New strands of militancy with origins in eccentric visions of religious truth include the Christian Identity faith, which denounces Jews while exalting white Christians. Originating in England in the mid-nineteenth century, it crossed the Atlantic in the latter twentieth to inspire American “Patriot,” militias, and white supremacy groups. Those with this religious background and records of lethal violence include Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations, and Eric Rudolph, the suspect in the Atlanta Olympics attack and other bombings, a fugitive who evaded capture until 2003.<sup>19</sup>

Observers today tend to shun the question whether the term “terrorism” applies to religious violence. Of course it does. One need only examine the deeds, statements, and writings of the relevant groups themselves. The 1994 American documentary film “Jihad in America” opened and closed with pictures of the New York Trade Towers, truck-bombed the year before, and included extensive footage from American cities of clandestine pep rallies for violence. The mass media ignored the film and so did commercial chains. Statements by Osama Bin Laden before 1998 were also largely disregarded. Now, of course, we have the remarkable video interviews, the Manchester safe-house training manual, and the recovered documents from computer hard drives found in terrorist headquarters in Afghanistan in late 2001.<sup>20</sup> These documents reflect the choices and reasons made to employ terror: power, hatred, politics, and religion. Actions are confirming years of words from self-declared warriors who are lethal enemies of those they consider to

<sup>17</sup> Among the new books on nationalism is Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (Boulder, CO, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, “The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 14, no. 3, 2002, pp. 145–6.

<sup>19</sup> Gregory A. Walker, “Service to Other Christians: Christian Identity’s Underground Railroad . . .,” *Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> The manual is entitled “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants” [undated; 180 pp.]. The most remarkable of the *Wall Street Journal*’s articles was by Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling Array of al Qaeda Memos,” Dec. 31, 2001. Later, the *New York Times* also acquired terrorists’ documents in Afghanistan.

be apostates who left the true path, most existing Arab or Middle Eastern regimes, Jews and Israel, and the West.

The violent spectacles recorded in the daily newspapers of the world underline that diverse causes ignite terrorist thoughts and terrorist acts. For Americans, the most significant causes have changed over time. Americans were most concerned from 1958 to 1961 about communist-inspired terrorist and guerrilla attacks against their citizens in Central and Latin America.<sup>21</sup> This problem intensified during the 1960s and 1970s. It was followed in the 1980s by racial attacks that shifted U.S. attention to domestic White Power groups and religious anticommunists. Then, in the 1990s, U.S. concern shifted again, to two different and rather new problems: militant Islam and “single-issue” terrorist groups concerned with such diverse issues as animal rights, protecting the environment, and antiabortion. Other nations have wrestled with similar challenges. Canada must watch the militant Tamil immigrants and their allies who raise millions of dollars to support the communist and separatist fight in Sri Lanka. In other countries, immigrants are often the victims, as with skinhead violence in such tolerant countries as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. Colombia confronts terrorism from old Marxist-Leninist groups whose political insurgency has melded with organized crime and narcotics trafficking. Peasant militias which arose to combat militant leftists are now a similar source of problems.<sup>22</sup>

#### HOW TERRORISM WORKS

*In April 2000, there began a strange drama in the Republic of the Philippines. It was staged by the separatist Muslim militants of Abu Sayyaf, the latest in a long line of indigenous Filipino insurgents in non-Catholic southern areas. Abu Sayyaf terrorists took foreigners hostage. Naturally that created a crisis – for the Filipino government, for the countries whose nationals were kidnapped, and, it goes without saying, for the victims. Tension and waiting ensued. Armed forces hunted and maneuvered. Strain showed in some political forums. Tourist receipts for the region fell. Some hostages were released, but others were not.*

*All this was archtypical. It had replayed in many climes and places. Then, about six months later, in October 2000, the crisis abated. Why? Apparently, the Libyan government – a past supporter of Muslim militants in the Republic of the Philippines – managed negotiations, which included millions of dollars*

<sup>21</sup> David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism* (Westport, CT, 1997), pp. 1–2.

<sup>22</sup> On the militia called AUC, see the confidential report for the new president of Colombia as described in the *Washington Post*, June 26, 2003. In his published autobiography, the group’s leader apparently admits the widespread drug trafficking.

in Libyan funds going to Abu Sayyaf. This money, it was suggested, helped “solve the crisis.” Indeed, it probably did.

No one can be against “solving a crisis.” For the most part, international silence settled over the case, a vague indicator of tacit approval of the settlement. The Abu Sayyaf group, predictably, bought more guns and speedboats and took more hostages. The Philippines’ armed forces continued their hunt and did catch several terrorists. Most hostages remained captives; yet, the news story sank from sight. Only two years later did the Filipinos capture most of the other terrorists.

Throughout, no one publicly asked certain questions: What would international reaction have been if, before April 2000 and without a hostage crisis, Libya had given this known terror group millions of dollars? What if millions in cash had been tendered, and after that, Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped the hostages? In both cases, the reply could only be international scandal and widespread denunciations of Tripoli. Yet, what has in fact happened? Hardly one adult in a thousand remembers the money paid by Libya. The main public discussion in Washington, DC, about Libya concerns Tripoli’s efforts to be removed from Washington’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.<sup>23</sup>

That example is instructive concerning how terrorism works its effects. Tactics are often simple and indifferent to state or national borders. In an open society such as India’s, a semiopen society such as Pakistan’s, or even an authoritarian one such as Burma’s, it is not difficult to attack a person with a knife or a pistol. The world is awash in small arms, and most who seek underworld dealers can find them. A claim of credit need not accompany each attack. Escape is not even regarded as necessary by some kinds of killers. For the more pragmatic, escape through urban traffic on foot or a motorcycle is likely, if planning is competent. Luck, or having no past criminal record, may enhance one’s chance of escape. Perhaps twice a month an innocent Asian dies for some political or religious reason at the hands of assassins who have tracked him through the streets, attacked suddenly, then vanished into the seams of urban life. Later arrest of the perpetrator is the best hope of lawful society because preventing such attacks is on most occasions too difficult.

At the strategic level, terrorism works in diverse ways. The oldest form is the killing of a foreign leader for reasons of state. Bulgaria used Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turk, to try to kill a pontiff (John Paul II) whose charisma

<sup>23</sup> Paraphrase of a part of the author’s speech at the Secretary’s Open Forum, U.S. Dept. of State, Oct. 22, 2001, and reprinted in *Vital Speeches*, Dec. 15, 2001, pp. 135–41; see p. 136.

Officials in the second Clinton Administration often publicly discussed how Libya might be removed from the State Dept. list of state sponsors of terror. This was enhanced when Tripoli pledged to pay compensation for the dead on Pan Am flight 103. The crisis of September 11 perpetuated the bilateral conversations due to hopes of gaining intelligence and other Libyan aid against religious zealots disturbing even to Col. Quaddafi.

was disturbing the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe. Another example occurred when the Hasan al Turabi/General Bashir regime in the Sudan turned trained assassins loose in neighboring Ethiopia in anticipation of a state visit by Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian president was nearly shot in the route taken by his motorcade.<sup>24</sup>

Decades of modern terrorism reveal numerous examples of the use of assassins to attack domestic rivals, at home or abroad, to silence their political activity or to remove them from the list of prospective future rulers. Thus, Bulgaria's communist authorities used assassins to hunt émigrés in London. The Ceaucescu regime reportedly hired "Carlos the Jackal" – Ilich Ramirez Sanchez – to kill a number of Romanian dissidents and exiles living in Paris. Paris was also the scene of several stealthy murders of Iranians, hunted down by the Khomeini regime, suggesting that religious totalitarians are no more troubled by the use of assassins than are communist totalitarians.

A related form of assassination are those acts aimed at removing a pretender to the throne. Such actions are often done by "substate actors." The genre includes Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist of the group "Union or Death" (often called Black Hand). On Serbian National Day, he attacked the car of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the streets of Sarajevo, his pistol shots igniting the second bloodiest war in history.<sup>25</sup> Another recent instance of a fateful killing on the verge of international war has already been nearly forgotten: the murder of a great guerrilla warlord and anti-Taliban figure, Ahmad Massoud, "The Lion of the Panshir Valley," blown up by explosives cleverly hidden within a camera, two days before the attacks on America on September 11, 2001. Both aimed at removing a potential ruler, and both did so. In the first case, war was an intended consequence. In the second case, it was already in progress.

A growing literature in the last decades of the twentieth century describes other strategic uses of terrorism. For example, terrorism has assumed a central role in certain insurgencies and has served as an adjunct to conventional war, as Saddam Hussein attempted to do worldwide as the coalition moved to liberate Kuwait. Psychologically, terror can be far more subtle and far reaching than the sounds of the bombs on which it depends.<sup>26</sup> It often makes use of the inevitabilities in human nature. As the Algerian FLN story of 1954

<sup>24</sup> One collection of details on Sudan and international terrorism is the author's "Sudan's Neighbors Accuse It of Training Terrorists," *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 19, 1995. Five years later, the head of state demoted al Turabi and his followers, some of whom were placed under house arrest.

<sup>25</sup> The Princip case is covered in James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York, 1966), pp. 73–5, and Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York, 1994), pp. 16–18.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, the U.S. Navy's Randall G. Bowdish, "Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 79–99. I also wish to thank Captain Bowdish for reviewing a draft of this chapter.

suggests, terror can polarize a community along racial, religious, or other lines. Osama Bin Laden understood this when crowing about his success in the first days after September 11: he boasted that al Qaeda actions were forcing the world's muslim community to make a choice – would it be with the militant purists or the degenerate West?

Violence is of course, quite overtly, a recruiting tool. Terror represents a flag, to signify movement and action, announce an offensive, and seek comrades for further actions. It remains unclear whether Bin Laden's claim after the attacks on the eastern United States that recruiting for his organization had never been stronger was accurate. Normally, that is one result of well-executed strikes. But there are exceptions, as when the human damage repels enough of the target audience sufficiently to cause the radicals to lose heart or at least set aside such methods. U.S. "Patriots" became quiet after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City caused such loss of innocent life in 1995.

Terror also has important roles *within* a militant movement. Landmark studies of terrorism's role in fascist and communist organizations of the 1930s and 1940s as yet have no counterpart in academic work on modern international terror groups. But the threat and practice of internecine violence against militants themselves for deviation or tendencies toward capitulation is common. In the fifteen months after the "Good Friday" accord, the IRA carried out both killings and some 150 "punishment beatings," many against its own, not its enemies.<sup>27</sup> Capital punishments following one mass self-criticism session cut deep into the ranks of the tiny Japanese Red Army. The death penalty was regularly used by the Abu Nidal Organization. Such internal terrorism communicates a spirit of insuperable force within the group and simultaneously rids it of troublesome potential rivals or nascent opposition. Killing can suppress the moderation that tends to appear in all human organizations. The FLN shoved aside some earnest and conscience-filled moderates in its drive to ignite violent revolution in Algeria. Ferhat Abbas, a long-known leader of the moderate movement toward Algerian independence, was in one sense a rival to the FLN as it initiated its revolution. His nephew was soon murdered, explicitly because of the younger man's criticism of FLN bloody excesses, but also perhaps as a warning to his famed uncle.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Punishment beatings as a reality in such illegal groups are mentioned by Andrew R. Molnar et al., *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Washington, DC, 1965), p. 172.

<sup>28</sup> Horn, pp. 119–20. Two years later, Ferhat Abbas himself joined, or was allowed to join, the FLN, all but abandoning his own brand of gentle political pressure on France. There followed a Machiavellian use of the gentleman's profile: he was elevated as head of the FLN Provisional Government, a handsome face for outside eyes. But after the successful parade into Algiers amidst victory in 1962, Abbas could be shunted aside three years later.

That is also often the pattern in successful revolutions. Moderates critical to revolutionary success are removed once the revolution has succeeded. The French Revolution began with great idealism, but soon degenerated into what analysts often describe as the modern world's first explicit state terror, dominated by men ostensibly devoted to "liberty, equality, and fraternity." Similar actions by the Bolsheviks led to Churchill's description in *The Aftermath* of how communists in Russia worked with liberals and socialists to make revolution, using them as "well-meaning and unwitting decoy ducks," only to destroy them immediately when their usefulness had passed.<sup>29</sup>

Terrorism is sometimes used to undermine public support for an ally. In the mid-1980s, Abu Nidal set a new standard for publicized mass murder of civilians at targets in Asia, the Middle East, and especially Europe. To this was added Hezbollah's hijacking of TWA 847 and a long drama in Beirut, complete with an execution, beatings, and press conferences. As the summer horrors by these two enemies of Tel Aviv mounted, pollsters reported no rise in sympathy for Israel; instead, their polls showed a decline in American public support for Israel. More than half of America believed Israel should do more to resolve the crisis. Private citizens queried each other on their views, sometimes with suspicion and resentment. Military officers quietly spoke of an "imbalance" in U.S. policy in the region. Public press organs and their commentators called for adjustments in Israeli policy. Although none of these speakers ever described themselves as "yielding to terrorism," their behavior illustrated its psychological and political effects.<sup>30</sup>

Terrorism by West European communists has often aimed at weakening NATO by driving wedges between its European and American partners.<sup>31</sup> Examples include the troubles in Germany during the 1990s. Frequently attacked in Germany by the PKK "Kurdish Workers Party," Bonn found itself further troubled when several long-standing international allies became unwilling to sell arms to the *Bundeswehr*. Consider the meaning of that quiet erosion of support for a NATO ally. Few states in recent decades have been less aggressive than Germany. Yet, a modest propaganda campaign by the PKK and neutral human rights activists focused on Ankara's use of German weapons against armed Kurds within Turkey caused serious problems for Berlin.

<sup>29</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, vol. 6, *The Aftermath* (Boston, 1928), pp. 76–7.

<sup>30</sup> Rep. James A. Courter explained, and sought to correct, this drift in public opinion in two brief floor speeches in the U.S. House of Representatives, June 18 and July 23, 1985.

<sup>31</sup> Harold W. Rood's lectures at Claremont Graduate School alerted me to this, and I then profited greatly from studying Paul B. Henze's work on the matter, including his book on the plot to kill Pope John Paul II and his essay "Goal: Destabilization: Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability, and Terrorism in NATO South," a Dec. 1981 report for the European American Institute for Security Research, Marina del Rey, CA.

This phenomenon occurs despite historical evidence that yielding rarely appeases terrorists.<sup>32</sup> The attacks in 2003 on Saudi Arabians and foreigners working in Riyadh occurred two weeks *after* the American Secretary of Defense made headlines on April 29 announcing that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the kingdom. Supposedly, such a withdrawal was the leading political objective of al Qaeda, but the group, nevertheless, proceeded with synchronized attacks that killed dozens of people. Saudi Arabia once was one of the half-dozen safest places in the world for a U.S. soldier – notably safer, for example, than Detroit at night. But since terrorist attacks began in 1995, Saudi Arabia has become much less friendly. A decade ago, Americans were standing with Saudis as brethren in arms to face down Iraq. By mid-2003, some Saudis were breathing relief with Americans’ departure. Terrorism directed by non-Saudis has driven a wedge into a century-old friendship.

Politically, terrorism has many other strategic effects. The most apparent to an interknit world is international publicity. Time and time again, the media elevates obscure causes into the public view as a result of terror inflicted by activists willing to target the innocent to attract attention. The Algerian FLN was media savvy. It self-consciously and explicitly sought world attention and United Nations support when it opened its campaigns of publicity, organization, guerrilla war, and terror.<sup>33</sup> It undertook armed activity and founded the revolutionary newspaper *El Moudjahid* to report on it. FLN emissaries appeared at the UN in New York and also staffed seven regional bureaus in Cairo, Damascus, Tunis, Beirut, Baghdad, Karachi, and Djakarta. They were supplemented by “mobile delegations” of roving diplomats.<sup>34</sup> Dr. Frantz Fanon was not only an editor of *El Moudjahid* in Tunis, but later a diplomat of the provisional government. A world sensitive to self-determination apparently accepted FLN terrorism. It looked at the blood and then beyond, just as the perpetrators hoped. Some accepted the human damage as resulting from a natural excess of nationalist passion. Others accepted it as the inevitable response to a century of French repression. Optimists believed that, whatever the cause of the terrorism, victory for the perpetrators would end the violence. It did not. Thus, long before the PLO existed, this North African insurgency made itself, in the world eyes, “the sole legitimate representative of the [Algerian] people.”

<sup>32</sup> See Henze, “Goal: Destabilization,” p. 61, for one example. President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and certain of their subordinates also enunciated the view that appeasement of terrorists would fail.

<sup>33</sup> Duchemin, *Histoire du F.L.N.*, p. 222, quoting Yacef. See also the detailed work by Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, 2002). This book does not explore the FLN’s terrorism.

<sup>34</sup> Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, p. 110.

The FLN's print-press offensive anticipated the media efforts of contemporary violent groups. Hezbollah runs a TV station. The Tamil Tigers have an endearing Web site. Support letters for the Iraqi-based terrorists of "People's Mujahideen" circulate annually in the halls of the U.S. Congress and win many signatures. A famous front group for the IRA Provos collects bag loads of money in New York and Boston, and has sent representatives to dine in the White House.

Terrorism also has an economic component. The economic dimensions of terrorism have been little studied. Social science and news journals – even those devoted to terrorism – rarely dwell on the economic impact of bombs, shootings, and threats. Private corporations have been left to their private concerns. Public citizens' groups seem not to notice. In the later 1990s, discussion emerged about what is variously called infoterror or cyberterrorism, which would not be "violent," but could be destructive in ways that are economic, bureaucratic, and psychological. September 11 brought instantaneous change. Now there is immense attention to economic losses, changes in stock prices, the bill for recovery in New York, the price of Homeland Security, the great costs of private security, and so on.<sup>35</sup> Whatever one thinks of the terrorists' objective, all these losses are an irretrievable wastage of the fruits of human labor.

Oil pipeline attacks by the ELN (National Liberation Army) in Colombia have severely injured state revenues from exports. But for the terrorists such attacks are effective in flying the ELN flag, in injuring Columbia's financial ability to defend itself, and in garnering money because some corporate victims will pay "revolutionary taxes" to avoid the damage. Through such extortion, terrorists drain the state's financial resources into their own purses. ELN is economically more powerful than most businesses in Colombia, and yet it is a weak rival to the larger FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), another terrorism-dependent insurgent group.

The economic strategies of terror groups also include damaging the tourism industry. Fanatical adherents to Islam have done this in Egypt. Gama'at and Jihad made many such attacks in the 1990s. The shooting of fifty-eight foreign visitors to Luxor Temple in November 1997 was their most deadly success. This tiny Egyptian minority sacrificed millions in future tourist dollars and ironically deterred visitors and students from learning about places and cultures which Islamic militants invariably claim outsiders ill understand.

<sup>35</sup> The first such book in the United States – doubtless the tip of an approaching mass – is *Terrorism and Business: The Impact of September 11, 2001*, edited by Yonah Alexander, perhaps the most published author on terrorism studies in the English language. It was appropriate that he move first because his 1979 work *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response* is one of a very few books on this line during the quarter-century before 2000.

History's overriding lesson is that terrorism does work, at least well enough to keep terrorists and their imitators attempting it. Such a conclusion is contentious.<sup>36</sup> But terrorism often does attain its tactical objectives. Moreover, it can survive at the operational or strategic levels for a long time even without apparent results, and that low standard for success is all many terrorists and guerrillas require. Some terrorists have indeed succeeded, such as Lenin, Mao, the Khmer Rouge, and the Ortega brothers in Nicaragua.<sup>37</sup> They used terror in calculated conjunction with other means to gain power and then used it again to hold power.<sup>38</sup> That is probably their own highest standard for success, and they achieved it. Finally, in other places and circumstances, groups could not win power, but did use all they had to batter the existing social structure or state, or obtain limited changes to the status quo. These are interim objectives obtained. Governments fell in Turkey and in Uruguay because of terrorist violence, clear defeats for democracy.

#### HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END

*The Assassins – sometimes called Isma'ilis, sometimes Nizaris, were an offshoot of Shia Islam. They arose in Iraq and Persia near the end of the eleventh century. Although never powerful in Iraq, the sect was immensely so in Persia, and it spread to Egypt and Syria for shorter periods. Not until the latter thirteenth century was the Assassins' power destroyed. The causes of this end were mixed.*

*In Egypt, violent Shia had a fair run – one branch even established its own caliphate. But Sunni Turkish authorities broke the strength of these “deviants” from mainstream Sunni faith – especially under the accomplished military leader Saladin (Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub). From 1171, he ruled his opponents in Egypt, and even found time to turn his attention to Syria.*

*In Syria, local strongmen let the Assassins (Nizaris) spread, either from tolerance or from hopes of using them to their own ends. But gradually the authorities' successors perceived the threat, and opposed it, often with*

<sup>36</sup> My view on this problem is probably not shared by the admirable Georgetown University authority Walter Laqueur. It is loudly disputed by a slender new book in print in the wake of September: Caleb Carr's *The Lessons of Terrorism: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why it Has Always Failed and Why it Will Fail Again*. Both authors deny terrorism's success; one hopes they are correct.

<sup>37</sup> A relevant source, describing all these revolutionary movements in a single large volume, is that prepared by a team of scholars including Stephane Courtois, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

<sup>38</sup> Terrorism is a psychological and political tool and a method, and one who uses it can legitimately be called “a terrorist” – even if he is also a revolutionary, a self-described humanist, an insurgent, a militia leader, a father of his country, etc. Examination of terrorists' writings and utterances yields cases, in which they call *themselves* terrorists – despite others hastening to their defense. These admissions are among the many indicators that, despite the difficulties, terrorism can be defined and described.

force, sometimes with massacres. Sunni rulers were the most devastating opponents of these Shia, and the latter's clever deals with Crusaders and Frankish authorities brought as many troubles as benefits. The sect in Syria suffered badly when Mongols battered the Assassins' human and ideological centers of gravity in Persia. Early in the fourteenth century, the line of Nizari Imams divided, and this schism doomed them in Syria.

In Persia, their stronghold, the cause of the sect's demise was the Mongols. Being ruthless, these Eastern horsemen and conquerors recognized total ruthlessness in their enemy, and from 1256 to 1270 systematically destroyed or defeated the Assassins' castle strongholds along the Caspian Sea and at points south. When the most celebrated and inaccessible fortress, Alamut, fell, a chronicler of the time gloated: "All the inmates of that seminary of iniquity and nest of Satan came down with all their goods and belongings."<sup>39</sup>

Twenty years ago, Britain's Peter Janke compiled a large and reliable volume of *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography*.<sup>40</sup> Most of the groups named in his volume have since departed the world stage. How that happens, however – how terrorist movements end – has received little attention. The following six ways in which groups have expired may be considered an introduction to this important phenomenon.

Perhaps the most historically common way that a terror group ends is that, confronting such a lethal threat, the regime strikes back with force, overwhelming or crushing the group or movement. That is what happened to the Assassins: deviousness and savagery were defeated by greater organization and greater savagery. That resolution anticipated the early twentieth-century demise of certain rivals to the Bolsheviks. Vladimir Lenin defeated other active revolutionary movements – some larger than his own – by being better organized and equally ruthless. In Churchill's words from *The World Crisis*, Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and other leftist rivals:

crumpled up almost simultaneously. One sect alone made a momentary stand. The Anarchists, strong in the traditions of Bakunin, conceived themselves unapproachable in extremism. If the Bolsheviks would turn the world upside down, they would turn it inside out; if the Bolsheviks abolished right and wrong, they would abolish right and left. They therefore spoke with confidence and held their heads high. But their case had been carefully studied in advance by the new authorities. No time was wasted in argument. Both in Petrograd and in Moscow they were bombed in their headquarters and hunted down and shot with the utmost expedition.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York, 2003). W. B. Bartlett, *The Assassins: The Story of Medieval Islam's Secret Sect* (Phoenix Mill, UK, 2001). The quotation at the end of my paragraphs is from Bartlett, *The Assassins*, p. 180.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Janke with Richard Sim, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography* (New York, 1983).

<sup>41</sup> Churchill, *The World Crisis* (London, 1929), p. 80.

A second way in which terrorism ends is through suppression by a moderate regime, roused into taking comprehensive and hard measures against the threat. It employs its local and national police, other law-related measures such as wire taps and prolonged detention, policies such as immigration controls, administrative powers such as regulating bank transactions, public information or propaganda campaigns against the terrorists, and perhaps corrective measures promoting public welfare. Sometimes, it also uses dramatic force; it may even use its army on its own citizens.

This is the approach modern democracies have at times taken since World War II. Two of the successes were against terrorist movements within larger insurgencies: the Malayan Emergency and the Huk movement in the Philippines. In both cases, indigenous leadership was important, for credibility as well as for efficiency. Tunku Abdul Rahman in Malaya had appeal to all parties and major social groups.<sup>42</sup> In the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay was surely one of the most impressive Third World leaders of this past century, however short his tenure as Defense Minister and President.<sup>43</sup> These leaders also had the advantage of aid from outside powers, Britain and the United States, respectively, but neither power overwhelmed its indigenous ally. Moreover, the insurgents in both countries lacked strong outside help. Both countries were moving rapidly to formal independence so the rhetoric of anticolonialism was blunted. And the two governments adopted comprehensive antiterror strategies. Making defeat of terrorism and insurgency their number one priority, they used all manner of political, psychological, economic, and military powers. They emphasized good human intelligence. Smart individual policemen were as important as high-ranking generals. A doctrine of minimal and responsible use of force was successful because the guerrillas were not substantially reinforced or armed from outside. In both countries, the governments moved belatedly, but they moved decisively, suppressing terrorism by arrests and small unit military action, which produced waves of defections from the communist side. Insurgency, and its components of guerrilla war and terrorism, ended together.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Dr. Ian Beckett, lecture on the Malayan Emergency, U.S. Marine Corps Command & Staff College, Quantico, VA, April 28, 2003. And see the classic by Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London, repr. 1987).

<sup>43</sup> On counterinsurgency against the Huks at the level of grand strategy, see Edward Geary Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York, 1972).

<sup>44</sup> Although Malaysia has in fact remained at peace, the same cannot be said of the Philippines. Before the Huk crisis, there had been a major war of independence waged by Aguinaldo at the end of the nineteenth century; after the mid-twentieth-century Huk crisis, there followed the (communist) New People's Army, which has waxed and waned but remains strong in some areas. There have always been muslim movements against the authorities, especially in the southern islands; Abu Sayyaf is one of these regularly employing terror. Terrorism, whether by NPA or moslem groups, has thus been a low-level perennial in the lives of this generation of Filipinos.

A third way terrorism ends is by the arrest of the individual who is its center of gravity. In the Algerian FLN, there was no such individual. The arrest of Ben Bella and several other revolutionary leaders, when the French forced down their Moroccan aircraft in 1956, merely injured the FLN without in any way crippling it. But the last decade has supplied two illustrations of how “decapitating” a group may render it helpless. The arrest of Abimael Guzman in September 1992 and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 all but ended the considerable power of Sendero Luminoso and the Kurdish Worker’s Party. The former wound down immediately and steeply. A follow-on leader emerged but was soon arrested. For a decade, the group has been almost completely silent.<sup>45</sup> The Kurds of PKK have changed their group name and pledged themselves to peaceful activism.<sup>46</sup> PKK attacks, once commonplace in Europe, especially Turkey and Germany, are now uncommon.

This raises the question of assessing al Qaeda, a new organization, for none is precisely like another. If Bin Laden’s personal authority is not assumable by another, if his purse strings are nontransferable, or if his lieutenants do not share his global vision, but desire to focus only on their different homelands, then capturing or killing Bin Laden would probably send the organization into precipitous decline, leaving more manageable splinter groups, each in its own locality or region. However, if al Qaeda is a kind of global religious insurgency, based on broad popular resentment, the death or capture of Bin Laden would be significant but not decisive.<sup>47</sup> It might simply shift the group’s control to Egyptian medical doctor Aiman al Zawahiri, currently the number two in the organization, a terrorist leader in his own right a decade ago, just as prolix as Bin Laden, and perhaps as good an organizer. He could assume rule; so could a committee. Successful defeat of al Qaeda then would require defeating and discrediting the militancy of Islamic radicals. Cultivation of sober Islamic leaders; good bilateral relations with Arab states; psychological operations against terrorism; targeted economic aid programs for poor “gray areas” in moslem sections of the Philippines, Sudan, and similar countries; and other

<sup>45</sup> In the new millennium, Sendero has shown limited signs of revival; see, for example, the *New York Times*, July 23, 2003.

<sup>46</sup> The name change to “Democratic Republic Party” was reported by the *Washington Times*, Feb. 20, 2002; a later State Department report indicates a change to KADEK, the “Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress” and notes the group still maintains some 8,000 trained fighters. Attacks have all but ceased. A recent exception was casualties from an engagement with Turkish forces as some members reinfiltate into Turkey following the coalition success against Saddam Hussein.

<sup>47</sup> The view of al Qaeda as a global insurgency – probably not subject to strictly military or “decapitation” strategies – is one propounded by Dr. Tucker, lecturing in Spring 2002 at the Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC.

measures would be as appropriate as was terminating Taliban influence in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup>

A fourth way terror groups have met their end is through sheer fatigue. Some just wear out. Chin Peng fought and held out hope for even longer than Mao Tse Tung, yet never prevailed, and eventually surrendered to Malaysian authorities, which ended his meager violent operations. His will was remarkable, yet even that could break. The other target of a well-directed 1950s counterinsurgency campaign mentioned previously, Luis Taruc of the Filipino Huks, ended his fight the same way: by surrender.

Many terrorists give up much faster. In a revealing memoir, *The Reckoning: A Neo-Nazi Drops Out*, Ingo Hasselbach recounts his swift rise to high rank on the right wing extremes of a reunited Germany. His descent was as swift. After only five years, he quit because of growing self-loathing and weariness. Hatred had been hot and fueled street action, but it ran short, and diffidence, self-contempt, and longing for civilized friendships crept in. He was a mere twenty-five years old when he left the movement, which he now condemns.<sup>49</sup>

Failure of will is one of the reasons many former terrorists have disappeared from the public eye. Ulrike Meinhof, the gifted German propagandist and leader of Baader-Meinhof, might now be a contented grandmother several times over, but that was never her aspiration. Serving a mere eight-year sentence for her crimes, Meinhof must have despaired, for she committed suicide in jail. The other two principals, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, also jailed, staked their hopes on being freed by comrades hijacking a Lufthansa jet in 1977. When that plan was ruined by a brilliant German commando operation, which retook the airliner in Mogadishu and rescued eighty-seven passengers, the two terrorists hanged themselves in jail, a year after Meinhof.<sup>50</sup> Clearly, this fourth termination mechanism, terrorist fatigue, owes something to the resistance by the state enemy.

A fifth way terrorism ends is that the perpetrators fold themselves into normal politics or civilized life. This was the approach taken by individuals such as Danny Cohen-Bendit, now a German official, and Mark Rudd, the American "Weatherman" leader, who by the mid-1980s was a school teacher in the American southwest. On occasion, an entire terror group has taken this path. Colombia's M-19 was a Castroite organization, small but with a high

<sup>48</sup> Another way to study al Qaeda would be as a complex adaptive system, in accordance with the Complexity Theory in use at the Santa Fe Institute and other locales. At Sandhurst in July 2003, conference speaker Lieutenant General P. K. Van Riper, USMC retired, recommended this to the author as a promising line of inquiry.

<sup>49</sup> The U.S. title by Ingo Hasselbach (with Tom Reiss) is *Fuhrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi* (New York, 1996).

<sup>50</sup> Although there was a second generation RAF, it also lapsed. Today, in Germany, there is great contention over plans for a late 2004 exhibit on the RAF and its meanings.

profile in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It enjoyed state support from Cuba, Nicaragua, and even Libya. In 1985, this “19th of April” organization took five hundred hostages while occupying the Palace of Justice in Bogotá. When the day ended, Colombia’s security forces stormed the building. Eleven high court justices died; the building was burned, and with it burned the records of M-19s narcotrafficking partners. M-19 lost many leaders that day and could no longer prevail against Colombian authorities. It accepted the offer of an amnesty and engaged in overt politics. A few members were successfully elected to politics and lived, but political enemies also assassinated many M-19 leaders once they set aside their guns and their precautions.

El Salvador’s one-time revolutionary Joachim Villalobos has done well folding into postwar democratic life. This talented extremist maneuvered and shot his way into leadership of the ERP (Revolutionary People’s Army).<sup>51</sup> When five such Salvadoran groups melded, he became a top field commander. Today, Villalobos is married to a millionaire, lives in a walled compound in a rich area of San Salvador, and is modestly active in politics. He often speaks abroad at conferences on conflict resolution, including the U.S. Army’s War College and Oxford, where he earned a doctorate. Several other Salvadoreans famous for terrorism and/or guerrilla war are now members of parliament in El Salvador.<sup>52</sup>

The Nicaraguan Sandinistas represent a similar case of a group that combined the practice of terrorism with clandestine organization and guerrilla war to attain power. But then they submitted to different rigors: electoral politics. Many observers were amazed when, after a decade in power, the Daniel and Humberto Ortega regime allowed popular elections. Perhaps the Ortega brothers and their comrades were themselves astonished when they lost. Since that time, 1990, they have kept the Sandinista Party alive.<sup>53</sup>

The Sandinistas’ decade in power suggests a sixth and final end: terrorism may win. This is not to argue that it always succeeds, much less that it succeeds by itself. But terrorism’s methods and calculations, when combined with persistence and fortune and some forms of public appeal, may triumph. Revolutionary parties, using terrorism in a calculated mix with guerrilla war and covert organization and other forms of politics that have

<sup>51</sup> Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Washington, DC, 1990), p. 210. Now dated, this superb volume has been the best English-language encyclopedia on militant leftists in the lower Western Hemisphere. Given the decline of most subject groups, it is unlikely to enjoy a second edition.

<sup>52</sup> World Wide Web pages such as those of Oxford University and the U.S. Army War College, and a June 2003 telephone interview with Dr. J. Michael Waller, Annenberg Professor of International Communication, The Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC.

<sup>53</sup> Some Sandinistas in overt politics were assassinated after their party lost. Others still active in politics include the once-feared secret police chief Lenin Cerna. Former interior minister Thomas Borge is among the Sandinistas now grown wealthy from business, according to Dr. Waller (op. cit.).

attained complete governmental power during the twentieth century, include the Bolsheviks, the Maoists, the Castroites, the Algerian FLN, and the Khmer Rouge.

The suggestion that terrorism may succeed prompts the question: "What is success?" As noted earlier, there are important forms of partial success. One is to gain effective sway over regional or national affairs without holding state office. Another is to assume state power temporarily. Another is simply to bring down the current state structure, even if the terrorists cannot themselves replace it. Like other human organizations, violent groups may have ultimate objectives and also intermediate ones. They may deem partial success worth having.

FARC has been a violent opponent of Colombian democracy since the mid-1960s. Its leaders may well think it enough to have survived and flourish in large swaths of that state, even if they are unlikely to break the government in Bogotá. Their cadre live in, and even administer via shadow governments, large "liberated" zones, including for several years a region the size of Switzerland that the last executive, President Pastrana, in a shocking abandonment of sovereignty, demilitarized and vacated. For famed FARC boss "Sure Shot" ("Tirofijo") Marulanda Velez, this may be victory enough. He is said to be vigorous for his years – three-fourths of a century. He is a hero to hundreds of thousands, one of the richer men in the country, and his word means life or death for all those within his power. Undoubtedly, he would prefer to hold national power, but his "state within a state" is doubtless a compensation and a good living. Counterinsurgency manuals sometimes state that, for the guerrilla, "to survive is to win." Although that limited form of success may not satisfy all, it satisfies many guerrillas and terrorists.

"Revolutionary Organization November 17" made virtually no outward progress during a quarter-century in the Greek underground. It had some two dozen hardcore members in 1975 and no more when the millennium ended. Often employing the same Colt 45 pistol in its murders and known for lengthy Marxist-Leninist proclamations, November 17 survived during all those years as a burr to authorities and a standard bearer for revolution. Its persistence and secretiveness kept fear alive in Greece and in NATO, a favored target of its assassinations. Gradually, the legacy came to include quiet international contempt for a Greek government which could not or would not stamp it out. No member of November 17 was arrested until the group botched a bombing in June 2002, and then, in subsequent arrests, informed on one another. By that year's end, the Greek government had arrested nineteen men.<sup>54</sup> But for decades, no member had defected in discouragement.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Dept. of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," Washington, DC, April 2003, p. 46.

## THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM

*“Three rapid attack craft and three supply ships belonging to the Sri Lankan Navy were damaged in this historic offensive launched by the Black Sea Tigers at 0130 yesterday morning. Nine Black Sea Tigers, including two women . . . embraced martyrdom from the LTTE side while carrying out this successful surprise attack. This attack was a joint operation. . . . Swimming underwater the Black Sea Tiger frogmen attached bombs to the ships and blasted them. . . . At the same time, a speedboat of the Black Sea Tigers entered the port swiftly and attacked the buildings in the port complex with rocket-propelled grenades. . . . At that time, there was fierce fighting between the Black Sea Tigers and Sri Lankan naval forces inside the harbor area. The fact that the Sea Tigers can penetrate the enemy’s security zone with weapons in groups and launch offensives has frightened the Sri Lankan authorities. A correspondent from Colombo reports that the nightmares of Sri Lankan authorities have come true.”<sup>55</sup>*

The Tamil success suggests much about the near-term future. First, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, one of the world’s most lethal killers of civilians, but also a group very adept at guerrilla war, released the previous statement. The LTTE have made the transition from terrorism to insurgency, and do both with facility, as Hezbollah does. Second, this attack and others by LTTE suggest much to armies and navies about force protection. Suicide boats or frogmen had sunk more than a few Sri Lankan naval vessels by the time of the suicide attack on the *USS Cole*. A third feature is that this was a press release, issued on the World Wide Web. A fourth is its boastfulness about its women as killers. LTTE also has used child killers in large numbers in the past, but recently ceased boasting about that morally awkward subject. Others may derive further insights from this brief statement by Tamil publicists.<sup>56</sup>

Modern history makes it evident that terrorism has a future. What can be said about that future? Social sciences are as much art as science; technically, they cannot offer predictions. That is why contributors to this volume have said so much about what history “suggests” and so little about what it ordains. It ordains nothing. Moreover, trends in evidence today may change or even reverse themselves tomorrow. Trend analysis is a touchy and unreliable subject. But it is clear that terrorism has a future. Even the current global war on terrorism led by the United States and Britain cannot and will not extirpate it. It has been with the international community for decades. All living citizens recall its sting because they all have been part of

<sup>55</sup> Tamil Eelam News Web posting of April 13, 1996, trans. and repr. by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 10, 1996, p. 80.

<sup>56</sup> A theme of my own publications is that the spoken and written words of active terrorists are far more revealing and useful than many social scientists think.

its designated audiences. Terrorism, in its durability, is akin to crime – it is successful enough so that it will always be with the world, and there will always be hopefuls who take up the method as an alternative to peaceful politics or for the power it gives or promises.

What cannot be foreseen is the level of global terrorism. One measure is incident levels. Currently, these average some 300 to 400 transnational acts a year. Another measure of terrorism is its reach. George W. Bush and his administration's campaign has from the beginning properly aimed at all "terror groups with global reach," not simply all terrorists, for that would be impossible. A third measure of terrorism's strength is the duration of the deadliest groups. One scholar probably errs in generalizing that "statistically, most guerrilla and terrorist campaigns last between 13 and 14 years."<sup>57</sup> Revolutionary Organization November 17, for example, lasted for more than a quarter-century, suffering not a single arrest. Were the generalization true, al Qaeda, which originated at the end of the 1980s, would now be dead. Instead, al Qaeda retains many personnel, including several key leaders. Even if further battered, it may still revive in unexpected places.

A related way to measure terrorism's endurance is to turn away from individual groups and take the long view of a state or states. Several governments such as Iran have for decades been outright sponsors of violence abroad. Iraq has been on the State Department's list of sponsors of terror since 1979. Only the forcible deposition of Saddam Hussein finally changed that pattern. Recent public discussion has focused on Iraq's limited linkages to al Qaeda, but the state's long-standing relations with the secular Palestinians Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas provide a clearer picture of Iraq's terrorist relations.<sup>58</sup> North Korea has always accentuated guerrilla war, but it has done more. Its agents have carried out terrorist attacks abroad – by assaults on South Korea, by kidnappings in Japan, and by bombing an airliner and a foreign Cabinet meeting in Burma. North Korea has already had a "regime change," but the successor to the "great leader" is the man reputed to have directed several of Pyongyang's worst terror attacks.<sup>59</sup>

The Republic of Yemen is a state of a wholly different sort, but also one associated with terrorism. Its pattern has been more of change than continuity. From 1970 onward, South Yemen was in the public eye as a member of the Soviet bloc, which itself fostered terrorism. That bilateral policy and the

<sup>57</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York, 2002), p. 13. This may be an error that even Gunaratna does not defend because his book makes it evident he thinks al Qaeda remains very powerful and dangerous. Gunaratna has since released a mid-2003 edition. He is in the unusual position of a scholar in great demand by academics, police, and media in Europe, the United States, and other regions, and his high repute is richly deserved.

<sup>58</sup> Nidal died in Iraq shortly before the war of 2003; Abbas was arrested when the Allies invaded.

<sup>59</sup> Kim Hyun Hee, *The Tears of My Soul* (New York, 1993).

country's remoteness and geographic advantages contributed to further international problems. The PLO trained pilots there, according to one report.<sup>60</sup> There were camps for foreign gunmen such as those loyal to George Habash, who led the PLO splinter group PFLP. The regime did not merely tolerate this; it gave every appearance of approval. Hijackers often sought refuge there.

South Yemen disappeared after the USSR did, when war broke out between north and south. Since reunification, the Yemeni state has been making its way back into the world community. Yet, by the late 1990s, united Yemen was again known for violence, its current phase characterized by criminal kidnappings for ransom, general lawlessness in certain areas, and the presence (but not necessarily sponsorship) of international terrorists. This homeland of Bin Laden's father yielded militants seeking jihad.<sup>61</sup> Moslem radicals also came to Yemen for training – this known by the end of the 1990s. Today, the country is not on the State Department's list of sponsors of international terrorism, but it remains under an international microscope. Absence of strong central government, ideological and familial sympathies with active terrorists, and geography all make the small state one to watch. Yemen's last several decades offer a case study in the way terrorism rarely dies; it may linger, or reemerge later, in new ways.

Similar problem states are Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Sudan. Some of the new "stans" are likely to continue adding to the transnational terrorism phenomenon. Jihadi training of youngsters now takes place in schools in the Fergana Valley connecting Uzbekistan with two of its neighbors.<sup>62</sup> Apart from such "gray area" states, there will always be states which are outright exporters of violence. Some have prospered through the use of terrorism, and others will attempt the same for their own interests. This factor has been a harsh challenge to international law and organization. The authors of the UN Charter did not dwell on the low-level purposeful export of violence by states. But the half-century since has demonstrated the need for counteraction.

There are many other reasons that terrorism will persist, having to do with transient but powerful underlying political causes, with the persistence of human problems, or with the intrepid nature of many ideologies. Terror's utility as a method of insurgents is yet another reason terror will endure. Terrorism was a tactic of Red Chinese insurgents and militia from the 1920s onward. After World War II, insurgents inspired by Mao such as the Huks,

<sup>60</sup> Owned by Jane's, *Foreign Report* was perhaps the best open-source periodical covering terrorism in English; later, it was bought by *The Economist*.

<sup>61</sup> For example, when the USS *Cole* was blown up in harbor, it emerged that perpetrators may have had identification documents via a Yemeni official of a low level, friendly but unofficially.

<sup>62</sup> Martha Brill Olcott and Bakhtiyar Babajanov, "The Terrorist Notebooks," *Foreign Policy*, March April 2003, pp. 30–40.

the Malay Communists, the Vietcong, and the Khmer Rouge, all used terror in their struggles. In the 1980s, Maoist methods brought Sendero Luminoso to power in large swaths of Peru, and there was Maoism evident in some violent parts of India. Since 1996, there has been a revolutionary war in Nepal by indigenous self-described Maoists.<sup>63</sup> Terrorism as a tool of insurgency thus is a well-founded pattern in history, as well as the product of clear and extremist political ideas of Maoist character.

Terrorism thus stays on, but it does not stay the same. Occasionally, there *are* new things under the sun. There are new political movements, new circumstances giving rise to violence, and new cults. Since 1968, the counterterrorist community has seen no other group like al Qaeda. There is no precedent for this powerful and cohesive international multiethnic terror organization.<sup>64</sup> Yet, because that is well recognized in the British and American capitals and other places, and because of the war underway since late 2001, the Islamic radical threat may soon seem less frightening to newspaper readers than some new rival, even as responsible governments soldier on. A decade from now, the concern may well be some new kind of terrorism – a fusion of nationalism with organized crime, or legions of agitators for a Kurdish state, or a dramatic and pervasive assassination campaign, worldwide, against providers of abortion.

The world will occasionally be surprised by new technologies. Once dynamite was invented, anarchists such as Germany's Johannes Most immediately found it a thrilling and effective way to announce themselves and their cause. In the late twentieth century, Sendero Luminoso rediscovered this simple weapon in Peru. If engineers and mechanics create a light portable automatic rifle that any fifteen-year-old girl can carry, produced in sufficient numbers to be affordable, terrorists are likely to examine and adopt this new weapon, as they have others in the past. Most terrorist acts are committed with fire, a knife, dynamite or other explosives, or with personal automatic weapons. The majority of these are at the "low-tech" levels. The change in this respect, and a strong recent concern, is increasing sophistication with remote detonation methods. These are disturbingly easy to arrange and can give new life to a deadly old standard, the vehicle bomb.

"Midtech" threats (to which the author drew attention in 2000) include the "dirty bomb" of nuclear waste dispersed by conventional explosive, the ultra-lite aircraft, and the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile. The last two already have been used, and SAMS were fired again at an Israeli aircraft leaving Nairobi airport in 2002. By the following year, popular literature

<sup>63</sup> One excellent source on the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Naxalites of India is the Web site of the South Asia Terrorism Portal, where one finds original party documents and articles by such writers as Dr. Ajai Sahni and K. P. S. Gill.

<sup>64</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaeda*, pp. 1 and 11.

had blossomed on the danger to commercial air travel. Use of a full airliner as a weapon was a powerful and imaginative stroke in the mid-tech range, suggested by a 1994 plot by Algerian extremists and realized successfully on September 11, 2001.<sup>65</sup> Police can imagine such scenarios without end. Clever ideas for evil uses of technology come easily to calculating minds, when they are inspired by their own needs, read of other groups' successes, or link plots with new technologies to imaginative theory in well-known handbooks, such as *The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* by Carlos Marighella, circa 1969, *The Turner Diaries* of white supremacist William Pierce (1978), and *Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants*, by al Qaeda (c. 1998). There is always new – something instructive and destructive – on the World Wide Web.

At the highest level are the potential and actual weapons of mass destruction, which must be taken profoundly seriously. Perhaps the best American analyst of terrorism, senior RAND political scientist Brian Jenkins, wrote a quarter-century ago that “terrorists don’t want a lot of people dead; they want a lot of people paying attention.” Even before September 11, 2001, he revised that thesis in a new essay.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps Aum Shinrikyo’s nerve gas attack and its other attempts to kill with biological weapons were the most apparent reason for reconsideration. Now there are others. Al Qaeda has demonstrated an interest in ricin and other chem/bio weapons. In the United States, anthrax has been weaponized and used to terrorize and kill. It is, indeed, fortunate that an atomic bomb is so complicated and so expensive to make.

Yet, there is no clear reason to expect enhancement of the recent trend toward greater lethality in the attacks. Much discussed, that trend has been real, but logic and experience show how trends may divert or die away. The use of gas by Germany against its Western enemies did not occur in World War II just because it had occurred in World War I. Thus far, the actual use of nuclear weapons has been a singular event in human history; 1945 set no pattern of use, only of research and development. Ricin was used in the 1978 murder of an émigré in London, and the U.S. White Power movement of the 1980s and early 1990s showed great interest in it. But ricin is not easy to administer, and despite continued interest in the toxin, apparently has never again been successfully deployed in political murder. Terrorism is commonplace on the globe’s surface, but the average terror incident will remain a focused, small-scale, low-tech affair, still featuring a telephone threat, use of a knife, murder by pistol or rifle, or placement of a time bomb. Judged only by numbers of incidents and the technology employed, there has been far

<sup>65</sup> Pages 54 and 196 of *Terrorism Today*; chap. 4 deals with other “mid-tech” threats; terrorism writer Ronald Payne chose to highlight these in his review of the book in *TLS* (London), Aug. 18, 2000. But I did not explicitly predict an attack like that of September 11.

<sup>66</sup> Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal,” chap. 13 of *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998).

more continuity than change. The lust for lethality stunningly demonstrated on September 11 is not of itself proof of a dark future world. One might just as reasonably foresee different terrorist patterns, such as emergent campaigns for the environment or animals. These would capture new attention and might involve hundreds of individual attacks and actions, but occur at the level of sabotage, not killing. Killing in such cases could be deterred by the sentiments, concerns, and ideologies of the perpetrators themselves, who see themselves as prolife. Such campaigns are likely, and they are most likely in relatively wealthy countries. People will not care about them as much as they do about al Qaeda, but such practices will be a part of the terrorism picture.

For the same reasons of logic, there is no assurance that the 1990s' rise in religious terrorist groups will continue. A brief period of Sikh fascination with terrorist spectacle ended in the 1980s. The Christian Identity movement spawned several terrorist actions in the United States but today has quieted. *Madrassas*, a pronounced threat to world peace, continue to enroll thousands of potential recruits to militant Islam. But even that pattern of graduates comes from perhaps a dozen countries, whose nationals are increasingly subject to police scrutiny worldwide. In the United States, Bin Laden's crimes may inspire violence by a few dozen moslem Americans and hot rhetoric from a few political zealots, but in this author's view, al Qaeda's mass murders are a painful embarrassment for most American moslems. Aum Shinrikyo has not spawned new religious terrorists in Japan or Russia, despite a wide following of the cult in both countries and a prevalence of available "root causes" in each place, including economic crisis and deep discontents. Religion will remain a source of much terrorism, but it need not become worse.

A pattern that will predictably intensify is the internationalization of terrorist causes. One may expect many twenty-first century rivals of "past masters," such as the nineteenth-century Anarchists or mid-twentieth-century Algerian FLN. The world will grow accustomed to such recent phenomena as a Tamil Web site used by global readers or a TV station run by Hezbollah for the attentions of its state sponsors and the Levantines. Indeed, it will be deemed notable, and perhaps odd, if a successful group more than two or three years old does *not* develop a Web site. From its first days of operation, it is likely to use the international post, satellite-aided cell phones, the transnational arms market, and so on.<sup>67</sup> Globalization, seemingly unstoppable,

<sup>67</sup> "What changed with 9-11 was that the threat was internationalized . . ." says a spokesman for the London-based World Markets Research Center (WMRC), upon release of a new report. This is of course only a matter of emphasis; historically, terrorism has often gone international, and for over three decades now it has been a fully international phenomenon. The WMRC report is one indicator of new concerns in the business community about the global character of threats to them. "9/11 Style Attack Predicted in Next Year," AP story of August 18, 2003, courtesy of Mr. Jim Holmes of the Institute of World Politics.

allows for airing of discontents and for violent action against the innocent to publicize such discontents. Finally, many virulent ideologies are internationalist by nature, and when ideologies yield up terrorists, globalization will only support the pattern.

One example is violent Irish nationalism. In the 1850s, at the time of the founding of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the supportive “Fenian Brotherhood” originated in the United States. A century later, in the 1950s and 1960s, such men as George Harrison, Cathal Goulding, and Joe Cahill labored to keep up the eastward transatlantic flow of money and weapons. The Irish Northern Aid Committee registered for official status with the U.S. government. Very unofficial, clandestine methods doubtless were even more useful. In the 1990s, the IRA Provos had representatives in the eastern United States trying to buy shoulder-fired missiles – a potential reply to British air power. Already in the new millennium, IRA operatives have turned up in Moscow to buy new sniper rifles, and in Colombia to teach FARC more about homemade mortars, a Provo specialty for many years. Members of the IRA have also attended many international terrorist summits on the continent of Europe. One should conclude that both the IRA’s own history and the latter twentieth-century phenomenon of international terrorist summits bringing together distant and disparate groups indicate that internationalization of terrorism is a trend that will continue. Globalization and emerging communications technologies will assist the pattern.

## CONCLUSION

The foregoing has suggested some conclusions about terrorism although some of them are limited, interim, or offer only a small a window on the future. Strictly speaking, the social sciences cannot predict. But we may hope that, in accord with Carl von Clausewitz, a diligent student of human nature and the past can unlock certain secrets and prepare his mind well for what the future may present. Perhaps that is enough.

Scattered pages of *On War* by Clausewitz offer a useful distinction between the “nature” of war and its “character.” Nature is permanent and so always present – by degrees of visibility – in all times and places; “all wars are political,” and so on. The character of a war may evolve, be similar to the last war, or change from one war to the next. Terrorism is no mere label and in no way ambiguous. It too has a nature, which is the deliberate use of violence against the innocent. Its objective is political power. It attacks the will, often by inflicting harm on a third party, and thus aims at a wide audience more than an immediate material purpose. It is more psychological than most forms of war; one archetype is the hostage drama that may never do physical damage. Terrorism has only limited similarity to guerrilla war: certain weapons and tactics, and its emphasis on reconnaissance, stealth,

and surprise. The nature of terrorism is exceedingly political, even if the announced objective appears to have most to do with a particular economic issue, social question, or religious matter. The end is power – power over a regime, over a people, on behalf of a foreign government, and so on.

The character of terrorism is variegated and malleable. Its styles have changed, and will do so again, as history stretches forward. Named groups can and sometimes do change their mode of operation or their targeting. In the last decade, observers *have* noted movement from psychological drama toward mass casualty acts. One symbol is Hamas, which began with the knife and now specializes in major suicide bombings. There *has* been less terrorism by secular political groups and more by religiously motivated groups in the last decade. Yet, there are more half-trends and whole illusions than things dramatically new. Three examples offer themselves. Today, terrorism is more internationalized in its effects and operations than ever, but it is not playing a *different* kind of role in global affairs than did transnational terrorism in 1968 or 1998; its political and psychological workings are essentially similar. Second, terrorism is not increasing, despite present concerns. For example, far fewer international terror attacks succeeded in 2002 than in the preceding year. Third, it has not been shown that organizations are more ad hoc or loose today than before. Today's Hezbollah and IRA Provos seem to run with ruthless discipline. In contrast, the principle of "leaderless resistance" was developed by a white power advocate in the United States a quarter-century ago, and when one reconsiders the violent Italian left of the 1970s, that was never well organized at the national level.<sup>68</sup>

In considering the future, one thus begins with the logic that present trends do not deserve to rivet the attention of analysts and policy makers. Only some groups follow cultish tradition. Many more evolve or innovate. There are always entirely new groups arising, as well as new methods of operation and attention grabbing. Predictions of terrorism, which rest on such rubrics as poverty and oppression are not useful; history does not support the linkage, and neither does the existence of massive slums in Latin American states, where there is virtually no revolutionary terrorism at all. It is clear that terrorism will never be eliminated; it can only be reduced. One should not regard it as a natural fact of life, but it is certainly a pattern in contemporary politics and most likely to persist. The reasons for that include a plethora of human problems, political obsessions such as hypernationalism, and the camp, insurgency, which often turns to terrorism as a tool, choice by

<sup>68</sup> My first journal article on terrorism (in 1982 in *Grand Strategy: Countercurrents*, from The Claremont Institute) concerned Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, heir to the Italian publishing firm, who promoted leftist militant books and aided certain terrorists, fostering indigenous militants but also a very loose international network. Recently, Dr. David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School has used such well-known past networks to question the new conventional wisdom that al Qaeda is wholly revolutionary in how it operates.

individuals and individual groups, and state practice. Special technology is not the holy grail of future terrorism. The dagger served the medieval Assassins well in the Middle East and was reintroduced by Hamas in the 1980s for similar effects. Past patterns of success, or limited success, will also continue to drive terrorists onward.

What is most evident about our future is that terrorism in some form will continue, and continue to attack moderate states and the democracies, which must in turn maintain the resolution and solid sense to resist terror by comprehending its manipulative methods and by defeating its worst outbursts. The year 2003 saw the unexpected reopening of files on convicted terrorists in Peru, a country that narrowly defeated the scourge in 1992 and has since become both calm and fully democratic. Peru's legal and judicial self-critique of the present moment is a vivid reminder of how terrorism puts democracies at risk: initially by horrific violence, then by the requirement for governmental response with sweeping legislation and force, and then again by the later patterns of relentless self-criticism and even shame. It must be hoped that Peru will prove an example of democratic strength, instead of this new self-examination encouraging or renewing terrorism, making Peru an example of *How Democracies Perish*.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> This is a reference to the admirable volume by Jean Francois Revel; another such study preceded it, and was at least as good: Harold W. Rood's 1980 *Kingdoms of the Blind*.