

# The past as prologue

*The importance of history  
to the military profession*

Edited by

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

*Institute of Defense Analysis*

RICHARD HART SINNREICH

*Carrick Communications, Inc.*

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active service." By mid-1956, this brutish approach triumphed at the strategic level, when it was debated and approved in conference in the mountains at Soummam. The man most responsible for assembling FLN political and military leaders there, Ramdane Abane, was known for his calculus that "one corpse in a [suit] jacket is always worth more than twenty in uniform." Soon after Soummam came the first horrific bombings in the capital, Algiers, where the targets were public gathering places, not exclusively French attractions, and certainly not security related. They had place names like Le Milk Bar and Lucky Starway dance hall. The carnage was shocking. That was precisely the point.<sup>2</sup>

The first and most powerful lesson about terrorism from this nationalist revolution of a half-century ago in Algeria is the one Alistair Horne illuminates and some other historians of that conflict have missed: terrorism is a deliberate choice – not merely the product of passion, nor of the environment of war, nor of the strength of feeling behind a cause. It is a method, not just a description.<sup>3</sup> That is central to the first of the four parts of this chapter.

#### WHY TERRORISM OCCURS

Terrorism is about power. It is, indeed, a complex phenomenon, challenging to understand, whether one is a social scientist, military commander, or political leader. There are indeed many tangled roots of the phenomenon in economic, social, and political conditions. In more cases than not, there is indirect or direct involvement of a sovereign state.<sup>4</sup> What is most evident,

<sup>2</sup> Jacques C. Duchemin, *Histoire du FLN*. (Paris, 1962), pp. 218–19. Yves Courrière, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, vol. II, *Le Temps des Léopards* (Paris, 1969), pp. 130–1, 195, 226–8, 427. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York, 1977), pp. 89, 135. The platform adopted at the Congress of Soummam described armed action as "a psychological shock that has freed the people from its torpor . . ." (trans. CCH, after Duchemin's text, p. 181). Also useful on that political/psychological phenomenon are Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria* (Princeton, 1960), e.g., pp. 86–90.

<sup>3</sup> This is also a theme of Martha Crenshaw's impressive essay "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> The documentation of state support of given terrorists is vast. Two commendable titles of the mid-1980s were Yonah Alexander and Ray Cline, "State-Sponsored Terrorism," a report for the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, June 1985, and Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Richard H. Shultz, et al., *Hydra of Carnage: The Witnesses Speak* (Lexington, MA, 1985). Dr. Harold W. Rood, reviewing my manuscript, pointed to a dozen relevant past examples of states' involvement; e.g., there was an announcement by the Mexican government in March 1971 that many Soviet diplomats were being ejected because of the direct aid Moscow and North Korea gave to the "Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria" (MAR); letter to author of July 19, 2003 (6 pp.). After the fall of the USSR, admissions and new documentation flowing from the region's archives literally ended years of public debate about whether communist states had been fostering international terrorism.

however, is that terrorism is about power. One might first explore that premise in the dual dimensions of psychological and political power.

It has become commonplace to read that violence by Moslem fanatics is rooted in the deep resentment and humiliation they feel. Some observers emphasize that in the rise and fall of great powers, Moslem and Arab peoples have done relatively poorly in modern times. Some argue that globalization has maximized the cultural influence of the West at the expense of the cultures of North Africa and the Middle East. Others allege that the United States pays too much attention to Israel (although it was Arab countries that were liberated in 1991 and 2003). The resentment is tangibly real: polling data published in 2002 drove home the point that even in countries with mixed or friendly relations with the West, anti-Americanism is deep. Such sentiment may inspire al Qaeda. Surely its supporters are buttressed by such feelings.<sup>5</sup>

There are numerous other historical examples of similar inspiration for terrorism. One may examine Palestinian resentment of second-class political status among the Jews, as well as Palestinian resentment of the Arabs. There was the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) expulsion from Lebanon in 1983, and before that the PLO's expulsion from Jordan in the Black September of 1970. The team that killed the Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972 was called Black September out of defiance, resentment, and humiliation, as much as hatred of Israel.

Resentment and humiliation are visible in the histories of what often are called "the first terrorists," known as the Assassins, Ismaili moslems of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. Their resentment was against the dominant Sunni faith. Their aim was physical and religious independence. Their strategy was a mix of manipulation of regional forces, alliance making, a network of strong castles, and audacious assassinations. They killed area rivals, irritants, conquerors, or leaders too proud to submit to Assassin requests or demands. For more than a century, they killed no westerners. Rather, their enemies were local and regional rivals for the moslem soul.<sup>6</sup> It

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, "Poll: Muslims Call U.S. 'Ruthless, Arrogant,'" CNN, Feb. 26, 2002, as well as "This Week," ABC TV, March 3, 2002. Of those questioned in nine Muslim countries, 53 percent had unfavorable opinions of the United States; most were "resentful" of the superpower. For suggestions of direct linkage between such muslim resentment and al Qaeda, see the articles on Kenya in the *New York Times* of Dec. 1, 2002.

"Humiliation" is now commonly referenced regarding causes of terrorism. For example, M. L. Cook's review in the Summer 2003 issue of *Parameters* directs us to this topic in Mark Juergensmeyer's book *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> This pattern whereby the Assassins' victims were nearly always other moslems is important and its corollary in terrorism today has been ignored. Yet, innumerable victims of the new moslem militants are other moslems – accused of apostasy, cultural infidelities, political despotism, submissiveness to the West, etc. In recent years, I suggested to

(continued)

the country possessed little or no real government. Belgian withdrawal had left a political vacuum. In August 1964, it produced insurrection: the provincial capital Stanleyville fell and 1,500 foreigners from two dozen countries became hostages, some of whom were murdered. Year's end brought the first great airborne counterterrorism mission. Belgian troops on the ground liberated hostages and gathered in other terrified victims of violence, and a combined Belgian-American air evacuation – the all-but forgotten “Dragon Rouge” – removed them to safety abroad.<sup>16</sup> Today's intervention by France is just as necessary, for many of the same human reasons. For half a century, this equatorial country has lingered in the-GAP.

From ungoverned areas, one may turn to a more common political source of terrorism. Countries in which strife and division are daily factors may also yield terrorism or terrorist groups. To paraphrase an admirable recent British Army field manual on counterinsurgency operations, it is not unusual for a soldier to find him- or herself serving in a nation or state where inherent social divisions based on racial, cultural, religious, or other differences drain away national cohesion.

Foreign commentators on Sri Lanka often seek the roots of that island nation's turmoil in British colonialism, but in reality British colonials had been gone for a generation when insurrection began in 1971. Its power-hungry sponsor was a man named Rohan Wijeweera; his organization was the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or People's Liberation Front], founded to enhance the majority status of the Sinhalese Sri Lankans and to maximize their advantages in the legal and political order of the country. Wijeweera himself reflected Chinese and Soviet influences, as well as a volatile combination of the left and right – a Patrice Lumumba University graduate who successfully exploited majoritarian nationalism. His JVP shredded the lovely island in the latter 1970s, and its decline facilitated the next phase of political violence by the Leninist “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” now one of the world's most significant terrorist groups as well as a capable guerrilla army.

The form of national separatism demonstrated by Tamil activists is similar to that of Basques within Spain, Irish Catholics within Ulster, and Palestinians within Israel. Despite the generous nature of the modern democratic state – against the backdrop of history, it is no overstatement to call the modern democratic state “generous” – there remain incentives for rebellion, deeply encoded and sometimes impermeably reflected in the traditions of certain families or the minds of certain leaders. National separatism has been and will remain a leading cause of terrorism, both domestic and international. When the Cold War ended, experts disagreed about whether the

<sup>16</sup> Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo* (Washington, DC, 1980).

picture would improve because of the end of Soviet sponsorship of terrorism or worsen because of emergent nationalist strife. In fact, terrorism has *not* become more common. Many national groups have rejected violence. But nationalist terrorism is unlikely ever to disappear from the globe.<sup>17</sup>

Religion has become a greater concern. That trend in the last decade has been documented in the journal *Terrorism & Political Violence*: fewer new terror groups formed in the last decade than in the 1980s or the 1970s, but of the seven groups created in the 1990s, five had a religious cast.<sup>18</sup> Among transnational terrorist groups active on the world stage today, the religiously based compete seriously with those based on ethnicity, ideology, or crime. New strands of militancy with origins in eccentric visions of religious truth include the Christian Identity faith, which denounces Jews while exalting white Christians. Originating in England in the mid-nineteenth century, it crossed the Atlantic in the latter twentieth to inspire American “Patriot,” militias, and white supremacy groups. Those with this religious background and records of lethal violence include Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations, and Eric Rudolph, the suspect in the Atlanta Olympics attack and other bombings, a fugitive who evaded capture until 2003.<sup>19</sup>

Observers today tend to shun the question whether the term “terrorism” applies to religious violence. Of course it does. One need only examine the deeds, statements, and writings of the relevant groups themselves. The 1994 American documentary film “Jihad in America” opened and closed with pictures of the New York Trade Towers, truck-bombed the year before, and included extensive footage from American cities of clandestine pep rallies for violence. The mass media ignored the film and so did commercial chains. Statements by Osama Bin Laden before 1998 were also largely disregarded. Now, of course, we have the remarkable video interviews, the Manchester safe-house training manual, and the recovered documents from computer hard drives found in terrorist headquarters in Afghanistan in late 2001.<sup>20</sup> These documents reflect the choices and reasons made to employ terror: power, hatred, politics, and religion. Actions are confirming years of words from self-declared warriors who are lethal enemies of those they consider to

<sup>17</sup> Among the new books on nationalism is Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (Boulder, CO, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, “The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 14, no. 3, 2002, pp. 145–6.

<sup>19</sup> Gregory A. Walker, “Service to Other Christians: Christian Identity's Underground Railroad . . .,” *Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> The manual is entitled “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants” [undated; 180 pp.]. The most remarkable of the *Wall Street Journal's* articles was by Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling Array of al Qaeda Memos,” Dec. 31, 2001. Later, the *New York Times* also acquired terrorists' documents in Afghanistan.

was disturbing the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe. Another example occurred when the Hasan al Turabi/General Bashir regime in the Sudan turned trained assassins loose in neighboring Ethiopia in anticipation of a state visit by Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian president was nearly shot in the route taken by his motorcade.<sup>24</sup>

Decades of modern terrorism reveal numerous examples of the use of assassins to attack domestic rivals, at home or abroad, to silence their political activity or to remove them from the list of prospective future rulers. Thus, Bulgaria's communist authorities used assassins to hunt émigrés in London. The Ceaucescu regime reportedly hired "Carlos the Jackal" – Ilich Ramirez Sanchez – to kill a number of Romanian dissidents and exiles living in Paris. Paris was also the scene of several stealthy murders of Iranians, hunted down by the Khomeini regime, suggesting that religious totalitarians are no more troubled by the use of assassins than are communist totalitarians.

A related form of assassination are those acts aimed at removing a pretender to the throne. Such actions are often done by "substate actors." The genre includes Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist of the group "Union or Death" (often called Black Hand). On Serbian National Day, he attacked the car of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the streets of Sarajevo, his pistol shots igniting the second bloodiest war in history.<sup>25</sup> Another recent instance of a fateful killing on the verge of international war has already been nearly forgotten: the murder of a great guerrilla warlord and anti-Taliban figure, Ahmad Massoud, "The Lion of the Panshir Valley," blown up by explosives cleverly hidden within a camera, two days before the attacks on America on September 11, 2001. Both aimed at removing a potential ruler, and both did so. In the first case, war was an intended consequence. In the second case, it was already in progress.

A growing literature in the last decades of the twentieth century describes other strategic uses of terrorism. For example, terrorism has assumed a central role in certain insurgencies and has served as an adjunct to conventional war, as Saddam Hussein attempted to do worldwide as the coalition moved to liberate Kuwait. Psychologically, terror can be far more subtle and far reaching than the sounds of the bombs on which it depends.<sup>26</sup> It often makes use of the inevitabilities in human nature. As the Algerian FLN story of 1954

<sup>24</sup> One collection of details on Sudan and international terrorism is the author's "Sudan's Neighbors Accuse It of Training Terrorists," *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 19, 1995. Five years later, the head of state demoted al Turabi and his followers, some of whom were placed under house arrest.

<sup>25</sup> The Princip case is covered in James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York, 1966), pp. 73–5, and Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York, 1994), pp. 16–18.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, the U.S. Navy's Randall G. Bowdish, "Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 79–99. I also wish to thank Captain Bowdish for reviewing a draft of this chapter.

suggests, terror can polarize a community along racial, religious, or other lines. Osama Bin Laden understood this when crowing about his success in the first days after September 11: he boasted that al Qaeda actions were forcing the world's moslem community to make a choice – would it be with the militant purists or the degenerate West?

Violence is of course, quite overtly, a recruiting tool. Terror represents a flag, to signify movement and action, announce an offensive, and seek comrades for further actions. It remains unclear whether Bin Laden's claim after the attacks on the eastern United States that recruiting for his organization had never been stronger was accurate. Normally, that is one result of well-executed strikes. But there are exceptions, as when the human damage repels enough of the target audience sufficiently to cause the radicals to lose heart or at least set aside such methods. U.S. "Patriots" became quiet after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City caused such loss of innocent life in 1995.

Terror also has important roles *within* a militant movement. Landmark studies of terrorism's role in fascist and communist organizations of the 1930s and 1940s as yet have no counterpart in academic work on modern international terror groups. But the threat and practice of internecine violence against militants themselves for deviation or tendencies toward capitulation is common. In the fifteen months after the "Good Friday" accord, the IRA carried out both killings and some 150 "punishment beatings," many against its own, not its enemies.<sup>27</sup> Capital punishments following one mass self-criticism session cut deep into the ranks of the tiny Japanese Red Army. The death penalty was regularly used by the Abu Nidal Organization. Such internal terrorism communicates a spirit of insuperable force within the group and simultaneously rids it of troublesome potential rivals or nascent opposition. Killing can suppress the moderation that tends to appear in all human organizations. The FLN shoved aside some earnest and conscience-filled moderates in its drive to ignite violent revolution in Algeria. Ferhat Abbas, a long-known leader of the moderate movement toward Algerian independence, was in one sense a rival to the FLN as it initiated its revolution. His nephew was soon murdered, explicitly because of the younger man's criticism of FLN bloody excesses, but also perhaps as a warning to his famed uncle.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Punishment beatings as a reality in such illegal groups are mentioned by Andrew R. Molnar et al., *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Washington, DC, 1965), p. 172.

<sup>28</sup> Horn, pp. 119–20. Two years later, Ferhat Abbas himself joined, or was allowed to join, the FLN, all but abandoning his own brand of gentle political pressure on France. There followed a Machiavellian use of the gentleman's profile: he was elevated as head of the FLN Provisional Government, a handsome face for outside eyes. But after the successful parade into Algiers amidst victory in 1962, Abbas could be shunted aside three years later.

The FLN's print-press offensive anticipated the media efforts of contemporary violent groups. Hezbollah runs a TV station. The Tamil Tigers have an endearing Web site. Support letters for the Iraqi-based terrorists of "People's Mujahideen" circulate annually in the halls of the U.S. Congress and win many signatures. A famous front group for the IRA Provos collects bag loads of money in New York and Boston, and has sent representatives to dine in the White House.

Terrorism also has an economic component. The economic dimensions of terrorism have been little studied. Social science and news journals – even those devoted to terrorism – rarely dwell on the economic impact of bombs, shootings, and threats. Private corporations have been left to their private concerns. Public citizens' groups seem not to notice. In the later 1990s, discussion emerged about what is variously called infoterror or cyberterrorism, which would not be "violent," but could be destructive in ways that are economic, bureaucratic, and psychological. September 11 brought instantaneous change. Now there is immense attention to economic losses, changes in stock prices, the bill for recovery in New York, the price of Homeland Security, the great costs of private security, and so on.<sup>35</sup> Whatever one thinks of the terrorists' objective, all these losses are an irretrievable wastage of the fruits of human labor.

Oil pipeline attacks by the ELN (National Liberation Army) in Colombia have severely injured state revenues from exports. But for the terrorists such attacks are effective in flying the ELN flag, in injuring Columbia's financial ability to defend itself, and in garnering money because some corporate victims will pay "revolutionary taxes" to avoid the damage. Through such extortion, terrorists drain the state's financial resources into their own purses. ELN is economically more powerful than most businesses in Colombia, and yet it is a weak rival to the larger FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), another terrorism-dependent insurgent group.

The economic strategies of terror groups also include damaging the tourism industry. Fanatical adherents to Islam have done this in Egypt. Gama'at and Jihad made many such attacks in the 1990s. The shooting of fifty-eight foreign visitors to Luxor Temple in November 1997 was their most deadly success. This tiny Egyptian minority sacrificed millions in future tourist dollars and ironically deferred visitors and students from learning about places and cultures which Islamic militants invariably claim outsiders ill understand.

<sup>35</sup> The first such book in the United States – doubtless the tip of an approaching mass – is *Terrorism and Business: The Impact of September 11, 2001*, edited by Jonah Alexander, perhaps the most published author on terrorism studies in the English language. It was appropriate that he move first because his 1979 work *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response* is one of a very few books on this line during the quarter-century before 2000.

History's overriding lesson is that terrorism does work, at least well enough to keep terrorists and their imitators attempting it. Such a conclusion is contentious.<sup>36</sup> But terrorism often does attain its tactical objectives. Moreover, it can survive at the operational or strategic levels for a long time even without apparent results, and that low standard for success is all many terrorists and guerrillas require. Some terrorists have indeed succeeded, such as Lenin, Mao, the Khmer Rouge, and the Ortega brothers in Nicaragua.<sup>37</sup> They used terror in calculated conjunction with other means to gain power and then used it again to hold power.<sup>38</sup> That is probably their own highest standard for success, and they achieved it. Finally, in other places and circumstances, groups could not win power, but did use all they had to batter the existing social structure or state, or obtain limited changes to the status quo. These are interim objectives obtained. Governments fell in Turkey and in Uruguay because of terrorist violence, clear defeats for democracy.

#### HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END

*The Assassins – sometimes called Isma'ilis, sometimes Nizaris, were an offshoot of Shia Islam. They arose in Iraq and Persia near the end of the eleventh century. Although never powerful in Iraq, the sect was immensely so in Persia, and it spread to Egypt and Syria for shorter periods. Not until the latter thirteenth century was the Assassins' power destroyed. The causes of this end were mixed.*

*In Egypt, violent Shia had a fair run – one branch even established its own caliphate. But Sunni Turkish authorities broke the strength of these "deviants" from mainstream Sunni faith – especially under the accomplished military leader Saladin (Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub). From 1171, he ruled his opponents in Egypt, and even found time to turn his attention to Syria.*

*In Syria, local strongmen let the Assassins (Nizaris) spread, either from tolerance or from hopes of using them to their own ends. But gradually the authorities' successors perceived the threat, and opposed it, often with*

<sup>36</sup> My view on this problem is probably not shared by the admirable Georgetown University authority Walter Laqueur. It is loudly disputed by a slender new book in print in the wake of September: Caleb Carr's *The Lessons of Terrorism: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why it Has Always Failed and Why it Will Fail Again*. Both authors deny terrorism's success; one hopes they are correct.

<sup>37</sup> A relevant source, describing all these revolutionary movements in a single large volume, is that prepared by a team of scholars including Stephane Courtois, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

<sup>38</sup> Terrorism is a psychological and political tool and a method, and one who uses it can legitimately be called "a terrorist" – even if he is also a revolutionary, a self-described humanist, an insurgent, a militia leader, a father of his country, etc. Examination of terrorists' writings and utterances yields cases, in which they call *themselves* terrorists – despite others hastening to their defense. These admissions are among the many indicators that, despite the difficulties, terrorism can be defined and described.

A third way terrorism ends is by the arrest of the individual who is its center of gravity. In the Algerian FLN, there was no such individual. The arrest of Ben Bella and several other revolutionary leaders, when the French forced down their Moroccan aircraft in 1956, merely injured the FLN without in any way crippling it. But the last decade has supplied two illustrations of how "decapitating" a group may render it helpless. The arrest of Abimael Guzman in September 1992 and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 all but ended the considerable power of Sendero Luminoso and the Kurdish Worker's Party. The former wound down immediately and steeply. A follow-on leader emerged but was soon arrested. For a decade, the group has been almost completely silent.<sup>45</sup> The Kurds of PKK have changed their group name and pledged themselves to peaceful activism.<sup>46</sup> PKK attacks, once commonplace in Europe, especially Turkey and Germany, are now uncommon.

This raises the question of assessing al Qaeda, a new organization, for none is precisely like another. If Bin Laden's personal authority is not assumable by another, if his purse strings are nontransferable, or if his lieutenants do not share his global vision, but desire to focus only on their different homelands, then capturing or killing Bin Laden would probably send the organization into precipitous decline, leaving more manageable splinter groups, each in its own locality or region. However, if al Qaeda is a kind of global religious insurgency, based on broad popular resentment, the death or capture of Bin Laden would be significant but not decisive.<sup>47</sup> It might simply shift the group's control to Egyptian medical doctor Aiman al Zawahiri, currently the number two in the organization, a terrorist leader in his own right a decade ago, just as prolix as Bin Laden, and perhaps as good an organizer. He could assume rule; so could a committee. Successful defeat of al Qaeda then would require defeating and discrediting the militancy of Islamic radicals. Cultivation of sober Islamic leaders; good bilateral relations with Arab states; psychological operations against terrorism; targeted economic aid programs for poor "gray areas" in moslem sections of the Philippines, Sudan, and similar countries; and other

<sup>45</sup> In the new millennium, Sendero has shown limited signs of revival; see, for example, the *New York Times*, July 23, 2003.

<sup>46</sup> The name change to "Democratic Republic Party" was reported by the *Washington Times*, Feb. 20, 2002; a later State Department report indicates a change to KADEK, the "Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress" and notes the group still maintains some 8,000 trained fighters. Attacks have all but ceased. A recent exception was casualties from an engagement with Turkish forces as some members reinfiltate into Turkey following the coalition success against Saddam Hussein.

<sup>47</sup> The view of al Qaeda as a global insurgency – probably not subject to strictly military or "decapitation" strategies – is one propounded by Dr. Tucker, lecturing in Spring 2002 at the Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC.

measures would be as appropriate as was terminating Taliban influence in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup>

A fourth way terror groups have met their end is through sheer fatigue. Some just wear out. Chin Peng fought and held out hope for even longer than Mao Tse Tung, yet never prevailed, and eventually surrendered to Malaysian authorities, which ended his meager violent operations. His will was remarkable, yet even that could break. The other target of a well-directed 1950s counterinsurgency campaign mentioned previously, Luis Taruc of the Filipino Huks, ended his fight the same way: by surrender.

Many terrorists give up much faster. In a revealing memoir, *The Reckoning: A Neo-Nazi Drops Out*, Ingo Hasselbach recounts his swift rise to high rank on the right wing extremes of a reunited Germany. His descent was as swift. After only five years, he quit because of growing self-loathing and weariness. Hatred had been hot and fueled street action, but it ran short, and diffidence, self-contempt, and longing for civilized friendships crept in. He was a mere twenty-five years old when he left the movement, which he now condemns.<sup>49</sup>

Failure of will is one of the reasons many former terrorists have disappeared from the public eye. Ulrike Meinhof, the gifted German propagandist and leader of Baader-Meinhof, might now be a contented grandmother several times over, but that was never her aspiration. Serving a mere eight-year sentence for her crimes, Meinhof must have despaired, for she committed suicide in jail. The other two principals, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, also jailed, staked their hopes on being freed by comrades hijacking a Lufthansa jet in 1977. When that plan was ruined by a brilliant German commando operation, which retook the airliner in Mogadishu and rescued eighty-seven passengers, the two terrorists hanged themselves in jail, a year after Meinhof.<sup>50</sup> Clearly, this fourth termination mechanism, terrorist fatigue, owes something to the resistance by the state enemy.

A fifth way terrorism ends is that the perpetrators fold themselves into normal politics or civilized life. This was the approach taken by individuals such as Danny Cohen-Bendit, now a German official, and Mark Rudd, the American "Weatherman" leader, who by the mid-1980s was a school teacher in the American southwest. On occasion, an entire terror group has taken this path. Colombia's M-19 was a Castroite organization, small but with a high

<sup>48</sup> Another way to study al Qaeda would be as a complex adaptive system, in accordance with the Complexity Theory in use at the Santa Fe Institute and other locales. At Sandhurst in July 2003, conference speaker Lieutenant General P. K. Van Riper, USMC retired, recommended this to the author as a promising line of inquiry.

<sup>49</sup> The U.S. title by Ingo Hasselbach (with Tom Reiss) is *Fuhrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi* (New York, 1996).

<sup>50</sup> Although there was a second generation RAF, it also lapsed. Today, in Germany, there is great contention over plans for a late 2004 exhibit on the RAF and its meanings.

## THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM

*"Three rapid attack craft and three supply ships belonging to the Sri Lankan Navy were damaged in this historic offensive launched by the Black Sea Tigers at 0130 yesterday morning. Nine Black Sea Tigers, including two women... embraced martyrdom from the LTTE side while carrying out this successful surprise attack. This attack was a joint operation... Swimming underwater the Black Sea Tiger frogmen attached bombs to the ships and blasted them... At the same time, a speedboat of the Black Sea Tigers entered the port swiftly and attacked the buildings in the port complex with rocket-propelled grenades... At that time, there was fierce fighting between the Black Sea Tigers and Sri Lankan naval forces inside the harbor area. The fact that the Sea Tigers can penetrate the enemy's security zone with weapons in groups and launch offensives has frightened the Sri Lankan authorities. A correspondent from Colombo reports that the nightmares of Sri Lankan authorities have come true."*<sup>55</sup>

The Tamil success suggests much about the near-term future. First, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, one of the world's most lethal killers of civilians, but also a group very adept at guerrilla war, released the previous statement. The LTTE have made the transition from terrorism to insurgency, and do both with facility, as Hezbollah does. Second, this attack and others by LTTE suggest much to armies and navies about force protection. Suicide boats or frogmen had sunk more than a few Sri Lankan naval vessels by the time of the suicide attack on the *USS Cole*. A third feature is that this was a press release, issued on the World Wide Web. A fourth is its boastfulness about its women as killers. LTTE also has used child killers in large numbers in the past, but recently ceased boasting about that morally awkward subject. Others may derive further insights from this brief statement by Tamil publicists.<sup>56</sup>

Modern history makes it evident that terrorism has a future. What can be said about that future? Social sciences are as much art as science; technically, they cannot offer predictions. That is why contributors to this volume have said so much about what history "suggests" and so little about what it ordains. It ordains nothing. Moreover, trends in evidence today may change or even reverse themselves tomorrow. Trend analysis is a touchy and unreliable subject. But it is clear that terrorism has a future. Even the current global war on terrorism led by the United States and Britain cannot and will not extirpate it. It has been with the international community for decades. All living citizens recall its sting because they all have been part of

<sup>55</sup> Tamil Eelam News Web posting of April 13, 1996, trans. and repr. by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 10, 1996, p. 80.

<sup>56</sup> A theme of my own publications is that the spoken and written words of active terrorists are far more revealing and useful than many social scientists think.

its designated audiences. Terrorism, in its durability, is akin to crime – it is successful enough so that it will always be with the world, and there will always be hopefuls who take up the method as an alternative to peaceful politics or for the power it gives or promises.

What cannot be foreseen is the level of global terrorism. One measure is incident levels. Currently, these average some 300 to 400 transnational acts a year. Another measure of terrorism is its reach. George W. Bush and his administration's campaign has from the beginning properly aimed at all "terror groups with global reach," not simply all terrorists, for that would be impossible. A third measure of terrorism's strength is the duration of the deadliest groups. One scholar probably errs in generalizing that "statistically, most guerrilla and terrorist campaigns last between 13 and 14 years."<sup>57</sup> Revolutionary Organization November 17, for example, lasted for more than a quarter-century, suffering not a single arrest. Were the generalization true, al Qaeda, which originated at the end of the 1980s, would now be dead. Instead, al Qaeda retains many personnel, including several key leaders. Even if further battered, it may still revive in unexpected places.

A related way to measure terrorism's endurance is to turn away from individual groups and take the long view of a state or states. Several governments such as Iran have for decades been outright sponsors of violence abroad. Iraq has been on the State Department's list of sponsors of terror since 1979. Only the forcible deposition of Saddam Hussein finally changed that pattern. Recent public discussion has focused on Iraq's limited linkages to al Qaeda, but the state's long-standing relations with the secular Palestinians Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas provide a clearer picture of Iraq's terrorist relations.<sup>58</sup> North Korea has always accentuated guerrilla war, but it has done more. Its agents have carried out terrorist attacks abroad – by assaults on South Korea, by kidnappings in Japan, and by bombing an airliner and a foreign Cabinet meeting in Burma. North Korea has already had a "regime change," but the successor to the "great leader" is the man reputed to have directed several of Pyongyang's worst terror attacks.<sup>59</sup>

The Republic of Yemen is a state of a wholly different sort, but also one associated with terrorism. Its pattern has been more of change than continuity. From 1970 onward, South Yemen was in the public eye as a member of the Soviet bloc, which itself fostered terrorism. That bilateral policy and the

<sup>57</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York, 2002), p. 13. This may be an error that even Gunaratna does not defend because his book makes it evident he thinks al Qaeda remains very powerful and dangerous. Gunaratna has since released a mid-2003 edition. He is in the unusual position of a scholar in great demand by academics, police, and media in Europe, the United States, and other regions, and his high repute is richly deserved.

<sup>58</sup> Nidal died in Iraq shortly before the war of 2003; Abbas was arrested when the Allies invaded.

<sup>59</sup> Kim Hyun Hee, *The Tears of My Soul* (New York, 1993).

had blossomed on the danger to commercial air travel. Use of a full airliner as a weapon was a powerful and imaginative stroke in the mid-tech range, suggested by a 1994 plot by Algerian extremists and realized successfully on September 11, 2001.<sup>65</sup> Police can imagine such scenarios without end. Clever ideas for evil uses of technology come easily to calculating minds, when they are inspired by their own needs, read of other groups' successes, or link plots with new technologies to imaginative theory in well-known handbooks, such as *The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* by Carlos Marighella, circa 1969, *The Turner Diaries* of white supremacist William Pierce (1978), and *Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants*, by al Qaeda (c. 1998). There is always new – something instructive and destructive – on the World Wide Web.

At the highest level are the potential and actual weapons of mass destruction, which must be taken profoundly seriously. Perhaps the best American analyst of terrorism, senior RAND political scientist Brian Jenkins, wrote a quarter-century ago that “terrorists don’t want a lot of people dead; they want a lot of people paying attention.” Even before September 11, 2001, he revised that thesis in a new essay.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps Aum Shinrikyo’s nerve gas attack and its other attempts to kill with biological weapons were the most apparent reason for reconsideration. Now there are others. Al Qaeda has demonstrated an interest in ricin and other chem/bio weapons. In the United States, anthrax has been weaponized and used to terrorize and kill. It is, indeed, fortunate that an atomic bomb is so complicated and so expensive to make.

Yet, there is no clear reason to expect enhancement of the recent trend toward greater lethality in the attacks. Much discussed, that trend has been real, but logic and experience show how trends may divert or die away. The use of gas by Germany against its Western enemies did not occur in World War II just because it had occurred in World War I. Thus far, the actual use of nuclear weapons has been a singular event in human history; 1945 set no pattern of use, only of research and development. Ricin was used in the 1978 murder of an émigré in London, and the U.S. White Power movement of the 1980s and early 1990s showed great interest in it. But ricin is not easy to administer, and despite continued interest in the toxin, apparently has never again been successfully deployed in political murder. Terrorism is commonplace on the globe’s surface, but the average terror incident will remain a focused, small-scale, low-tech affair, still featuring a telephone threat, use of a knife, murder by pistol or rifle, or placement of a time bomb. Judged only by numbers of incidents and the technology employed, there has been far

<sup>65</sup> Pages 54 and 196 of *Terrorism Today*; chap. 4 deals with other “mid-tech” threats; terrorism writer Ronald Payne chose to highlight these in his review of the book in *TLS* (London), Aug. 18, 2000. But I did not explicitly predict an attack like that of September 11.

<sup>66</sup> Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal,” chap. 13 of *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998).

more continuity than change. The lust for lethality stunningly demonstrated on September 11 is not of itself proof of a dark future world. One might just as reasonably foresee different terrorist patterns, such as emergent campaigns for the environment or animals. These would capture new attention and might involve hundreds of individual attacks and actions, but occur at the level of sabotage, not killing. Killing in such cases could be deterred by the sentiments, concerns, and ideologies of the perpetrators themselves, who see themselves as prolife. Such campaigns are likely, and they are most likely in relatively wealthy countries. People will not care about them as much as they do about al Qaeda, but such practices will be a part of the terrorism picture.

For the same reasons of logic, there is no assurance that the 1990s’ rise in religious terrorist groups will continue. A brief period of Sikh fascination with terrorist spectacle ended in the 1980s. The Christian Identity movement spawned several terrorist actions in the United States but today has quieted. *Madrassas*, a pronounced threat to world peace, continue to enroll thousands of potential recruits to militant Islam. But even that pattern of graduates comes from perhaps a dozen countries, whose nationals are increasingly subject to police scrutiny worldwide. In the United States, Bin Laden’s crimes may inspire violence by a few dozen moslem Americans and hot rhetoric from a few political zealots, but in this author’s view, al Qaeda’s mass murders are a painful embarrassment for most American moslems. Aum Shinrikyo has not spawned new religious terrorists in Japan or Russia, despite a wide following of the cult in both countries and a prevalence of available “root causes” in each place, including economic crisis and deep discontents. Religion will remain a source of much terrorism, but it need not become worse.

A pattern that will predictably intensify is the internationalization of terrorist causes. One may expect many twenty-first century rivals of “past masters,” such as the nineteenth-century Anarchists or mid-twentieth-century Algerian FLN. The world will grow accustomed to such recent phenomena as a Tamil Web site used by global readers or a TV station run by Hezbollah for the attentions of its state sponsors and the Levantines. Indeed, it will be deemed notable, and perhaps odd, if a successful group more than two or three years old does *not* develop a Web site. From its first days of operation, it is likely to use the international post, satellite-aided cell phones, the transnational arms market, and so on.<sup>67</sup> Globalization, seemingly unstoppable,

<sup>67</sup> “What changed with 9–11 was that the threat was internationalized . . .” says a spokesman for the London-based World Markets Research Center (WMRC), upon release of a new report. This is of course only a matter of emphasis; historically, terrorism has often gone international, and for over three decades now it has been a fully international phenomenon. The WMRC report is one indicator of new concerns in the business community about the global character of threats to them. “9/11 Style Attack Predicted in Next Year,” AP story of August 18, 2003, courtesy of Mr. Jim Holmes of the Institute of World Politics.



individuals and individual groups, and state practice. Special technology is not the holy grail of future terrorism. The dagger served the medieval Assassins well in the Middle East and was reintroduced by Hamas in the 1980s for similar effects. Past patterns of success, or limited success, will also continue to drive terrorists onward.

What is most evident about our future is that terrorism in some form will continue, and continue to attack moderate states and the democracies, which must in turn maintain the resolution and solid sense to resist terror by comprehending its manipulative methods and by defeating its worst outbursts. The year 2003 saw the unexpected reopening of files on convicted terrorists in Peru, a country that narrowly defeated the scourge in 1992 and has since become both calm and fully democratic. Peru's legal and judicial self-critique of the present moment is a vivid reminder of how terrorism puts democracies at risk: initially by horrific violence, then by the requirement for governmental response with sweeping legislation and force, and then again by the later patterns of relentless self-criticism and even shame. It must be hoped that Peru will prove an example of democratic strength, instead of this new self-examination encouraging or renewing terrorism, making Peru an example of *How Democracies Perish*.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> This is a reference to the admirable volume by Jean Francois Revel; another such study preceded it, and was at least as good: Harold W. Rood's 1980 *Kingdoms of the Blind*.

## History and future of civil-military relations: bridging the gaps

FRANCIS G. HOFFMAN

As the small group of insiders filed out of the president's office, they were sure one of them would never be back. It was November 1938, and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had just met with his most trusted advisors and military leaders. He had called the meeting in the aftermath of the Munich debacle to find a way of deterring Hitler's apparently insatiable ambitions. Roosevelt proposed to build 10,000 airplanes a year as a strategic deterrent. He suggested no other increases to American defenses – neither ground forces nor the requisite aviation support. As he went around the room, the president's personal advisors seemed to be in complete support. Wrapping up the meeting and pleased with the apparent consensus, Roosevelt turned to the only individual who had not spoken, asking, "Don't you think so, George." The newly minted Army deputy chief of staff, Major General George C. Marshall, responded, "I am sorry, Mr. President, but I don't agree with that at all."<sup>1</sup> The president appeared startled, and the other participants were surprised at Marshall's blunt candor. They believed he had committed a serious gaffe and that his career prospects were over. But the one advisor with the temerity to suggest that the president was wrong would not have considered any other answer. He was merely stating his professional judgment as requested.

As events soon proved, everyone underestimated Roosevelt. Marshall's long selfless career had not reached its end. A year later, the president personally selected Marshall to become the next Army chief of staff. On the eve of global war, Roosevelt reached down below thirty more senior officers, and selected a man he could count on to provide honest, forthright advice. Their remarkable partnership would prove a major factor in the successful

<sup>1</sup> Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of A General, 1880-1939* (New York, 1963), pp. 322-3.