The political personality profile was developed to provide senior policymakers with a comprehensive psychological representation of the leader in context, not only describing the life course of the leader that shaped key attitudes but also specifying particular aspects of leadership behavior especially relevant to policymakers dealing with the leader. Thus in addition to traditional elements of clinical psychological assessment, the elements reviewed in assessing political personality include management style, negotiating style, strategic decision making, crisis decision making, rhetorical style, cognitive style, and leadership style. Each of these aspects of political leadership is of course shaped by the cultural and political context, but the core leader personality influences each of these leadership characteristics.

The term personality connotes a systematic pattern of functioning that is consistent over a range of behaviors and over time. In the political personality profile, we attempt to characterize the core political personality, identifying the deeply ingrained patterns that are coherent and accordingly have powerful predictive implications. But it is important to emphasize that not all political situations engage the political personality, and an important goal of the political personality profile is to identify which political issues and decisions are especially salient for the leader's personality. Put more colloquially, the task is to identify which issues "hook" the leader's political personality and differentiate them from those that do not.

To be able to specify what those issue areas are and to identify deeply ingrained patterns that are consistent over time, it is essential
to integrate the life experiences that shaped and gave form to that political personality. As Brewster-Smith (1968) has emphasized, that goes beyond the family environment and must encompass the historical, political, and cultural context as well. This emphasis on the life course and the entirety of the political personality, integrating longitudinal life course analysis with the cross-sectional analysis of personality, stands in contrast to the approaches of political psychology scholars who have focused on particular elements of political personality, such as political cognition, political drives and motives, and other traits.

The Methodology for Developing Political Personality Profiles

The method for developing political personality profiles is drawn from the clinical case study methodology, also known as the anamnesis, which integrates a longitudinal and cross-sectional approach. In the longitudinal consideration, the life course of the subject is reviewed, constructing a psychobiography. The cross-sectional approach analyzes the subject's cognition, affect, and interpersonal relationships, attempting to define the nature of the basic personality.

But in applying this approach to political figures, the method developed necessarily goes well beyond clinical case studies, focusing on life course and personality features that bear particularly on political leadership. In contrast to the psychobiographic reconstruction of the clinical case study of the psychiatric patient, in which the primary task is to analyze the traumatic events in the life course that predisposed to the present illness, in the psychobiographic reconstruction of the life course of a political leader, the goal is to understand shaping life events that influenced core attitudes, political personality, leadership, and political behavior. Similarly, in the cross-sectional personality study of a political leader, the goal is not to specify dimensions of psychopathology but rather to identify characteristic adaptive styles and those aspects of cognition, attitudes, affect, and interpersonal relations that bear on specific elements of leadership functioning, such as leadership style, crisis decision making, negotiating style, as well as the identification of those political issues that are especially salient for the subjects' psychology. An outline of the longitudinal and cross-sectional elements consid-
ered in constructing a political personality profile can be found at the conclusion of this chapter.

**The Leader in Context**

Drawing on Brewster-Smith’s elegant map of personality and politics, and as modified in Stone and Schaffner (1988), the leader is envisaged as residing within a series of fields, the cultural, political, and historical context of his country, the specific aspects of the leader’s background that shaped the individual, and the nature of the current political situation (see Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). The importance of that political and cultural context cannot be overestimated. Greenstein (1987) has observed in his seminal discussion of action dispensability that the degree to which leader personality affects political behavior is in part a function of the nature and flexibility of the political system. There is a profound difference in how personality will affect political behavior between a leader functioning in a collective leadership and a dictator functioning in a closed system. The manner in which the culture shapes expectations of the leader also shapes the formation and selection of the leader. The political figure who violates cultural norms will not survive long. In constructing a political personality profile, the degree of constraint upon the political behavior of the leader by his role and by the culture and nature of the political system is regularly examined.

The psychoanalytic framework of Erik Erikson ([1950] 1963), which relates personality development to the cultural context, is extremely helpful as a model. It emphasizes the intimate dynamic relationship between the developing personality and the environment and undergirds Brewster-Smith’s emphasis on the cultural, political, and historical context in which the leader develops. Leader personality does not exist in vacuo; it is the leader in context that is our focus, the context that shaped the leader's development, the contemporary context that continues to shape and influence leader behavior and decision making. Before even considering the particular circumstances surrounding the development of the future leader, however, one must understand thoroughly the culture, especially the political culture, in which the leader's family was embedded. In these regards, the works of Pye (2000) and Kellerman (1991) are especially instructive.
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Fig. 4.1. Variables relevant to the study of personality and politics. (Also see Brewster-Smith 1968.)

I. Historical Milieu

II. The Social Environment

III. The Person
   - Character
   - Id-Ego-Superego
   - Attitudes
   - Skills
   - Group Identities
   - Mood
   (here and now)
   (neighborhood, church, school, family, peers)

IV. The Immediate Situation

V. Political Behavior

The Life Course of Political Leaders: The Psychobiography

In developing the psychobiographic section of the political personality profile, the primary focus is on shaping events. It may be that several years can be captured in one sentence, while the details of a key afternoon may require several pages to depict and analyze. Thus the psychobiographic profile is envisaged as collapsing and expanding, by no means a merely linear and chronological depiction of life events. Early leadership successes and failures are particularly important to identify and analyze in detail, as they are often endowed with
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exaggerated importance in guiding future events. The manner of writing the psychobiography should prepare the reader for the detailed description of the political personality and analysis of leadership to follow.

In the psychobiographic reconstruction, particular attention is given to specifying the sources of political identity. Erikson's ([1950] 1963) emphasis on the formation and vicissitudes of personal identity is especially helpful in reconstructing the lives of political leaders, for as personal identity is consolidating so too is political identity. This requires careful research in the preceding generations. Thus the influence of King Abdullah, the grandfather of King Hussein of Jordan, on the development of Hussein as a leader was profound. A charismatic man of towering political stature, Abdullah was ashamed of his son Talal, who suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He early selected his grandson to play a special role in the history of Jordan and started shaping him to the role of future king. The boy was fifteen and at his grandfather's side on the steps of the Al Aqsa Mosque when his grandfather was struck down by an assassin's bullet. Young Hussein too was struck by a bullet but was reportedly saved from death by the medal on his chest that his grandfather had given him earlier that day—probably a powerful determinant of Hussein's sense of destiny (Snow 1972).

A psychobiographic nugget from which we can infer the degree to which a political leader was shaped to fulfill a parent's own ambitions is provided by the mother of David Hawke, former prime minister of Australia. When she looked in the crib after her newborn son was brought to her, she reported that she realized some day her son would be prime minister. Her prophecy was to be fulfilled, powerful confirmation of a mother's shaping her son to fulfill her own narcissistic dreams (Post 1986). Indira Gandhi recounted in her autobiography the influence of her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, twice president of India and prominent nationalist leader, and her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, four times president of India, who continued his father's struggle for Indian independence (Gandhi 1982). When her parents were away in prison, as they often were during her politically tumultuous childhood when they were struggling for independence, Indira Gandhi indicated she did not play with dolls but rather with toy metal soldiers. At the head of the column of soldiers was one with a white shield on which there was a red cross, suggesting her
identification with Joan of Arc. She marched the soldiers into a fire again and again, suggesting the early foundation of her career long bent for conflict, perhaps presaging her ultimate martyr's death in her assassination by Sikh bodyguards in the Golden Temple. It is instructive to observe that she was characterized as "the goddess of destruction" by her political opponents and was seen as a leader who regularly promoted political conflict, lacking her parents' conciliatory skills.

Key Life Transitions

Erikson follows the course of personality over the life cycle, identifying the major crisis associated with each developmental epoch. Drawing on Erikson, Dan Levinson's (1978) work on the life course is instructive in focusing on the three major life transitions—the young adult transition, the mid-life transition, and the late adult transition. Levinson emphasizes that the successful negotiation of each life transition requires successfully weathering the challenges of the previous life transition. Levinson's work has important implications for the influences of the life cycle on the leader's political behavior (Post 1980, 1984). His emphasis on the role of what he calls the Dream and the importance of the mentor during youth is particularly important in understanding the influence of key life experiences in shaping political personality.

Foundations of the Dream: Childhood Heroes and Models

It is important to search for the foundation of political ambition—the Dream—the crystallization of political ambition that for some can serve as a lode star. Childhood heroes and models are important to identify. Young Anwar Sadat, for example, as a boy identified with Mohandas Gandhi and would cloak himself in a sheet, leading his goat around while on a self-imposed fast, the germs of his later role as peacemaker between Egypt and Israel that won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

The Dream, formed in adolescence, may be the spur to future greatness, a quest that can be accelerated when confronting major illness. Both King Hussein and Palestinian chairman Yasir Arafat had survived over the years by carefully assessing political risks. Hussein had never broken from major Arab constituencies; nor had Arafat, in
his quest for an independent Palestinian nation, been willing to
break from the radical absolutists in the Palestinian movement. But
both leaders took major risks for peace in the wake of confronting
their mortality, which emphasized that their time was limited to
accomplish their goals. It was only after Arafat’s helicopter crashed
in the Libyan desert, killing the pilot and resulting six weeks later in
a medical evacuation to the King Hussein Hospital in Amman for
emergency brain surgery to remove blood clots on the brain, that he
broke with the radical rejectionists and agreed to participate in the
Oslo negotiations, leading to the remarkable handshake with Prime
Minister Yitzak Rabin of Israel in the Rose Garden and to the
Nobel Peace Prize. Several weeks later, King Hussein was hospital-
ized in the same hospital to remove a cancerous kidney. Subse-
quently he entered into independent peace negotiations with Israel,
his attempt to remove the stain on his historical record of losing cus-
tody over the holy sites in Jerusalem in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
and to fulfill his historic destiny. To be sure, his grandfather,
Motalil, who had held meetings with Israeli Palestinian Jews in an
effort to achieve peace, provided a positive model for such efforts, but
the timing, coming as it did in the wake of his confrontation with
mortality, suggests that this provided an impetus to abandon his
customary caution and boldly strike out individually as he faced the
ebbing of his life. From a distance, of course, we never can know to a
certainty what drives and influences a leader, but, as this example
makes clear, the more solidly we understand the foundations of the
leader's identity and ambitions, the more confidently we can infer
psychological influences on political behavior.

But reactions to frustrated dreams of glory have led to intemper-
ate acts that have been destabilizing as well. The Shah of Iran had
written of his mission for his country, what had been termed the
White Revolution, his goal of transforming Iran into a modernizing
Middle Eastern nation. When he was informed by his French physi-
cians in 1973 that he was ill with a slowly developing malignancy,
he accelerated dramatically the pace of his efforts. Breaking with the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), he quadru-
pled the oil revenues pouring into Iran, which had a poorly devel-
oped infrastructure. This led to a tidal wave of rising expectations,
which destabilized the social structure, leading to profound discon-
tent and setting the stage for Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution. In his rush to accomplish his dreams before he died, the Shah superimposed his personal timetable on the political timetable.

The Role of the Mentor

The role of the mentor in determining a leader's political behavior is extremely consequential, and it is important to subject it to careful analysis. Young Josif Dzhugashvili (who was not to assume the pseudonym Stalin until twenty years later), oppressed by the rigors of the Orthodox seminary in Tbilisi, rebelled by smuggling in the works of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. He came particularly to admire, indeed idealize, Lenin through his revolutionary writings and left the seminary to serve the cause of the revolution and assist his idealized mentor in pursuing that dream. But the contrast between Lenin as idealized model at a distance and Lenin as personal mentor was striking. A mentor is both a role model for political behavior, the source of important political ideas, and a teacher of the practice of politics, but a mentor also can be seen as an impediment to achieving power. Initially a loyal protege, increasingly Stalin became restive under Lenin's leadership, seeking power and authority for himself, which led to a powerful confrontation between Stalin and his mentor when Stalin was in his early forties. Lenin subsequently suffered a disabling stroke, and Stalin went on to consolidate his power.

Another example of lifelong effects of a positive role model, although not as intense a relationship as that of Stalin to Lenin, is provided by Menachem Begin, who early came to admire the Zionist pioneer Vladimir Jabotinsky, whose dreams of a secure Jewish homeland were deeply influential and became consolidated within Begin as a core aspect of his political personality.

The Influence of Early Experiences

Autobiographic memoirs are a particularly rich source of material for determining the political behavior of leaders. With Menachem Begin we were fortunate to have not one but two memoirs: White Nights, which detailed his years in political exile in Siberia, and The Revolt, the story of his leadership of the underground resistance group Irgun in the struggle for Israeli independence. Begin recounts being seared by the experience of losing many of his fam-
ily in the Holocaust, leading him to vow "Never Again," a psychological pledge that was to shape his oppositional political style. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain recounted the impact on him as a boy of living in the shadow of a political prison in the Franco years.

Psychologically Salient Issues

Referring again to figure 4.1, it is important to distinguish between those political behaviors that derive from the leader's role and those that engage his political personality. Discriminating which issues can be considered objectively and which strike deep psychological chords is crucial. Chiang Ching-kuo, president of the Republic of China, was judicious and objective in his considerations of economic policy for Taiwan, selecting world-class economists as his advisers and helping create the economic miracle of Taiwan. His primary political mentor, however, was his father, Chiang Kai-shek, which meant that the issue of relationships with mainland China could never be considered with the same rational objectivity and that progress toward ameliorating that conflictual relationship would have to await his death. As this example illustrates, it is important to identify which issues are salient for the leader's political psychology. However intense the family influences, the leader is exposed to the vicissitudes of the political environment to which he must react and adapt. The leader who cannot adapt to external realities because he rigidly adheres to an internally programmed life script has, in Laswellian terms, displaced his private needs upon the state and has rationalized it in the public good. Inevitably the gap between the private needs and the public needs becomes the source of ineffective and/or conflicted leadership.

The Political Personality Study

In the cross-sectional analysis, the political personality study, the goal is to identify and characterize the nature of the subject's personality, with particular reference to the political personality. Personality implies a patterned relationship among cognition, affect, and interpersonal relationships. Accordingly, the organizing concept of personality implies a linkage among belief systems, value systems, attitudes, leadership style, and other personality features. Put differently, the nature of person-
ality puts constraints upon information processing, the range of beliefs and attitudes, and the nature of relationships with the leadership circle, including who is chosen to serve in the inner circle, all of which influence political decision making.

Again, as with the longitudinal analysis and psychobiographic reconstruction in the previous section, careful attention is given to all of the traditional elements considered in the clinical case study, but additional elements particular to political leadership are examined as well. Traditional elements of particular importance to political personality include intelligence; knowledge; drives and affects, including anxiety, aggression, hostility, activity and passivity, and shame and guilt; evaluation of reality; judgment; interpersonal relations, including capacity for empathy; identity and ambivalence; and characteristic ego defenses. The additional elements applicable to political leaders include health (energy level, working hours, drinking, drugs); cognitive/intellectual style; and the drives for power, achievement, and affiliation. The latter are important in attempting to identify whether the leaders sought their leadership role in order to wield power, to be recorded on the pages of history, or merely to occupy the seat of power with the attendant place in the limelight.

Ego Defenses and Personality Types

It is particularly important to identify the characteristic pattern of ego defenses, for it is this repetitive manner of mediating between the subject's internal and external worlds that is at the heart of personality, the basis of the structure of character. The identification of patterns of ego defenses is a matter not of intuition but of pattern recognition. Well-trained clinicians will reliably identify the same characteristic ego defenses, but it does not require clinical training to be sensitive to and identify these patterns.

Clinicians and students of personality development have identified particular personality types, each of which has a characteristic array of ego defenses mediating between inner drives and the external world, each of which has its own cognitive, affective, and interpersonal style. In evaluating ego defenses, it is useful to discriminate a hierarchy of defenses, from the most primitive through the mature defenses. Defenses do tend to aggregate, as exemplified by the so-called psychotic triad of denial, distortion, and delusional
projection. This primitive, most seriously disordered pattern is associated with paranoid psychoses and severe paranoid disorders. In contrast, the obsessive-compulsive personality pattern, which will be described in detail shortly, is associated with a much healthier array of ego defenses, the neurotic (intermediate) defenses, which include dissociation, displacement, isolation (or intellectualization), repression, and reaction formation.

Identifying a characteristic pattern of ego defenses is especially helpful in predicting behavior under stress, for it is under stress that these coping mechanisms not only come into play but can become exaggerated. This is particularly true in the face of serious illness (Post and Robins 1993) and with increasing age (Post 1973). As people grow older, they do not mellow but become more like themselves, a veritable self-caricature. Thus the somewhat compulsive individual whose decision making was unimpaired in the early and middle decades can become paralyzed by indecision in the later years. This is apt to be particularly problematic in the face of a crisis, when, searching for certainty, an individual is required to make a decision in the face of ambiguous or conflicting information. The suspicious individual can become frankly paranoid under stress. Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, the Soviet secret-police chief, was able to manipulate Stalin's paranoid tendencies to advantage himself by eliminating rivals. As with the case of Stalin and Beria, personality significantly colors interpersonal relationships and thus can significantly distort relationships within the leadership circle. The fragile narcissist whose ego is intolerant of criticism may be impelled to surround himself with sycophants who can significantly distort his appreciation of political reality.

In exaggerated caricatured form, each of these patterns of personality organization can be psychologically disabling, at which time they would be considered personality disorders. The essential features of personality disorders, according to the standard psychiatric diagnostic reference,
wide range of important social and personal contexts. (APA 1994, 630).

Most of the major personality disorders, such as the avoidant personality, the dependent personality, and the schizoid personality, are clearly inconsistent with sustained political leadership; a leader exhibiting the characteristics of these disorders would not last long in the seat of power. On the other hand, other personality patterns, such as the narcissistic personality and the obsessive-compulsive personality, are disproportionately represented among political leaders. Though the paranoid personality is not common in the ranks of political leaders, when it occurs it can have catastrophic consequences for international relations. As previously noted, severe personality disorders are inconsistent with sustained political leadership, at least in democracies, but under the stress of crisis decision making, each of the discrete personality patterns can at least temporarily show features of the disorder, and prominent examples of leaders with the full-blown disorders are found in the pages of history, particularly in closed societies led by dictators. The stable pattern of defenses is also known as character, or the character armor (Reich 1933). The personality disorders referred to in this discussion are also called character disorders.

The Linkage between Personality Types, Belief Systems, and Leadership Styles

Particular personality types tend to be associated with particular belief systems and particular leadership styles. A major element of personality—emotional needs and drives—will often constrain the range of beliefs (or the types of belief system) that individual will ultimately develop. Paranoid individuals consumed by fear of enemies will not develop an optimistic and benign worldview. Accordingly, discussions of cognitive factors should pay greater attention to the emotional determinants of beliefs and to the manner in which personality style affects decision rules and information processing. One can identify the cognitive approaches typically associated with particular personality types and emotional needs. Some previous political science studies of emotional factors have focused narrowly on only a few traits or needs rather than on larger stable constellations of related traits and needs, that is, personality types.
The differentiation among personality types described in this chapter provides a means of explaining an empirical conclusion that has dogged belief system approaches for some time: namely, that some individuals seem to be able to tolerate a great deal of inconsistency in their statements, espoused beliefs, and actions without any apparent ill effects from cognitive dissonance. For a personality type frequently encountered in political leaders, the narcissistic personality, it is extremely hazardous to infer core determinant political beliefs from public statements, so that the measurement of their expressed beliefs will demonstrate greater "ambiguity tolerance." To an extent much greater than for other personality types, the narcissistic individual often, indeed characteristically, publicly espouses beliefs only for immediate instrumental purposes, that is, for the immediate political or personal utility derived from their public association with these beliefs. Methodologically, it is important to treat the public expressions of beliefs of these individuals in a much different fashion than one would treat statements of individuals more inclined to consistency.

Misperceptions and distorted, apparently irrational, decisions can be produced by "motivated" biases, that is, those driven by emotional drives, or "unmotivated information-processing factors" or some combination of these. While certain types will be more prone to misperceptions and miscalculations than other types, nevertheless all types will have vulnerabilities under certain circumstances to particular types of suboptimal decision-making behavior. For example, the individual with a paranoid personality, for a variety of primarily emotional reasons, has a strong need to maintain his belief system intact. He had a particular disposition to see hostile intentions in his adversaries. The paranoid personality will be the most prone to motivated biases, the most prone to disregard information inconsistent with this belief system, and the least willing to reexamine past policies in light of new evidence. On the other hand, the obsessive-compulsive personality may engage in suboptimal decision-making behavior due to a somewhat more complex interaction of emotional needs and cognitive factors.

Knowledge concerning these personality types has not been sufficiently applied to the analysis of political leaders. Two of these personality types—the narcissistic personality and the obsessive-
compulsive personality—are frequently encountered among political and military leaders. The third type, the paranoid personality, while rarer, can have major political consequences. These three personality types will be described in greater depth, and special aspects of their associated styles with implications for political functioning will be explored.

**Personality and Political Behavior: Linkages among Cognitive Beliefs, Information Processing Styles, Organizational Propensities, and Political Preferences**

In this section, each of the three personality types—narcissistic personality, obsessive-compulsive personality, and paranoid personality—will be discussed in relationship to two groups of factors important to political functioning. First, certain cognitive factors associated with each general personality type will be identified. Two different cognitive factors will be examined: cognitive beliefs and cognitive processes. Second, this section will look at certain organizational propensities and policy preferences, which would tend to flow from each of the personality types. Examination of the belief system in relationship to personality types will include the image of the adversary (e.g., George 1969, 1979), the beliefs about the role of conflict and the image of the international system (George 1979; Holsti 1977), and the beliefs about the manner in which war might start in a crisis. In some cases, associations between a particular personality type and an operational code belief system (Holsti 1977; Walker 1990) will also be made.

Cognitive beliefs are closely tied to other personality elements; affective needs and emotional drives can constrain the particular form of cognitive belief system that develops. Moreover, the presumption is that the stronger and more rigid the personality characteristics, the more frequently one would see systematic distortions that affect information processing associated with particular leader personality types. For illustrative purposes, crisis behavior will be the particular form of policy preference examined here. Crisis behavior would include such matters as the types of general approach to international crisis bargaining, the inclination toward the use of force in a crisis, and the negotiating style of that personality type in that crisis.
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The Narcissist in Power

It is probably not an exaggeration to state that if narcissistic characters were stripped from the ranks of public figures, the ranks would be significantly thinned. The label narcissism covers a broad range of behaviors. At the healthiest end of the narcissistic spectrum are egotistical individuals with extreme self-confidence. But primitive narcissism, so-called malignant narcissism, represents an extremely severe and dangerous personality disorder, which, in addition to extreme self-absorption with an incapacity to empathize with others, is characterized by a paranoid outlook, absence of conscience, and willingness to use whatever aggression is necessary to accomplish personal goals.

The following information summarizes the clinical description of the narcissistic personality disorder as delineated in DSM-IV, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA 1994). A number of the features described have obvious relevance to the decision making and behavior of political leaders.

The essential features of the narcissistic personality disorder are the following: a grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness; preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success; exhibitionistic need for constant attention and admiration; characteristic responses to threats to self-esteem; and characteristic disturbances in interpersonal relationships, such as lack of empathy, entitlement, interpersonal exploitiveness, and relationships that vacillate between the extremes of overidealization and devaluation.

The exaggerated sense of self-importance tends to be manifested as extreme self-centeredness, egocentricity, and self-absorption. Abilities and achievements tend to be unrealistically overestimated, but minor setbacks can give a sense of special unworthiness.

There is a preoccupation with fantasies involving unrealistic goals. These goals may include achieving unlimited power, wealth, brilliance, beauty, or fame. These fantasies frequently substitute for realistic activity in pursuit of success. Even when the goals are satisfied, it is usually not enough; there is a driven quality to the ambitions that cannot be satisfied.

There is a constant search for admiration and attention and more concern with appearance than substance. This quality too is insa-
tiable, so there is a constant need for reassurance, a constant concern for how well he is doing, how well others think of him, and an exaggerated response to criticism or defeat, which can lead to feelings of rage, inferiority, shame, humiliation, or emptiness.

Interpersonal relationships are regularly disturbed. Because these individuals are so self-absorbed, there is a failure of ability to empathize with others. Indeed, others are seen as extensions of the self and are there only to supply admiration and gratification, such that when an individual is no longer perceived as psychologically useful, he or she can be dropped suddenly. There is often an exploitative quality to interpersonal relationships. These individuals, who can be extremely charming, are often described as "sharks."

An aspect of the "special" quality of these individuals is the feeling of entitlement they convey. They expect special treatment from others, expect others to do what they want, and will be angered when others fail to live up to their unreasonable demands. They regularly ignore the rights and needs of others. There is accordingly a major inability to sustain loyal relationships over time.

There are a number of apparent contradictions in the narcissistic personality, because for each of the dimensions there is both an overt and covert aspect (Akhtar and Anderson 1982). Thus the overt picture of haughty grandiosity overlies feelings of inferiority, which helps explain the narcissist's continuous search for fame and glory. There is a hunger for acclaim and a tendency to change meanings of reality when self-esteem is threatened. The overt picture of zealous morality overlies a corruptible conscience.

The Narcissistic Personality: Implications for Leadership

The following discussion amplifies the characteristics described previously in order to highlight the manner in which narcissistic personality features influence the conduct of leadership. A notable aspect of the narcissist in power is the manner in which the narcissistic personality seeks to gratify his or her psychological needs through the exercise of leadership. Despite the apparent sustained devotion of their energies to socially productive endeavors, and the selfless rationales, the primary goal of the self-oriented narcissist is actually to gain recognition, fame, and glory. This search for recog-
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ning and adulation that drives these individuals springs from their excessive self-absorption, their intense ambition, and their grandiose fantasies. But underlying and impelling this quest is an inner emptiness and uncertainty about identity. Helen Tartakoff, for example, has written of the Nobel Prize complex, the search for acclaim by intellectually gifted narcissists (Tartakoff 1966).

The interpersonal relationships of narcissists are regularly and characteristically disturbed. There is a quality of personal exploitiveness, with a disregard for the feelings and needs of others. The narcissist surrounds himself with admirers and requires a constant stream of adulation from them. Yet it is a one-way street, and when the loyal followers are no longer useful to the psychological economy of the narcissist, they can be dropped suddenly without a backward glance. This precipitous fall from grace will frequently be bewildering to the individuals dropped, who mistakenly believed they were highly valued by their hero. Indeed, their provision of psychological supplies of adulation was valued, but they had not been seen as separate individuals, with needs of their own, but rather as an extension of the narcissist. The narcissist is often extremely charming and delightful to be with, contributing to the false spell cast over his intimates. Thus there is a characteristic difficulty in sustaining loyal relationships over time.

The mirror image of the quest for adulation is sensitivity to slight and criticism. The narcissist is vulnerable, easily hurt, and goes through complicated maneuvers to avoid being hurt. The narcissist can put on a mask of cold indifference and can envelop himself in what Volkan (1980) has called "the glass bubble." Like the Little Prince, the narcissists feel they live by themselves in splendid isolation, a glorious but lonely existence, enclosed by an impervious but transparent protection.

Because narcissists are so vulnerable to injury psychologically, they cannot afford to acknowledge ignorance. This in turn leads to major difficulties with learning, for the learning process carries with it an implicit assumption of lack of knowledge and it inhibits profoundly the acceptance of constructive criticism. Dogmatic certainty with no foundation of knowledge is a posture frequently struck by the narcissist. This discomfort with learning is related to the sensi-
ntivity to constructive criticism. If the narcissist's self-concept of perfection and brilliance is to be sustained, no one can give him new knowledge and no aspect of his understanding is to be faulted.

Volkan has emphasized that the narcissist in power has special psychological advantages in terms of sustaining his grandiose self-image. He can actually restructure his reality by devaluing or even eliminating those who threaten his fragile self-esteem. This leads to a tendency for the narcissistic leader to be surrounded by sycophants who sense their leader's need for uncritical adulation and agreement and who have been sensitized by the abrupt departure of advisers who dared to criticize or brought unpleasant news. Thus the narcissistic leader can be in touch with reality psychologically but by dint of surrounding himself with anxious sycophants can be totally out of touch with political reality. The savvy adviser in such circumstances will learn to provide recommendations to the narcissist in such a way that the leader believes it is his own idea, for example, "I agree with your suggestion that …"

The conscience of the narcissist is dominated by self-interest. Unlike the sociopath, who is without an internal beacon, without an internalized body of scruples and principles, the narcissist does indeed have a conscience, but it is a flexible conscience. He sincerely believes himself to be highly principled but can change positions and commitments rapidly as "circumstances change." The righteous indignation with which he stands in judgment of the moral failure of others often stands in striking contrast to his own self-concerned behavior. The sincerity of his beliefs is communicated in such a way that the unwary may be completely persuaded of the sincerity of the narcissist; and indeed, at that moment, he is sincere.

It is hard to identify the narcissistic personality with any consistent beliefs about the world, the adversary, and so forth, because these beliefs tend to shift. In addition, more than any other personality types, what the narcissistic personality says should be viewed as calculated for effect. Accordingly, to place great weight on the analysis of core determining beliefs from speeches when dealing with a narcissistic personality is apt to lead the unwary political analyst far astray. Words do not convey deeply held beliefs for the narcissist. Their only use is instrumental, to enhance his personal position and gain admiration and support. The only central and stable belief of the
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*narcissist is the centrality of the self. What is good for him is good for his country.* The interesting point here is that this attitude goes beyond "naked" self-interest. The individual comes to believe that the national interest and national security are in fact crucially contingent upon his reelection or reappointment.

The central tendency has interesting implications for the narcissist's image of the adversary. For one thing, the narcissistic personality has a profound inability to empathize or to understand different points of view, interests, or perspectives. Perhaps even more important, the narcissist tends to greatly exaggerate the degree of influence one can have on the internal politics or external actions of other nations. By far the most important cognitive heuristic for the narcissistic personality in trying to understand the world is with reference to his own personal experiences.

These characteristics of the narcissist make for certain serious problems in information processing and problem solving. Unlike the paranoid, who imagines problems that don't exist, or the obsessive-compulsive, who responds to real problems but in a futile, counterproductive manner, the narcissistic responds to a totally different sort of agenda. For the narcissist, the problems are not "What are the threats to our nation?" and "What can be done to meet these threats?" but "How can I use this situation to either preserve or enhance my own reputation?" Information search is undertaken in as public a manner as possible with a view toward eliciting public admiration and making the leader "look good."

Generally speaking, the narcissistic personality would show a preference for a style of management in which he or she is at the center and there is a heavy emphasis on support and teamwork from group members. Because of the narcissist's sensitivity to slight and the underlying fragility of his or her self-esteem, there would be strong pressure to avoid dissension to help meet this person's need for reassurance and to prevent the narcissist in power from looking bad. Moreover, because of the narcissist's need to be omniscient, to know everything, it is hard to present the consummate narcissist with new information. Such action would indicate his ignorance, which is unacceptable. The purpose of the group is not to generate new options or to provide additional cognitive capacity for evaluating these options and not even primarily for reasons of division of
labor—its purpose is but to serve as a means for reassurance and supporting the personal needs for attention of the narcissistic individual. Yet if the followers of the narcissist are able to convey ideas to him or her in such a way that they seem to be embellishments of his or her own ideas, this can be effective, as long as they do not try to take credit themselves for the ideas. Bright individuals seeking to shine themselves do not last long in the circle of the narcissist. The narcissist in subtle fashion often plays one adviser against another to ensure that he is the supreme leader, the major domo. The narcissist in power is particularly apt to stimulate the collective decision-making malady of groupthink.

The Obsessive-Compulsive Personality in Power

The obsessive-compulsive (O-C) personality is frequently encountered in government and business executives, scientists and engineers, academic scholars, and military leaders. The strengths of this personality style—organizational ability, attention to detail, emphasis on rational process—all can contribute to significant professional success. But when these traits become exaggerated, the strengths can become disabilities. This extremity comprises the O-C personality disorder. The O-C personality places heavy reliance on the ego defense of intellectualization, emphasizing rationality and abhorring emotionality, which implies lack of control.

In summary form, the essential features of the O-C personality disorder are the following: preoccupation with matters of rules, order, organization, efficiency, and detail, with a loss of ability to focus on "the big picture"; indecisiveness; insistence that others submit to his or her way of doing things; excessive devotion to work and productivity to the exclusion of pleasure; serious and formal relationships with others; and restricted ability to express warm and tender emotions. These features will be described in detail to shed caricatured light on qualities that, in more subtle form, can systematically influence decision making and can adversely affect crisis decision making.

Although maximal efficiency and perfection are the idealized goal, they are, of course, never attained. Time is regularly poorly allocated, with the most important tasks left to the last moment. There is an inappropriate preoccupation with trivial details, causing the indi-
individual to lose perspective of the overall picture "not seeing the forest for the trees."

Decision making is either avoided, postponed, or protracted. This springs from an inordinate fear of making a mistake, for the overweening goal of the O-C personality is to leave no room for error, to not make mistakes, to achieve perfection.

The O-C personality places a major positive value on work and productivity, to the exclusion of pleasure and the value of interpersonal relationships. When pleasure is contemplated, such as a vacation, it requires a great deal of planning and must be worked for. It is not uncommon for such individuals to keep postponing activities that are supposed to be pleasurable. The ranks of workaholics are heavily populated with O-C characters. But while there is intense preoccupation with work, it is often busywork, because of the tendency to become preoccupied with details. Thus an individual may spend hours locating a misplaced list rather than recreate the list from memory in a few minutes.

Frequently such individuals are excessively conscientious, moralistic, scrupulous, and judgmental of self and of others. Location in the interpersonal hierarchy is of great importance to individuals with this character type, and they are preoccupied with their relative status in dominant-submissive relationships. Although oppositional when subjected to the will of others, they stubbornly insist that others submit to their way of doing things and are unaware of the resentment their behavior induces in others.

These individuals have considerable difficulty showing warm and tender feelings and are stingy both with their emotions and with their material possessions. Their everyday relationships tend to be serious, formal, and conventional, lacking charm, grace, spontaneity, and humor. Wilhelm Reich (1933) has described these individuals as "living machines."

In his classic *Neurotic Styles*, David Shapiro (1967) focuses on three particular aspects of O-C cognitive style: rigidity, autonomy, and loss of reality. The rigidity of the compulsive character leads them to be described as dogmatic or opinionated. Such individuals are perceived as uninfluenceable. It is not that they oppose contrasting views; rather, they actively disattend to them in the service of persevering with their own views. The O-C will have a sharp focus, will
indeed in examining the situation get the facts, but in getting the facts will not get the picture. As noted earlier, the individual "loses the forest for the trees."

The preoccupation with productivity and concentration imparts a special cast to the cognitive style and life-style of these individuals. They are immensely productive and show impressive abilities to concentrate on their work, often cranking out huge volumes of work, especially in technical areas. But everything seems laborious, determined, tense, and deliberate; there is a quality of effortfulness, leading to the frequent characterization of the O-C as "driven." Yet, as Shapiro notes, if the individual is driven, then he or she is the driver, for the O-C very much marches to his or her own drummer, is his or her own harsh taskmaster. The O-C is dominated by shoulds and oughts. These individuals regularly tell themselves (and others) what they should do; the language of "wants" is alien. There is a necessity to maintain a rigid and continuous state of purposeful activity.

The O-Cs then are not free men. While these directives, to which the O-C is subjected, are on the one hand burdensome, they also provide clear guidelines for behavior. These individuals do not feel comfortable with any nonpurposive activity. To relax for the sake of relaxation is unthinkable, indeed anxiety producing—thus the gravity with which leisure time activity is planned. The guarded state of attention, the inability to relax, the preoccupation with "should" are all in the service of avoiding the loss of control. There is a tight lid on feelings, an avoidance of impulse or whim.

The O-C personality has major consequences for decision making. The preoccupation with doing what is "right" places a premium on avoiding mistakes. O-Cs accordingly often have difficulty coming to decisional closure, searching for additional evidence to ensure they are not making a mistake. But they live in a world of ambivalence and mixed feelings, and their decision making is like that of the "fiddler on the roof"- "on the one hand, on the other hand." To travel through a decision-making process with a thoroughgoing O-C is an exhausting journey. And just as they apparently are coming to a decision, all of the doubts rush up to question, and often undo, the conclusion.

This decisional agony can be forestalled if there is a rule that can be applied. Thus if the elements of a situation fit a psychological
template that is well established for the individual—"When one is in situation a, the right thing to do is b"—he or she can without thinking apply the formula. If there is no formula, however, the O-C will become quite anxious. Thus new and unanticipated situations are particularly threatening.

The preoccupation with detail can lead to a distortion of reality. Preoccupied with formulas, the O-C, as Shapiro (1967) notes, is concerned with what "fits" rather than what is. He gives the example of the obsessive man who said of the girl he planned to marry, "I must be in love with her—she has all the qualities I want in a wife."

As long as the formula fits, certain details and even major facts can be excluded from attention and ignored. This leads to the dogmatism noted earlier but can also lead to significant distortion of the capacity to evaluate reality.

**The Obsessive-Compulsive Personality:**

**Implications for Leadership**

The O-C personality will typically take much longer to develop cognitive beliefs and will be much more uncertain as to the validity of these beliefs than the narcissistic personality. While the O-C personality might still ultimately develop a few fixed, black-and-white beliefs, more typically the O-C personality tends to see a world that is characterized by shades of gray. In fact, the world is seen as so complex and foreign policy is seen as so subtle that the O-C personality often despairs of his or her inability to make clear choices. The image of the adversary tends to be mixed, therefore. One is always in some state of uncertainty.

For the O-C personality, the drive in life is to achieve certainty, to try to put a modicum of order in a chaotic world. This perspective colors the O-C's view of the origin and nature of international conflict. International conflict is due first of all to lack of order in the international system; that is, international anarchy is at the root of international conflict. There may be other causes as well (e.g., aggressive motivations of some nations)—one never knows—but the anarchy is always a necessary contributing factor. As long as anarchy exists, conflict will persist.

The O-C is characterized more by rigidity in cognitive processes rather than by rigidity in cognitive beliefs. (This is in sharp contrast
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with the paranoid personality, whose beliefs are fixed.) The exact nature of these processes may vary from individual to individual; nevertheless, one can identify some commonalities among all O-Cs. One commonality is the decisional imperative: "Act only after gathering as much information as possible." Another related imperative is to "Preserve one's options as long as possible." Like the paranoid individual, the O-C individual will want to receive raw data. However, both the scope and the magnitude of these information requests are much greater in the O-C. The O-C will want to see the minutiae about almost everything. The strong preference here is to act later rather than sooner, preferring procrastination rather than the dangers of hasty action or "premature closure." Due to this lack of certainty, the O-C will have a strong tendency to opt, by default, for the status quo or perhaps make incremental change. The O-C has a strong bias for satisficing rather than optimizing.

The O-C personality will have a tendency to focus on concrete and quantifiable data rather than the abstract, nonquantifiable dimensions. This is an ironic development for the personality type, which more than any other tends to recognize the complexity of the world and tends to want to avoid "simplistic" understandings of issues. It is important to understand that the process the O-C adopts is counterproductive. When confronted with uncertainty (essentially, when faced with any policy decision), the O-C responds by becoming immersed in as many details as possible in a quixotic quest to somehow "fully understand" the issue. What happens is that this drive is so obsessive, and the data search and immersion in minutiae so extensive, that the O-C begins to lose perspective. Paradoxically, in the drive to understand the subtleties of the situations, the O-C is forced, unconsciously, to place a heavy reliance on very simplistic cognitive shortcuts, most particularly, to focus on concrete and quantifiable data rather than on abstract data. Eventually, he simply becomes overwhelmed with minutiae and raw data, and he begins to think of issues in terms of data. The use of quantifiable indices becomes a convenient and readily available shorthand for understanding the issue. Unlike the paranoid, who is more belief driven, the O-C is more data driven. The absence of definitive data is extremely anxiety producing.

Most O-Cs tend to prefer a formalistic style of management. This
management style is most compatible with their strong need for order and regularity. Because of their strong need for raw data, however, many O-Cs would not be content with the summaries and general policy analysis of their immediate advisers. Instead, they would request—following normal channels—much of the raw data and subanalyses that went into these reports. Thus they have a great deal of difficulty delegating and relying upon subordinates, who, after all, might make a mistake.

The inclination of the O-C is to wait in a crisis rather than to take immediate, dramatic action. The O-C decides by default: often to go with the status quo. As a natural consequence of their tendency toward procrastination and incremental responses, O-C personalities will tend to feel (probably accurately) that they are always "behind the power curve," that as much as they try, they can never seem to be quite on top of crises (and events in general). When a decision is forced, there is a strong imperative to adopt a middle or mixed course—one that preserves one's options as long as possible. In bargaining terms, the O-C personality would favor both the "carrot and the stick" rather than one or the other, or he or she would have a carefully prescribed sequence for introducing one and then the other. If escalation were to occur, it would be measured or incremental in nature; it would tend not to be dramatic. The O-C would be adverse to dramatic political-diplomatic solutions, as well as to major military escalation, because these might narrow one's options. In military actions or diplomatic activities, there is a tendency to elevate process over substance. The O-C personality may, for example, begin to see diplomacy as exclusively the procedures and the process.

Dominated by a strong conscience, the O-C personality is a "man of his word." When he has made a commitment in negotiations, he can be relied upon, in contrast to the narcissistic personality, who can reverse commitments as circumstances dictate. Moreover, to the extent that the O-C has committed to writing policy goals and preferences, these can be taken as a reliable map of intentions.

The Paranoid Personality

The essential features of the paranoid personality disorder are a pervasive and long-standing suspiciousness and mistrust of people in general. Individuals with this disorder are hypersensitive and easily
slighted. They continually scan the environment for clues that validate their original prejudicial ideas, attitudes, or biases. Their affective experience is severely limited.

In *Neurotic Styles*, Shapiro (1967) describes in detail formal features of suspicious thinking, the sine qua non of the paranoid personality. A striking quality is pervasive rigidity. Suspicious people have something on their mind, and they search repetitively, and only, for confirmation of it. Suspicious people do not ignore new data but examine them extremely carefully. The goal of the examination is to find confirmation of their suppositions, dismissing evidence that disconfirms their fearful views and seizing upon what apparently confirms them.

In many life circumstances, being suspicious and on guard is both appropriate and adaptive. However, psychologically healthy individuals can abandon their suspicions when they are presented with convincing contradictory evidence. Paranoid individuals, in contrast, have a firm conclusion in search of evidence. Hostile, stubborn, and defensive, they will reject evidence that disproves their suspicions. Indeed, well-meaning attempts to reassure them or reason with them will usually provoke anger, and the "helpful one" may become the object of suspicions as well. Paranoids are hypervigilant, ever alert to a hostile interpersonal environment, always expecting plots and betrayal. They have a readiness to see themselves alone, surrounded by enemies. This explains why paranoia is the most political of mental disorders, because of the requirement for enemies.\(^6\)

Paranoids tend to be rigid and unwilling to compromise. In a new situation, they intensely and narrowly search for confirmation of their bias with a loss of appreciation of the total context. They usually find what they anticipated finding. Theirs is a world of hidden motives and special meanings. They have a readiness to counterattack against a perceived threat and can become excited over small matters, "making mountains out of molehills."

Priding themselves on always being objective, unemotional, and rational, they are uncomfortable with passive, soft, sentimental, and tender feelings. They avoid intimacy except with those they absolutely trust, a minute population. They show an exaggerated need to be self-sufficient, relying on no one. They avoid participating in a group setting unless they are in a dominant position. Keenly
aware of rank and power and superiority or inferiority, they are often jealous of and rivalrous with people in power. Their wary hypervigilance and readiness to retaliate often generate fear and uneasiness in others. One treads carefully around a paranoid, "walks on eggshells," lest he or she become upset.

Thus pervasive suspiciousness is at the core of paranoid individuals and colors every aspect of their behavior and thinking. The suspicious cognitive style of the paranoid has a number of formal characteristics, of which Shapiro (1967) considers rigidity the most fundamental one. Paranoids look at the world with fixed expectations. They know the Truth in advance and accordingly know what they are looking for. They will examine data extremely carefully, "seeing through" what does not confirm their expectations and seizing on the elements of the data that confirm their fixed beliefs. This rigidity, as Shapiro notes, has the quality of directedness. Their ideas are not the mere product of an overactive imagination but are the result of disproportionate attention to confirmatory details that are the result of intense and penetrating observation. What is the underlying premise that is being confirmed by this directed attention? It is the premise of external danger. Thus the essential cognitive feature of the paranoid is a rigid, intentional search for external danger. Because the premise of external danger is a fixed conclusion in search of confirmatory evidence, there is at the same time intentional disregard of disconfirming evidence.

In addition to the qualities of rigidity and intentionality, another key quality of paranoid individuals that influences their cognitive style is hyperalertness and hypersensitivity. Always on the alert for danger, their antennae constantly sweeping the horizon for signs of threat, paranoids will mobilize their rigid intentional cognitive mode in the face of anything unusual or out of the ordinary. Thus anything surprising is extremely distressing to an individual with this mind-set. Their world has been disturbed, their structure undone. A goal of the searching that is mobilized is to bring that which was out of control under control.

Clearly, insofar as paranoid individuals intentionally seek out only data that confirm their premise of external danger and systematically exclude evidence to the contrary, their evaluation of reality is often skewed. In effect, their views of external reality are distorted by their
internal needs. In searching for details, paranoid individuals do not accurately place events in the totality of their context. The search for a particular kind of tree regularly has them not apprehending the quality of the landscape, be it forest or meadow.

The primary basis of the paranoid style's characteristic suspiciousness is an overreliance on the ego defense of projection—the attribution to external figures of internal motivation, drives, or other feelings that are intolerable and hence repudiated in oneself. Projection, as Shapiro notes, distorts the significance of apparent reality; it is an autistic interpretive distortion of external reality. It is regularly observed that there is usually a core of reality in a paranoid notion, that "projection is a compromise with reality," that "the paranoid meets reality halfway."

An important characteristic of the paranoid that has significant implications for leadership style but also affects cognitive style is the exaggerated need for autonomy. Paranoids are constantly seeking evidence that dangerous others are out to control them or to betray them. The only defense in such a dangerous world is to rely on no one, to exaggeratedly emphasize independence and autonomy.

Paranoid individuals guard against losing control of their feelings, especially warm, soft, tender, and passive feelings. This is in the service of avoiding submission, of yielding to another. There can be no yielding to pressure or authority. This exaggerated fear of submission is a reaction to a strong wish to submit, a wish that is unacceptable to the paranoid and must be avoided at all costs. Being on guard at all times against one's feelings blocks all spontaneity. There can be no humor or playfulness, and, absent spontaneity, there is clearly a major inhibition of creative expression. Shapiro (1967) has characterized this constant state of internal surveillance as "an internal police state." Like an army, the paranoid is constantly on alert, mobilized to counterattack against the ever-present danger.

Thus paranoids are simultaneously defending themselves against external danger and internal impulses, a burdensome and exhausting psychological war on two fronts. As internal tension builds, suspiciousness grows, and through the process of projection an external and more manageable threat is constructed. The individual then has a state of heightened alertness, a state of continuous, alert guardedness against the now external danger.

It is evident that individuals who view the world through a suspi-
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cious lens and are continually seeking to confirm their core premise of external danger, against which they must defend themselves, have significant constraints on their interpretation of the political world and their manner of dealing with it.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that there are many similarities between the O-C personality and the paranoid personality. For both, there is a focus on detail, an emphasis on autonomy, and a guarded rigidity. But these qualities have significant differences too. The O-C fixes on details, while the paranoid searches for clues. The O-C is searching for certainty, while the paranoid is searching for confirmation of a fixed conclusion of danger. While the O-C is stubborn and obstinate, the paranoid is touchy and guarded. The O-C is dominated by conscience, by what he or she should do, whereas the paranoid is dominated by fear and is in a constant state of perceived external danger. There are many points of continuity, but the paranoid style is more extreme, more unstable, and more psychologically primitive.

The Paranoid in Power: Implications for Political Behavior

The paranoid personality tends to hold very strong, rigidly entrenched cognitive beliefs. Of all the personality types, this type is the one most motivated to seek to maintain internal consistency among cognitive beliefs—often at the expense of an "objective" examination of incoming information. The paranoid personality typically includes a belief system with a vivid and central image of the adversary. As one might suspect, the adversary is seen as inherently and pervasively evil and a major and incorrigible threat to one's own personal/national interest. There is little doubt that the adversary will respond to conciliatory goals by taking advantage of them. The paranoid personality, by definition, sees adversaries everywhere. Therefore, the individual sees the world in polarized terms. The paranoid's world is a Manichean universe, divided into two camps—allies and adversaries; neutrals are impossible. "If you are not strongly for me—you must be against me."

There is a powerful tendency to exaggerate greatly not only the hostile nature of the adversary's intentions but the adversary's political and military skill and ability to take threatening actions relatively unconstrained by logistical, chronological, or informational
constraints. The paranoid personality tends to view the adversary as highly rational, highly unified, in total control of all his or her actions. People or nations are never compelled to do things by virtue of circumstances. Rather, their actions are always a product of their negative adversarial qualities. For example, there is no such thing as a "defensive" action by the adversary taken solely to protect their own security—all actions of one's adversary are necessarily "aggressive." The attitude toward the adversary's military capabilities is oddly mixed. On the one hand, there is a tendency to exaggerate the adversary's military capabilities as to the degree to which they threaten one's own interests—the paranoid assumes that they do. One can never safely assume that the adversary's military potential is so small that it will never become a threat, even if it isn't one now. On the other hand, the paranoid personality often exaggerates his or her own capability to temporarily (though never permanently) thwart the capabilities of this adversary.

The world is a conflictual place, and the source of conflict is the evil nature or character of other nations or people. War would never emerge in a crisis for inadvertent reasons; war occurs because of the nefarious, aggressive motivations of the adversary. Under no circumstances is international conflict attributed to anarchy or even to an absence of balance between forces in the system.

The information-processing style and cognitive heuristics of the paranoid personality are closely associated with the belief system described previously. There is often a heavy and very simplistic over-reliance on historical analogies that reinforce this black-and-white view of the world. In other words, when confronted with a new situation in world politics, the paranoid personality, like the narcissistic personality, would tend to say, "This is like what happened to me."

Precisely because of the rigidity of the beliefs and the central importance of the adversary image in the paranoid's worldview, this individual is heavily biased in favor of worst-case analysis of almost any incoming information. In fact, the information search pattern will be exclusively tactical in nature because the long-term objectives of the adversary are already known. The paranoid individual will seek information on the probable military or political ploys this adversary is likely to employ in this instance and the various counters to these ploys. An important related topic of interest will be
information relating to the "enemy within" or "fifth column activity." The adversary is believed to be very creative and devious in this sort of covert subversion, and people of one's own nation who do not fully share the views of the paranoid leader are believed to be either suspect themselves or, at best, naive, unwitting dupes.

Faced with the need to make a decision, the paranoid personality will manifest a strong tendency to act sooner rather than to procrastinate, out of fear that "he who hesitates is lost."

The paranoid personality will gravitate toward one of two management styles described by Alexander George (1991). The paranoid in power will adopt either a competitive style or a formalistic style. The decision will be made largely on the basis of whether that individual can identify a few individuals that he or she can trust. If he or she can, there will often be a propensity for a formalistic style with all information and contacts funneled through these few (often one or two—and certainly no more than a handful) uniquely trusted individuals. More often, however, the paranoid will adopt a management style that is closer to the competitive model described by George. The assumption is that one can't trust any one source of information or any one concentration of power. So to garner diverse information and, most important, to prevent the rise of any potential internal threats, the paranoid leader adopts a management style that seeks to play one adviser or one bureaucracy off another one. Paranoic political decision makers, especially those with a competitive management style, will often manifest an almost insatiable desire for raw data. They will typically not be satisfied with the analyses and conclusions of people working under them. The manipulative subordinate can take advantage of the paranoid leader's suspiciousness to plant suspicions concerning bureaucratic rivals, as did Beria with Stalin.

Because of the paranoid's image of the world as very conflictual and because of the image of the adversary as incorrigibly aggressive and politically devious, the paranoid leader has a strong preference for the use offeree over persuasion. In other words, the leader would prefer a fait accompli that directly affects the capabilities of the adversary to a coercive threat that tries to affect the willingness of the adversary to threaten. The point is to alter leadership or capabilities of adversaries rather than try to "persuade" the adversaries not to do
something or to alter their behavior. In a crisis, there is a strong preference for what is seen as preemptive action. The paranoid may even initiate a crisis or a war out of the belief that preventive action against the adversary is necessary and that one might as well "strike while the iron is hot"; that is, since the adversary is preparing to act, it is preferable to act first while the military balance is more in one's favor.

In those instances when the use of brute force is not seen as practically feasible, then coercion through threat of military retaliation (deterrence or compellance) becomes the preferred method of crisis bargaining. A preponderance of force is preferable to a balance of force or to rough equivalence to help one achieve this coercion. This preponderance has no practical limits because the paranoid can never be satisfied that he or she has attained enough arms or military capability. Negotiations and diplomacy may be viewed as either largely efforts that ratify the military status quo or exercises in Machiavellian deception and counterdeception. Accommodation is used only to lull the adversary into lowering his guard.

Having described these pure character types in detail for illustrative purposes, it is important to emphasize that most individuals, and most leaders, possess a broad array of characteristics that do not fit one pure type. Rather, it is the predominance of one style over another that affects outcomes.

The healthy leader personality has characteristics that contribute to effective leadership, to sound decision making, to accurate diagnosis of the environment, and to effective work with a leadership circle chosen for their expertise and wisdom and from whom the self-confident leader can learn and take wise counsel.

**Concluding Thoughts**

What the single case studies provide that is particularly valuable is a longitudinal perspective that offers a framework for understanding the manner in which previous life experiences help shape and influence political behavior and help distinguish between political behaviors that are role dependent and those that reflect strong personality influences, where leader personality is particularly engaged by the political circumstances. A key aspect linking the psychobiographic and psychodynamic approaches is understanding psycholog-
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ical themes ingrained during adolescence that psychologically continue to influence throughout the life cycle. As has been emphasized, dreams die hard, and pursuit of the dreams of glory formed during adolescence can drive a leader throughout his lifetime, having special force at the midlife transition and during the later years' transition.

A significant emphasis of the approach described for developing the political personality profile is identifying stable and enduring aspects of leader personality, including cognitive, affective, and interpersonal elements. Implying a linkage between belief systems, attitudes, and leadership style, the nature of personality puts constraints upon information processing and the nature of relationships with the leadership circle. Leader personality importantly influences negotiating behavior as well as crisis decision making. Because personality is stable over time, the longitudinal approach helps identify enduring patterns of behavior.

Three important leader personality types—the narcissist, the obsessive-compulsive, and the paranoid—and their implications for political behavior have been described at length to illustrate this important principle. These patterns are deeply ingrained and, when present, permeate all aspects of political behavior—crisis decision making, strategic decision making, negotiating behavior, worldview, and relationships with the leadership circle. The centrality of the self for the narcissist influences all aspects of political behavior. The narcissist's sensitivity to slight and need to be seen as all knowing and perfect tends to lead to a sycophantic leadership circle. The flexible conscience makes the narcissist's use of words instrumental, with no organized belief system, and commitments can change as circumstances change. For the obsessive-compulsive, there is a tendency to get lost in details. The search for certainty can be particularly troubling in crisis situations, leading to procrastination and indecisiveness. The centrality of intellectual processes and the strong conscience of the obsessive-compulsive have important implications for negotiations, as well as the ability to identify central beliefs from language. The dominance of paranoid individuals' conviction that enemies surround them colors not only their view of political adversaries but also interferes with their capacity to trust their own advisers. Because these personality patterns are so deeply ingrained, they can be detected early in a political career and can reliably be pre-
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dieted to continue to affect leadership behavior throughout the
political career and become intensified with stress. These personality
qualities do not mellow with age. Indeed, these characteristics tend
to become intensified with the passage of years.

Appendix: Conceptual Framework and Organization Design for an
Integrated Political Personality Profile

Jerrold Post

PART I. Psychobiographic Discussion: The Development of the Individual in
the Context of the Nation's History (*use parallel time lines)*
1. Cultural and historical background. Describe constraints of the political
culture on the role of leader.
2. Family origins and early years
   a. Family constellation—grandparents, parents, siblings;
      relationships—politics of family
   b. Heroes and models
3. Education and Socialization
   a. Climate in country
   b. Student years, examples of leadership
4. Professional career
   a. Mentors
   b. Early career
   c. Successes and failures
5. The subject as leader
   a. Key events
   b. Crises
   c. Key political relationships, influences
6. Family and friends

PART II. Personality
1. General personal description
   a. Appearance and personal characteristics (include description of
      lifestyle, work/personal life balance, working hours, hobbies,
      recreation)
   b. Health (include energy level, drinking, drug use)
2. Intellectual capacity and style
   a. Intelligence

* The analyst is required to develop two time lines, one indicating key events
  in the life of the subject, the second indicating key events in the nation's history.
  By moving these lines parallel, a visual representation is created of the impact of
  historical events on individual development.
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b. Judgment
c. Knowledge
d. Cognitive complexity

3. Emotional reactions
   a. Moods, mood variability
   b. Impulses and impulse control

4. Drives and character structure
   a. Identify personality type (if possible)
   b. Psychodynamics
      i. Self-concept/self-esteem
      ii. Basic identification
      iii. Neurotic conflicts
   c. Reality (sense of/testing/adaptation to)
   d. Ego defense mechanisms
e. Conscience and scruples
   f. Psychological drives, needs, motives (discriminate to degree possible among drive for power, for achievement, for affiliation)
g. Motivation for seeking leadership role (to wield power, to occupy seat of power, to achieve place in history)

5. Interpersonal relationships
   a. Identify key relationships and characterize nature of relationships
      i. Inner circle, including unofficial advisors, "kitchen cabinet"
      ii. Superiors
      iii. Political subordinates
      iv. Political allies, domestic and international
   v. Political rivalries, international adversaries

PART in. Worldview
1. Perceptions of political reality (include cultural influences/biases)
2. Core beliefs (include concept of leadership, power)
3. Political philosophy, ideology, goals, and policy views (domestic, foreign, and economic policy views and view of U.S. Include discussion of which issues most interest the leader, in which issue areas his or her experience lies, and which issues are particularly salient for the leader's political psychology). Note that not all leaders have a core political philosophy or body of governing political ideas.
4. Nationalism and identification with country

PART iv. Leadership Style
i. General characteristics (include discussion of the role expectations—both general public and elite—placed on the individual, emphasizing the leader's political and cultural determinants and skill in fulfilling them)
   a. How subject defines his or her role
   b. Relationship with public
c. Oratorical skill and rhetoric
2. Strategy and tactics—goal-directed behavior
3. Decision making and decision implementation style
   a. Strategic decision making
   b. Crisis decision making
   c. How does leader use staff/inner circle? Does the leader vet decisions or use them only for information? How collegial? Does the leader surround himself or herself with sycophants or choose strong self-confident subordinates?
   d. Dealing with formal and informal negotiating style

PART v. Outlook
1. Note particularly political behavior closely related to personality issues. Relate personality to key issues, emphasizing in which direction the psychological factors point. Estimate drives, values, and characteristics that are the most influential.
2. Attempt to predict how the individual will interact with other political figures, including opposition leaders and other key foreign leaders.

Notes
1. Traditional elements include appearance; level of activity; speech and language; intelligence; knowledge; memory; thought content and delusions; drives and affects, including anxiety, aggression, hostility, sexuality, activity and passivity, shame and guilt, and depression; evaluation of reality; judgment; interpersonal relations, including capacity for empathy; identity and ambivalence; and characteristic ego defenses.
2. For an excellent example of the systematic application of the traditional elements of psychiatric diagnosis applied to a historical figure, see the psychopathological assessment of Adolph Hitler in Redlich 1998.
3. Drawing on the works of early neo-Freudian Elvin Semrad, Vaillant (1992) has identified four levels of defensive organization. He identifies the psychotic triad of denial, distortion, and delusional projection as representing the most primitive level of psychological organization. The immature defenses include projection, passive aggression, acting out, and fantasy. The neurotic (intermediate) defenses include dissociation, displacement, isolation (or intellectualization), repression, and reaction formation. Mature defenses include suppression, sublimation, and altruism.
4. This discussion of the relationship among three key personality types, leadership style, and worldview draws on Post and Rogers 1988.
5. This section draws significantly on Post 1992.
6. See Robins and Post 1997. This volume offers an extended treatment of the political manifestations of paranoia. A number of the key points expanded at length in Robins and Post 1997 are summarized in a preliminary article (Robins and Post 1987).
"Post is a pioneer in the field of political-personality profiling."
—Jane Mayer, *The New Yorker*

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Ann Arbor
To Alexander George, a dear friend
and admired mentor, whose gentle wisdom
and clarity of vision have illuminated
the path for so many.
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