An Analysis Using the Case of Judge Dariusz Łubowski of the Regional Court in Warsaw
by Marcin Romanowski, PhD, LL.M. (Regensburg, Germany)
Polish MP in Exile in Hungary, Director of the Hungarian-Polish Institute of Freedom
1. Introduction
2. The Case of the Surrender of Volodymyr Zhuravlov to Germany
3. The Case of the Surrender to the Netherlands of the den Hertog Couple and Their Son Martin
4. The Case of the Surrender of Denis Lisov and His Daughters to Sweden
5. The Decision Revoking the EAW Against Marcin Romanowski
5.1. Political Reprisals in the Justice Fund Case
5.2. The Content of the Reasoning of the Decision of 19 December 2025
6. Reprisals Against the Judge Following the Issuance of the Decision of 19 December 2025
6.1. A Political Attack by the Minister of Justice on a Judge
6.2. Manipulations in Connection with a New Application for an EAW
6.3. Change in the Scope of Judge Łubowski’s Duties
6.4. Unlawful Deprivation of the Right to Appeal
6.5. Context of the Unlawful Takeover of the Court’s Leadership
6.6. Unlawful Removal of Judge Łubowski from the Position of Head of the Section
7. Summary
1. Introduction
Since December 2025, public attention in Poland has been drawn to the reprisals applied by Tusk’s left-liberal administration against the respected, experienced judge Dariusz Łubowski of the Regional Court in Warsaw, who issued a ruling inconsistent with the expectations of those in power. These reprisals have revealed the scale of weaponizing justice for the purposes of lawfare waged against politicians of the conservative opposition and other dissenting voices in Poland after the left-liberal camp took power in December 2023.
In December 2025, Judge Dariusz Łubowski of the Regional Court in Warsaw caused an earthquake within the circles of Tusk’s administration in Poland by revoking the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued against me a year earlier in a case which, in the narrative of the left-liberal coalition, is supposed to be one of the greatest scandals of the PiS governments. Even more devastating was the reasoning of the decision, in which the judge issuing the ruling, cast doubt on the credibility of the allegations, described the actions in the case as political reprisals, devastating the image of the Polish justice system and annihilating the credibility of the Polish State, including the Polish judiciary. He described the current situation in Poland as a crypto-dictatorship, and the actions of the authorities as contemptible.
This widely discussed decision became an opportunity to take a closer look at other, earlier rulings by this judge, who two months earlier had refused Germany the surrender of a Ukrainian citizen suspected of participation in the blowing up of Nord Stream. Earlier, he had been known for rulings refusing, for example, Sweden or the Netherlands the surrender of parents who had fled to Poland in order to protect their children taken from them without justification within Western European liberal foster-care systems. In particular, these rulings exemplify the fact that Poland, during the period of conservative government in 2015–2023, was a place where the family and the welfare of the child were protected against actions motivated by left-wing ideology. It was also—typically in cooperation with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary—the state that consistently blocked the woke ideological agenda in the European legal space, particularly in the area of family law, by blocking projects aimed at the institutionalization of same-sex unions, same-sex parenthood, the imposition of recognition of surrogacy and so-called gender change, the introduction of gender ideology into education, child-protection systems, and other areas of law.
Dariusz Łubowski is a judge with many years of experience dating back to 1995, and thus a person who cannot be accused of having entered the judiciary after the reforms of 2017 contested by left-liberal elites. During Tusk’s first government, he worked at the Ministry of Justice as a judge seconded to matters of international legal cooperation. A polyglot, he is one of the most outstanding specialists in Poland in the field of judicial law in cross-border cases. Since 2018, he has been the head of the international criminal matters section at the Regional Court in Warsaw—the largest and most important ordinary court in Poland. It is worth looking at several of his most high-profile rulings, because this will make it possible to understand why the left-liberal establishment in Europe may so deeply hate a state in which such decisions could be issued.
2. The Case of the Surrender of Volodymyr Zhuravlov to Germany
In September 2022, the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea were blown up. From the outset, sovereigntist political circles in Poland regarded them as a platform of cooperation between Russia and Germany over the heads of Central Europe. The projects, completed in 2011 and 2021 respectively, were compared at the political level to the 1939 Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact. They constituted an important element in Germany’s financing of Putin’s regime, while Germany in turn benefited from competitively priced Russian gas, indispensable to its economy within an energy mix featuring a significant share of wind power.
In the course of the criminal proceedings conducted after 2022, the German authorities identified as a suspect in these actions a Ukrainian citizen residing in Poland, Volodymyr Zhuravlov. The German authorities sought his prosecution through the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) procedure, aiming at his surrender for the purpose of conducting further criminal proceedings. Volodymyr Zhuravlov was detained by Polish authorities, and a district court in Warsaw imposed pre-trial detention on him. The case, however, took a decisive turn at the Regional Court in Warsaw when, on 17 October 2025, Judge Dariusz Łubowski refused to execute the European Arrest Warrant against Volodymyr Zhuravlov and lifted the previously imposed pre-trial detention, ordering his immediate release.[1]
In this case, Judge Dariusz Łubowski held that “regardless of who carried out the blowing up of NS 1 and 2, insofar as he acted within the framework of a just war on behalf of Ukraine, he did not commit a crime.” He further stated that “the German state has no jurisdiction to prosecute any natural person for causing the explosion of NS 1 and 2, and it had no grounds to use EU law when issuing a European Arrest Warrant.” He additionally indicated that the German side had provided very general information concerning the description of the act itself. Judge Łubowski refrained from assessing the circumstances raised by the defense indicating the complete politicization of the German judiciary, focusing instead on the conclusion that the alleged acts—if indeed committed by Volodymyr Zhuravlov, which he did not determine—did not constitute a criminal offense. After an extensive discussion of scholarly writings and international regulations, Judge Łubowski concluded that the conditions of a just war are “undoubtedly fulfilled by Ukraine in its struggle against Russian aggression and genocide.” As a consequence, he held that “actions undertaken by armed forces, including special forces, during a just defensive war against the aggressor’s critical infrastructure are not sabotage, but a military action of a diversionary character, which cannot be crimes. Ukraine, if it was Ukraine and its special forces—including the pursued individual—[that] the court does not determine, organized an armed mission to destroy the enemy’s pipelines, then those actions were not unlawful. On the contrary, they were justified, rational, and just.” Therefore, “Ukrainian soldiers and those who work in its army cannot be regarded as terrorists or saboteurs, because by pursuing by all means the objective of defending the homeland, they weaken the enemy.”
“As a consequence, the destruction of Russian gas pipelines and depriving the enemy of billions of euros paid by Germany for pumped gas had a deep military sense, because it weakened Russia’s military potential. Indirectly, Germany, by buying gas from Russia and transferring billions of euros during an already full-scale military aggression, and of acts of genocide committed by Russia against the Ukrainian civilian population known even before this event also to Germany, the German state co-financed that aggression. Germany’s behavior was, from this point of view, hostile toward Ukraine. Incidentally, it should be noted that both pipelines are the property of a state hostile to Ukraine, namely Russia. Formally, NS 1 and 2 are Swiss-law companies and are owned as follows: NS 1 is 51 percent owned by Gazprom, i.e., Russia. The remaining 49 percent is dispersed among minor shareholders from several states, including Germany. NS 2, in turn, is 100 percent owned by Gazprom, i.e., Russia. From a legal point of view, these are not German entities. Germany is attempting to prosecute Volodymyr Z. for the destruction of Russian property. A rhetorical question should therefore be asked: Should Ukraine, when destroying Russia’s critical infrastructure, first examine the ownership structure of targets and choose such targets in which Germany is not even a minority shareholder? Because otherwise Ukrainian commanders and soldiers will be prosecuted by the German authorities?”
Irrespective of one’s assessment of this ruling, Judge Łubowski cannot be denied knowledge, erudition, independence, and courage. While at the same time avoiding political evaluations, he is not afraid to make legal assessments of actions that arouse powerful emotions in domestic and international politics. Officially, both Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, spoke in superlatives about this ruling. It is not, however, without grounds to interpret their behavior as “putting on a brave face in a bad situation.” Aware of anti-Russian sentiments and sympathy for the courage and efficiency of the alleged perpetrators of the Nord Stream sabotage (treated in Poland as an element of German–Russian blackmail toward Central Europe), they simply had no alternative but to join the general social support for this decision — a decision taken by an independent judge on whom they could not exert political pressure and force a ruling consistent with Germany’s expectations. As it appears, they would most readily have brought about Zhuravlov’s surrender, without regard to legal motives, but for primitive reasons of fulfilling the expectations of the German authorities, which contributed materially to installing Tusk’s administration in Poland. This thesis is corroborated by the fact that a few days earlier the Polish state allowed German services to conduct operational activities freely in connection with the search and detention of Zhuravlov on Polish territory, which demonstrates, in this case, the complete subordination of Polish institutions to German interests. As a consequence, Judge Dariusz Łubowski’s words, “Mr. Zhuravlov, you are free,” may be regarded as entering a collision course with powerful interests, guarded, among others, by the Tusk government installed in Poland.
3. The Case of the Surrender to the Netherlands of the den Hertog Couple and Their Son Martin
The case concerns a married couple who, together with their seven-year-old son suffering from autism, fled from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Poland. Its genesis goes back to February 2018, when Dutch social services received an anonymous report from a neighbor who claimed that he could hear the child screaming and observed disturbing signs in the family home. On this basis, the child was taken from the parents and placed not with a foster family, but in a boarding facility. From the outset, the parents objected to this decision, indicating that their son has serious developmental disorders and requires intensive therapy as well as constant, individualized care. For the first thirteen months, the Dutch authorities completely prohibited the parents from having any contact with the child; they received only a short email update every two weeks regarding his functioning. Only after that period were they allowed to see their son once a month, for approximately three hours.
On 26 June 2019, the couple took their seven-year-old son from the care facility and fled with him to Poland. In response, the Dutch authorities initiated criminal proceedings against the parents and classified their actions as the abduction of a child from a care institution.
In connection with the family’s flight to Poland, the Zeeland–West-Brabant Court of the Kingdom of the Netherlands issued a European Arrest Warrant against the parents. The case was brought to Poland, where the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor’s Office—after analyzing the circumstances—submitted to the Regional Court in Warsaw a motion to refuse the surrender of the couple to the Dutch authorities. The Prosecutor’s Office’s actions were fully consistent with the policy of the Polish Ministry of Justice, oriented toward protecting Polish children and families in situations of cross-border disputes, and also toward providing assistance to families fleeing persecution in other states.
The Regional Court in Warsaw granted the prosecutor’s motion and refused to execute the European Arrest Warrant, which meant that consent to surrender the parents to the Kingdom of the Netherlands was denied.
In the oral reasoning of the ruling, Judge Dariusz Łubowski indicated that the European Arrest Warrant issued by the Dutch authorities “violates the freedoms and rights of man and citizen.” The court focused on assessing the actions of Dutch public institutions toward the family and the child. The judge emphasized that the parents had been placed by the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands “in a situation with no way out.” As he noted, “their only child was taken from them, and at the same time no charges were brought against them. They were not given a chance to possibly change the manner in which they exercised care over the child.”
The court also drew attention to the lack of proportionality and transparent grounds for state interference, indicating that the Dutch authorities “without any verifiable reasons took the child from the parents and did not allow them any contact with the child for more than a year.” These actions—in the court’s assessment—were conducted “with a gross violation of all internationally recognized psychological standards in such cases.”[2]
Judge Łubowski indicated that if surrender were to occur, the boy’s parents would be placed in pre-trial detention in the Netherlands and would be deprived of parental authority—considering “the extremely authoritarian and repressive approach of the local child-care authorities toward parents.” As a consequence, the court noted that, since 2002, the Netherlands has permitted euthanasia in the case of severely ill or even severely depressed people, including children from the age of 12, and where sick persons are alone or remain under state care, in practice, the exclusive decision regarding euthanasia belongs to the physician. And since it is highly probable that, in the case of this particular child, separation from the parents would result in a “significant deterioration of health and deepening of mental ailments (…), after reaching the age of 12 he may, in accordance with Dutch law, be deprived of life by physicians, without the consent, and even without the knowledge, of his parents.” In this connection, “the Regional Court in Warsaw, being unable to exclude such a course of events, will not take upon its conscience the life of this child, already harmed by fate and by the Dutch authorities.” Summarizing the legal assessment, Judge Dariusz Łubowski formulated an unequivocal conclusion, stating: “The conduct of the Dutch authorities must be assessed as extremely inhuman and barbaric.”[3]
4. The Case of the Surrender of Denis Lisov and His Daughters to Sweden
The case of Denis Lisov concerns a Russian citizen who, in 2019, fled from Sweden to Poland with his three daughters after they had been taken from him by the Swedish foster-care system and placed with a Muslim foster family.
The Swedish authorities issued a European Arrest Warrant against Lisov on allegations of abducting the children, an offense for which he faced a custodial sentence in Sweden. Denis Lisov and his daughters were detained by the Polish Border Guard upon arriving from Sweden to Poland by ferry, and he applied for asylum in Poland, arguing that the children had been placed in foster care in violation of his parental rights and of the children’s cultural identity.
Judge Dariusz Łubowski of the Regional Court in Warsaw refused to surrender Lisov to the Swedish authorities, holding that the execution of the EAW would violate human freedoms and rights. In the reasoning, he emphasized that: “Denis Lisov was placed in a situation with no way out, in a veritable trap. His children were taken from him, and at the same time conditions were imposed for their recovery that were impossible to meet, because the right of permanent residence was not granted to him. The authorities did not guarantee him a proper right to contact with the children. A foster family was designated at a significant distance from his place of residence (…) In the foster family they did not feel safe, which could deepen their stress and lead to disorders. The father could not watch this calmly, and the actions of the Swedish authorities struck at the welfare of the children. The actions of the Swedish authorities, in an uncompromising manner, did not respect the sensitivity of children coming from a European Russian family.”
During the judicial proceedings, Lisov and his family remained in Poland under the father’s care, and his counsel was attorney Bartosz Lewandowski. Lisov publicly emphasized that Poland, as a country that values family values, constitutes a safe environment for his children. Several months later, the Lisov family returned to Russia, and Lisov publicly thanked Poland and his counsel for the support provided against the Swedish decisions concerning their children.
After Judge Dariusz Łubowski issued, on 19 December 2025, the decision revoking the EAW against me, both the judge himself and attorney Lewandowski became targets of attack. The hate portal Belarus Ukraine published, of course, a false insinuation that Lisov was allegedly a GRU employee; the leftist activist Klementyna Suchanow alleged that Lewandowski visited Russia after the entire matter (which took place at the invitation of Lisov himself as an expression of gratitude for saving his family). In turn, the lawyer Paweł Zieliński, linked to left-liberal circles, alleged that in the Lisov case Lewandowski cooperated with the Russian embassy in Warsaw,[4] which is a normal and obvious practice in cross-border matters of this kind—something any moderately competent lawyer should know.
5. The Decision Revoking the EAW Against Marcin Romanowski
5.1. Political Reprisals in the Justice Fund Case
By decision of 19 December 2025 (case file no. VIII Kop 330/24), the Regional Court in Warsaw, sitting in the person of Judge Dariusz Łubowski, revoked the European Arrest Warrant issued against me on the basis of an earlier decision dated 19 December 2024 and ordered the cancellation of the international search.
Since March 2024—alongside many other PiS politicians, former officials, and social activists—I became a target of prosecution by the prosecutorial service illegally taken over by Tusk’s administration.[5] A dozen or so charges were brought against me, bearing the strictly political character of an unauthorized and unlawful criminalization of lawful political actions or actions falling within the scope of administrative discretion, related to the exercise of the function of a fund administrator financing tasks in the area of assistance to victims of crime and prevention. None of these charges concerns corruption or the appropriation of any financial assets, and the only personal “benefit” attributed to me is the satisfaction of financing public tasks of a conservative or Christian character, thus consistent with my worldview as the then Deputy Minister of Justice. During the period of conservative government, the Justice Fund broke the monopoly of left-wing and liberal organizations in access to public funds, which was one of the principal reasons for the reprisals.
In this case, bearing the classic hallmarks of lawfare, there were also numerous gross procedural violations, including unlawful deprivation of liberty in breach of international law (Council of Europe immunity), the falsification of evidence, unlawful searches, procedural acts undertaken by persons who should have been excluded due to lack of impartiality, and—above all—conduct bearing the features of abuse and inhuman and degrading treatment. Two justice officials, Urszula Dubejko and Karolina Święcicka, were held in solitary confinement without bail in seven-month pre-trial detention under 24-hour surveillance – as was Fr. Michał Olszewski, a Catholic priest and a Fund grantee, who was pressured to incriminate opposition politicians in exchange for freedom. All three were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment: women were searched by male officers; they were forced to shower and use the bathroom in the presence of male officers. At times, detainees were forced to relieve themselves in their cells, with no toilet facilities. They were treated as dangerous criminals and transported in full restraints (handcuffs and shackles), with no access to defense counsel or religious ministry and no contact with immediate families (Urszula Dubejko has a disabled son, and Karolina Święcicka is a primary caretaker of her elderly mother). Attorney Bartosz Lewandowski, who represents me and former Minister Ziobro, was also targeted: in retaliation for his defense work, he was publicly threatened by a high-ranking government official with retaliatory financial audits and baselessly accused of pro-Putin sympathies by another.
Alongside the wide-ranging reprisals by the state apparatus, the case was accompanied by a massive campaign of harassment in the form of threats of murder, beating, or public threats of abduction “in a car trunk” (including those expressed by former prime minister and post-communist politician Leszek Miller, as well as by the incumbent Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek), as well as a media campaign. In foreign media, among other things, false allegations appeared concerning supposed corruption charges. In Poland, this was conducted mainly by media outlets with foreign ownership structures: the TV stations TVN and TVN24 (Warner Bros. Discovery), the tabloid Fakt, and the onet.pl portal (Axel Springer), as well as by the unlawfully and forcibly seized public television, which harassed me and my family at private residences, publicizing their exact locations.
In connection with these political reprisals, I obtained political asylum in Hungary in December 2024. In connection with the issuance, by a district court in Warsaw that had earlier been unlawfully taken over, of a decision imposing pre-trial detention, the prosecution service also obtained a European Arrest Warrant issued against me. Its revocation after a year became the reason for reprisals against the judge who issued that ruling.
5.2. The Content of the Reasoning of the Decision of 19 December 2025
The extensive reasoning of the decision of 19 December 2025 is, in every respect, worthy of analysis. In order to avoid allegations of lack of objectivity, I will seek to describe it by citing substantial excerpts from it.
First, the court indicated that “the authority issuing a European Arrest Warrant is obliged to continuously monitor the continued existence of the positive prerequisites for maintaining that warrant in force and the possible emergence of negative prerequisites, because the occurrence of the latter obliges, at any time, a modification of the original procedural decision. In particular, even after the issuance of a European Arrest Warrant, the court has a duty to constantly verify whether a negative prerequisite has not arisen for the further maintenance in force of an already issued European Arrest Warrant under Article 607b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the interest of the administration of justice. The European Arrest Warrant mechanism is based on a high degree of trust between Member States, which execute it on the basis of mutual recognition of decisions of justice authorities (Decision of the Court of Appeal in Kraków of 17.11.2004, II AKz 403/04 – court footnote). Ergo, in the Member State issuing warrants, such standards of protection of human rights and civil liberties should prevail that other Member States are not forced to refuse to execute such warrants. (…) It cannot lie in the interest of the administration of justice in the European area of freedom, justice and security (which are the axiological foundations of the European Union) to allow a situation in which the European Arrest Warrant is used, contrary to the intentions of the EU legislator, as a tool of political repression. In this context, of fundamental importance is the fact that after the issuance of the decision of 19 December 2024 on the issuance of a European Arrest Warrant against Marcin Romanowski, new fundamental circumstances emerged which simultaneously constitute negative procedural prerequisites for the further maintenance in force of the European Arrest Warrant in question, namely: [1] The granting to Marcin Romanowski of refugee status (political asylum) by the Hungarian authorities; [2] The refusal to issue the so-called red notice by the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL and the refusal to initiate an international search for Marcin Romanowski; [3] The violation by the executive power of human rights and civil liberties and of the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland.”
The court indicated that for more than half a year the prosecution service did not inform the court of the official refusal by the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL with respect to the application by the Polish authorities for the issuance of a red notice and the initiation of an international search for me, nor of the official information provided by the Secretariat of the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union on 5 March 2025 regarding the fact that the Hungarian authorities had granted me refugee status (political asylum). The documents in both matters were provided to the court only upon its request on 21 November 2025. Earlier, they were known only generally from media reports.
As the court noted, “such conduct of the prosecution service prevented the court from an appropriate reaction to circumstances entirely different from those existing at the time of issuing the European Arrest Warrant, in accordance with the principle arising from the indicated provisions that the court must take into account the entirety of the circumstances of the case and the collected evidence, and the principle of the rule of law, which above all it is precisely the prosecution service that should defend.” The motive of concealing these official documents by the prosecution service is also indicated by the fact that the prosecution service contacted the court in the EAW matter, seeking a modification of the warrant, as the court points out: “in the period from the moment the National Prosecutor’s Office obtained information about the granting of refugee status and the refusal of entry of a red notice and the refusal to initiate an international search by INTERPOL, the National Prosecutor’s Office twice requested the Court to modify the EAW in question and did not notify the Court of these facts. The failure to inform the Court in the present case could alternatively have resulted from two causes: either it was an intentional concealment of these facts from the Court, or it resulted from chaos and lack of professionalism of the National Prosecutor’s Office, which may also be indicated by the manner in which the prosecution service proceeded in the present case (…).” Having regard to the modus operandi of the prosecution service, both in this case and in other proceedings conducted against opposition politicians, the aim of its actions is to carry out political reprisals against the political opposition. One should rather accept the following hypothesis of the court described in the decision in question: “in particular, if such conduct toward the Regional Court in Warsaw could constitute the concealment of information essential to the present criminal proceedings by state officials, then it may bear the characteristics of acting to the detriment of the interest of the administration of justice. In both cases, legally prescribed proceedings should be initiated against the persons responsible, and if irregularities are found, within the appropriate procedural framework those persons should be held accountable.”
I considered that the concealment of information material to the proceedings justifies a suspicion of an offense, inter alia, under Article 231 of the Criminal Code, constituting an abuse of authority to the detriment of the public and private interest for the purpose of obtaining personal and financial benefits by prosecutors applying the reprisals in question against me—and I submitted the appropriate notification.[6]
Proceeding to discuss the three general premises underlying the decision of 19 December 2025, the court first addressed the decision of INTERPOL. The court stated: “A matter of fundamental significance for the procedural decision to revoke the European Arrest Warrant in question is the refusal, upon the application of the National Prosecutor’s Office, to issue the so-called red notice by the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL and the refusal to initiate an international search for Marcin Romanowski. Such a refusal on the part of INTERPOL is not only, in itself, a ground for finding that the further maintenance in force of the European Arrest Warrant against Marcin Romanowski is grossly contrary to the interest of the Polish administration of justice, but also, through this, disqualifying the Polish executive authority, and in particular the National Prosecutor’s Office, as an organ of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.”
Earlier, discussing the documents submitted by the prosecution service, the court assessed: “According to the letter of the Secretariat of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, translated and certified from English on 7 April 2025, the said Commission examined the files concerning Marcin Romanowski, finding that the storage of the pursued person’s data was not consistent with:
- INTERPOL’s obligation to ensure effective cooperation between police authorities ‘in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Article 2 of the INTERPOL Constitution).
- Article 10(1) of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD), which provides that ‘the processing of data in INTERPOL’s Information System may be carried out only for a specific, explicit purpose that is consistent with the aims and activities of the Organization.’
- Article 12 of the RPD, which provides that ‘the processing of data in INTERPOL’s Information System must be (…) relevant and not excessive for the purpose.’”
As a consequence, in assessing Interpol’s decision, the court held that “INTERPOL refused to issue a red notice and to pursue Marcin Romanowski, finding that maintaining the entry of data (a red notice) constitutes an affront to the catalogue of human and civil rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly by resolution 217/III A on 10 December 1948 in Paris, which constituted the starting point for the adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to which the Republic of Poland is a party. – court note], and thus violates the human rights of the person pursued in this case. In addition to the legal grounds indicated in INTERPOL’s refusal of entry, it is also necessary to invoke INTERPOL’s internal provisions regulating the fundamental values on which INTERPOL is based. This is Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution [A legal act binding upon the Republic of Poland promulgated in the Journal of Laws of 2 November 2015, item 1758. – court note], which provides that ‘it is strictly forbidden for the Organization [INTERPOL] to undertake any intervention or activities [with respect to acts] of a political character’. (It is necessary here to entirely exclude other grounds for refusal concerning family matters, morality, civil claims, petty offenses, etc.). It must be assumed that INTERPOL regarded the actions of the Polish authorities directed against Marcin Romanowski as political persecution. The further maintenance in force of the European Arrest Warrant in question would be—primarily for that reason—grossly contrary to the interest of the Polish administration of justice. One must not allow a situation in which even a shadow of suspicion falls upon Polish courts that they are politicized and controlled by the executive power, as will be discussed below.”
The second premise underlying the decision of 19 December 2025 was the violation by the executive power of human rights and civil liberties, and of the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland. In this regard, the court stated: “Continuing the references to the issue of the interest of the Polish administration of justice, which is crucial in the present case, it is impossible not to notice the phenomenon—extremely dangerous for a democratic state governed by the rule of law and unheard of in any civilized legal order—of interference by the highest-ranking representatives of the executive power in the sphere of judicial independence. Facts notoriously known to the Polish, and unfortunately also to the international, public opinion are the facts of drastic violations of the constitutional order by the executive power in Poland. The court in the present case has no jurisdiction to discuss these issues broadly, the assessment of which may be made by the competent bodies in the appropriate proceedings. A phenomenon notoriously known are constant public statements concerning ongoing court proceedings and pronouncing judgments before they have been issued by the court. This is unlawful conduct, because it violates the most fundamental human rights of all accused persons in the form of the presumption of innocence (vide: Article 42(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 5 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) and the right to respect for human dignity (Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland [Article 30. [Principle of inherent dignity]. The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person constitutes the source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. It is inviolable, and its respect and protection is the duty of public authorities. – court note], Article 1 and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [Article 1. Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected. Article 4. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 202 of 7.6.2016, pp. 389–405), a legal act; adopted and signed on 7 December 2000 at the European Council summit in Nice. – court note]). These are behaviors that devastate the image of the Polish administration of justice domestically and—most importantly in the present case—also in the international arena (argumentum ad Article 607b of the Code of Criminal Procedure).”
Referring, in turn, to the third issue—the granting to me of political asylum in the Republic of Hungary and the consequences of this decision for the continued existence of the EAW—the court first raised that “Hungary is a full member of the European Union, and any decisions of the Hungarian State on the granting of political asylum produce full identical legal effects to such decisions issued in any other Member State of the European Union. No legal act nor any ruling of an EU tribunal has deprived Hungary of any attributes or powers arising from the fact of membership in the European Union. Guided by the fundamental principle of legal cooperation between Member States of the European Union, namely the principle of trust in the authorities of other Member States, it must be stated that since the Hungarian State recognized that Marcin Romanowski is persecuted in the Republic of Poland for political reasons, that assessment must be treated as made in good faith and fully respected. It is significant, moreover, that—even according to the sparse information provided to the Court by the National Prosecutor’s Office—the Hungarian State fulfilled all formalities connected with granting Marcin Romanowski refugee status: in particular, it notified the Council of the European Union of this fact; the Council accepted this information, did not question it, and then notified the Polish side and all other Member States of the European Union of this fact. There can therefore be no doubt whatsoever that the decision of the Hungarian authorities is fully consistent with European Union law and international law.”
Further, the court continued its legal reasoning concerning the legal effects of granting me political asylum: “At this point, it is necessary to discuss the following issue: What legal effects does the granting of international protection (political asylum) by one Member State produce in other Member States? There is no doubt in this respect that granting anyone refugee status (political asylum) in one Member State produces far-reaching legal effects in all other Member States. This issue is resolved by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU. It is necessary here, however, to make the observation that neither EU primary law nor EU secondary law, nor even the case-law of the CJEU, has envisaged a situation—until recently impossible to foresee—that in any of the EU Member States there could occur such serious violations of the internal constitutional order, blatant breaches of law, and persecution of the opposition for base motives (in particular such as revenge), and attempts to draw the judiciary into these persecutions, that another Member State would consider it necessary and justified to grant an persecuted citizen of such a Member State refugee status and to provide him with international protection. The question of the legal effects of granting refugee status in one Member State vis-à-vis other Member States was assessed by the CJEU in particular in two cases: C-753/2210 [C-753/22 Judgment of the CJEU of 18 June 2024 – preliminary reference of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht – court note] and C-352/22 [C-352/22 Judgment of the CJEU of 10 July 2024 – preliminary reference of the Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm. – court note]. These are milestones of European case-law in this area. In both cases, the applicants sought recognition of the binding effect of a decision taken by one Member State on proceedings in other Member States. The CJEU in case C-352/22 recognized the binding effect of the granting of refugee status on extradition proceedings conducted in each of the other Member States. The Court held that Article 21 of the Qualification Directive [Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted – court note] must be interpreted in the spirit of Articles 18 and 19(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has such consequences for extradition proceedings that surrendering a refugee to his country of origin is inadmissible. Such surrender would deprive the refugee of the possibility of effectively exercising his rights under Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. That provision excludes the possibility of surrendering a refugee to a state from which he fled and in which there is a risk of criminal prosecution of that person. The Court expressly held that extradition is possible only and exclusively if the Member State (here Hungary) deprives such a person of refugee status. As already noted above, EU legislators did not foresee the situation present in the instant case, where one EU Member State grants refugee status to a citizen of another Member State in which that person is persecuted for political reasons. In such a situation, the above-mentioned CJEU case-law must, per analogiam, also apply to prosecution on the basis of European Arrest Warrants, which in factual states such as the present one may be perceived as a tool of persecution of persons to whom another EU Member State has granted refugee status. As already emphasized above, the European Arrest Warrant cannot be perceived as a tool of repression against persons who, in the assessment of any of the EU Member States, are persecuted in another Member State for political reasons. Also for this reason, the European Arrest Warrant issued against Marcin Romanowski in the present case could not stand (argumentum ad Article 607b of the Code of Criminal Procedure).”
Continuing, the court posed the rhetorical question “whether every opponent of any government in any democratic state governed by the rule of law, even if he were a criminal, ceases to be a human being and is to be deprived of all human rights as well as human dignity? The court in the present case has acquainted itself with the entirety of the investigation files and all collected evidence and—without daring to render any judgment—considers it wholly unjustified to publicly present the image of Marcin Romanowski as a guilty person who, once brought into the country, will be convicted and imprisoned (as publicly stated by one of the highest-ranking representatives of the executive power, oppositionists hiding abroad should be kidnapped by Polish special services and brought to Poland ‘in a trunk’). These contemptible statements, not comporting with elementary standards of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, are widely known also to the international public opinion. They directly enter the sphere of judicial independence also in the present case. These are circumstances annihilating the credibility of the Polish State, including the Polish judiciary (argumentum ad Article 607b of the Code of Criminal Procedure).”
In conclusion, the court used a formulation that has become a commonly used term for the state of the rule of law in Poland: “In light of the circumstances indicated above, there are serious concerns that the situation currently prevailing in the Polish State may be classified as a crypto-dictatorship. Incidentally, it must be added that these violations of human rights and of the constitutional order are taking place amid the complete silence of all organs of the European Union. To sum up: First, no politicians—even and especially those holding the highest positions in the executive power—nor even the court in the present case—are entitled to adjudicate on the guilt of Marcin Romanowski. Second, at the present stage of the criminal proceedings it cannot be excluded that the competent adjudicating panel of the Regional Court in Warsaw will issue any ruling in this matter, including the acquittal of Marcin Romanowski of all allegations brought against him. Marcin Romanowski remains a human being and, at the present moment, from a legal point of view, still an innocent person. In this situation—also for the above reason—the further maintenance in force of the European Arrest Warrant in question against one of the leading representatives of the opposition, in a situation where he has been publicly deemed guilty and ‘convicted’ by the most important representatives of the executive power, would cause the complete loss of credibility of the Polish administration of justice not only domestically but above all on the international plane (argumentum ad Article 607b of the Code of Criminal Procedure). For all these reasons, it was necessary to rule as in the operative part of the present decision.”
The extensive reasoning of the decision, Judge Dariusz Łubowski concluded with the maxim attributed to St. Augustine: “Fiat iustitia pereat mundus!” (Let justice be done, though the world may perish). As it quickly turned out, the thought expressed therein became reality. The response to the administration of justice through that ruling—and to the firm and unequivocal opposition to reprisals—was reprisals directed against the judge himself.
6. Reprisals Against the Judge Following the Issuance of the Decision of 19 December 2025
6.1. A political attack by the Minister of Justice on a judge
Immediately—within two hours of the public release of the substance of the ruling—Judge Dariusz Łubowski was publicly attacked by the Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, in a hastily prepared recording full of insinuations and manipulations, in which he once again, in an inadmissible manner, commented on the ongoing criminal proceedings.
Employing manipulative techniques, the Minister of Justice formulated the accusation that the decision had been taken at a “closed session.” Meanwhile, in criminal proceedings there is no such institution as a “closed session;” the provisions provide for a session without the participation of the parties, and matters concerning the issuance or revocation of a European Arrest Warrant are, as a rule, examined precisely in that mode. The Minister of Justice alleged that the prosecution service had not been notified of the date of the session, whereas the binding regulations do not provide for notifying the prosecution service of the date of a session in EAW matters, because it has no possibility of participating in that mode of examination. The Minister further alleged that the decision had been issued by a single-judge formation, whereas under the provisions the only proper formation in matters concerning the issuance or revocation of a European Arrest Warrant is a single-judge formation; the law provides for no other formations in this regard. The Minister of Justice accused the judge of issuing a ruling “without the files,” in a situation where, when issuing the decision, the judge not only had the files at his disposal, but continues to have them at his disposal.
Publicly questioning the legality of a court’s adjudicatory acts by the Minister of Justice, based on untrue or misleading theses as to the applicable procedures, undoubtedly constitutes conduct that strikes at the standards of the rule of law and judicial independence.
6.2. Manipulations in Connection with a New Application for an EAW
On the instruction of the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, the prosecution service—merely three days (on Monday, 22 December) after the issuance of the final decision (on Friday, 19 December)—on the basis of the same circumstances and evidence, filed a new application for an EAW against me. At the same time, an application was filed which led to the recusal of Judge Łubowski from the case on the basis of criticism of the content of his earlier decision, which is inadmissible. What is surprising is that, in the decision recusing Judge Łubowski, the reporting judge explicitly admitted that the new application had been filed “on the basis of identical (the same) evidentiary material,” thereby confirming that such an application is inadmissible, constituting at least a circumvention of the law.
At the same time, the unlawful authorities of the Regional Court in Warsaw, instead of drawing a new judge by lot, indicated a judge from the on-call list, having earlier—in haste, without issuing the order required by law—replaced judges on the list in such a way that the case was assigned to a judge from the politicized judicial association Iustitia, hostile toward conservatives. Since in 2024 the unlawful court leadership carried out purges, removing many independent judges from criminal divisions, the motion to recuse her was dismissed by another judge from the same association, also engaged before 2023 in the fight against the actions of the then Ministry of Justice. She did so in haste, without providing reasons for the decision—apparently because, on the same day, a motion to recuse her was filed. As a result, the very judge designated in this manner to adjudicate—apparently in the face of further violations of law in the case being revealed by the media practically every day—herself, in a motion to review that decision, questioned the correctness of the manner in which she had been designated to decide the case. Ultimately, however, she granted the prosecution’s motion and, on 17 February 2026, issued a European Arrest Warrant on the basis of the same circumstances and evidence on which, two months earlier, Judge Dariusz Łubowski had set aside the EAW by a final decision. Consequently, this involved both manipulation of the adjudicating panel and a breach of the prohibition of double jeopardy, thereby violating statutory, international, and constitutional procedural guarantees. In particular, the decision issuing the EAW is inconsistent with the requirements of Article 1(3) of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1, as amended). The application of the EAW may not lead to a breach of fundamental rights and of the legal principles enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights.
6.3. Change in the Scope of Judge Łubowski’s Duties
The unlawful court authorities initially changed the scope of Judge Łubowski’s duties, burdening him with time-consuming domestic criminal cases. On 15 January 2026, the judge was served with a new allocation of duties (a new scope of obligations), under which—while leaving him with his existing docket covering matters in the field of international criminal proceedings—he was additionally assigned participation in the allocation of “ordinary” criminal cases in an amount defined as a 75% share in the random assignment of cases from the criminal register. This decision obviously and drastically increased his adjudicatory burden, leading to a situation objectively impossible to execute organizationally and threatening the parties’ right to have their cases heard within a reasonable time. The inflow of cases to the international criminal matters section over the course of several years had more than doubled—from approximately 200 cases per year to more than 500 cases. In 2025 alone, 537 cases were filed with the section, of which Judge Łubowski adjudicated a total of 482 cases, including 328 cases concerning European Arrest Warrants and extradition. The workload, therefore, already in this section alone exceeded the standard caseload of a regional court judge.
6.4. Unlawful Deprivation of the Right to Appeal
Judge Dariusz Łubowski, acting within the statutory time limit, filed an appeal to the National Council of the Judiciary pursuant to Article 22a § 5–6 of the Act – Law on the System of Common Courts,[7] through the president of the court, in accordance with the unequivocal directive of the statute.
Instead of forwarding the appeal to the National Council of the Judiciary within 14 days together with the position of the court president, the appeal was unlawfully returned to the judge, and Judge (retired) Beata Najjar, usurping the position of President of the Regional Court in Warsaw, arbitrarily declared the appeal “inadmissible” and asserted the “finality” of her own decision—without indicating any legal basis whatsoever.
The above actions constitute a gross and obvious violation of Article 22a § 5–6 of the Act – Law on the System of Common Courts, which expressly grants a judge, against whom a change in the allocation of duties resulting in a change in the scope of obligations has been made, a statutory right to lodge an appeal to the National Council of the Judiciary, and imposes on the court president an absolute obligation to transmit that appeal to the National Council of the Judiciary within 14 days together with an opinion. That provision also establishes the rule that until the appeal is examined by the National Council of the Judiciary, the judge performs his existing duties. The withholding of the appeal, the arbitrary recognition of it as “inadmissible,” and the immediate implementation of the new allocation of duties constitute a violation of the above-mentioned Act.
The described actions also violate constitutional standards, in particular Article 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which guarantees everyone the right to challenge decisions issued at first instance where the law provides such a route—which in this case it did. The judge was therefore deprived of the constitutionally guaranteed right to have a decision interfering with his professional situation and the scope of his adjudicatory duties reviewed.
These actions are also inconsistent with Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantees everyone an effective remedy before a national authority in the event of a violation of their rights and freedoms. In the present case, Judge Łubowski was deprived of a real and effective remedy to the constitutional body tasked with safeguarding the independence of the courts, namely the National Council of the Judiciary. That remedy was taken from him not by statute, but by an arbitrary decision of the judicial administration authority, which directly undermines the “effectiveness” standard of a remedy within the meaning of the Convention.
The principle of legality expressed in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland was also violated, according to which public authorities act exclusively on the basis of and within the limits of the law. Finally, the described actions infringe the constitutional principle of judicial independence (Article 178 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), which encompasses not only the prohibition of interference in the content of judgments, but also the prohibition of applying pressure, organizational harassment, and administrative reprisals against a judge because of the content of decisions issued. A drastic change in the allocation of duties combined with depriving the judge of a remedy to the National Council of the Judiciary constitutes an instrument of pressure of an organizational character, which in the realities of the present case should be viewed as a form of retaliation for a specific judicial decision.
The described actions infringe the public interest consisting in the protection of judicial independence and the proper functioning of the administration of justice in matters concerning international legal cooperation, as well as the private interest of the judge, whose professional situation was worsened in a repressive manner. From the context of the entire matter, including the sequence of events occurring directly after Judge Dariusz Łubowski issued the decision revoking the European Arrest Warrant against me, there arises a justified suspicion that a repressive mechanism motivated by retaliation for the content of his ruling was activated against the judge.
Judge Dariusz Łubowski himself indicated before the National Council of the Judiciary that for more than thirty years of adjudication, including many years of issuing thousands of decisions in international matters, he had never encountered any reprisals, harassment, or negative personnel consequences connected with the content of his decisions. He emphasized that only after issuing the decision revoking the EAW against me did his situation “deteriorate drastically,” and that he experienced “situations which never occurred in my more than thirty-year period of adjudication as a judge,” which he perceives as harassment and reprisals.
Undoubtedly, the entire sequence of administrative-repressive actions within the Regional Court in Warsaw occurred directly after the public, mendacious political attack by the Minister of Justice on the judge. The effects included a declared “loss of confidence” by the judge’s superiors, an announcement of actions aimed at removing him from the position he held, a drastic change in the allocation of duties consisting in imposing on him additional adjudicatory obligations on a scale practically impossible to perform, and—particularly importantly—an unlawful blocking of the appellate path to the National Council of the Judiciary by returning the filed appeal and arbitrarily announcing the “finality” of the decision. Finally, he was removed from the position of head of the section, while it should be borne in mind that, under the law, this removal does not produce legal effects as it was performed by an unauthorized person—Beata Najjar, usurping the position of President of the Regional Court in Warsaw. Only force and control over the apparatus of coercion cause these actions of the unlawful court authorities to be implemented in practice.
In the matter of reprisals against Judge Dariusz Łubowski, I filed a notification of suspected offenses consisting in abuse of powers and failure to fulfill duties by public officials at the Regional Court in Warsaw, classifying these actions as an act committed in an organized criminal group (Article 258 of the Criminal Code) and as an official offense under Article 231 § 1 and § 2 of the Criminal Code, indicating the infringement of the public interest and the judge’s rights. The described actions violate constitutional and international standards protecting judicial independence and the right to an effective remedy. Having regard to the nature of the violations committed for the purpose of obtaining personal or financial benefits, the penalty exposure is 10 years’ imprisonment.[8]
6.5. Context of the Unlawful Takeover of the Court’s Leadership
In this context, the actions of the unlawful leadership of the Regional Court in Warsaw may be viewed as part of a broader mechanism of subordinating the judiciary to the current political authority, consisting in exerting organizational and personal pressure on judges who issue rulings undesirable from the perspective of the executive power.
It should be noted that the repressive actions against Judge Łubowski fit into the broader context of the unlawful takeover of the Regional Court in Warsaw[9]—the largest court in Poland. It was carried out through the unlawful removal of the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw, Joanna Przanowska-Tomaszek, and the installation in that position of an unauthorized person—Beata Najjar—and the purges that followed in the authorities and structure of that court—especially in the criminal divisions. These actions were undertaken by the then Minister of Justice, Adam Bodnar, in gross violation of the Act of 27 July 2001 – Law on the System of Common Courts (Journal of Laws of 2024, item 334 – consolidated text, as amended)—in particular Article 27 of that Act—as well as the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 16 October 2024 (K 2/24)—and are tolerated and supported by the current Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek. Analogous lawlessness concerns the majority of courts in Poland. In the matter of the unlawful takeover of the leadership of the Regional Court in Warsaw, I also filed a notification of suspected commission of an official offense and the usurpation of office.[10]
Additionally, the unlawful court president is committing yet another act of lawlessness. Under the provisions of the Act – Law on the System of Common Courts, once a judge reaches the specified age, it must be recognized that she has automatically retired; she therefore remains a judge in retirement (in a state of rest), who cannot hold the office of court president. The statute provides for submitting an application to the National Council of the Judiciary, which may extend a judge’s period of active service. However, Beata Najjar, refusing to recognize the legality of the Council, did not file such an application; instead, without any legal basis, she applied to the Minister of Justice to extend her active-service status, and he—also without any legal basis—purported to grant such consent. It is difficult to find an adequate conceptual framework to describe conduct of this kind, which unquestionably satisfies the elements of the offense under Article 227 of the Criminal Code (usurpation of a public function).
6.6. Unlawful Removal of Judge Łubowski from the Position of Head of the Section
At the same time, in January 2026, the court began searching for volunteers for the international matters section, which ultimately resulted in the removal of Judge Dariusz Łubowski from the section and the appointment in his place of Judge Tomasz Grochowicz. It should be recalled that these actions are vitiated by a defect, because they were undertaken by a person who, de lege lata, is not a judge and not the President of the Regional Court in Warsaw. In a situation where, under internal regulations, EAW cases as a rule go to the head of the section, this produces the effect of an improperly constituted court, i.e., the occurrence of an absolute ground of appeal referred to in Article 439 § 1 point 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is surprising is that Judge Tomasz Grochowski, appointed as a judge back in the communist era, will retire in a few months. Additionally surprising is the fact that he does not know any foreign language (Judge Łubowski was fluent in six) and has never procedurally dealt with matters in the field of international legal cooperation in criminal cases. These circumstances indicate that he was placed in the section for a transitional period, because there was an urgent need to remove Judge Łubowski and to find a person willing to sign decisions in line with the expectations of the executive power.
In addition, the media revealed shocking information concerning the judge himself: he is under an allegation of unintentionally causing a road traffic accident (Article 177 § 1 of the Criminal Code), having lost control of a motorcycle and struck pedestrians on a crosswalk. After the unlawful takeover of the prosecution service, the application for his prosecution was first withdrawn by the prosecution service in August 2024, and then re-filed in December 2025. Commentators point out that such a situation raises significant doubts as to whether pressure is being exerted on the judge in this manner.
7. Summary
During the conservative governments, Poland significantly strengthened the protection of its own citizens, in particular children from mixed marriages, in which situations occurred involving disputes and the flight of a spouse of Polish nationality to Poland with a child, and cross-border disputes on that background. In order to efficiently handle cases concerning so-called parental abductions under the Hague Convention in the best interests of the child, a central authority was established at the Ministry of Justice to provide support in cross-border maintenance and family matters, as well as a specialized division within the structure of the common courts, also oriented toward the use of mediation with the support of specialists such as a psychologist or educator.
The den Hertog family case and the Lisov family case alone show that, in that period, Poland also became a place of refuge for families persecuted by left-liberal authorities of EU Member States. Until 2023, the Polish prosecution service in surrender and extradition matters presented a position taking into account the welfare of the child and the family, rather than the expectations of the authorities of the states requesting surrender, as had been the case earlier and as is the case now under left-liberal rule. And Judge Dariusz Łubowski, who for many years was a judge in the International Matters Section of the Regional Court in Warsaw, repeatedly issued decisions which to this day provoke the fury of left-liberal circles in Europe. In turn, the decision in the Zhuravlov case struck at the protection of one of the most important infrastructure projects, concerning an issue fundamental to Germany—access to cheap supplies of Russian gas. A kind of sealing culmination was the decision revoking the EAW in my case. Treated as perhaps the “largest scandal of the PiS governments,” in reality it rests on absurd allegations constituting classic lawfare in the form of the unauthorized criminalization of actions falling within the realm of administrative discretion and political decisions. The real aim is the destruction of conservative politicians pursuing a consistent policy defending sovereignty, opposing woke ideas, defending the family (including those directly responsible for the fact that Poland could be a refuge for persecuted families), opposing immigration, and opposing a “zero-emissions” policy. It was also a blow against social organizations to which the then leadership of the Ministry of Justice entrusted public tasks, breaking with the principle of supporting only left-liberal projects.
[1] https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/743385-sad-odmowil-wydania-wolodymyra-zurawlowa-niemcom (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[2] https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7977/artykul/2586494,malzenstwo-ktore-zabralo-cierpiacego-na-autyzm-syna-i-ucieklo-z-holandii-do-polski-bezpieczne (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[3] https://euractiv.pl/section/praca-i-polityka-spoleczna/news/warszawski-sad-okregowy-nakaz-aresztowania-holandia/ (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[4] https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/748735-nie-tylko-romanowski-wazne-decyzje-sedziego-lubowskiego (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[5] https://www.iwp.edu/articles/2025/05/28/weaponizing-justice-the-unlawful-takeover-of-polands-prosecution-service-by-the-left-liberal-government-of-donald-tusk/ (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[6] https://oczyscicpolske.pl/zawiadomienia/zawiadomienie-marcina-romanowskiego-z-24-stycznia-2026-roku-w-sprawie-uzasadnionego-podejrzenia-popelnienia-przestepstwa-ukrywania-przez-uzurpatorow-z-prokuratury-dokumentow-interpolu-i-dotyczacych-az/.
[7] https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20010981070/U/D20011070Lj.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[8] https://oczyscicpolske.pl/zawiadomienia/zawiadomienie-marcina-romanowskiego-z-4-lutego-2026-roku-w-sprawie-uzasadnionego-podejrzenia-popelnienia-przestepstwa-urzedniczego-w-celu-represji-wobec-sedziego-dariusza-lubowskiego-przez-grupe-przes/ (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[9] https://www.iwp.edu/articles/2025/11/06/national-sovereignty-vs-liberal-juristocracy/ (accessed on 12 February 2025).
[10] https://oczyscicpolske.pl/zawiadomienia/zawiadomienie-marcina-romanowskiego-z-19-stycznia-2026-roku-w-sprawie-uzasadnionego-podejrzenia-popelnienia-przestepstwa-przejecia-sadu-okregowego-w-warszawie-przez-zorganizowana-grupe-przestepcza-kie/ (accessed on 12 February 2025).